Fuller v. Polaris Industries Inc et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
GERSHOM FULLER as next friend of 	§
K.F., a minor, 	§
§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-CV-2094-B
§
POLARIS INDUSTRIES, INC. d/b/a
POLARIS INC., and CT SPORTS,
§
§
INC. d/b/a CYCLE SOUTH TOWN, 	§
§
Defendants. 	§
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is a Motion to Remand (Doc. 6), filed by Plaintiff Gershom Fuller as next
friend of K.F., a minor. The Court DENIES the Motion.
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Gershom Fuller filed this lawsuit in state court on behalf of minor K.F., alleging
injuries due to defects in an off-road vehicle (the “vehicle”) manufactured by Polaris Industries, Inc.
(“Polaris”). Doc. 1-3, Pet. ¶¶ 8-10. K.F.’s parents purchased the vehicle from Defendant CT Sports,
Inc. d/b/a Cycle Town South (“CT Sports”) in 2023. Id. ¶ 8. As alleged, K.F. was injured in August
2023 while driving the vehicle, when the vehicle’s steering mechanism failed. Id. ¶¶ 9-10. Fuller
asserts various causes of action against Polaris, and a single cause of action for negligence against CT
Sports. See id. at 3-5.
Fuller, and K.F., reside in and are citizens of Texas. Id. ¶ 2. Polaris is a Minnesota
Corporation with its principal place of business in Minnesota. Id. ¶ 3. Accordingly, Polaris is a citizen
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of Minnesota. See 28 U.S.C. 1332(c)(1) (A corporation is “a citizen of every State and foreign state
by which it has been incorporated and of the State or foreign state where it has its principal place of
business.”). CT Sports is incorporated in Texas. Doc. 1-3, Pet. ¶ 4. Accordingly, CT Sports is a citizen
of Texas. See § 1332(c)(1).
Polaris removed this action to federal court, arguing that complete diversity of citizenship
exists because CT Sports was improperly joined and need not be considered for purposes of the
Court’s jurisdiction. Doc. 1, Notice Removal ¶ 3. Fuller filed his Motion to Remand shortly
thereafter. See generally Doc. 6, Mot. Remand. Fuller claims that CT Sports is a properly joined party,
thus the action lacks complete diversity and the Court lacks jurisdiction. Id. at 2. The Court
considers the Motion below.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Settlement Funding, L.L.C. v. Rapid
Settlements, Ltd., 851 F.3d 530, 537 (5th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). Thus, courts “must presume
that a suit lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction
rests on the party seeking the federal forum.” Id. “If the record does not contain sufficient evidence
to show that subject matter jurisdiction exists, a federal court does not have jurisdiction over the
case.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). Federal district courts possess original jurisdiction over civil
cases in which the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and there is complete diversity among
the parties. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). The “complete diversity” requirement demands that “all plaintiffs
have a different citizenship from all defendants.” Getty Oil Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 841 F.2d 1254,
1258 (5th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted).
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The burden falls on a removing defendant to establish jurisdiction, and “any doubt about
the propriety of removal must be resolved in favor of remand.” Gasch v. Hartford Accident & Indem.
Co., 491 F.3d 278, 281-82 (5th Cir. 2007). When a defendant removes an action to federal court on
the basis of improper joinder, the burden is particularly heavy. Smallwood v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co.,
385 F.3d 568, 574 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 992 (2005). To establish improper
joinder, such that a court may disregard a particular defendant for citizenship purposes, the moving
defendant has two options. The defendant must show (1) actual fraud in pleading jurisdictional
facts, or (2) that the plaintiff cannot establish a cause of action against the non-diverse defendant in
state court. Griggs v. State Farm Lloyds, 181 F.3d 694, 699 (5th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). Under
the second option, courts consider whether there is any “reasonable basis . . . to predict that the
plaintiff might be able to recover against [the] in-state defendant.” Smallwood, 385 F.3d at 573. This
possibility of recovery “must be reasonable, not merely theoretical.” Harris v. New Werner Holding,
Co. Inc., No. 308-CV-1750-L, 2009 WL 1211409, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 1, 2009) (Lindsay, J.).
Generally, a court’s analysis under the second option is the same as that conducted under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Id. A court “look[s] initially at the allegations of the complaint to
determine whether [the plaintiff] states a claim under state law . . . .” See id. (citation omitted).
III.
ANALYSIS
Polaris contends that Fuller improperly joined CT Sports. Doc. 10, Resp. Mot. Remand, 2.
In support, Polaris argues that there is no reasonable basis to predict that Fuller can recover against
CT Sports, because the Texas Products Liability Act (“TPLA”) immunizes CT Sports for the alleged
harm. Id. at 7. In relevant part, the TPLA immunizes a “seller that did not manufacture a product”
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from harm caused to a claimant by the product unless the seller meets certain exceptions. T EX . CIV .
P RAC. & R EM . CODE § 82.003(a). Among those exceptions, a seller is not immunized where it
“participated in the design of the product,” “altered or modified the product,” “exercised substantial
control over the content of [an inadequate] warning or instruction that accompanied the product,”
made false representations about the product, or knew of the product’s defects at the time of sale.
§ 82.003(a)(1)-(2), (4)-(6). The TPLA defines seller as “a person who is engaged in the business of
distributing or otherwise placing, for any commercial purpose, in the stream of commerce for use or
consumption a product or any component part thereof.” § 82.001(3).
Fuller does not address the TPLA or its application in his Motion to Remand or Petition.
However, Fuller does appear to allege that CT Sports is a “seller” “engaged in the business of
distributing or otherwise placing” Polaris products into the market. See id. (defining seller under the
TPLA). Specifically, Fuller alleges that K.F.’s parents purchased the vehicle from CT Sports in 2023.
Doc. 1-3, Pet. ¶ 8. Fuller then claims that CT Sports was “negligent in marketing” the vehicle, CT
Sports “implied” from product placement that the vehicle was safe for use, and CT Sports did not
communicate any safety failure issues then known to the public. Id. at 5. In its Motion to Remand,
Fuller claims that CT Sports “is a major component of” Polaris’s distribution network. Doc. 6, Mot.
Remand, 2. Thus, based on the facts alleged by Fuller, CT Sports is plainly a “seller” under the
TPLA, and—absent an applicable exception—the TPLA immunizes CT Sports from liability.
Because Fuller does not allege sufficient facts that would trigger an applicable exception, the
Court finds that the TPLA bars Fuller’s negligence claim against CT Sports and precludes recovery.
Fuller does not allege or argue that CT Sports designed, altered, or controlled the vehicle. Nor does
Fuller claim that CT Sports exercised significant control over the vehicle’s accompanying warnings
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or instructions, that CT Sports made any express misrepresentations about the vehicle, or that CT
Sports was aware of any particular defects with the vehicle at the time of sale. Fuller’s Motion to
Remand attaches a “safety recall notice” that Polaris issued in December 2023, about potential
defects with their products. See generally Doc. 6-1, Safety Recall Notice. This notice, not addressed to
CT Sports, fails to save Fuller’s argument. While this could suggest that CT Sports had a duty moving
forward to inform customers of a known risk regarding the vehicle, because the notice was issued
months after both the sale to K.F. and the accident, see Doc. 1-3, Pet. ¶ 9 (alleging that accident
occurred in August 2023), the notice’s mere existence does not show CT Sports knew of a risk “at
the time the seller supplied the product.” See § 82.003(6).
The TPLA bars Fuller’s negligence claim against CT Sports, thus there is no “reasonable
basis . . . to predict that [Fuller] might be able to recover against [CT Sports].” See Smallwood, 385
F.3d at 573. Accordingly, Polaris meets its burden to show that CT Sports was improperly joined,
and the Court denies Fuller’s Motion to Remand (Doc. 6).
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES Fuller’s Motion to Remand (Doc. 6). The
Court also DISMISSES without prejudice Fuller’s sole claim against CT Sports. See Int'l Energy
Ventures Mgmt., L.L.C. v. United Energy Group, Ltd., 818 F.3d 193, 210 (5th Cir. 2016) (holding that
improperly joined, nondiverse parties should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction).
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SO ORDERED.
SIGNED: November 20, 2025.
JANE J. BOYLE
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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