Marquez v. US Immigration and Customs Enforcement

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
ISRAEL ROJAS MARQUEZ, 	§
A #074022992, 	§
Petitioner, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	No. 3:25-CV-2515-S-BW
§
U.S. IMMIGRATION AND 	§
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, 	§
Respondent. 	§ 	Referred to U.S. Magistrate Judge1
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court is the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241, received on September 17, 2025. (Dkt. No. 3.) Based on the relevant filings
and applicable law, the Court should DISMISS the petition without prejudice as
moot.
I. BACKGROUND
Israel Rojas Marquez, then an immigration detainee at the Prairieland
Detention Center in Alvarado, Texas, filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 claiming that his prolonged detention by United States Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) violated 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) and his due process
rights under the Fifth Amendment. (See id. at 6.) He sought immediate release from
that detention. (See id. at 7.)
1 By Special Order No. 3-251, this habeas case has been automatically referred for
full case management.
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On November 21, 2025, Respondent filed a response in opposition to
Marquez’s § 2241 petition. (See Dkt. No. 6.) Marquez did not file a reply. Because
it appeared to the Court from available online records that Marquez was no longer in
ICE custody, the Court entered an order on February 2, 2026 requiring Respondent
to file a notice specifically addressing Marquez’s current custodial status and its
effect, if any, on the § 2241 petition. (See Dkt. No. 8.) On February 4, 2026,
Respondent filed a status update seeking dismissal of the petition for lack of
jurisdiction as moot based on Marquez’s removal from the United States. (See Dkt.
No. 9.) The supporting document submitted with Respondent’s status update shows
that Marquez was removed from the United States on December 5, 2025. (See id. at
4-5.)
II. MOOTNESS
“Article III of the Constitution limits . . . federal-court jurisdiction[] to ‘Cases’
and ‘Controversies.’” United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 395
(1980). A case becomes moot “when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the
parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Id. at 396 (quoting Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969)).
This case-or-controversy requirement subsists through all stages of
federal judicial proceedings, trial and appellate . . . . The parties must
continue to have a ‘personal stake in the outcome’ of the lawsuit. This
means that, throughout the litigation, the plaintiff “must have suffered,
or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and
likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.
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Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted).
Here, Marquez contended that his immigration detention by ICE violated
§ 1231(a)(6) and the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. (See Dkt. No. 3 at
6.) In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), the Supreme Court held that detention
of an alien subject to a final order of removal is limited to a period reasonably
necessary to bring about his removal from the United States, which is presumably six
months, and that he must thereafter be released if “there is no significant likelihood
of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. at 701. Marquez challenged
only the lawfulness of his prolonged detention and sought immediate release from
ICE custody. (See Dkt. No. 3 at 6-7.)
Because Respondent’s evidence shows that Marquez is no longer detained and
has been removed from the United States, Marquez’s claims challenging the
lawfulness of his detention are moot. See, e.g., Francis v. Lynch, 622 F. App’x 455,
455-56 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding that the petitioner’s challenge to the duration of his
detention pending removal became moot when he was removed from the United
States). The Court therefore should dismiss Marquez’s § 2241 petition as moot.
III. RECOMMENDATION
The Court should DISMISS the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Under
28 U.S.C. § 2241, received on September 17, 2025 (Dkt. No. 3), without prejudice as
moot.
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SO RECOMMENDED on February 6, 2026.
____________________________________
BRIAN McKAY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the
manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and
recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being
served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); F ED . R. C IV. P. 72(b). To be specific,
an objection must identify the finding or recommendation to which objection is
made, state the basis for the objection, and indicate the place in the magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An
objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the
magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the
aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the
magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon
grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415,
1417 (5th Cir. 1996), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)
(extending the time to file objections to 14 days).
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