James v. Eastern District of Texas

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
AUDIE JAMES, §
PLAINTIFF, §
§
V. § CASE NO. 3:25-CV-2748-N-BK
§
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS, §
DEFENDANT. §
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Special Order 3, this pro se civil action was
automatically referred to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial
management. Doc. 4. Before the Court for findings and a recommended disposition is
Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand1, Doc. 6, and Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Jurisdiction. Upon review of the relevant pleadings and applicable law, Plaintiff’s motion for
remand should be DENIED and Defendant’s motion to dismiss should be GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Audie James filed this lawsuit against the United States District Court for
Eastern District of Texas2 (“EDTX”) in a Texas state court, seeking “reimbursement for
litigation-related costs and expenses incurred while attempting to seek redress against
1 A motion to “remand is a dispositive matter on which a magistrate judge should enter a
recommendation to the district court subject to de novo review.” Davidson v. Georgia-Pac.,
L.L.C., 819 F.3d 758, 765 (5th Cir. 2016).
2 Plaintiff’s petition merely names “Eastern District of Texas” as Defendant.” Doc. 1-5.
However, in the context of Plaintiff’s allegations, the Court liberally construes as the intended
defendant the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.
Case 3:25-cv-02748-N-BK Document 14 Filed 01/21/26 Page 1 of 6 PageID <pageID>

2
Defendant[s], Kenneth Carlile et. al, Stolen Forks Land & Timber, LLC, [and] Searle & Searle,
PLLC, in prior legal proceedings.” Doc. 1-5 at 2. James’ claims apparently stem from a lawsuit
he filed last year in EDTX that was dismissed without prejudice by District Judge Sean D.
Jordan on January 24, 2025. See James v. Carlile, No. 4:24-CV-13-SDJ-BD, 2025 WL 307275,
at *1 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 24, 2025). James alleges that [EDTX] failed to render a fair and impartial
resolution, denying remedy,” which constituted a “breach of jurisdictional duty under the organic
law of Texas,” and thus entitles him to relief that includes monetary damages of $19,521.00.
Doc. 1-5 at 14, 15.
EDTX was served with process on October 2, 2025. Doc. 1-7. On October 9, EDTX
removed the case to this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). Doc. 1. James now moves for
remand to Justice Court, Precinct One, Dallas County, Texas. Doc. 6. EDTX has filed a
response in opposition, as well as the instant motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Doc. 7; Doc. 10. James has not
filed a response to the motion to dismiss.
II. APPLICABLE LAW
A. Motion for Remand.
28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) authorizes the removal of any civil action against “[t]he United
States or any agency thereof or any officer (or person acting under that officer) of the United
States or of any agency thereof ... for or relating to any act under color of such office.” Once a
case is removed, the plaintiff may file a “motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect ...
within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal under [28 U.S.C.] section 1446(a).” 28
U.S.C. § 1447(c).
Case 3:25-cv-02748-N-BK Document 14 Filed 01/21/26 Page 2 of 6 PageID <pageID>

3
B. Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss
A federal court “generally may not rule on the merits of a case without first determining
that it has jurisdiction over the category of claim in suit ([i.e.,] subject-matter jurisdiction).”
Sinochem Int’l Co. Ltd. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430-31 (2007). A motion
to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) challenges a federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction. See FED.
R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1). Under Rule 12(b)(1), a claim is properly dismissed when the court lacks
statutory or constitutional authority to adjudicate the claim. See Home Builders Ass’n of Miss.,
Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998).
In considering a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction,
“a court may evaluate (1) the complaint alone, (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed
facts evidenced in the record, or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the
court’s resolution of disputed facts.” Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. HeereMac Vof, 241 F.3d
420, 424 (5th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). “Unlike a court considering a Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule
56 motion, district courts have a ‘unique power . . . to make factual findings which are decisive
of [subject matter] jurisdiction’ when considering a motion under Rule 12(b)(1) that raises
questions of fact relevant to subject matter jurisdiction. Hernandez v. United States, 739 F. Supp.
3d 541, 544 (S.D. Tex. 2024) (alterations in original) (quoting Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d
404, 412-13 (5th Cir. 1981)).
The Court must also liberally construe pleadings filed by pro se litigants. See Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (noting pro se pleadings are “to be liberally construed” and “held
to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”); cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e)
(“Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice.”). Even under the most liberal construction,
Case 3:25-cv-02748-N-BK Document 14 Filed 01/21/26 Page 3 of 6 PageID <pageID>

4
however, James has not alleged facts that establish this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction over
his claims against the Eastern District of Texas.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Removal was Proper.
In his motion to remand, James first argues that remand is proper because “[n]o affidavit
of authority, appointment, or standing was submitted,” and that there is “no evidence of agency
authorization permitting representation of the Eastern District of Texas as a defendant.” Doc. 6
at 2. James, however, submits no legal authority in support of his argument nor elaborates
further. To the extent that James is arguing that counsel does not have the authority to represent
the Defendant Court, his argument fails.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 516, “the conduct of litigation in which the United States, an
agency, or officer thereof is a party, or is interested . . . is reserved to officers of the Department
of Justice, under the direction of the Attorney General.” Importantly, this section authorizes
government representation in three distinct situations. First, litigation is reserved to the
Department of Justice when a United States “agency” is involved. Id. Second, litigation is
reserved to the Department of Justice in lawsuits involving officers of the United States. Id.
Third, the statute reserves litigation to the Department of Justice in situations where “the United
States . . . is interested.” Id. Clearly then, the United States Attorney, as arm of the Department
of Justice, is authorized to represent and defend the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Texas, to the extent that EDTX is even amenable to suit.
James also contends that the “statutory prerequisites” of 28 U.S.C. § 1442 have not been
satisfied. Doc. 6 at 2. Unlike most removal statutes, which are strictly construed in favor of
remand, “[t]he Supreme Court has stated that § 1442(a)(1) is to be construed broadly and ‘should
Case 3:25-cv-02748-N-BK Document 14 Filed 01/21/26 Page 4 of 6 PageID <pageID>

5
not be frustrated by a narrow, grudging interpretation.’” Humphries v. Elliott Co., 760 F.3d 414,
417 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 407 (1969)). Without question,
EDTX is a component of the judicial branch of the United States government, see 28 U.S.C. §
124, and thus falls within § 1442(a)(1)’s purview. Therefore, removal from the state court where
this suit was initially filed is proper under § 1442(a). Accordingly, James’s motion for remand
should be DENIED.
B. The Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction.
EDTX correctly argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction over James’s claims based on the
doctrine of sovereign immunity. Doc. 7. The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Texas, as an entity of the sovereign United States, is immune from suit and James’s
claims against it must be dismissed.
“Sovereign immunity is jurisdictional in nature.” FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475
(1994); St. Maron Props., L.L.C. v. City of Houston, 78 F.4th 754, 762 (5th Cir. 2023). A
declaration of sovereign immunity precludes cases against the United States and its agencies
from proper jurisdiction, except for claims in which sovereign immunity is clearly waived by the
United States. Hercules Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 417, 422 (1996). Claims barred by the
invocation of sovereign immunity “can be dismissed only under Rule 12(b)(1) and not with
prejudice.” Warnock v. Pecos Cty., 88 F.3d 341, 343 (5th Cir. 1996).
Few rules are more settled in this Nation’s body of law than the jurisdictional rule that
“the United States may not be sued without its consent.” United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206,
212 (1983); see Cotton v. United States, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 229, 231, 13 L.Ed. 675 (1850). “As a
federal court created by Congress, a United States District Court is part of that combined
sovereign that cannot be sued absent congressional waiver.” United States v. Russell, 797 F.
Case 3:25-cv-02748-N-BK Document 14 Filed 01/21/26 Page 5 of 6 PageID <pageID>

6
Supp. 3d 552, 568 (D. Md. 2025) (citing Atchison v. U.S. Dist. Cts., 190 F. Supp. 3d 78, 89
(D.D.C. 2016), aff’d, 240 F. Supp. 3d 121 (D.D.C. 2017)). And here, while James bears the
burden of establishing the government’s waiver of sovereign immunity, he has failed to identify
any such waiver. See St. Tammany Par., ex rel. Davis v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 556
F.3d 307, 315 (5th Cir. 2009).
Accordingly, EDTX’s motion to dismiss should be GRANTED, and James’ claims
should be dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Remand, Doc. 6, should be DENIED,
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 7, should be GRANTED, Plaintiff’s claims should be
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, and this case should be closed.
SO RECOMMENDED on January 21, 2026.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the manner
provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and recommendation must file
specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). An objection must identify the finding or recommendation to
which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and indicate where in the magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely
incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific.
Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual
findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district
court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d
1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending
the time to file objections to 14 days).
Case 3:25-cv-02748-N-BK Document 14 Filed 01/21/26 Page 6 of 6 PageID <pageID>