Stephenson v. Bon Secours Mercy Health et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
SHARISSE STEPHENSON, 	§
§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
V. 	§ 	No. 3:26-cv-799-B-BN
§
BON SECOURS MERCY HEALTH, 	§
ET AL., 	§
§
Defendants. 	§
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER TRANSFERRING CASE
Plaintiff Sharisse Stephenson filed a pro se complaint that includes allegations
that Defendants violated provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”),
a federal statute. See Dkt. Nos. 3 & 4.
And Senior United States District Judge Jane J. Boyle referred this lawsuit to
the undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28
U.S.C. § 636(b). See Dkt. No. 8.
Insofar as this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this lawsuit based on
Stephenson’s ADA allegations, as to claims under the ADA, the Court entered an
order on March 31, 2026 requiring Stephenson to show by April 22, 2026 why the
Court should not transfer this lawsuit based on an improper or more convenient
venue. See Dkt. No. 10.
Granting Stephenson’s motion, the Court extended her deadline to respond to
May 20, 2026. See Dkt. Nos. 11 & 15.
The same day the Court granted the motion for extension, Defendants Bon
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Secours Mercy Health and Bon Secours Medical Group Hampton Roads Specialty
Care LLC moved to dismiss this case for improper venue under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(3) or, alternatively, to transfer this case to a proper venue (the
Norfolk Division of the Eastern District of Virginia). See Dkt. No. 13.
And Stephenson has filed a response to Defendants’ motion indicating that she
does not oppose Defendants’ alternative request to transfer this lawsuit to the Norfolk
Division of the Eastern District of Virginia. See Dkt. No. 14.
For the reasons explained below, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion to
the extent that it will order that this case be immediately transferred to the Norfolk
Division of the Eastern District of Virginia.
Discussion
On a Rule 12(b)(3) motion, once a defendant raises the issue of improper venue,
the plaintiff has the burden to prove that the chosen venue is proper. See Int’l Truck
& Engine Corp. v. Quintana, 259 F. Supp. 2d 553, 558 (N.D. Tex. 2003).
And “[w]here venue is improper, the district court should generally dismiss the
case.” Seville v. Maersk Line, Ltd., 53 F.4th 890, 894 (5th Cir. 2022).
“But the court retains discretion to transfer it to a proper venue if such a
transfer would serve ‘the interest of justice.’” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a)
(providing that “[t]he district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue
in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice,
transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought”));
see also Caldwell v. Palmetto State Sav. Bank of S.C., 811 F.2d 916, 919 (5th Cir.
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1987) (“The district court has broad discretion in deciding whether to order a
transfer.”).
And a magistrate judge may properly order that a case be transferred to
another federal district or another division of the same court as a nondispositive
matter under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). Cf. Franco v. Mabe Trucking Co., 3 F.4th 788
(5th Cir. 2021) (affirming order by magistrate judge, on pretrial management
reference, transferring case under 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (but labeled by judge as 28 U.S.C.
§ 1406(a)) to another district for want of personal jurisdiction).
Venue as to an ADA claim is governed by Title VII’s special venue provisions,
which “displace[] the general rules for venue.” Dabney v. A&R Logistics, Inc., Civ. A.
No. 14-788-BAJ-RLB, 2015 WL 4210988, at *2 (M.D. La. July 10, 2015) (citing 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3); In re Horseshoe Entm’t, 337 F.3d 429, 432-33 (5th Cir. 2003));
see also Pinson v. Rumsfeld, 192 F. App’x 811, 817 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (“The
venue provisions of § 2000e-5(f)(3) were intended to be the exclusive venue provisions
for Title VII employment discrimination actions and ... the more general provisions
of [28 U.S.C.] § 1391 are not controlling in such cases.” (cited in Allen v. U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., 514 F. App’x 421, 422 n.3 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam))); Beavers v.
Express Jet Holdings, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 2d 994, 996 (E.D. Tex. 2005) (“The [ADA]
incorporates by reference the special venue provisions that Congress enacted for Title
VII employment discrimination actions.” (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12117)).
Section 2000e-5(f)(3) provides that
[e]ach United States district court and each United States court of a
place 	subject 	to 	the 	jurisdiction 	of 	the 	United 	States 	shall 	have
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jurisdiction of actions brought under this subchapter. Such an action
may be brought in any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful
employment practice is alleged to have been committed, in the judicial
district in which the employment records relevant to such practice are
maintained and administered, or in the judicial district in which the
aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful
employment practice, but if the respondent is not found within any such
district, such an action may be brought within the judicial district in
which the respondent has his principal office. For purposes of sections
1404 and 1406 of Title 28, the judicial district in which the respondent
has his principal office shall in all cases be considered a district in which
the action might have been brought.
Id.
So, under Section 2000e-5(f)(3), “venue is not limited to the judicial district in
which the unlawful employment practices occurred if the state is a multi-district
state; but venue is appropriate in any district in the state in which the unlawful
employment practices occurred.” Adams v. Cal-Ark Int’l, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 2d 402,
409 (E.D. Tex. 2001) (cleaned up).
And, had Stephenson plausibly alleged that unlawful employment practices
occurred elsewhere in Texas, a transfer of venue from this district would not be
appropriate under Section 1406(a) but still could be available under 28 U.S.C. §
1404(a). Cf. In re Google, L.L.C., ___ F.4th ____, No. 25-40788, 2026 WL 934924, at
*2 (5th Cir. Apr. 7, 2026) (observing in the context of mandamus that “Section 1404(a)
allows district courts to transfer certain cases for the convenience of parties and
witnesses and in the interest of justice” if “[t]he moving party … show[s] … [that t]he
new venue [is] clearly more convenient than the alternative,” a “standard [that]
reflects the fact that courts ordinarily defer to the plaintiff’s choice of venue” (cleaned
up)).
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But Stephenson has not shown that venue is appropriate in Texas where, for
example, she alleges that she now resides in Dallas but that the defendant “is a
healthcare entity operating specialty clinics in Virginia,” Dkt. No. 3 at 3-4, and where
Stephenson 	attaches 	exhibits 	to 	the 	complaint 	indicating 	that 	the 	defendant
employed her in Suffolk, Virginia, that she resided in Virginia when the defendant
denied her request for a workplace accommodation, and that she filed the applicable
EEOC charge in Norfolk, Virginia, see Dkt. No. 4; see also Dkt. No. 13 (noting the
same connections to the Norfolk Division of the Eastern District of Virginia).
And, so, this case should be transferred under Section 1406(a) to the Norfolk
Division 	of 	the 	Eastern 	District 	of 	Virginia. 	See 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	127(a);
https://www.vaed.uscourts.gov/eastern-district-virginia-jurisdiction (setting out the
geographic parameters of the divisions of that district, including that the Norfolk
Division includes the cities of Norfolk and Suffolk) (last visited Apr. 8, 2026).
Conclusion
The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion [Dkt. No. 13] to the extent that it
ORDERS that this case be IMMEDIATELY TRANSFERRED to the Norfolk Division
of the Eastern District of Virginia under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), as both sides consent to
this transfer. Cf. N.D. TEX. L. CIV. R. 62.2 (requiring a 21-day stay of all orders
transferring a case to a district court outside the Fifth Circuit unless all affected
parties consent).
SO ORDERED.
_________________________________________
Dated: April 8, 2026 	DAVID L. HORAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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