Solomon v. HomeLoanServ, Inc. et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
MARTHA WILLETTA SOLOMON, 	§
§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
V. 	§ 	No. 3:25-cv-3507-E-BN
§
RASHAWD SOLOMON, ET AL., 	§
§
Defendants. 	§
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
After pro se Plaintiff Martha Willetta Solomon filed an amended petition [Dkt.
No. 1-6] and motion to strike [Dkt. No. 1-7] in state court, Defendant HomeLoanServ
Inc. (“HLS”) removed this lawsuit under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441, and 1446. See Dkt.
No. 3.
United States District Judge Ada Brown referred the removed action to the
undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28
U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference.
After reviewing the notice of removal and the attached state court record, the
undersigned questioned whether there is subject-matter jurisdiction under Section
1331 and entered a memorandum opinion and order to set out those concerns and to
allow HLS an opportunity to respond (and, if it did so, to allow Solomon an
opportunity to reply). See Solomon v. Solomon, No. 3:25-cv-3507-E-BN, 2025 WL
3724554 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 24, 2025) [Dkt. No. 4]; cf. St. Paul Reinsurance Co. v.
Greenberg, 134 F.3d 1250, 1253 (5th Cir. 1998) (“The burden of establishing subject
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matter jurisdiction in federal court rests on the party seeking to invoke it.” (cleaned
up)).
HLS responded. See Dkt. No. 17. And, in addition to a barrage of other post-
removal filings, see Dkt. Nos. 5, 6, & 8-17, Solomon filed a reply, see Dkt. No. 18.
For the following reasons, the Court should remand this lawsuit to the state
court from which it was removed because there was not federal subject-matter
jurisdiction at the time of removal.
Discussion
A defendant may remove an action filed in state court to federal court if the
action is one that could have originally been filed in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. §
1441(a).
But the federal courts’ jurisdiction is limited, so they generally may only hear
a case of this nature if it involves a question of federal law or where diversity of
citizenship exists between the parties. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 & 1332.
Applicable to HLS’s removal, subject-matter jurisdiction under Section 1331
typically “exists when ‘a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law
creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on
resolution of a substantial question of federal law.’” Borden v. Allstate Ins. Co., 589
F.3d 168, 172 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation
Tr., 463 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1983)).
And that well-pleaded federal question must appear on the face of the
complaint at the time of removal. See Turner v. GoAuto Ins. Co., 33 F.4th 214, 215
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(5th Cir. 2022) (per curiam) (“When a case is removed from state court to federal court
and the plaintiff seeks to have the case remanded, we evaluate the complaint at the
time of removal.” (citing Bonin v. Sabine River Auth. of La., 961 F.3d 381, 385 (5th
Cir. 2020))).
Section 1331, as an “independent basis of subject matter jurisdiction,” then
allows for supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 for purely state law
claims. Atkins v. Propst, No. 22-10609, 2023 WL 2658852, at *2 (5th Cir. Mar. 28,
2023) (per curiam) (citing Arena v. Graybar Elec. Co., Inc., 669 F.3d 214 (5th Cir.
2012)).
In the notice of removal, HLS alleges that, since filing this lawsuit on
November 19, 2025, see Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 1, Solomon
has filed numerous other filings, including but not limited to a Verified
Amended 	Petition 	to 	Quiet 	Title, 	Declaratory 	Relief, 	Temporary
Restraining Order, and Equitable Tender (“Amended Petition”) on
December 15, 2025, and a Motion to Strike Foreclosure and All Related
Instruments and its Supplemental Affidavit in Support of Plaintiff’s
Motion to Strike and Notice of Jurisdictional Challenge (the “Motion to
Strike”). In the Amended Petition, Plaintiff again asserts fraud-based
claims and seeks injunctive relief and to quiet title in her name. In the
Motion to Strike, Plaintiff clarifies that her request for injunctive relief
is based on alleged violations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures
Act (“RESPA”), the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), and the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) by HLS, and others. See Motion to
Strike at 8 (“These failures constitute administrative defaults and
create federal questions 12 U.S.C. § 503, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, 12 U.S.C. §
2605(f), and Public Law 101-73 (FIRREA).”); 10 (“Plaintiff has shown
probable right to recovery under RESPA, TILA, FIRREA, and common
law fraud.”). Indeed, Plaintiff admits that HLS’s purported violations of
these statutes “create federal questions.” Id. at 8.
Id., ¶ 2 (cleaned up); see also generally Dkt. No. 1-6 (amend pet.) & Dkt. No. 1-7
(motion to strike).
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So, according to HLS, removal is proper “because the Amended Petition and
Motion to Strike constitute ‘other paper’ under [28] U.S.C. § 1446(b) from which
Defendant first ascertained that the case is one which has become removable.” Dkt.
No. 1, ¶ 6.
And an examination of the amended petition [Dkt. No. 1-6] and the motion to
strike [Dkt. No. 1-7] confirms that, consistent with its notice of removal, HLS
ascertained that this lawsuit was removable through language that appears only in
the motion to strike.
And, so, whether subject-matter jurisdiction existed at time of removal turns
on the intersection of other-paper removals and the well-pleaded complaint rule.
“Under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3), where the original complaint is not initially
removable, a defendant may later remove the case to federal court after receipt of ‘an
amended 	pleading, 	motion, 	order 	or 	other 	paper 	from 	which 	it 	may 	first 	be
ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable.’” Nieto v. Lantana
Cmty. Ass’n, Inc., No. 4:19-CV-00239, 2019 WL 3502794, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 1,
2019).
Generally, when courts look to “other paper” to ascertain removability,
courts are clarifying that diversity jurisdiction has been established. In
these diversity cases, a plaintiff will typically bring a state-law claim
against a diverse party in state court but will not allege an amount in
controversy in the complaint. Then, some “other paper” will enable the
defendant to ascertain the amount in controversy, establishing federal
diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. In these cases, the other
paper provides new information – not contained in the complaint – that
enables the defendant to ascertain that the case is one which is or has
become removable under § 1446(b)(3). When the defendant receives this
other paper, the 30-day removal clock begins.
Id. (cleaned up).
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But HLS did not remove this case based on diversity, so, whether subject-
matter jurisdiction existed at the time of removal turns on the existence of a well-
pleaded complaint that establishes some substantial, disputed question of federal
law.
And, “for removal based on ‘other paper’ to be proper and consistent with the
well-pleaded complaint rule, the ‘other paper’ cannot be used to interject a new
federal claim, but instead must be used to clarify that the plaintiff’s existing claims
are federal in nature.” Strikes for Kids v. Nat’l Football League, No. 3:17-cv-18-B,
2017 WL 2265534, at *3 (N.D. Tex. May 24, 2017) (citing Eggert v. Britton, 223 F.
App’x 394, 397-98 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam)); accord Nieto, 2019 WL 3502794, at
*5 (“Due to the well-pleaded complaint rule, the § 1446(b)(3) analysis is different
when courts look to ‘other paper’ to clarify whether federal question jurisdiction has
been established. [Because] the well-pleaded complaint rule provides that federal
jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the
plaintiff’s 	properly 	pleaded 	complaint. 	Therefore, 	other 	paper 	providing 	new
information – not contained in the complaint – cannot enable a defendant to ascertain
that the case is one which is or has become removable for the purposes of establishing
federal question jurisdiction under § 1331, because the new information is not found
on the face of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint.” (cleaned up)).
In Eggert, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
opened 	its 	discussion 	of 	this 	issue 	by 	observing 	that 	only 	“[u]nder 	limited
circumstances” have courts “looked to ‘other paper’ to establish federal question
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jurisdiction, such as to clarify that a plaintiff’s state law claim is one that would be
preempted by federal law.” 223 F. App’x at 397 (citing Peters v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 285
F.3d 456, 468-69 (6th Cir. 2002)); see also Leday v. CarMax Bus. Servs., LLC, No.:
4:24-CV-1804, 2024 WL 3626511, at *3 (S.D. Tex. July 1, 2024) (“Unlike removal in
diversity cases based on ‘other paper,’ removal asserting federal question jurisdiction
based on ‘other paper,’ most often occurs when the ‘other paper’ establishes that
plaintiff’s state law claim is preempted by federal law.” (citation omitted)), rec.
adopted, 2024 WL 3628047 (S.D. Tex. July 31, 2024).
And – if “other paper” Section 1331 removals exist outside the pre-emption
context – a plaintiff’s “other paper” citing a federal statute or a federal regulation
cannot –without more – clarify that a federal question exists at the time of removal:
In Eggert, the Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiff’s cursory
reference to federal law in an interrogatory response was not sufficient
for removal based on federal question jurisdiction because the plaintiff’s
state court petition unambiguously alleged only state law claims. Eggert
held that, where the putative federal-law claim does “not appear in the
pleadings,” and where the references to federal law in the “other paper”
do not “clarify any possible federal nature of the claims made in the
pleadings,” removal on the basis of statements in “other paper” is
“inconsistent with the well-pleaded complaint rule and the intent of §
1446(b).” In other words, federal courts may rely on the “other paper”
doctrine to ascertain federal question jurisdiction “only to clarify the
ambiguous nature of an existing claim.” There is not “a single case where
a federal court has used the ‘order or other paper’ rule to inject a federal
question into a complaint that alleges strictly state law based claims.”
Ngo v. PM/CTS, LLC, No. 4:15-CV-1644, 2015 WL 5458598, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Sept.
15, 2015) (citations omitted) (concluding there that, “[b]ecause a district court may
base federal question jurisdiction on ‘other paper’ only if a complaint is ambiguous as
to whether the plaintiff’s claims arise under state or federal law, it is clear that
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Plaintiff’s references to Title VII in the discovery filings do not create federal question
jurisdiction”).
This aspect of Eggert is also consistent with the requirement that subject-
matter jurisdiction under Section 1331 must be based on a claim that is more than
frivolous or insubstantial. See, e.g., Leday, 2024 WL 3626511, at *4 (discussing
Eggert, Ngo, and Trotter v. Steadman Motors, Inc., 47 F. Supp. 2d 791, 793 (S.D. Miss.
1999) (“discussed with approval in Eggert”), in connection with the requirement that
the 	“other 	paper” 	must 	support 	a 	federal 	claim 	that 	is 	“cognizable” 	and 	not
“nonsensical”); see also Biegon v. City of Dall., No. 3:21-cv-2006-C-BN, 2021 WL
4897660, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2021) (“In sum, Biegon has not shown that the
allegations in a well-pleaded complaint established that federal jurisdiction existed
at the time of removal, which requires that the Court sua sponte remand his case to
state court.”), rec. accepted, 2021 WL 4894267 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 20, 2021); cf. Copeland
v. E*Trade Cap. Mgmt., L.L.C., No. 24-10658, 2025 WL 66732, at *2 (5th Cir. Jan.
10, 2025) (per curiam) (“[W]hen a federal claim appears on the face of the complaint,
dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is only proper in the case of a frivolous
or insubstantial claim, i.e., a claim which has no plausible foundation or which is
clearly foreclosed by a prior [United States] Supreme Court decision.” (cleaned up;
quoting Young v. Hosemann, 598 F.3d 184, 188 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Bell v. Health-
Mor, Inc., 549 F.2d 342, 344 (5th Cir. 1977)))).
In its brief responding to the Court’s memorandum opinion and order, HLS
concedes that
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[i]t is undisputed that Plaintiff’s Amended Petition does not, on its face,
assert claims under federal law. Indeed, Plaintiff’s Amended Petition
asserts no claims – state or federal – against Defendant at all. It is not
until the Motion to Strike was filed that Plaintiff clarified that her
claims 	against 	Defendant 	are 	based 	upon 	purported 	violations 	of
RESPA, TILA, and FDCPA – all federal laws that expressly grant this
Court jurisdiction to hear such claims.
Dkt. No. 17 at 14.
First, if HLS contends that no claims were pleaded, it’s then difficult to
understand how the motion to strike, as the “other paper,” can clarify non-existent
claims in a state court petition as opposed to impermissibly interjecting those claims.
In any event, examining the motion to strike filed in state court that counts as
the “other paper” that HLS argues justifies removal based on a federal question [Dkt.
No. 1-7 at 8], the undersigned cannot find that it clarifies that Solomon’s well-pleaded
claims at the time of removal arise under federal law.
Instead, and at most, this “other paper” interjects references to provisions of
federal law. That is, HLS has not shown, as the party invoking the Court’s subject-
matter jurisdiction, that Solomon’s references to federal laws qualify as more than
nonsensical.
But again, most importantly, HLS has not explained how these references
clarify 	the 	then-pleaded 	allegations, 	much 	less 	shown 	– 	as 	may 	be 	required,
considering Eggert – that the referenced federal laws pre-empt the pleaded state-law
claims.
And, so, this lawsuit should be sua sponte remanded to state court for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“If at any time before final
judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case
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shall be remanded.”); accord Int’l Primate Prot. League v. Adm’rs of Tulane Educ.
Fund, 500 U.S. 72, 89 (1991).
Recommendation
The Court, on its own motion, should remand this lawsuit to the state court
from which it was removed because there was not federal subject-matter jurisdiction
at the time of removal.
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on
all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these
findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections
within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED . R. CIV.
P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or
recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and
specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation
where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by
reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure
to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the
factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or
adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v.
United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
DATED: January 9, 2026
_________________________________________
DAVID L. HORAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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