Bynum v. Federal Express Corporation

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
TERE’LYNN D. BYNUM, 	§
§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
V. 	§ 	No. 3:25-cv-3023-N-BN
§
FEDERAL EXPRESS
CORPORATION,
§
§
§
Defendant. 	§
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This case was referred to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for
pretrial management under 8 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference from
Senior United States District Judge David Godbey. See Dkt. No. 3.
Plaintiff Tere’Lynn Bynum filed a second amended pro se petition in state court
on October 27, 2025, alleging negligence, conversion, and fraud claims against
Defendant Federal Express Corporation (“FedEx”). See Dkt. No. 1-2 at 31-36.
FedEx removed the action to federal court on November 5, 2025, see Dkt. No.
1, and filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) on November 6, 2025, see Dkt. No. 6.
Bynum responded through a Combined Opposition and Motion for Remand
with 	Sanctions, 	Default 	Enforcement, 	and 	Rebuttal 	to 	Defendant’s 	Dismissal
Authorities. See Dkt. No. 16.
She filed several other responses to the motion to dismiss without leave, see
Dkt. Nos. 19, 21, 22, 28, & 32, which the undersigned said it would disregard, see Dkt.
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No. 33.
Bynum then filed an amended Motion to Remand, for Sanctions, for District
Attorney Referral, and for Immediate Payment Order. See Dkt. No. 25.
The pending motions are now fully briefed. See Dkt. Nos. 16, 20, 30, & 34-37.
The 	undersigned 	enters 	these 	findings 	of 	fact, 	conclusions 	of 	law, 	and
recommendation that the Court should deny Bynum’s motions [Dkt. No. 16 & 25],
grant FedEx’s Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. No. 6], and dismiss this lawsuit without
prejudice.
Legal Standards
I. 	Motion to Remand
A defendant may remove an action filed in state court to federal court if the
action is one that could have originally been filed in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. §
1441(a).
Because FedEx chose to remove this lawsuit to federal court, it undertook the
burden to establish federal jurisdiction. See St. Paul Reinsurance Co. v. Greenberg,
134 F.3d 1250, 1253 (5th Cir. 1998) (“The burden of establishing subject matter
jurisdiction in federal court rests on the party seeking to invoke it.” (cleaned up)).
And the federal courts’ jurisdiction is limited, so they generally may only hear
a case of this nature if it involves a question of federal law or where diversity of
citizenship exists between the parties. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 & 1332.
Subject-matter jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 only when there is
complete diversity of citizenship between the parties and the amount in controversy
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exceeds $75,000. See Vantage Drilling Co. v. Hsin-Chi Su, 741 F.3d 535, 537 (5th Cir.
2014). “Complete diversity requires that all persons on one side of the controversy be
citizens of different states than all persons on the other side.” Harvey v. Grey Wolf
Drilling Co., 542 F.3d 1077, 1079 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332).
The party invoking jurisdiction under Section 1332 is responsible for showing
that the parties are completely diverse. See Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 612
F.2d 507, 511 (5th Cir. 1980); see also Getty Oil Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 841 F.2d
1254, 1259 (5th Cir. 1988) (“The burden of proving that complete diversity exists rests
upon the party who seeks to invoke the court’s diversity jurisdiction.”).
And, “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
II. 	Motion to Dismiss
Considering a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court “accepts all well-pleaded
facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” In re Katrina
Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205-06 (5th Cir. 2007).
Even so, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), and must
plead those facts with enough specificity “to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level,” id. at 555.
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); cf. Bryant v. Ditech
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Fin., L.L.C., No. 23-10416, 2024 WL 890122, at *3 (5th Cir. Mar. 1, 2024) (“[J]ust as
plaintiffs cannot state a claim using speculation, defendants cannot defeat plausible
inferences using speculation.”).
“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks
for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678.
So, “[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a
defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
entitlement to relief.” Id. (cleaned up; quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557); see, e.g.,
Parker v. Landry, 935 F.3d 9, 17 (1st Cir. 2019) (Where “a complaint reveals random
puffs of smoke but nothing resembling real signs of fire, the plausibility standard is
not satisfied.”).
And, while Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) does not mandate detailed
factual allegations, it does require that a plaintiff allege more than labels and
conclusions, and, so, while a court must accept a plaintiff’s factual allegations as true,
it is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Consequently, a threadbare or formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of 	action, 	supported 	by 	mere 	conclusory 	statements, 	will 	not 	suffice. 	See 	id.;
Armstrong v. Ashley, 60 F.4th 262, 269 (5th Cir. 2023) (“[T]he court does not ‘presume
true a number of categories of statements, including legal conclusions; mere labels;
threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action; conclusory statements; and
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naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.’” (quoting Harmon v. City of
Arlington, Tex., 16 F.4th 1159, 1162-63 (5th Cir. 2021))).
And, so, “to survive a motion to dismiss” under Twombly and Iqbal, plaintiffs
must “plead facts sufficient to show” that the claims asserted have “substantive
plausibility” by stating “simply, concisely, and directly events” that they contend
entitle them to relief. Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 12 (2014) (per
curiam) (citing F ED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)-(3), (d)(1), (e)).
“Pro se complaints receive a ‘liberal construction.’ Even so, ‘mere conclusory
allegations on a critical issue are insufficient.’” Brown v. Tarrant Cnty., Tex., 985 F.3d
489, 494 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Carlucci v. Chapa, 884 F.3d 534, 538 (5th Cir. 2018),
then United States v. Woods, 870 F.2d 285, 288 n.3 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam)). And
“liberal construction does not require that the Court ... create causes of action where
there are none.” Smith v. CVS Caremark Corp., No. 3:12-cv-2465-B, 2013 WL
2291886, at *8 (N.D. Tex. May 23, 2013).
“To demand otherwise would require the ‘courts to explore exhaustively all
potential claims of a pro se plaintiff” and would “‘transform the district court from its
legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest
arguments and most successful strategies for a party.’” Jones v. Mangrum, No. 3:16-
cv-3137, 2017 WL 712755, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 23, 2017) (quoting Beaudett v. City
of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985)).
That said, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 requires that leave to amend be
granted freely “when justice so requires.” F ED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2). And, because this
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rule provides a “strong presumption in favor of granting leave to amend,” Fin.
Acquisition Partners, LP v. Blackwell, 440 F.3d 278, 291 (5th Cir. 2006), the Court
must do so “unless there is a substantial reason to deny leave to amend,” Dussouy v.
Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 598 (5th Cir. Nov. 1981).
One such reason is futility: “If the complaint, as amended, would be subject to
dismissal, then amendment is futile and the district court [is] within its discretion to
deny leave to amend.” Martinez v. Nueces Cnty., Tex., 71 F.4th 385, 391 (5th Cir.
2023) (quoting Ariyan, Inc. v. Sewage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 29 F.4th 226, 229
(5th Cir. 2022)).
Analysis
I. 	The Court should deny Bynum’s motions because FedEx properly
removed this lawsuit on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.
Bynum has filed two motions for remand and sanctions, both of which are
predominantly based on improper removal. See Dkt. Nos. 16 & 25.
Bynum contends that she “asserts only state-law claims, and no federal
question exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.” Dkt. No. 25 at 2. The undersigned agrees.
Bynum’s second amended petition pleads no federal causes of action or facts that give
rise to a federal question. See Dkt. No. 1-2 at 31-36. It pleads only claims for
negligence (along with negligent hiring, training, and supervision), fraud, and
conversion. See id.
Bynum further argues that “FedEx has not met its burden to establish
diversity jurisdiction or amount in controversy under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.” Dkt. No. 25
at 2. And, so, Bynum contends, “[r]emoval was improper under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, and
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remand is required under 28 U.S.C. § 1447.” Id.
The undersigned disagrees.
In its notice of removal, FedEx alleges that Bynum “is a citizen of Texas who
is domiciled and resides in Dallas County, Texas.” Dkt. No. 1 at 2. And it alleges that
“FedEx is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Tennessee.”
Id.
With these allegations, the undersigned finds that FedEx has sufficiently
pleaded that Bynum is a citizen of Texas and FedEx is a citizen of Delaware and
Tennessee and, so, has met its burden at the pleading stage to show that complete
diversity exists. See SXSW v. Fed. Ins. Co., 83 F.4th 405, 407 (5th Cir. 2023) (“For
natural persons, 	§ 	1332 	citizenship 	is 	determined by domicile, 	which 	requires
residency plus an intent to make the place of residency one’s permanent home.”); 28
U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (For diversity jurisdiction purposes, “a corporation shall be
deemed to be a citizen of every State and foreign state by which it has been
incorporated and of the State or foreign state where it has its principal place of
business.”); see also Megalomedia Inc. v. Phila. Indem. Ins. Co., 115 F.4th 657, 659
(5th Cir. 2024) (“At the pleading stage, the party invoking the federal court's
jurisdiction must allege the citizenship of each” party.).
And FedEx points to Bynum’s second amended petition, in which she “seeks
damages of 1,040,000.00.” Dkt. No. 1 at 2 (citing Dkt. No. 1-2 at 34). And, so, FedEx
has established that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000 when the case was
removed.
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Because FedEx adequately pleaded that complete diversity jurisdiction exists
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, its removal was proper. And, so, Bynum’s motions for remand
and sanctions [Dkt. No. 16 & 25], to the extent they are predicated on FedEx’s
allegedly improper removal, are without merit.
As to Bynum’s other purported grounds for sanctions, the undersigned declines
to recommend sanctions against FedEx for producing “contradictory evidence.” Dkt.
No. 25 at 4. A motion for sanctions is not the appropriate vehicle for challenging the
sufficiency of evidence. And the record does not reflect any abuse of process, violation
of rules or orders, or falsification of evidence by FedEx.
Nor is the undersigned persuaded that FedEx has “misstated governing law,”
as Bynum provides no examples of legal misrepresentations by FedEx. Id. And
Bynum has not pointed to any acts or omissions by FedEx that warrant a referral for
criminal proceedings. See id.
And, so, the Court should deny Bynum’s motions [Dkt. No. 16 & 25].
II. 	The Court should grant FedEx’s motion to dismiss because Bynum’s
claims are preempted by federal law.
FedEx moves to dismiss Bynum’s claims on the basis that her allegations are
conclusory and that each of her claims is “preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act
of 1978,” as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 41713 (the “ADA”). Dkt. No. 6 at 2.
There are three general categories of preemption: (1) express preemption,
where “Congress define[s] explicitly the extent to which its enactments preempt state
law”; (2) field preemption, where Congress’s regulatory scheme is “so pervasive as to
make 	reasonable 	the 	inference 	that 	Congress 	left 	no 	room 	for 	the 	States 	to
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supplement it” or where an Act of Congress “touches a field in which the federal
interest 	is 	so dominant 	that the federal 	system 	will be assumed to 	preclude
enforcement of state laws on the same subject”; and (3) conflict preemption, where
state and federal law directly conflict, making it “impossible for a private party to
comply with both state and federal requirements” or where state law “stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.” English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990) (citations omitted).
To show express preemption, Congress must “explicitly state its intent to
preempt relevant state laws.” United States v. Zadeh, 820 F.3d 756, 751 (5th Cir.
2016).
The ADA is an example of a federal statute that explicitly provides for
preempting state law. The ADA provides that,
“[e]xcept as provided in this subsection, a State … may not enact or
enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect
of law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier that may
provide air transportation under this subpart.”
49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1).
“The Supreme Court reads broadly the ‘related to’ language of this section and,
in turn, the preemptive effect of the ADA.” In re Am. Airlines, Inc., Privacy Litig., 370
F. Supp. 2d 552, 561 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (citing Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992) (“The ordinary meaning of [relating to] is a broad one … and
the words thus express a broad pre-emptive purpose.”)).
Here, Bynum’s claims arise entirely out of a “king-size velvet platform bed”
that she ordered in March 2025 and was “shipped via FedEx Ground” but “was never
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delivered” to her. Dkt. No. 1-2 at 31-32. Neither Bynum’s second amended petition
nor 	her 	prior 	pleadings, 	which 	she 	incorporated 	by 	reference, 	include 	factual
allegations about any series of events other than the loss of her package. See Dkt. No.
1-2 at 2-13, 23-27, 31-35.
And “it is undisputed that [FedEx] is an air carrier for purposes of the ADA”
and this lawsuit, irrespective of how Bynum’s package was transported. N. Cypress
Med. Ctr. Operating Co. Ltd. v. Fedex Corp., 892 F. Supp. 2d 861, 866-67 (“Although
aimed at the airline industry, the ADA and the preemption provision also apply to all
carriers that are affiliated with a direct air carrier … whether or not such property
has had or will have a prior or subsequent air movement. … [Here], although there
is no contention that the boxes were ever carried by air, the ADA is still applicable
because the property was transported by a company certified as an air carrier.”
(cleaned up)).
“Generally, all state tort actions against an air carrier for lost or damaged
goods are preempted by the ADA.” N. Cypress, 892 F. Supp. 2d at 867 (cleaned up;
citing Gemnet Exp. Inc. v. Fed Express Corp., No. 06 Civ. 2648(DF), 2009 WL 928299,
at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2009) (“[S]tate court claims, including those sounding in
negligence or fraud, are preempted by federal law, when such claims are based on
lost or damaged cargo.”)); cf. Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 228-33 (1995)
(holding that breach of contract claims are not preempted by the ADA).
And, so, the undersigned finds that Bynum’s claims of negligence, negligent
hiring, negligent training, negligent supervision, conversion, and fraud – all of which
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arise out of her missing package – are preempted by the ADA. See Cathedral of Hope
v. FedEx Corporate Servs., Inc., No. 3:07-cv-1555-D, 2008 WL 2242546, at *1, *4 (N.D.
Tex. May 30, 2008) (holding that negligence and gross negligence claims against
FedEx relating to a “mis-delivered package” were preempted by the ADA and
dismissing those claims with prejudice).
The undersigned also finds that Bynum’s claims under the Texas Deceptive
Trade Practices Act (the “DTPA”) are preempted by the ADA. See Trujillo v. Am.
Airlines, Inc., 938 F. Supp. 392, 393 (N.D. Tex. 1995) (holding that DTPA claims
against air carrier “for the loss of a commercial package” were preempted by the ADA
and dismissing those claims with prejudice).
Because her claims are preempted by federal law, and because Bynum has
amended her petition twice already, any further leave to amend would be futile.
And, so, the Court should dismiss Bynum’s claims with prejudice.
Recommendation
For the reasons explained above, the Court should deny Plaintiff Tere’Lynn
Bynum’s first Motion for Remand with Sanctions [Dkt. No. 16] and Amended Motion
to Remand, for Sanctions, for District Attorney Referral, and for Immediate Payment
Order [Dkt. No. 25]; grant Defendant Federal Express Corporation’s Motion to
Dismiss [Dkt. No. 6]; and dismiss this lawsuit with prejudice.
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on
all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these
findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections
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within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); F ED. R. CIV.
P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or
recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and
specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation
where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by
reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure
to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the
factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or
adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v.
United Services Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
DATED: March 5, 2026
_________________________________________
DAVID L. HORAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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