Somerville v. Director, TDCJ-CID

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
KEITH LAWRENCE SOMERVILLE, 	§
ID # 00529020, 	§
Petitioner, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	No. 3:25-CV-2573-G-BW
§
DIRECTOR, TDCJ-CID, 	§
Respondent. 	§ 	Referred to U.S. Magistrate Judge1
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court is Petitioner Keith Lawrence Somerville’s Motion to Arrest
Judgment in Accordance with Fed. R. of Civil Proc. 59(e) received on November 14,
2025. (Dkt. No. 10.) Based on the relevant filings and applicable law, the Court
should DENY the motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Keith Lawrence Somerville, a prisoner of the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice, Correctional Institutions Division (“TDCJ-CID”), filed a habeas petition
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 purporting to challenge a denial of parole. (See id. at 5
(“Petition challenge is for parole not conviction or sentence”).)
In 1987, a Dallas County jury convicted Somerville of burglary of a habitation
and sentenced him to life imprisonment. See Somerville v. State, 792 S.W.2d 265, 266
(Tex. App.—Dallas 1990, pet. ref’d). The conviction was reversed on direct appeal,
1 By Special Order No. 3-251, this habeas case has been automatically referred for
full case management.
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and Somerville was re-tried with a new jury that again convicted him and sentenced
him to life imprisonment on January 30, 1992; the intermediate state appellate court
affirmed the second judgment on direct appeal, and Somerville’s petition for
discretionary review was refused. See id. at 269; Somerville v. State, No. 05-92-00395-
CR, 1993 WL 459995 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 10, 1993, pet. ref’d).
Somerville filed multiple unsuccessful federal habeas petitions challenging his
1992 conviction and sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Somerville v. Texas, No.
3:25-cv-0412-B (BT), 2025 WL 1298167, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 6, 2025) (citing
cases), rec. adopted, 2025 WL 1296664 (N.D. Tex. May 2, 2025). In 2012, the Court
dismissed Somerville’s fifth unsuccessful § 2254 petition and barred him from filing
any successive habeas petition unless it was “accompanied by a motion for leave to
file.” Somerville v. Thaler, No. 3:11-CV-3146-B (BK), 2012 WL 612782, at *3 (N.D.
Tex. Feb. 9, 2012), rec. adopted¸ 2012 WL 626219 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 27, 2012).
In May 2024, Somerville was denied parole by the Texas Board of Pardons
and Paroles (“BPP”). See Parole Review Information, https://inmate.tdcj.texas
gov/InmateSearch (search Somerville’s name or TDCJ identification number) (last
visited Sept. 30, 2025). The state trial court received Somerville’s state habeas
application challenging the May 2024 denial of parole on July 22, 2024. See Ex parte
Somerville, No. W-8794983-L (204th Jud. Dist. Ct., July 22, 2024). On September
18, 2024, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (“TCCA”) dismissed the application
as an abuse of the writ, and it also dismissed Somerville’s subsequent motion for a
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hearing en banc. See Ex parte Somerville, No. WR-31,451-18 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept.
18, 2024).
In this case, Somerville challenged the procedures accompanying the denial of
parole, asserting the following grounds2:
(1) 11.07 Sec. 4 inop[er]able;
(2) Parole file does not contain 1992 judgment and sentence, nor
indictment N/A to deadly weapon finding;
(3) Registration not part of 65th Legislation ex post facto not part of
sentencing; and
(4) 3-4 year set-off is against sentence scheme for based on deadly
weapon– only Governor can revoke 65th Leg.;
(Dkt. No. 2 at 5-10 (capitalization altered).) The undersigned entered Findings,
Conclusions, and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge (“FCR”)
on October 1, 2025, recommending summary dismissal of the petition because
Somerville could not assert his claims based on the denial of parole in a petition filed
pursuant to § 2254. (Dkt. No. 7.) Somerville filed objections. (Dkt. No. 6.) On
October 30, 2025, the Court accepted the FCR and dismissed Somerville’s petition.
(Dkt. Nos. 7, 8.)
Somerville now moves for relief from the judgment dismissing the petition
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59. The grounds for his motion are several and unexplained.
2 Because Somerville states that he is not challenging his conviction or sentence, the
Court has previously barred him from challenging his conviction or sentence without filing
a motion for leave, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has not
authorized him to challenge his conviction or sentence in a successive habeas petition, the
Court does not construe this § 2254 action as challenging Somerville’s 1992 conviction or
sentence.
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He asserts that (a) he filed a supplemental brief and new evidence supporting his
claims; (b) the respondent is misleading the Court through fraud; (c) the Court’s
decisions are made “on one-sideness.” (Dkt. No. 10 at 1.) He also complains about
the proceedings underlying his conviction. (See id. at 2.)
II. APPLICABLE LAW
To prevail on a motion to alter or amend a judgment under Rule 59(e), the
moving party must show (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the
availability of new evidence not previously available; or (3) a manifest error of law or
fact. See Schiller v. Physicians Resource Group Inc., 342 F.3d 563, 567 (5th Cir. 2003).
A Rule 59(e) motion “is not the proper vehicle for rehashing evidence, legal theories,
or arguments that could have been offered or raised before the entry of judgment.”
Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 2004). Although courts have
“considerable discretion” to grant or to deny a Rule 59(e) motion, they use the
“extraordinary remedy” of Rule 59(e) “sparingly.” Id. When considering a motion
to alter or amend a judgment, “[t]he court must strike the proper balance between
two competing imperatives: (1) finality, and (2) the need to render just decisions on
the basis of all the facts.” Edward H. Bohlin Co., Inc. v. Banning Co., Inc., 6 F.3d 350,
355 (5th Cir. 1993).
III. ANALYSIS
Somerville does not make the showing necessary to warrant altering and
amending the judgment under Rule 59(e). He does not establish that any intervening
change in controlling law requires relief. And while he refers generally to having
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filed a supplemental brief with new evidence, he does not specify the contents of or
any details about such filing, and the docket does not reflect any such filing. The
appears to be mere boilerplate when considered alongside Somerville’s additional
averment that “respondent is misleading the Court through intrinsic fraud” (Dkt.
No. 10 at 1) although Respondent has never appeared in this action.
Additionally, Somerville has not shown any manifest error of law or fact. He
has not disputed the grounds for the Court’s summary dismissal based of the petition
based on his inability to challenge the parole decisions through § 2254. He points the
Court to Govan v. Director, TDCJ-ID, No. 1:97-CV-241-C (N.D. Tex.), which he
asserts supports amending the judgment here. On review of that case, however, the
petition brought a habeas claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2241—not § 2254—alleging that
he was unlawfully denied mandatory supervision. The case does not establish any
manifest error of fact or law warranting amendment of the judgment.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
The Court should DENY Somerville’s Motion to Arrest Judgment in
Accordance with Fed. R. of Civil Proc. 59(e).
SO RECOMMENDED on December 3, 2025.
____________________________________
BRIAN McKAY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the
manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and
recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being
served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). To be specific,
an objection must identify the finding or recommendation to which objection is
made, state the basis for the objection, and indicate the place in the magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An
objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the
magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the
aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the
magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon
grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415,
1417 (5th Cir. 1996), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)
(extending the time to file objections to 14 days).
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