Wilkerson v. Director, TDCJ-CID

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
SENRICK SHERN WILKERSON, §
§
Petitioner, §
§
V. § No. 3:26-cv-671-X-BN
§
DIRECTOR, TDCJ-CID, §
§
Respondent. §
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Petitioner Senrick Shern Wilkerson filed a set of documents that have been
construed as a pro se application for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254
attacking his 2010 Dallas County convictions for sexual performance by a child and
sexual assault of a child. See Dkt. No. 2. United States District Judge Brantley Starr
referred Wilkerson’s habeas petition to the undersigned United States magistrate
judge for pretrial management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of
reference.
And the undersigned enters these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
recommendation that, under the circumstances here and for the reasons and to the
extent set out below, the Court should dismiss the federal habeas challenge under
Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (Habeas Rule 4).
Legal Standards and Analysis
Habeas Rule 4 allows a district court to summarily dismiss a habeas
application “if it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits
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annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” see also
Kiser v. Johnson, 163 F.3d 326, 328 (5th Cir. 1999) (“This rule differentiates habeas
cases from other civil cases with respect to sua sponte consideration of affirmative
defenses. The district court has the power under [Habeas] Rule 4 to examine and
dismiss frivolous habeas petitions prior to any answer or other pleading by the state.
This power is rooted in ‘the duty of the court to screen out frivolous applications and
eliminate the burden that would be placed on the respondent by ordering an
unnecessary answer.’” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 4 Advisory Committee Notes)).
Habeas Rule 4 authorizes the Court to consider whether Wilkerson is “in
custody” under the convictions that he now challenges. If not, the Court lacks
jurisdiction to consider his collateral challenge to those convictions. See, e.g., Claybon
v. Texas, No. 3:16-cv-2479-K-BN, 2016 WL 5793767, at *2-3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2016),
rec. accepted, 2016 WL 5717532 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2016) (citing Brown v.
Wenerowicz, Civ. A. No. 13-430, 2013 WL 2404152 (W.D. Pa. May 31, 2013); Yuen v.
Lee, No. 3:09CV-P919-S, 2010 WL 299277 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 19, 2010)).
Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3) and 2254(a), “[a] habeas petitioner may seek
relief from a state court judgment only if he is ‘“in custody” under the conviction or
sentence under attack at the time his petition is filed.’” Rubio v. Davis, 907 F.3d 860,
862 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490-91 (1989)).
This jurisdictional requirement “can be satisfied by certain non-criminal
judgments, including civil commitment orders.” Id. (citing Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S.
167, 176 (2001); Francois v. Henderson, 850 F.2d 231, 232 (5th Cir. 1988)).
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And a petitioner need not be physically confined to be “in custody” for the
purpose of habeas relief. See Sinclair v. Blackburn, 599 F.2d 673, 676 (5th Cir. 1979)
(“‘[I]n custody’ does not necessarily mean ‘in custody for the offense being attacked.’
Instead, jurisdiction exists if there is a positive, demonstrable relationship between
the prior conviction and the petitioner’s present incarceration.”); accord Carter v.
Procunier, 755 F.2d 1126, 1129 (5th Cir. 1985) (“It is well settled that a habeas corpus
petitioner meets the statutory ‘in custody’ requirements when, at the time he files the
petition: (1) he is in custody pursuant to the conviction he attacks or (2) he is in
custody pursuant to another conviction that is positively and demonstrably related to
the conviction he attacks.” (citations omitted)). But see Carter, 722 F.2d at 1129 (“The
court’s jurisdiction does not continue, and a petitioner does not meet the statutory ‘in
custody’ requirement, however, when he (1) files the petition while in custody
pursuant to a conviction that is positively and demonstrably related to the conviction
he attacks, and (2) later is discharged from custody on that related offense before the
petition is finally adjudicated.” (citing Escobedo v. Estelle, 655 F.2d 613 (5th Cir. Unit
A Sept. 1981))).
Even so, “once the sentence imposed for a conviction has completely expired,
the collateral consequences of that conviction are not themselves sufficient to render
an individual ‘in custody’ for the purposes of a habeas attack upon it.” Maleng, 490
U.S. at 492; see also Hendrix v. Lynaugh, 888 F.2d 336, 337-38 (5th Cir. 1989)
(adverse consequences of expired sentence, including possibility that conviction may
be used to impeach future testimony and enhance future punishment, held
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insufficient to satisfy the “in custody” requirement).
Wilkerson has been released from custody, and even though the requirement
to register as a sex offender may be a collateral consequence of his convictions, the
requirement does not render Wilkerson in custody for purposes of a Section 2254
habeas challenge. See Lempar v. Lumpkin, No. 20-50664, 2021 WL 5409266, at *1-2
(5th Cir. June 8, 2021); Johnson v. Davis, 697 F. App’x 274, 275 (5th Cir. 2017);
Sullivan v. Stephens, 582 F. App’x 375 (5th Cir. 2014).
So, Wilkerson does not meet the in custody requirement to pursue federal
habeas relief as to his Dallas County convictions.
Recommendation
Under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, the Court should
dismiss Petitioner Senrick Shern Wilkerson’s habeas application.
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on
all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these
findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections
within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV.
P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or
recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and
specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation
where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by
reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure
to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the
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factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or
adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v.
United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
DATED: March 16, 2026
_________________________________________
DAVID L. HORAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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