Novak v. Marshall, III

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
VAN DARWIN NOVAK, 	§
#56080-177, 	§
§
Petitioner, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	No. 3:25-CV-02021-S-BW
§
WILLIAM K. MARSHALL, III, 	§
DIRECTOR OF BOP, 	§
§
Respondent. 	§
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Special Order 3, this pro se civil action
was referred to the United States magistrate judge for case management, including
the entry of findings and a recommended disposition where appropriate. As
discussed below, the Petition should be DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
Petitioner Van Darwin Novak, a federal prisoner housed at FCI Seagoville,
filed this 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition challenging the Bureau of Prisons’ (“BOP’s”)
calculation and application of his First Step Act (“FSA”) time credits and the timing
of his placement in prerelease custody. (Dkt. No. 3.)
In his sole ground for relief, Novak alleges that the BOP has erroneously
calculated his earned FSA Time Credits (also known as federal time credits, or
“FTCs”), resulting in the loss of 765 credits and causing his “FSA Conditional
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Placement Date” to be erroneously set at August 28, 2027, rather than July 24, 2025,
as he believes it should be. (Dkt. No. 3 at 7.) He seeks an order directing the BOP to
properly calculate and apply all FTCs earned during his entire imposed term of
imprisonment. Id.
Novak was convicted in this district of conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, Case No. 4:17-CR-
00168-O, and was sentenced on July 31, 2018, to 200 months of imprisonment.
(Dkt. No. 3 at 3.) He did not appeal. Id. He exhausted his administrative remedies
through the BOP’s grievance process, submitting BP-8 through BP-11 forms between
January and May 2025, each of which was either unaddressed or denied. Id. at 2.
On September 10, 2025, Respondent submitted a response explaining that
Novak’s FSA credits have been correctly calculated and applied. (Dkt. No. 7.) As of
August 3, 2025, Novak had earned a total of 1,170 FSA Time Credits. (Dkt. No. 7
at 5.) Of those, 365 were applied toward early transfer to supervised release—the
statutory maximum under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(3)—advancing his projected release
date from November 5, 2031, to November 5, 2030. Id. The remaining 805 FTCs
were counted toward prerelease custody placement, but Novak could not yet apply
them because his earned credits did not equal the remainder of his imposed term of
imprisonment as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(1)(A). Id. at 5-6.
Upon review, the undersigned concludes that Novak is statutorily ineligible
for the relief he seeks. His petition should therefore be denied.
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II. LEGAL STANDARD AND ANALYSIS
A petitioner may seek habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 if he is “in custody
in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(c)(3). It is well established that the “sole function [of habeas actions] is to
grant relief from unlawful imprisonment or custody and it cannot be used properly
for any other purpose.” Pierre v. United States, 525 F.2d 933, 935-36 (5th Cir. 1976);
see also Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004) (habeas actions are reserved for
“[c]hallenges to the validity of any confinement or to particulars affecting its
duration,” while civil-rights actions are typically used to attack conditions of
confinement (citations omitted)). “[I]f a favorable determination of the prisoner’s
claim [does] not automatically entitle him to accelerated release,” then the
appropriate means to challenge the conditions of confinement is through a civil rights
lawsuit. Melot v. Bergami, 970 F.3d 596, 599 (5th Cir. 2020) (finding a challenge to
exclusion from program allowing home confinement for elderly offenders is more
properly brought as a civil rights suit).
Additionally, the FSA grants discretion to the BOP to determine the
placement of inmates who have earned enough time credits to receive a sentence
reduction. See 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(C) (“Time credits earned under this paragraph
by prisoners who successfully participate in recidivism reduction programs or
productive activities shall be applied toward time in prerelease custody or supervised
release.” (emphasis added)); see Girven v. Smith, No. 4:23-CV-859-P, 2023 WL
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8606807, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 2023) (summarizing FSA time credits for
evidence-based recidivism reduction programming).
“An eligible inmate . . . may earn FSA Time Credits for programming and
activities in which he or she participated from December 21, 2018, until January 14,
2020,” and “may earn FSA Time Credit if he or she is successfully participating in
[Evidence-Based Recidivism Reduction] programs or [Productive Activities] that the
[BOP] has recommended based on the inmate’s individualized risk and needs
assessment on or after January 15, 2020.” 28 C.F.R. §§ 523.42(b)(2)-(3).
However, Congress placed two express limitations on the application of those
credits: (1) Credits toward early supervised release may not exceed twelve months.
18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(3), and (2) Credits toward prerelease custody may not be applied
until the prisoner has earned credits “in an amount equal to the remainder of the
prisoner’s imposed term of imprisonment.” 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(1)(A). Thus, while
the statute mandates application of earned credits, it conditions that application on
specific statutory prerequisites.
The BOP also retains authority over prerelease placement decisions, including
placement in a Residential Reentry Center (“RRC”) and home confinement. 18
U.S.C. § 3624(g)(2); 28 C.F.R. § 523.44(b). Courts in this district have repeatedly
recognized that a request for prerelease placement based on FSA credits is not
cognizable in habeas to the extent it challenges placement rather than sentence
duration. Id.; Maldonado v. Rule, No. 4:24-CV-0971-P, 2025 WL 476256, at *2 (N.D.
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Tex. Feb. 11, 2025) (holding a request for placement in prerelease custody because of
FSA time credits is not cognizable in habeas).
A. 	Novak has received the maximum benefit for the duration of his sentence
that the FSA permits.
The FSA’s twelve-month cap on early supervised release is not in dispute here.
The BOP applied 365 days of Novak’s earned FTCs toward early transfer to
supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(3), advancing his projected release date
by one full year, from November 5, 2031, to November 5, 2030. (Dkt. No. 7 at 5.)
That is the statutory ceiling. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(3) (authorizing transfer to
supervised release “at an earlier date, not to exceed 12 months”). Novak cannot
receive additional credit toward his release date through the FSA. See McLean v.
Rivers, No. 3:23-CV-1750-G-BK, 2024 WL 665858, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 2024)
(concluding BOP inmate was statutorily ineligible for further relief because the BOP
had applied 365 days of FSA time credit to his projected statutory release date), rec.
adopted, 2024 WL 666070, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 15, 2024).
Novak’s remaining claim concerns the timing of his placement in prerelease
custody—that is, his transfer to a RRC or home confinement—which is governed by
a separate and independent statutory requirement.
B. 	Novak was not eligible to apply FTCs toward prerelease custody on July
24, 2025.
Novak contends that the BOP has miscalculated his placement in prerelease
custody by failing to apply all of his FTCs at a single point in time once, in his view,
the statutory threshold is satisfied. In his reply, he argues that the First Step Act
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requires credits to be aggregated across the entire imposed term of imprisonment and
effectively “front-loaded” into a single application date reflected in his proposed
“best case scenario.” (Dkt. No. 9 at 1-2, 6-7.) That reading misstates the statute.
Section 3624(g) requires that credits be earned, not projected. Because Novak had
not met that threshold on the date he identifies, his claim fails as a matter of law.
Section 3624(g)(1)(A) provides that FSA credits may be applied only when the
prisoner “has earned time credits . . . in an amount equal to the remainder of the
prisoner’s imposed term of imprisonment.” 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(1)(A). This is a
hard statutory prerequisite, not a target the BOP may accelerate or waive.
The record shows that on July 24, 2025, the date Novak contends he should
have been transferred to prerelease custody, he had 1,930 days remaining on his
imposed term of imprisonment. (Dkt. No. 7 at 5-6.) As of August 3, 2025, Novak
had earned 805 FTCs available for application toward prerelease custody. Id. at 5.
Those 805 earned credits fell far short of the 1,930-day remainder, meaning the
statutory prerequisite for application had not been met. Novak was therefore
ineligible for prerelease placement on July 24, 2025.
Novak’s argument that the BOP’s methodology is flawed and that credits
should be aggregated and front-loaded to produce an earlier placement date has been
squarely rejected in this district. Courts have explained that FSA credits “are not
applied until such time as the inmate has earned time credits in an amount equal to
the remainder of the term of imprisonment because earned time credits may be lost
as a result of misconduct.” Maldonado, 2025 WL 476256, at *1; see also Lang v. Rule,
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No. 4:24-CV-0788-P, 2025 WL 489343 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2025); Blake v. Rule, No.
4:24-CV-0726-P, 2025 WL 489342 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2025). The FSA requires that
credits be earned before they may be applied. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(1)(A). There is
no authority permitting the BOP to apply anticipated future credits, nor is there
authority requiring it to do so.
This framework distinguishes FSA Time Credits from Good Conduct Time
(“GCT”) credits. GCT credits are awarded automatically at a rate of 54 days per
year of the imposed sentence and carry protected liberty interests enforceable through
habeas. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). FSA Time
Credits, by contrast, are earned only through participation in qualifying
programming and are contingent on continued compliance. Because they may be
forfeited for misconduct, Congress required that the § 3624(g)(1)(A) threshold be
satisfied by actually earned credits before any application may occur.
C. 	BOP’s August 28, 2027, conditional placement date reflects a proper
application of the statutory framework.
The BOP projected that if Novak’s FSA status remains unchanged, he will
earn a total of 1,165 FTCs applicable toward prerelease custody. (Dkt. No. 7 at 6.)
On August 28, 2027, the days remaining on his sentence will equal the 1,165
projected credits, satisfying the § 3624(g)(1)(A) threshold. Id. The August 28, 2027,
FSA Conditional Placement Date thus represents the earliest date on which the
statutory prerequisite will be met, and the BOP has designated that as the projected
date for Novak’s transfer to prerelease custody.
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Novak identifies no legal or mathematical error in that calculation. He offers
no authority requiring the BOP to credit anticipated programming before it is earned,
and no authority prohibiting the use of projected totals to calculate a conditional
placement date. The use of projected credits to establish a planning date is a
practical mechanism—not a present entitlement. Courts in this district and
elsewhere have consistently upheld this approach. See Gutierrez v. Hijar, No. 5:22-
CV-1231, 2023 WL 2317790, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 28, 2023); Maldonado v. Martinez,
No. 2:23-CV-00983, 2023 WL 8270640, at *1 (W.D. La. Nov. 6, 2023), rec. adopted,
2023 WL 8264495 (W.D. La. Nov. 29, 2023).
D. 	Novak’s claim is, in substance, a challenge to a BOP placement decision
that is not reviewable by this court.
Although framed as a credit dispute, the substance of Novak’s claim is a
challenge to when he may be placed in prerelease custody (RRC or home
confinement). (See Dkt. No. 3 at 7; see also Dkt. No. 9 at 1.) That issue is governed
not by § 3624(g), but by 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b), which gives the BOP sole discretion to
designate an inmate’s place of confinement.
Section 3621(b) expressly provides that: “A designation of a place of
imprisonment under this subsection is not reviewable by any court.” See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3621(b). Courts consistently hold that placement in an RRC or on home
confinement constitutes a designation decision committed to BOP’s discretion and is
insulated from judicial review. See McLean, No. 3:23-CV-1750-G-BK, 2024 WL
665858, at *2; Lawrence v. Warden of Seagoville, No. 3:24-CV-2731-N-BK, 2025 WL
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1240765, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 4, 2025), rec. adopted, No. 3:24-CV-2731-N-BK, 2025
WL 1239725 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 29, 2025); see also Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224
(1976) (no constitutional right to placement in a particular facility).
Here, Novak effectively asks the Court to order BOP to move up his prerelease
placement date to July 24, 2025. That request directly implicates BOP’s designation
authority under § 3621(b), which this Court lacks jurisdiction to review.
Accordingly, even if this Court were to conclude that the BOP’s credit calculations
were somehow incorrect, it would lack authority to order Novak’s transfer to
prerelease custody. The petition must be denied on this independent ground as well.
III. RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should DENY the Petition for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 because Novak has failed to demonstrate he
is entitled to relief.
SO RECOMMENDED on March 27, 2026.
______________________________________
BRIAN McKAY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the manner
provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and recommendation
must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. See
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). An objection must identify the finding or
recommendation to which objection is made, the basis for the objection, and the place
in the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation the disputed determination is
found. 	An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing
before the magistrate judge is not specific. 	Failure to file specific written objections
will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions
of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon
grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th
Cir. 1996), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the time
to object to 14 days).
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