Frenotec LLC et al v. Texas Motorsports and Design LLC et al

3:25-cv-01457Txnd8 de dez. de 2025

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
FRENOTEC, LLC, et al.
Plaintiffs,
v.
TEXAS MOTORSPORTS AND
DESIGN LLC, et al.
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 3:25-CV -1457-X
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are Defendants Texas Motorsports & Design, LLC, Texas
Motorsports Design TMD, LLC, Texas Superbikes, LLC, Alexander Quintero, and
Jazmine 	Quintero’s 	(collectively, 	“Defendants”) 	motion 	to 	dismiss. 	(Doc. 	12).
Additionally, Frenotec LLC and David Roy (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed a motion to
dismiss the counterclaim. 	(Doc. 14). 	The Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to
dismiss. 	The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss the counterclaim and
GRANTS Defendants leave to amend the counterclaim within twenty-eight days of
this order.
I. 	Background
This case is about trademark infringement. 	Plaintiffs brought this action
under the Lanham Act because they claim Defendants used Plaintiffs federally
registered 	trademark—NORTH 	TEXAS 	SUPERBIKES—without 	authorization.
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants use of the terms TX SUPERBIKES and TEXAS
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SUPERBIKES are confusingly similar to Plaintiffs’ NORTH TEXAS SUPERBIKES
mark.
II. Legal Standard
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a complaint must “state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.”1 The complaint must allege sufficient facts “to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”2 And there must be enough facts for the
Court to be able to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.”3
In its evaluation, the Court construes the complaint liberally in favor of the
plaintiff, and accepts all facts pleaded in the complaint as true.4 	But conclusory
statements or legal conclusions are not credited.5
III. Analysis
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Lanham Act claims and Plaintiffs move
to dismiss Defendants counterclaim. The Court addresses each in turn.
A. Lanham Act Claims
First, the Court notes that Defendants moved to dismiss this case “[p]ursuant
to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a.”6 	Perhaps the attempt to file a state court
dismissal in federal court explains the scant briefing devoid of legal analysis, but
1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
2 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 50 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
3 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
4 Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000).
5 See Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678.
6 Doc. 12 at 1.
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either way, the Court is a federal court and operating under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 	Construing the motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the motion is lacking any
legal argument for dismissal. Defendants most cognizable argument—the trademark
is generic—is a question of fact not suitable for a motion to dismiss.7
“To prevail on a claim of federal trademark infringement under the Lanham
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq., a plaintiff must show (1) ownership of a legally
protectable mark and (2) a likelihood of confusion created by an infringing mark.”8
Here, construing the motion under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard, Plaintiffs must
only plead those two elements. 	The complaint is full of well pled facts to meet this
standard. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
B. Counterclaim
Second, 	Plaintiffs 	moved 	to 	dismiss 	Defendants’ 	counterclaim 	seeking 	a
declaratory judgment that the trademark is generic. Defendants did not respond to
Plaintiffs’ motion.
Under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”9 As it pertains
to a declaratory judgment counterclaim, if the counterclaim amounts to no more than
a recitation of a defense to the originally asserted claims, then the counterclaim is
7 See Am. Auto. Ass’n (Inc.) v. AAA Legal Clinic of Jefferson Crooke, P.C., 930 F.2d 1117, 1121
(5th Cir. 1991).
8 All. for Good Gov’t v. Coal. for Better Gov’t, 901 F.3d 498, 505 (5th Cir. 2018).
9 Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (cleaned up).
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redundant.10 Additionally, the Court has broad discretion in determining whether to
entertain a declaratory judgment action under 28 U.S.C. § 2201.11
Here, Defendants’ declaratory judgment counterclaim is only one sentence and
lacks anything other than their defenses to Plaintiffs’ claims.12 Further Defendants
pled no additional relevant facts as to their counterclaim. Because the counterclaim
is both redundant and fails to state a claim, the Court DISMISSES WITHOUT
PREJUDICE the counterclaim under Rule 12(b)(6).
IV. 	Conclusion
Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss, GRANTS
Plaintiffs’ 	motion 	to 	dismiss, 	and 	DISMISSES 	WITHOUT 	PREJUDICE
Defendants’ counterclaim.
Defendants 	are 	given 	leave 	to 	replead 	and 	cure 	the 	defects 	in 	their
counterclaim within twenty-eight days of the date of this order. 	The changes
Defendants may make in that pleading are limited to curing the defects this Order
identifies. Defendants may not add new claims or parties in the amended pleading.
10 See Pro Mineral, LLC v. Marietta, No. 3:21- CV-02773- E, 2023 WL 2410884 at *7 (N.D. Tex.
Mar. 8, 2023) (Brown, J.) (collecting cases).
11 See Winton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 287 (1995) (noting that the Declaratory
Judgment Act is “an enabling Act, which confers a discretion on the courts rather than an absolute
right upon the litigant.”).
12 See Doc. 13 at 6 (“Defendant seeks a declaration that Plaintiff’s Registered Trademark is
invalid and should be cancelled due to generic terms, functional descriptions, and unfair trade
practices.”).
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IT IS SO ORDERED this 8th day of December, 2025.
___________________________________
BRANTLEY STARR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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