Hamza v. Noem

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
MOHAMED KHALID SNOUSI
HAMZA,
Plaintiff,
v.
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, in his
official capacity as the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security,1
Defendant.
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Civil Action No. 3:25-CV-01710-X
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Mohamed Khalid Snousi Hamaza (Hamza), a Libyan national, applied for
asylum in 2022 and completed his biometrics appointment in early 2023. Yet
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) hasn’t adjudicated his
application. He asks this Court to compel the Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security (the Secretary) to accelerate adjudication of his asylum
application. The Secretary moved to dismiss. (Doc. 10.) Because this Court lacks
jurisdiction, the Court GRANTS the Secretary’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 10) and
DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Hamza’s petition for writ of mandamus
(Doc. 1).
1 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), “[a]n action does not abate when a public officer
who is a party in an official capacity . . . ceases to hold office while the action is pending. The officer's
successor is automatically substituted as a party.” Congratulations on the Senate confirmation, Mr.
Secretary. But now you’ve been sued.
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I. Background
Hamza, a Libyan national, initially entered the United States with an F-2 Visa,
which was changed to an F-1 Visa when he enrolled in Wayne State University. He
moved to Texas and enrolled in the University of North Texas, where after graduation
in 2022, he filed a Form I-589 application for asylum with USCIS. He completed his
necessary biometric examination in 2023, but USCIS has not interviewed him or
further adjudicated his application. In fear of potential removal, Hamza petitioned
for a writ of mandamus to compel Kristi Noem, then-Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security, to direct USCIS to expedite his asylum application adjudication.
The Secretary moved to dismiss under Federal Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).
II. Legal Standard
Courts dismiss actions for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). When a 12(b)(1) motion is filed, a court must inquire
“into its own jurisdiction.”2
III. Analysis
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction having only the authority
endowed by the Constitution and that conferred by Congress.”3 “Without jurisdiction
the court cannot proceed at all in any cause . . . And when it ceases to exist, the only
2 Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507, 511 (5th Cir. 1980).
3 Scarlott v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 771 F.3d 883, 887 (5th Cir. 2014).
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function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the
cause.”4
Hamza seeks to establish jurisdiction through the Immigration &
Naturalization Act (INA), the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1361 (the “Mandamus Act”). None support jurisdiction over this matter.
A. The INA
Under the INA, Congress has expressly stripped federal courts of judicial
review over “any other decision or action of the Attorney General or the Secretary of
Homeland Security the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be
in the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security.”5
Because the timing of asylum adjudication falls within the discretion of the
Secretary of Homeland Security, the INA cannot confer jurisdiction over this matter.
To be sure, the INA states that “the initial interview or hearing on the asylum
application shall commence not later than 45 days after the date an application is
filed” and the “final administrative adjudication of the asylum application . . . shall
be completed within 180 days after the application is filed.”6 Even so, that is subject
to “the absence of exceptional circumstances.”7 Tellingly, the INA provides no
guidance for reviewing courts to determine whether a circumstance is exceptional.
And the Supreme Court has stated that “even where Congress has not affirmatively
4 Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 514, 19 L.Ed. 264 (1868) (cleaned up).
5 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).
6 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(d)(5)(A)(ii), (iii).
7 Id.
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precluded review, review is not to be had if the statute is drawn so that a court would
have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of
discretion.”8
Moreover, Congress failed to provide any penalties for USCIS if it should fail
to schedule an interview or adjudicate an application within the stated timeframes.
The Supreme Court has also explained that “the failure of Congress to specify a
consequence for noncompliance with [a timing requirement] implies that Congress
intended the responsible officials administering the Act to have discretion.”9
The statute further confirms the absence of consequences for noncompliance.
Section 1158(d)(7) states that “[n]othing in this subsection shall be construed to
create any substantive or procedural right or benefit that is legally enforceable by
any party against the United States or its agencies or officers or any other person.”10
Taken together, these provisions commit the pace of asylum application
adjudication to the discretion of the Secretary of Homeland Security under the INA.
Like other courts,11 the Court concludes it lacks jurisdiction under the INA to
adjudicate Hamza’s claim.12
8 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985).
9 United States v. Jones Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 64–65 (1993).
10 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(7).
11 See, e.g., Kizilyildirim v. Duam, 2024 WL 1722277, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 2024); Yilmaz
v. Jaddou, 2023 WL 7389848, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2024). Cf. Ayvali v. United States, 2024 WL
1319751, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2024).
12 This broad discretion also fits neatly within the Executive Branch’s inherent authority over
immigration as a species of foreign affairs. See John Locke, Second Treatise of Government ch. XII at
§§ 146–148 (1690) (“This therefore contains the power of war and peace, leagues and alliances, and all
the transactions, with all persons and communities without the commonwealth, and may be called
federative. . . . These two powers, executive and federative, though they be really distinct in
themselves, . . . yet they are always almost united . . . They are hardly to be separated, and placed at
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B. The APA
The Secretary of Homeland Security’s discretion under the INA similarly
forecloses judicial review under the APA. To be sure, “the APA establishes a basic
presumption of judicial review for one suffering legal wrong because of agency
action.”13 And where agency action is “unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed,”
the court “shall compel agency action.”14
But “that presumption can be rebutted by a showing that the relevant statute
precludes review, § 701(a)(1), or that the agency action is committed to agency
discretion by law, § 701(a)(2).”15 The Supreme Court has limited those exceptions to
“those rare circumstances where the relevant statute is drawn so that a court would
have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of
the same time, in hands of distinct persons: for both of them requiring the force of the society for their
exercise, it is almost impracticable to place the force of the common wealth in distinct, and not
subordinate hands; or that the executive and federative power should be placed in persons, that might
act separately, whereby the force of the public would be under different commands.” (cleaned up)); 1
Emer De Vattel, The Law of Nations ch. XIX, § 230, at 170 (Joseph Chitty ed., T. & J.W. Johnson &
Co. 1844) (1758) (“The sovereign may forbid the entrance of his territory either to foreigners in general
or in particular cases, or to certain persons or for certain particular purposes, according as he may
think it advantageous to the state. There is nothing in all this that does not flow from the rights of
domain and sovereignty.” (cleaned up)); 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England
251–52 (1765) (“By the law of nations no member of one society has a right to intrude into another.
And therefore it is left in the power of all states to take such measures about the admission of strangers
as they think convenient. . . [Once admitted] they are under the king’s protection; though liable to be
sent home whenever the king sees occasion.” (cleaned up)). The Founders Americanized these
principles by vesting the president with the executive power (which includes the federative power over
foreign affairs). U.S. CONST. art. II., § 1. But they also gave express power to Congress to establish a
uniform rule for naturalization. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. As a result, we courts will take seriously the
executive branch’s failure to follow Congressional deadlines when Congress removes the president’s
discretion and spells out the consequences for that failure. Absent that, we must abide by the
executive’s prerogative over foreign affairs.
13 Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 591 U.S. 1, 16 (2020) (cleaned up).
14 5 U.S.C. § 706(1).
15 Regents, 591 U.S at 17 (cleaned up).
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discretion.”16 And as stated above, 1158(d)(5)(A)(ii)–(iii) has “no meaningful standard
against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.”17
So the APA does not confer jurisdiction over this matter.
C. The Mandamus Act
Finally, the Mandamus Act provides no relief either. “Mandamus may only
issue when (1) the plaintiff has a clear right to relief, (2) the defendant has a clear
duty to act, and (3) no other adequate remedy exists.”18
“It is beyond serious dispute that mandamus pursuant to § 1361 is unavailable
to compel compliance with a statutory obligation when the underlying statute
expressly disclaims a private right of action.”19 Because § 1158(d) expressly disclaims
a private right of action, this Court has no jurisdiction over Hamza’s mandamus
claim.
Accordingly, this Court lacks jurisdiction and the case must be dismissed.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the Secretary’s motion to
dismiss and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Hamza’s petition for a writ of
mandamus.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 24th day of March, 2026.
16 Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 586 U.S. 9, 23 (2018) (cleaned up).
17 Id.
18 Wolcott v. Sebelius, 635 F.3d 757, 768 (5th Cir. 2011) (cleaned up).
19 Topuz v. Daum, 2024 WL 4282091, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 24, 2024) (cleaned up).
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___________________________________
BRANTLEY STARR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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