Esaadi v. Starbucks Corporation

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
WALEED MOHAMED ESAADI, 	§
§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
V. 	§ 	No. 3:25-cv-2486-L-BN
§
STARBUCKS CORPORATION, 	§
§
Defendant. 	§
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Paying the fee to do so, pro se Plaintiff Waleed Mohamed Esaadi filed this
lawsuit alleging claims under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000a, and Texas law against Defendant Starbucks Corporation. See Dkt. No. 3.
United States District Judge Sam A. Lindsay referred Esaadi’s lawsuit to the
undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28
U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference.
Because Esaadi paid the filing fee, the Court entered an order on September
24, 2025 cautioning him that it’s his obligation to properly serve each defendant
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 (or obtain a waiver of service) and file proof
of service (or an executed waiver of service) prior to December 15, 2025 to avoid
dismissal of this lawsuit without prejudice under Rule 4(m). See Dkt. No. 6.
Esaadi filed the same day proof of service reflecting that he served Starbucks
by certified mail on September 22, 2025. See Dkt. No. 7.
And Esaadi has moved for judgment against Starbucks based on this service
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and Starbuck’s failure to respond. See Dkt. No. 8.
The undersigned recommends that the Court deny the motion for judgment
and sua sponte extend Esaadi’s deadline to properly serve Starbucks for the following
reasons.
Discussion
When a defendant has “failed to plead or otherwise defend” an action, the Court
may enter a default judgment if the plaintiff establishes the following prerequisites:
(1) the defendant was served with the summons and complaint and default was
entered; (2) the defendant is not “a minor or incompetent person”; and (3) the
defendant is not in the military. FED R. CIV. P. 55(b)(2); see also 50 U.S.C. § 3931(a),
(b) (providing “[p]rotection [for] servicemembers against default judgments”).
But, before a defendant can be considered in default under Rule 55, the Court
must confirm that it has jurisdiction over that defendant. See Sys. Pipe & Supply,
Inc. v. M/V Viktor Kurnatovskiy, 242 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he district
court has an affirmative duty to look into its jurisdiction both over the subject matter
and the parties.” (quoting Williams v. Life Savings & Loan, 802 F.2d 1200, 1203 (10th
Cir. 1986))).
Such personal jurisdiction must be obtained through proper service of process,
which is “fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant” and is
therefore “the official trigger for responsive action by an individual or entity named
defendant.” Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350, 353
(1999).
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So “[a] federal court is without personal jurisdiction over a defendant unless
the defendant has been served with process in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4.” Naranjo v. Universal Sur. of Am., 679 F. Supp. 2d 787, 795 (S.D. Tex.
2010) (citing Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987),
superseded by statute on other grounds, see FED . R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2)); accord Pennie v.
Obama, 255 F. Supp. 3d 648, 658 (N.D. Tex. 2017).
And, “[w]hen a plaintiff fails to properly serve process on a defendant, the
district court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant and any default judgment
would be void.” Webster v. Kijakazi, No. 21-50455, 2021 WL 4468889, at *3 (5th Cir.
Sept. 29, 2021) (per curiam) (citing Rogers v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 167
F.3d 933, 940 (5th Cir. 1999)); see also Rogers, 167 F.3d at 937 (“[A] defendant can
not make an appearance for purposes of Rule 55(b)(2) until after the plaintiff effects
service and the defendant becomes susceptible to default.”).
Esaadi’s proof of service reflects that he sent to Starbucks by certified mail the
summons and complaint. This manner of service implicates Rules 4(h)(1)(A) and
4(e)(1) and Texas law, which the undersigned will explain below. But the takeaway
is that, as the plaintiff, Esaadi is not authorized to personally mail the summons and
complaint.
“Service by mail is not expressly permitted by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
4.” Caceres-Mejia v. Watson, 718 F. App’x 307, 309 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam); see
also Gilliam v. Cnty. of Tarrant, 94 F. App’x 230, 230 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam)
(noting that “the use of certified mail is not sufficient to constitute ‘delivering’ under
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Rule 4” (citing Peters v. United States, 9 F.3d 344, 345 (5th Cir. 1993))).
Still, “an individual may be served by ‘following state law for serving a
summons in an action brought in courts of general jurisdiction in the state where the
district court is located or where service is made.’” Caceres-Mejia, 718 F. App’x at 309
(quoting FED . R. CIV. P. 4(e)(1)); see also FED . R. CIV. P. 4(h)(1)(A).
And Texas law does contemplate the use of mail – more specifically, Texas law
provides for service by registered or certified mail, with return receipt requested. See
TEX. R. C IV. P. 106(a)(2) (“Unless the citation or an order of the court otherwise
directs, the citation shall be served by any person authorized by [Texas Rule of Civil
Procedure] 103 by mailing to the defendant by registered or certified mail, return
receipt requested, a true copy of the citation with a copy of the petition attached
thereto.”); see also Cross v. Grand Prairie, No. 3:96-cv-446-P, 1998 WL 133143, at *6
(N.D. Tex. Mar. 17, 1998) (“Although Rule 4(e)(1) authorizes service pursuant to
Texas law, absent prior authorization by the trial court, the only methods of service
permitted in Texas are service in person or by registered mail.” (citing TEX. R. C IV. P.
106(a))).
But it still matters who serves the defendant by mail, as neither Rule 4 nor
Texas’s rules allow a party to serve a defendant. See FED . R. CIV. P. 4(c)(2) (“Any
person who is at least 18 years old and not a party may serve a summons and
complaint.”); TEX. R. CIV. P. 103.
And under Texas’s rules,
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 106, process may be served by any person
authorized 	by 	[Texas] 	Rule 	103 	by 	“mailing 	to 	the 	defendant 	by
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registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, a true copy of the
citation with a copy of the petition attached thereto.” Texas Rule 103
explicitly requires that process be served by “(1) any sheriff or constable
or other person authorized by law, (2) any person authorized by law or
by written order of the court who is not less than eighteen years of age,
or (3) any person certified under order of the Supreme Court.” T EX. R.
CIV. P. 103. Rule 103 also states that service by certified mail must be
effected by the clerk of the court, if requested, and that “no person who
is a party to or is interested in the outcome of a suit may serve any
process in that suit.” T EX. R. C IV. P. 103; see also FED . R. CIV. P. 4(c)(2).
Carter v. EZ Flo Int’l, No. 6:22-CV-00094-JDK, 2022 WL 17541407, at *7 (E.D. Tex.
Sept. 2, 2022), rec. adopted, 2022 WL 17091857 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 2022).
Texas law also requires that particular information be included in the return
of service, such as the address served and the date of service or attempted service, see
TEX. R. CIV. P. 107(b), and “when certified mail has been selected as the method of
service, 	Texas 	law 	further 	requires 	that 	the 	return 	receipt 	be 	signed 	by 	the
addressee,” Lucky, 2013 WL 3054032, at *3 (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 107(c); Keeton v.
Carrasco, 53 S.W.3d 13, 19 (Tex. App. – San Antonio 2001, pet. denied)); accord
Carter, 2022 WL 17541407, at *7.
And where a plaintiff is the person who sends the registered or certified mail
to a defendant, such service is plainly invalid. See Hill v. N. Tex. State Hosp., No.
7:09-cv-158-O, 2010 WL 342227, at *1-*2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 2010) (Because “[i]t
conclusively 	appears 	from 	the 	file 	materials 	that 	Plaintiff 	alone 	caused 	the
summonses to be mailed by certified mail to the defendants, … plaintiff has failed to
comply with either of the Rule 4 prescribed means of affecting service of process in
this case.” And, so, the Court should “deny Plaintiff’s Motion for Default.” (cleaned
up)); Carter, 2022 WL 17541407, at *7 (“For Plaintiff’s certified mail service of process
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to be valid, a copy of the summons and complaint must have been sent by an
authorized uninterested party and served on the Defendant. See TEX. R. C IV. P. 103,
106(a)(2). However, in this case, there is no evidence that an authorized uninterested
party mailed a copy of the complaint with the summons. Rather, the unexecuted
summons indicates that Plaintiff attempted to serve EZ Flo himself via certified
mail.”); 	Williams 	v. 	Midland 	Credit 	Mgmt., 	Inc., 	No. 	4:24-cv-110-P, 	2024 	WL
1540265, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 18, 2024) (“Plaintiff, in his response, admits that the
service by certified mail on Defendant was sent directly by the Plaintiff to the
Defendant…. Consequently, the Court finds and concludes that Plaintiff has failed to
establish proper service of process on Defendant that complies with the Federal and
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.” (cleaned up)), rec. adopted, 2024 WL 1543762 (N.D.
Tex. Apr. 9, 2024); see also Mori Seiki USA, Inc. v. McIntyre, No. 3:06-cv-2344-B, 2007
WL 2984658, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 12, 2007) (“Because it is unclear who sent Taylor
the certified mail, the Court … finds that the [motion] should be denied without
prejudice pending the filing of a motion complying with the Rule 4 requirements for
service of process.” (cleaned up)).
In sum, because the Court has yet to obtain jurisdiction over the defendant in
this lawsuit – because it has not been shown that that defendant was properly served
– that defendant cannot be considered in default under Rule 55.
Esaadi’s motion for judgment [Dkt. No. 8] must therefore be denied.
And, should the Court accept or adopt this recommendation, considering
Esaadi’s pro se status, the Court should also extend his deadline to properly serve
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Starbucks to at least thirty days after entry of any order accepting or adopting these
findings, conclusions, and recommendation.
Recommendation
The Court should deny Plaintiff Waleed Mohamed Esaadi’s motion for default
judgment [Dkt. No. 8] and sua sponte extend his deadline to properly effect service of
process.
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on
all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these
findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections
within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED . R. CIV.
P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or
recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and
specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation
where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by
reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure
to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the
factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or
adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v.
United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
DATED: March 5, 2026
_________________________________________
DAVID L. HORAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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