Snider v. Marshall, III

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
ROY WARREN SNIDER 	§
#57390-177 	§
Petitioner, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	No. 3:25-CV-2020-D-BW
§
WILLIAM K. MARSHALL, III, 	§
Director of BOP, 	§
Respondent. 	§
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Special Order 3, this pro se civil action
was referred to the United States magistrate judge for case management, including
the entry of findings and a recommended disposition where appropriate. As
explained below, the Petition should be DENIED.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner Roy Warren Snider, a federal prisoner at FCI Seagoville, filed this
28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition challenging the Bureau of Prisons’s (“BOP’s”) calculation
and application of his First Step Act (“FSA”) time credits and the timing of his
placement in prerelease custody. (Dkt. No. 3.)
In his sole ground for relief, Snider alleges that the BOP miscalculated his
earned FSA Time Credits (also known as federal time credits or “FTCs”), resulting
in the loss of 555 credits and causing his “FSA Conditional Placement Date” to be
set at February 17, 2026, instead of August 11, 2024. (Dkt. No. 3 at 5, 7.) He seeks
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an order directing the BOP to recalculate his credits and move his prerelease
placement date forward to August 11, 2024. (See id. at 7.)
Respondent submitted a comprehensive response explaining that Snider’s FSA
credits were correctly calculated and applied. (Dkt. No. 7 at 2-5.) Respondent
represents that Snider accrued 2,192 program days. (Id. at 3.) From these days, 365
FTCs were applied toward early transfer to supervised release, moving Snider’s
projected release date from April 2, 2029, to April 2, 2028. (See id.) This is the
maximum amount of FSA credits that may be applied toward early supervised
release under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(3).
Upon review, the Court concludes that Snider is statutorily ineligible for the
relief he seeks. His petition should therefore be denied.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS AND ANALYSIS
A petitioner may seek habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 if he is “in custody
in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(c)(3). The “sole function [of habeas actions] is to grant relief from unlawful
imprisonment or custody and it cannot be used properly for any other purpose.”
Pierre v. United States, 525 F.2d 933, 935-36 (5th Cir. 1976); see also Muhammad v.
Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004) (habeas actions are reserved for “[c]hallenges to the
validity of any confinement or to particulars affecting its duration,” while civil-rights
actions are typically used to attack conditions of confinement (citations omitted)).
“[I]f a favorable determination of the prisoner’s claim [does] not automatically entitle
him to accelerated release,” then the appropriate means to challenge the conditions
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of confinement is through a civil rights lawsuit. Melot v. Bergami, 970 F.3d 596, 599
(5th Cir. 2020) (finding a challenge to exclusion from program allowing home
confinement for elderly offenders is more properly brought as a civil rights suit).
Additionally, the FSA grants discretion to the BOP to determine the
placement of inmates who have earned enough time credits to receive a sentence
reduction. 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(C) (“Time credits earned under this paragraph by
prisoners who successfully participate in recidivism reduction programs or
productive activities shall be applied toward time in prerelease custody or supervised
release.” (emphasis added)); see Girven v. Smith, No. 4:23-CV-859-P, 2023 WL
8606807, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 2023) (summarizing FSA time credits for
evidence-based recidivism reduction programming).
“An eligible inmate . . . may earn FSA Time Credits for programming and
activities in which he or she participated from December 21, 2018, until January 14,
2020,” and “may earn FSA Time Credit if he or she is successfully participating in
EBRR [Evidence-Based Recidivism Reduction] programs or PAs [Productive
Activities] that the [BOP] has recommended based on the inmate’s individualized
risk and needs assessment on or after January 15, 2020.” 28 C.F.R. §§ 523.42(b)(2)-
(3) (emphasis added).
However, Congress placed two express limitations on the application of those
credits: (1) credits toward early release onto supervised release may not exceed
twelve months, 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(3), and (2) credits toward prerelease custody
may not be applied until the prisoner has earned credits “in an amount equal to the
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remainder of the prisoner’s imposed term of imprisonment.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3624(g)(1)(A). Thus, while the statute mandates application of earned credits, it
conditions that application on specific statutory prerequisites.
The BOP also retains authority over prerelease placement decisions, including
placement in a Residential Reentry Center (“RRC”) and home confinement. 18
U.S.C. § 3624(g)(2); 28 C.F.R. § 523.44(b). Courts in this district have repeatedly
recognized that a request for prerelease placement based on FSA credits is not
cognizable in habeas to the extent it challenges placement rather than sentence
duration. Id.; Maldonado v. Rule, No. 4:24-CV-0971-P, 2025 WL 476256, at *2 (N.D.
Tex. Feb. 11, 2025) (holding a request for placement in prerelease custody because of
FSA time credits is not cognizable in habeas).
A. 	Snider does not show that he earned credits equal to the remainder of his
sentence on August 11, 2024.
Snider does not dispute that the BOP applied 365 days of credit toward early
supervised release. (Dkt. No. 9 (“Reply”) at 6.) Nor does he dispute that this
adjusted his projected release date to April 2, 2028. Id. Instead, he argues that his
additional earned credits should have been applied in a way that advances his
prerelease eligibility date from February 17, 2026, to August 11, 2024. (See id. at 1.)
That argument fails as a matter of law because Snider did not meet the statutory
threshold required for application of credits toward prerelease custody on August 11,
2024.
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Section 3624(g)(1)(A) expressly provides that FSA credits may not be applied
until the inmate “has earned time credits . . . in an amount equal to the remainder of
the prisoner’s imposed term of imprisonment.” 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(1)(A). Courts
interpreting this provision have recognized that the statute conditions application on
credits actually earned, not anticipated, and that earned credits may be lost through
misconduct. See Maldonado, No. 4:24-CV-0971-P, 2025 WL 476256, at *2 (citing
Sharp v. Brown, No. 3:23-CV-138, 2024 WL 3493792, at *3 (N.D.W. Va. July 22,
2024); see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 539 (1974) (recognizing earned
credits may be revoked for misconduct).
On August 11, 2024, Snider had 1,330 days remaining on his sentence. (Dkt.
No. 7 at 4.) Even accepting his assertion that an additional 555 FTCs had been
earned, he still had not accumulated credits equal to the remainder of his term of
imprisonment on that date. Accordingly, he was statutorily ineligible for application
of credits toward prerelease custody in August 2024.
Snider’s reliance on the word “shall” in § 3632(d)(4)(C) does not alter this
conclusion. (Dkt. No. 9 at 3-7.) That subsection must be read together with
§ 3624(g)(1)(A) and § 3624(g)(3). While § 3632(d)(4)(C) mandates that earned
credits “shall be applied,” Congress expressly limited when and how they may be
applied. Reading “shall” to require immediate and unconditional application of all
credits would nullify the remainder-of-sentence requirement and the twelve-month
cap for early supervised release. Courts must avoid constructions that render
statutory language superfluous. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001).
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Moreover, Snider’s argument rests on a structural misreading of
§ 3624(g)(1)(A). Snider’s own calculation table reflects that he measures the
“remainder” against the original projected release date and aggregates all potential
credits over the entire imposed term, treating them as available for application at a
single point in time. (Dkt. No. 4 at 11.) That methodology assumes the imposed
term remains fixed and ignores the statute’s sequential application framework, under
which previously applied credits alter the remainder against which future credits are
measured.
Once the BOP applied 365 days of FSA credits toward early supervised release
pursuant to § 3624(g)(3), the projected statutory release date shifted from April 2,
2029, to April 2, 2028, and the remainder was correspondingly reduced. Section
3624(g) does not freeze the imposed term at its original length for all future
calculations. By anchoring his analysis to the original sentence and aggregating
projected lifetime credits as though presently available, Snider advances an
interpretation unsupported by the statutory text and inconsistent with the structure
Congress enacted.
Because Snider had not earned credits equal to the remainder of his sentence
on August 11, 2024, he cannot demonstrate a violation of § 3624(g).
B. 	BOP’s conditional placement date reflects a lawful application of the
statutory framework.
The record reflects that the BOP projected Snider would earn up to 775
additional FSA time credits during the remainder of his sentence. (Dkt. No. 7 at 4.)
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After accounting for the 365 credits already applied toward early supervised
release—the statutory maximum under § 3624(g)(3)—approximately 700 credits
remained potentially available for application to prerelease custody. (See id. at 3); see
also McLean v. Rivers, No. 3:23-CV-1750-G-BK, 2024 WL 665858, at *2 (N.D. Tex.
Jan. 26, 2024) (concluding BOP inmate was statutorily ineligible for further relief
because the BOP had applied 365 days of FSA time credit to his projected statutory
release date), rec. adopted, 2024 WL 666070, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 15, 2024).
The BOP then calculated the point at which Snider’s earned and projected
credits would equal the remainder of his term of imprisonment, as required by
§ 3624(g)(1)(A). Based on that calculation, it identified February 17, 2026, as his
“FSA Conditional Placement Date.” (Id. at 4.) Federal courts have consistently
upheld this methodology. See, e.g., Gutierrez v. Hijar, No. 5:22-CV-1231, 2023 WL
2317790, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 28, 2023); Maldonado v. Martinez, No. 2:23-CV-
00983, 2023 WL 8270640, at *1 (W.D. La. Nov. 6, 2023), rec. adopted, 2023 WL
8264495 (W.D. La. Nov. 29, 2023).
Importantly, the statute creates no entitlement to the application of projected
or anticipated future credits. Section 3624(g)(1)(A) requires that the prisoner “has
earned” credits equal to the remainder of his term before they may be applied. The
statute does not authorize the BOP to “front-load” credits or apply credits that have
not yet been earned. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(1)(A); Owens v. Rule, No. 4:24-CV-939-
O, ECF No. 9 at 2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 10, 2025); see also Maldonado, 2025 WL 476256,
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at *2. The use of projected credits to calculate a conditional placement date is a
planning mechanism—not a present entitlement to earlier transfer.
Snider cites no authority prohibiting the BOP from using projected credits to
determine a conditional placement date, nor does he demonstrate that the BOP’s
calculations are legally or mathematically incorrect. Rather, he contends that his
“Best Case Scenario” requires aggregation of all earned credits at a single point in
time. (Dkt. No. 9 at 5-6.) But § 3624(g) does not require such aggregation, and
nothing in the statute converts a projected eligibility date into an immediate right to
transfer. To the extent he seeks additional credit toward supervised release beyond
the 365 days already applied, that request is foreclosed by § 3624(g)(3).
Accordingly, Snider has not demonstrated any legal error in BOP’s calculation
or application of his FSA credits.
C. 	Snider’s claim is, in substance, an unreviewable challenge to a BOP
placement decision.
Although framed as a credit dispute, the substance of Snider’s claim is a
challenge to when he may be placed in prerelease custody (RRC or home
confinement). (See Dkt. No. 3 at 7.) That issue is governed not by § 3624(g), but by
18 U.S.C. § 3621(b), which gives the BOP sole discretion to designate an inmate’s
place of confinement.
Section 3621(b) expressly provides that: “A designation of a place of
imprisonment under this subsection is not reviewable by any court.” See 18 U.S.C.
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§ 3621(b). Courts consistently hold that placement in an RRC or on home
confinement constitutes a designation decision committed to BOP’s discretion and
insulated from judicial review. See McLean, No. 3:23-CV-1750-G-BK, 2024 WL
665858, at *2; Lawrence v. Warden of Seagoville, No. 3:24-CV-2731-N-BK, 2025 WL
1240765, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 4, 2025), rec. adopted, No. 3:24-CV-2731-N-BK, 2025
WL 1239725 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 29, 2025); see also Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224
(1976) (no constitutional right to placement in a particular facility).
Here, Snider effectively asks the Court to order BOP to accelerate his
prerelease placement date to August 11, 2024. That request directly implicates
BOP’s designation authority under § 3621(b), which this Court lacks jurisdiction to
review. Even if BOP had miscalculated credits, this Court could not compel earlier
RRC or home confinement placement.
III. 	RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should DENY the Petition for a Writ of
Habeas 	Corpus 	under 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	2241 	because 	the 	petitioner 	has 	failed 	to
demonstrate he is entitled to relief.
SO RECOMMENDED on February 13, 2026.
______________________________________
BRIAN McKAY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the
manner provided by law. 	Any party who objects to any part of this report and
recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served
with a copy. 	See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). 	To be specific, an
objection must identify the finding or recommendation to which objection is made,
state the basis for the objection, and indicate the place in the magistrate judge’s report
and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. 	An objection that
merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is
not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from
appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are
accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. 	See
Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996),
modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the time to file
objections to 14 days).
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