Demus v. Director, TDCJ-CID

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
LLOYD ERIC DEMUS, #2378867, §
§
Petitioner, §
§
v. § No. 3:25-cv-1247-G (BT)
§
DIRECTOR, TDCJ-CID §
§
Respondent. §
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Lloyd Eric Demus, a Texas inmate proceeding pro se, filed an amended
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Amended
Habeas Petition (ECF No. 5). The District Judge should dismiss Demus’s Amended
Habeas Petition with prejudice under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 cases
and close this case.
Background
On January 13, 2022, Demus pleaded guilty to and was convicted of
aggravated robbery, enhanced, and continuous violation of a protective order two
or more times within 12 months in Cause No. F-2041501-R and Cause No. F-
2175986-R, respectively and sentenced to concurrent terms of 15 years’
imprisonment. State of Texas v. Lloyd Demus, F-2041501, F-2175986 (265th Jud.
Dist. Ct., Dallas Cnty., Jan. 13, 2022). On direct appeal, the Texas Fifth District
Court of Appeals affirmed the judgments with modifications. See Demus v. State,
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2022 WL 4376712 (Tex. App—Dallas Sept. 22, 2022, no pet.). He did not petition
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals for discretionary review, and there is no
indication in available court records that he pursued state habeas relief.
On May 14, 2025, Demus filed an application for habeas relief under 28
U.S.C. § 2254 in this Court (ECF No. 3), which he amended on June 16, 2025, in
response to a Court order. See Amended Habeas Petition. His Amended Habeas
Petition—the operative pleading—presents one ground for relief: that he is entitled
to a sentence reduction under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 for providing
substantial assistance to the federal government. Amended Habeas Petition at 6.
Legal Standards and Analysis
Under Habeas Rule 4, a district court may summarily dismiss a 28 U.S.C. §
2254 habeas application “if it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any
exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district
court,” id.,:
This rule differentiates habeas cases from other civil cases with
respect to sua sponte consideration of affirmative defenses. The
district court has the power under [Habeas] Rule 4 to examine and
dismiss frivolous habeas petitions prior to any answer or other
pleading by the state. This power is rooted in “the duty of the court to
screen out frivolous applications and eliminate the burden that would
be placed on the respondent by ordering an unnecessary answer.”
Kiser v. Johnson, 163 F.3d 326, 328 (5th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).
“[E]ven though the statute of limitations provision of the [Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)] is an affirmative defense rather than
jurisdictional,” a district court may dismiss a time-barred Section 2254 application
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sua sponte under Habeas Rule 4. Kiser, 163 F.3d at 329. Before doing so, however,
the district court must give the parties fair notice and an opportunity to present
their positions. Wyatt v. Thaler, 395 F. App’x 113, 114 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)
(quoting Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 210 (2006)) (alteration to original).
These findings, conclusions, and recommendation provide Demus fair notice, and
the opportunity to object (explained below) gives him a chance to explain why his
case is not barred under the AEDPA’s statute of limitations. See, e.g., Reyna v. Dir.,
TDCJ-CID, 2021 WL 6297752, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 6, 2021) (Horan, J.), rec.
accepted 2022 WL 60351 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2022) (Boyle, J.).
The AEDPA establishes a one-year statute of limitations for federal habeas
proceedings. See AEDPA, Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). Under the statute,
the limitations period runs from the latest of:
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion
of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking direct
review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application
created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws
of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented
from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly
recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively
applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims
presented could have been discovered through the exercise of
due diligence.
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28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).
In most cases, the limitations period begins when the judgment becomes
final after direct appeal or the time for seeking such review has expired. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(d)(1)(A). The “filing of a state habeas application ordinarily tolls the federal
one-year statute of limitations.” Flores v. Quarterman, 467 F.3d 484, 485 n.2 (5th
Cir. 2006). But a state habeas application filed after the limitations period has
expired does not toll the one-year limitations period. Id.
1. Demus’s Amended Habeas Petition is time-barred.
Demus’s convictions became final on October 24, 2022, after the expiration
of the 30-day period for seeking further review after his convictions were affirmed
as modified on direct appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 4.1(a), 68.2(a); Roberts v.
Cockrell, 319 F.3d 690, 694 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that “the conviction becomes
final when the time for seeking further direct review in the state court expires”). So
he had until October 24, 2023, to file his federal habeas application under §
2244(d)(1)(A), but he did not file the habeas petition here until May 2025,
rendering it untimely.
None of the other provisions in § 2244(d)(1) apply to postpone the October
24, 2022 accrual date. Demus does not allege that state action prevented him from
filing a § 2254 petition earlier, nor does he allege any newly recognized
constitutional right made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review. See
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B), (C). Finally, Demus fails to establish that the factual
predicate of his claims could not have been discovered with due diligence by the
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time his conviction became final under § 2244(d)(1)(A). He vaguely alleges that
“the information didn’t become useful until after the one year statute of
limitations.” Amended Habeas Petition at 9. But he does not allege that he lacked
knowledge of the factual predicate underlying his claim when his conviction
became final. Instead, he appears to argue he was unaware of the legal significance
of facts supporting his claim, which does not delay the start of the limitations
period. See Klein v. Franklin, 437 F. App’x 681, 684 (10th Cir. 2011) (The
“limitations period begins to run when the petitioner knows of the facts giving rise
to the habeas claim; it is not required that he or she understand the legal
significance of those facts.”).
Thus, Demus’s § 2254 habeas application—filed more than a year after his
conviction became final under § 2244(d)(1)(A)—is untimely absent equitable
tolling.
2. Demus is not entitled to equitable tolling.
The one-year limitation period also is subject to equitable tolling in “rare
and exceptional cases.” Davis v. Johnson, 158 F.3d 806, 811 (5th Cir. 1998); see
also Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 713 (5th Cir. 1999) (asserting that courts must
“examine each case on its facts to determine whether it presents sufficiently 'rare
and exceptional circumstances' to justify equitable tolling”) (quoting Davis, 158
F.3d at 811). The Fifth Circuit has held that “[e]quitable tolling applies principally
where the plaintiff is actively misled by the defendant about the cause of action or
is prevented in some extraordinary way from asserting his rights.” Coleman v.
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Johnson, 184 F.3d 398, 402 (5th Cir. 1999), abrogated on other grounds by
Causey v. Cain, 450 F.3d 601, 605–06 (5th Cir. 2006). A petitioner bears the
burden of proof to show he is entitled to equitable tolling. Phillips v. Donnelly, 216
F.3d 508, 511 (5th Cir. 2000).
Demus fails to meet the high burden of showing that equitable tolling applies
here. The Court can discern no basis to apply equitable tolling from the record.
Thus, the District Judge should dismiss Demus’s Amended Habeas Petition with
prejudice as untimely.
3. Demus’s Amended Habeas Petition is meritless.
Alternatively, Demus’s lone habeas claim—that the state court violated his
federal rights by not applying Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35—is meritless.
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, including Rule 35, do not apply in state
courts and cannot justify federal habeas relief for a state prisoner. See, e.g., Mosley
v. Cockrell, 2003 WL 21832120, at *10 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2003) (Ramirez, J.)
(denying § 2254 petition premised on failure to give an instruction required under
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure because “[t]he Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure have no applicability to petitioner’s state criminal proceedings”); James
v. Dir., TDCJ-CID, 2009 WL 484987, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2009) (rejecting
habeas relief for state prisoner based on Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
because “his state-court trial was not conducted under the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, and habeas corpus review of state court trials does not apply
these Rules”).
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Recommendation
The District Judge should sua sponte dismiss with prejudice Demus’s
Amended Habeas Petition (ECF No. 5) under Habeas Rule 4 and close this case.
SO RECOMMENDED.
March 23, 2026.
______________________________
REBECCA RUTHERFORD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the
manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and
recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being
served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). To be specific,
an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which
objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the
magistrate judge's report and recommendation where the disputed determination
is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the
briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written
objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal
conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district
court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Auto.
Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
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