Solomon v. HomeLoanServ, Inc. et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
MARTHA WILLETTA SOLOMON, 	§
§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
V. 	§ 	No. 3:25-cv-3507-E-BN
§
RASHAWD SOLOMON, ET AL., 	§
§
Defendants. 	§
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER CONCERNING
SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION
After pro se Plaintiff Martha Willetta Solomon filed an amended petition [Dkt.
No. 1-6] and motion to strike [Dkt. No. 1-7] in state court, Defendant HomeLoanServ
Inc. (“HLS”) removed this lawsuit under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441, and 1446. See Dkt.
No. 3.
United States District Judge Ada Brown referred the removed action to the
undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28
U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference.
After reviewing the notice of removal and the attached state court record, the
undersigned questions whether there is subject-matter jurisdiction under Section
1331 and enters this memorandum opinion and order to set out those concerns and
to allow HLS an opportunity to respond (and, if it does so, to allow Solomon an
opportunity to reply).
A defendant may remove an action filed in state court to federal court if the
action is one that could have originally been filed in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. §
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1441(a).
But the federal courts’ jurisdiction is limited, so they generally may only hear
a case of this nature if it involves a question of federal law or where diversity of
citizenship exists between the parties. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 & 1332.
Applicable to HLS’s removal, subject-matter jurisdiction under Section 1331
typically “exists when ‘a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law
creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on
resolution of a substantial question of federal law.’” Borden v. Allstate Ins. Co., 589
F.3d 168, 172 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation
Tr., 463 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1983)); see also In re Hot-Hed Inc., 477 F.3d 320, 323 (5th Cir.
2007) (“A federal question exists ‘if there appears on the face of the complaint some
substantial, disputed question of federal law.’” (quoting Carpenter v. Wichita Falls
Indep. Sch. Dist., 44 F.3d 362, 366 (5th Cir. 1995))).
Under Section 1331, “when a federal claim appears on the face of the
complaint, dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is only proper in the case
of a frivolous or insubstantial claim, i.e., a claim which has no plausible foundation
or which is clearly foreclosed by a prior [United States] Supreme Court decision.”
Copeland v. E*Trade Cap. Mgmt., L.L.C., No. 24-10658, 2025 WL 66732, at *2 (5th
Cir. Jan. 10, 2025) (per curiam) (cleaned up; quoting Young v. Hosemann, 598 F.3d
184, 188 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Bell v. Health-Mor, Inc., 549 F.2d 342, 344 (5th Cir.
1977))).
Section 1331, as an “independent basis of subject matter jurisdiction,” then
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allows for supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 for purely state law
claims. Atkins v. Propst, No. 22-10609, 2023 WL 2658852, at *2 (5th Cir. Mar. 28,
2023) (per curiam) (citing Arena v. Graybar Elec. Co., Inc., 669 F.3d 214 (5th Cir.
2012)).
HLS alleges that, since filing this lawsuit on November 19, 2025, see Dkt. No.
1, ¶ 1, Solomon
has filed numerous other filings, including but not limited to a Verified
Amended 	Petition 	to 	Quiet 	Title, 	Declaratory 	Relief, 	Temporary
Restraining Order, and Equitable Tender (“Amended Petition”) on
December 15, 2025, and a Motion to Strike Foreclosure and All Related
Instruments and its Supplemental Affidavit in Support of Plaintiff’s
Motion to Strike and Notice of Jurisdictional Challenge (the “Motion to
Strike”). In the Amended Petition, Plaintiff again asserts fraud-based
claims and seeks injunctive relief and to quiet title in her name. In the
Motion to Strike, Plaintiff clarifies that her request for injunctive relief
is based on alleged violations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures
Act (“RESPA”), the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), and the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) by HLS, and others. See Motion to
Strike at 8 (“These failures constitute administrative defaults and
create federal questions 12 U.S.C. § 503, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, 12 U.S.C. §
2605(f), and Public Law 101-73 (FIRREA).”); 10 (“Plaintiff has shown
probable right to recovery under RESPA, TILA, FIRREA, and common
law fraud.”). Indeed, Plaintiff admits that HLS’s purported violations of
these statutes “create federal questions.” Id. at 8.
Id., ¶ 2 (cleaned up); see also generally Dkt. No. 1-6 (amend pet.) & Dkt. No. 1-7
(motion to strike).
So, according to HLS, removal is proper “because the Amended Petition and
Motion to Strike constitute ‘other paper’ under [28] U.S.C. § 1446(b) from which
Defendant first ascertained that the case is one which has become removable.” Dkt.
No. 1, ¶ 6.
“Under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3), where the original complaint is not initially
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removable, a defendant may later remove the case to federal court after receipt of ‘an
amended 	pleading, 	motion, 	order 	or 	other 	paper 	from 	which 	it 	may 	first 	be
ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable.’” Nieto v. Lantana
Cmty. Ass’n, Inc., No. 4:19-CV-00239, 2019 WL 3502794, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 1,
2019).
Generally, when courts look to “other paper” to ascertain removability,
courts are clarifying that diversity jurisdiction has been established. In
these diversity cases, a plaintiff will typically bring a state-law claim
against a diverse party in state court but will not allege an amount in
controversy in the complaint. Then, some “other paper” will enable the
defendant to ascertain the amount in controversy, establishing federal
diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. In these cases, the other
paper provides new information – not contained in the complaint – that
enables the defendant to ascertain that the case is one which is or has
become removable under § 1446(b)(3). When the defendant receives this
other paper, the 30-day removal clock begins.
Id. (cleaned up).
But HLS did not remove this case based on diversity.
Instead, the propriety of its removal turns on the existence of a well-pleaded
complaint that establishes some substantial, disputed question of federal law.
And, “for removal based on ‘other paper’ to be proper and consistent with the
well-pleaded complaint rule, the ‘other paper’ cannot be used to interject a new
federal claim, but instead must be used to clarify that the plaintiff’s existing claims
are federal in nature.” Strikes for Kids v. Nat’l Football League, No. 3:17-cv-18-B,
2017 WL 2265534, at *3 (N.D. Tex. May 24, 2017) (citing Eggert v. Britton, 223 F.
App’x 394, 397-98 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam)); accord Nieto, 2019 WL 3502794, at
*5 (“Due to the well-pleaded complaint rule, the § 1446(b)(3) analysis is different
when courts look to ‘other paper’ to clarify whether federal question jurisdiction has
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been established. [Because] the well-pleaded complaint rule provides that federal
jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the
plaintiff’s 	properly 	pleaded 	complaint. 	Therefore, 	other 	paper 	providing 	new
information – not contained in the complaint – cannot enable a defendant to ascertain
that the case is one which is or has become removable for the purposes of establishing
federal question jurisdiction under § 1331, because the new information is not found
on the face of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint.” (cleaned up)).
The undersigned’s examination of the amended petition [Dkt. No. 1-6] and the
motion to strike [Dkt. No. 1-7] confirms that, consistent with its notice of removal,
HLS ascertained that this lawsuit was removable through language that appears
only in the motion to strike.
And, so, because that language is not found on the face of a well-pleaded
complaint, this case was not removable under Sections 1331, 1441, and 1446.
HLS may argue that, as a pro se plaintiff, Solomon’s filings should be liberally
construed, which is true enough. But that rule of liberal construction should not be
weaponized against pro se plaintiffs to deprive them of their venue of choice –
especially here, where the record reflects that Solomon filed the amended petition on
December 15 and separately filed the motion to strike the next day. Compare Dkt.
No. 1-6 at 2, with Dkt. No. 1-7 at 2.
Based on this analysis, then, this lawsuit should be sua sponte remanded to
state court for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction: “If at any time before final judgment
it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be
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remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); accord Int’l Primate Prot. League v. Adm’rs of Tulane
Educ. Fund, 500 U.S. 72, 89 (1991).
But the Court will allow HLS, as the party invoking federal subject-matter
jurisdiction through removal, an opportunity to respond to this order before the
undersigned makes a recommendation to Judge Brown. Cf. St. Paul Reinsurance Co.
v. Greenberg, 134 F.3d 1250, 1253 (5th Cir. 1998) (“The burden of establishing subject
matter jurisdiction in federal court rests on the party seeking to invoke it.” (cleaned
up)).
HLS must file its written response to show why this case should not be
remanded for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction by January 7, 2026.
And, if HLS files a response, Solomon may file a reply by January 14, 2026.
Relatedly, federal district courts routinely allow pro se litigants an opportunity
to amend their pleadings after removal. See Plamquist v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc.,
103 F.4th 294, 303 (5th Cir. 2024) (“[A] plaintiff should not be penalized for adhering
to the pleading standards of the jurisdiction in which the case was originally brought.
Otherwise, where there are potentially diverse parties, plaintiffs would essentially
have to plead the federal pleading standard in state court for fear of having their
claims against non-diverse parties thrown out upon reaching federal courts for failing
to comply with the demands of [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 12(b)(6).” (citing
Peña v. City of Rio Grande City, 879 F.3d 613, 617 (5th Cir. 2018) (“Removal from a
notice-pleading jurisdiction is a natural time at which justice would call for the court
to permit such an amendment.” (citing Faulkner v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., 706 F.3d
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1017, 1021 (9th Cir. 2013))))).
And, earlier this year, the United States Supreme Court reinforced the adage
that a plaintiff is the master of her complaint by explicitly holding that a plaintiff
may amend her complaint after removal to eliminate the federal cause of action on
which the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction is based and trigger a probable remand
to state court. See Royal Canin U. S. A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 43-44 (2025)
(“The earliest version of that suit contained federal-law claims and therefore was
properly removed to federal court. The additional state-law claims were sufficiently
related to the federal ones to come within that court’s supplemental jurisdiction. But
when Wullschleger amended her complaint, the jurisdictional analysis also changed.
Her deletion of all federal claims deprived the District Court of federal-question
jurisdiction. And once that was gone, the court’s supplemental jurisdiction over the
state claims dissolved too. Wullschleger had reconfigured her suit to make it only
about state law. And so the suit became one for a state court.”); see, e.g., Joel v.
Howard Univ., Civ. A. No. 24-1655 (LLA), 2025 WL 358769, at *2 (D.D.C. Jan. 31,
2025) (“Here, Ms. Joel has abandoned her claims arising under federal law, which
were the basis for Howard University’s removal to this court…. Accordingly, the court
must remand this case to the Superior Court.”).
SO ORDERED.
DATED: December 24, 2025
_________________________________________
DAVID L. HORAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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