Sao v. Mayorkas et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
RA SAO, §
Petitioner, §
§
v. § No. 3:26-CV-261-E-BW
§
ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, et al., §
Respondents. §
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is the Emergency Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order and Stay of Removal, filed on February 2, 2026. (Doc. 3.) Based
on the relevant filings and applicable law, the habeas petition is SUMMARILY DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
I. BACKGROUND
Petitioner Ra Sao, a citizen and national of Cambodia who is subject to a final order of
removal from the United States, filed this habeas action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in
connection with an anticipated future detention by United States Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”) and removal from the United States. (See id. at 1-4.) Sao states that, at a
scheduled appointment with ICE on January 31, 2026 in Dallas, Texas, ICE gave him a notice
informing him of its intent to re-detain him no earlier than 14 days from the date of the notice in
order to execute his final order of removal and remove him to Cambodia. (See id. at 3, 7, 28.)
The same day, he was scheduled to return for a future ICE appointment in Dallas on February
17, 2026. (See id. at 3, 9, 28.) ICE also provided a notice for Sao to appear before an
immigration judge in San Antonio, Texas on February 18, 2026. (See id. at 3, 11-14, 28.) Based
on these notices, Sao “fears that ICE intends to detain him in Dallas on February 17 and transfer
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him immediately to San Antonio to limit access to federal courts and counsel.” (Id. at 3.) Sao
also has a pending state habeas application challenging the validity of a discharged state felony
conviction. (See id. at 2, 25, 28.)
In his § 2241 petition, Sao asserts three grounds for relief, each of which relates to his
pursuit of state and federal post-conviction habeas relief on his discharged state felony
conviction: (1) “Denial of Access to Courts/Interference with Pending Habeas”; (2) “Substantive
Due Process/Excessive Delay”; and (3) “Challenge to Underlying Conviction.” (Id. at 3.)
II. SUMMARY DISMISSAL
Under Rule 4 of the of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States
District Courts, which also covers § 2241 habeas petitions, “[i]f it plainly appears from the
petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court,
the judge must dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner.” After
considering the substance of Sao’s grounds for relief to determine whether the claims are
properly brought pursuant to § 2241, the Court concludes that they are not.
A petitioner is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus under § 2241 only to remedy his
restraint of liberty in violation of the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States. See
Jones v. Cain, 600 F.3d 527, 541 (5th Cir. 2010); Pierre v. United States, 525 F.2d 933, 935-36
(5th Cir. 1976) (holding that the “sole function” of habeas “is to grant relief from unlawful
imprisonment or custody and it cannot be used properly for any other purpose.”). Habeas
proceedings are properly used to challenge the fact or duration of confinement, whereas
constitutional challenges to “rules, customs, and procedures affecting conditions of confinement”
are properly raised in a civil rights action. Schipke v. Van Buren, 239 F. App’x 85, 85-86 (5th
Cir. 2007). Where an alleged unconstitutional condition of confinement or procedure may affect
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the timing of a petitioner’s release from confinement, the Fifth Circuit has developed a “simple,
bright-line rule” for determining the proper vehicle for the claim: “If a favorable determination .
. . would not automatically entitle [the petitioner] to accelerated release, . . . the proper vehicle is
a [civil rights] suit.” Carson v. Johnson, 112 F.3d 818, 820-21 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Orellana
v. Kyle, 65 F.3d 29, 31 (5th Cir. 1995)).
Here, even liberally construing Sao’s grounds for relief, his allegations do not present a
cognizable basis for relief under § 2241. In his petition, Sao’s asserted grounds for relief are
premised on anticipated constitutional violations relating to his ability to pursue and obtain state
and federal collateral review of a discharged state felony conviction should ICE detain, transfer,
and ultimately remove him from the United States in the near future. (See Doc. 3 at 1-4.)
Assuming arguendo that his claims are ripe in the first instance, they do not challenge the fact or
duration of any current confinement, and a favorable determination on them would not
automatically entitle him to immediate or accelerated release from custody.1 See, e.g., Awwad v.
Willis, No. EP-17-CV-213-DCG, 2017 WL 3433544, at *6 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 8, 2017) (“[A]n
access-to-the-courts claim does not challenge the fact or duration of a prisoner’s confinement.”
(citing cases)); Lineberry v. United States, 380 F. App’x 452, 453 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that
the proper remedy for a due process violation based on a condition of confinement or procedure
is “the discontinuance of a practice or to require the correction of an unconstitutional condition,”
not accelerated release). Accordingly, because Sao does not assert any grounds for relief that are
cognizable in a habeas action, the Court summarily dismisses his § 2241 petition.
1 To the extent it appears Sao is attempting to challenge his final order of removal by alleging that it “is
based on a conviction challenged in pending state habeas proceedings, raising serious constitutional concerns[,]”
he cannot do so in this Court through a § 2241 petition. (Doc. 3 at 3 (emphasis in original)); see Gul v. Rozos, 163 F.
App’x 317, 318-19 (5th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he Real ID Act [] stripped the district courts of jurisdiction over 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 petitions attacking removal orders.”).
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III. CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, the Emergency Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Stay of Removal, filed on February 2, 2026 (Doc.
3), is summarily DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. See Rule 4 of the Rules Governing
Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts.
In light of this dismissal, the Court also DENIES AS MOOT Sao’s request to proceed in
forma pauperis (Doc. 4).
SO ORDERED this 5th day of February, 2026.
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