Ratcliff v. Old American County Mutual Insurance Company et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
ELIJAH W. RATCLIFF, 	§
§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
V. 	§ 	No. 3:26-cv-620-S-BN
§
OLD AMERICAN COUNTY MUTUAL 	§
INSURANCE COMPANY and 	§
MARQUEZ INES TOLENTINO, 	§
§
Defendants. 	§
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This case was referred to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for
pretrial management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference from
United States District Judge Karen Gren Scholer. See Dkt. No. 1.
Plaintiff Elijah W. Ratcliff filed this pro se lawsuit against Defendants Old
American County Mutual Insurance Company and Marquez Ines Tolentino. See Dkt.
No. 2.
Ratcliff has filed numerous civil cases in this circuit. And at least the Eastern
District of Texas has explicitly noted his vexatious litigation practices and sanctioned
him accordingly. See Ratcliff v. State of Tex., No. 9:15-cv-106, 2017 WL 907992, at *2
(E.D. Tex. Mar. 7, 2017).
The Eastern District of Texas has previously noted that “Ratcliff has a history
of filing pleadings that are frivolous and filing pleadings in federal court with no basis
for federal jurisdiction.” Ratcliff v. Unauthorized Prac. of Law Comm., No. 9:13-cv-
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70, 2013 WL 4029045, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2013) (collecting cases filed by Ratcliff).
Ratcliff now brings these claims against Defendants under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1983
& 1985 and the First Amendment based on a motor vehicle collision. See Dkt. No. 2.
The 	undersigned 	enters 	these 	findings 	of 	fact, 	conclusions 	of 	law, 	and
recommendation that the Court should dismiss this lawsuit without prejudice based
on the sanctions imposed by the Eastern District of Texas and for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction.
Legal Standards
I. 	Sanctions
“[T]he judicial system is generally accessible and open to all individuals.”
Kaminetzky v. Frost Nat’l Bank of Hous., 881 F. Supp. 276, 277 (S.D. Tex. 1995). But
“district courts have an obligation to protect the orderly administration of justice and
prevent abuse of the court’s process by frivolous and vexatious litigants[, which
means p]ro se litigants have ‘no license to harass others, clog the judicial machinery
with meritless litigation, and abuse already overloaded court dockets.’” Ruston v.
Dall. Cnty., Tex., No. 3:07-cv-1076-D, 2008 WL 958076, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 9, 2008)
(quoting Farguson v. MBank Hous., N.A., 808 F.2d 358, 359 (5th Cir. 1986)).
Accordingly, “[t]he proper administration of justice requires that courts [honor
sanctions orders imposed by other courts as] to prisoner and nonprisoner litigants
alike.” Sheehan v. State of Tex., No. 3:05-cv-1318-K, 2005 WL 2036686, at *1 (N.D.
Tex.
In general, the court retains the inherent authority to curb abusive
litigation. Federal courts in Texas will honor sanctions imposed by other
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federal district courts in Texas against a prisoner litigant. See MISC.
O RD. 48 (N.D. Tex.); Balawajder v. Scott, 160 F.3d 1066, 1067 (5th Cir.
1999) (affirming dismissal of action based on enforcing other district’s
sanction order); Schmidt v. Van Buren, 243 F. App’x 803 (5th Cir. June
13, 2007) (unpublished per curiam) (noting district court’s enforcement
of sister court’s sanction orders).
“In cases involving litigious, non-prisoner pro se plaintiffs, the
distinction between prisoner and non-prisoner litigants is one without a
difference for Misc. Ord. 48 purposes.” Sparkman v. Charles Schwab &
Co., Inc., et al., No. 3:07-cv-1457-B (N.D. Tex. Feb. 29, 2008) (enforcing
multiple sanctions and orders of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Texas against non-prisoner pro se litigant).
Id. (enforcing the sanction order of the Western District of Texas pursuant to Misc.
Ord. 48 against a non-prisoner pro se plaintiff, dismissing action with prejudice, and
barring plaintiff “from filing any future civil actions in any court in the Northern
District of Texas without first seeking leave of court”); accord Sheehan v. State of Tex.,
No. 3:05-cv-1318-K, 2005 WL 2036686, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 2005) (“The proper
administration of justice requires that courts [honor sanctions orders imposed by
other federal courts as] to prisoner and nonprisoner litigants alike.” (citations
omitted)).
II. 	Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
The federal courts’ jurisdiction is limited, and federal courts generally may
only hear a case of this nature if it involves a question of federal law or where
diversity of citizenship exists between the parties. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. So,
“[a]s a general rule, absent diversity jurisdiction, a case will not be removable if the
complaint does not affirmatively allege a federal claim.” Beneficial Nat’l Bank v.
Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 6 (2003).
Due to the limited nature of the federal courts’ jurisdiction, “[t]he burden of
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establishing subject matter jurisdiction in federal court rests on the party seeking to
invoke it.” St. Paul Reinsurance Co., Ltd. v. Greenberg, 134 F.3d 1250, 1253 (5th Cir.
1998) (footnote omitted).
Federal question jurisdiction exists in all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
To determine whether federal question jurisdiction exists, courts apply the
“well-pleaded complaint” rule. The well-pleaded complaint rule “provides that federal
jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the
plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392
(1987); Elam v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 635 F.3d 796, 803 (5th Cir. 2011).
“Most directly, and most often, federal jurisdiction attaches when federal law
creates the cause of action asserted.” Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v.
Manning, 578 U.S. 374, 383 (2016). And, so, if the Court finds a federally created
cause of action on the face of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint, the Court may
exercise federal question jurisdiction over the claim.
“The applicable test for determining jurisdiction on the face of the pleadings is
not whether the plaintiffs could actually recover, but whether the federal claim
alleged is so patently without merit as to justify the district court’s dismissal for want
of jurisdiction.” Suthoff v. Yazoo Cnty. Indus. Dev. Corp., 637 F.2d 337, 340 (5th Cir.
Unit A Feb. 1981) (citing Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S.
59 (1978)). Put another way, “[s]ome claims are ‘so insubstantial, implausible, ... or
otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy.’” Atakapa
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Indian de Creole Nation v. Louisiana, 943 F.3d 1004, 1007 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting
Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Oneida Cnty., 414 U.S. 661, 666 (1974)). And “a
complaint that alleges the existence of a frivolous or insubstantial federal question is
not sufficient to establish jurisdiction in a federal court.” Raymon v. Alvord Indep.
Sch. Dist., 639 F.2d 257, 257 (5th Cir. Unit A Mar. 1981) (citing Olivares v. Martin,
555 F.2d 1192, 1195 (5th Cir. 1977); Hagans v. Levine, 415 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1974));
accord Southpark Square Ltd. v. City of Jackson, Miss., 565 F.2d 338, 342 (5th Cir.
1977) (a claim “must be more than frivolous to support federal question jurisdiction”).
In sum, a complaint that simply points to a federal law does not provide for
subject-matter jurisdiction under Section 1331 where the complaint lacks factual
allegations showing how the federal law applies to a plaintiff’s claim. See Mitchell v.
Clinkscales, 253 F. App’x 339, 340 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (“[A]lthough Mitchell
argues that Clinkscales is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Mitchell does not allege facts
demonstrating that Clinkscales acted under color of state law; thus, Mitchell failed
to plead and establish subject-matter jurisdiction based on the existence of a federal
question. [And t]he district court was required to dismiss the complaint.” (citation
omitted)); Harrington v. City of Shiner, Tex., No. 6:20-cv-00039, 2021 WL 4503013, at
*5 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2021) (“Harrington failed, not in stating conclusory or vague
facts to support his Section 1983 claim, but in showing that the Section 1983 claim
was not frivolous, insubstantial, or patently without merit given the facts that he did
allege. Thus, the district court concluded that the claim did not raise a federal
question given the lack of a foundation for the Section 1983 claim – that is, an alleged
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constitutional rights violation – as well as the lack of any factual allegations that
could even imply the applicability of the statute.” (discussing prior dismissal by the
court; citations omitted)).
As to diversity jurisdiction, subject-matter jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332 only when there is complete diversity of citizenship between the parties and
the matter in controversy exceeds $75,000. See Vantage Drilling Co. v. Hsin-Chi Su,
741 F.3d 535, 537 (5th Cir. 2014). “Complete diversity requires that all persons on
one side of the controversy be citizens of different states than all persons on the other
side.” Harvey v. Grey Wolf Drilling Co., 542 F.3d 1077, 1079 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing 28
U.S.C. § 1332); accord Soaring Wind Energy, L.L.C. v. Catic USA Inc., 946 F.3d 742
(5th Cir. 2020).
The party invoking jurisdiction under Section 1332 is responsible for showing
that the parties are completely diverse. See Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 612
F.2d 507, 511 (5th Cir. 1980); see also Getty Oil Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 841 F.2d
1254, 1259 (5th Cir. 1988) (“The burden of proving that complete diversity exists rests
upon the party who seeks to invoke the court’s diversity jurisdiction.”).
Analysis
I. 	The Court should dismiss this lawsuit without prejudice for
Ratcliff’s failure to comply with previous sanction orders.
Ratcliff is a sanctioned litigant in the Eastern District of Texas and is “enjoined
from filing any further action, complaint, or motion in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Texas without first paying the sanction ordered, and
the previous sanctions ordered by [the court], and obtaining leave” from the court.
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Ratcliff v. State of Tex., 2017 WL 907992, at *2. And Ratcliff has not attempted to
obtain leave to file this lawsuit.
And, 	so, 	the 	Court 	should 	dismiss 	this 	lawsuit 	without 	prejudice. 	See
Balawajder, 160 F.3d at 1067-68 (affirming dismissal without prejudice based on
recognition of sanctions imposed by other federal courts in Texas).
And the Court should warn Ratcliff that, if he persists in filing frivolous
lawsuits, filing lawsuits without leave, or otherwise violating prior sanctions orders,
the Court may impose monetary sanctions or bar him from bringing any further
actions in the Northern District of Texas. See F ED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2) and (c)(1).
II. 	The Court should dismiss this lawsuit without prejudice for lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Even if Ratcliff had obtained leave of court, the Court would not have
jurisdiction over his claims.
Ratcliff’s complaint alleges that his claims arise out of two federal statutes –
28 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 – and the First Amendment. See Dkt. No. 2 at 2.
Section 1983 “entitles an injured person to money damages if a state official
violates his or her constitutional rights.” Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 130 (2017).
“Section 1985(1) prohibits conspiracies ‘to prevent, by force, intimidation, or
threat’ a federal officer from discharging his duties or to injure him because of his
lawful discharge of his duties,” and “Section 1985(2) prohibits conspiracies to deny
any citizen equal protection of the laws or to injure a citizen for his efforts to ensure
the rights of others to equal protection,” Bryant v. Military Dep’t of Miss., 597 F.3d
678, 687 (5th Cir. 2010) (citations and footnote omitted), while “Section 1985(3)
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prohibits 	private 	conspiracies 	to 	deprive 	persons 	of 	equal 	protection 	of 	the
laws,” Daigle v. Gulf State Utils. Co., 794 F.2d 974, 978 (5th Cir. 1986) (footnote
omitted).
Ratcliff has alleged no facts supporting these federal causes of action or a First
Amendment violation. He does not allege that any party is a government official or
entity; that any of his constitutional rights – including those under the First
Amendment or Equal Protection Clause – were infringed; or that any party engaged
in a conspiracy.
Rather, his factual allegations surround a vehicle collision between himself
and Defendant Tolentino that subjected him to physical injuries. See Dkt. No. 2. And
he fails to show how the sources of federal law cited in his complaint apply to these
alleged events.
And, so, the undersigned finds that Ratcliff’s alleged federal claims, on the face
of his complaint, are “so patently without merit as to justify the district court’s
dismissal for want of jurisdiction.” Suthoff, 637 F.2d at 340.
Nor can Ratcliff rely on diversity jurisdiction, as he has not alleged the
citizenship of any party. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332; see also SXSW, L.L.C. v. Fed. Ins. Co.,
83 F.4th 405, 407 (5th Cir. 2023) (“Because federal courts have limited jurisdiction,
parties must make clear, distinct, and precise affirmative jurisdictional allegations
in their pleadings.”).
And, so, the Court should dismiss this lawsuit for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction.
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Recommendation
The 	Court 	should 	dismiss 	Plaintiff 	Elijah 	W. 	Ratcliff’s 	lawsuit 	without
prejudice for failure to comply with the terms of a prior sanctions order entered by
another 	judge 	in 	this 	circuit 	and 	for 	lack 	of 	subject-matter 	jurisdiction. 	The
undersigned further recommends that Ratcliff be warned that sanctions may be
imposed if he persists in filing frivolous lawsuits or filing lawsuits without leave.
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on
all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these
findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections
within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); F ED. R. CIV.
P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or
recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and
specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation
where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by
reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure
to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the
factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or
adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v.
United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
DATED: February 27, 2026
_________________________________________
DAVID L. HORAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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