Ryan v. United States Department of Justice et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
JENNIFER L. RYAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE et al.,
Defendants.
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Case No. 3:25-cv-00325-X-BT
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court are separate motions to dismiss filed by Defendants the
United States Department of Justice (DOJ) (ECF No. 27) and former Assistant
United States Attorney (AUSA) Karen E. Rochlin (ECF No. 26). Also before the
Court is Plaintiff Jennifer L. Ryan’s First Motion for Leave to File Second Amended
Complaint (ECF No. 31). As explained below, the District Judge should GRANT
Defendants’ Motions, DISMISS all of Plaintiff’s claims without prejudice, and
DENY Plaintiff leave to amend her pleadings.
Background
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed this civil action against the DOJ and former
AUSA Rochlin for alleged prosecutorial misconduct in United States v. Jennifer
Leigh Ryan, Case No. 1:21-cr-00050-CRC (D.D.C.)—a criminal action in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia arising out of events at the
U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. See generally Am. Compl. (ECF No. 20-1).
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Plaintiff pleaded guilty in the underlying criminal case to a misdemeanor charge of
Parading, Demonstrating, or Picketing in a Capitol Building, in violation of 40
U.S.C. § 5104(e)(2)(G), and served a 60-day prison sentence. Id. ¶ 6 (PageID 154–
55).1 In 2025, Plaintiff received a Presidential Pardon, and Rochlin was fired from
the DOJ. Id. ¶ 7 (PageID 155).
In her live pleading,2 Plaintiff claims Rochlin engaged in prosecutorial
misconduct to obtain a custodial sentence. See id. ¶¶ 15, 19. Plaintiff asserts that
the first prosecutor assigned to her case suggested probation as a possible
sentence, but Rochlin took over the case after Plaintiff pleaded guilty and pursued
a custodial sentence based on fabricated evidence, misrepresentations of Plaintiff’s
character, and minimization of Plaintiff’s cooperation. See id. ¶¶ 16–19. Plaintiff
alleges that Rochlin’s efforts to secure a custodial sentence constitute investigatory
tasks that fall outside a prosecutor’s role as an advocate and thus are not protected
by prosecutorial immunity. See id. ¶ 22, 30, 35–37, 43, 49, 50. She also avers that
Rochlin’s conduct was part of the DOJ’s retaliatory agenda against Plaintiff and
other criminal defendants who were charged in connection with events at the U.S.
1 Plaintiff’s complaint contains a preliminary statement and introduction with
paragraphs numbering 1–9. Following those sections, however, the paragraph
numbering starts over at “1” and continues for the rest of the complaint. To avoid
confusion, when the FCR cites a paragraph from the preliminary statement or
introduction, it also includes the PageID number imprinted on the ECF file stamp
at the top right of each page. Otherwise, the FCR uses the paragraph numbering
that begins on page 5.
2 With leave of court, Plaintiff filed her Amended Complaint (ECF No. 20-1), which
is the live pleading.
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Capitol on January 6, 2021. See id. ¶ 23. Plaintiff states that Defendants’ actions
caused her emotional anguish and damaged her reputation and career prospects.
See id. ¶¶ 27, 72, 75, 76.
Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts Bivens claims against Rochlin
for malicious prosecution, First Amendment retaliation, and violation of her Fifth
Amendment due process rights. See id. ¶ 8 (PageID 155). She also asserts claims
against the DOJ under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for malicious
prosecution, defamation and false light, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. See id. Plaintiff seeks $75,000,000 in compensatory and punitive
damages, declaratory relief, court costs, and fees. See id. ¶ 76.
Rochlin and the DOJ filed separate motions to dismiss all of Plaintiff’s
claims. See ECF Nos. 26, 27.
The DOJ argues that Plaintiff’s FTCA claims should be dismissed under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) because the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over those claims where (1) Plaintiff failed to sue the proper defendant;
(2) Plaintiff did not exhaust her administrative remedies; and (3) the FTCA’s
discretionary-function exception and intentional-tort exception bar her claims.
See DOJ Mot. 4–11 (ECF No. 27).3 The DOJ further argues that Plaintiff’s claims
for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress are
3 When citing to Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 26, 27), the FCR uses
the bolded page numbers at the bottom of each page.
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subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. See id. at 13–
25.
Rochlin argues that Plaintiff’s claims against her should be dismissed under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) because the Court lacks personal
jurisdiction over Rochlin. See Rochlin Mot. 5–8 (ECF No. 26). Rochlin also argues
that Plaintiff’s claims against her should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) because
(1) Rochlin is entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity; (2) Plaintiff’s claims
present a “new context” for Bivens and that “special factors” preclude extending
Bivens liability here; and (3) to the extent Rochlin is not entitled to absolute
immunity and a Bivens remedy is available, Rochlin is entitled to qualified
immunity. See id. at 9–40.
Defendants’ motions are fully briefed, and Plaintiff has moved for leave to
file a second amended complaint. See Mot. Leave (ECF No. 30).
Legal Standards
I. Rule 12(b)(1)
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) challenges a federal court’s subject
matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Federal courts are courts of limited
jurisdiction; without jurisdiction conferred by statute, they lack the power to
adjudicate claims. See Stockman v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 138 F.3d 144, 151 (5th
Cir. 1998). The Fifth Circuit recognizes a distinction between a “facial attack” and
a “factual attack” upon a complaint’s subject matter jurisdiction. Rodriguez v.
Texas Comm’n of Arts, 992 F. Supp. 876, 878–79 (N.D. Tex. 1998), aff’d, 199 F.3d
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279 (5th Cir. 2000). “A facial attack requires the court merely to decide if the
plaintiff has correctly alleged a basis for subject matter jurisdiction” by examining
the allegations in the complaint, which are presumed to be true. Id. at 878 (citation
omitted). If the defendant supports the motion with evidence, however, then the
attack is “factual,” and “no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff’s
allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial
court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims.” Williamson v.
Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav.
And Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977)). Regardless of the attack, “[t]he
plaintiff constantly bears the burden of proof that jurisdiction does exist.”
Rodriguez, 992 F. Supp. at 879 (“The burden of proof for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion
to dismiss is on the party asserting jurisdiction.”) (citations omitted).
“When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with other Rule 12
motions, the court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before
addressing any attack on the merits.” Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161
(5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (citing Hitt v. City of Pasadena, 561 F.2d 606, 608
(5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam)). Considering Rule 12(b)(1) motions first “prevents a
court without jurisdiction from prematurely dismissing a case with prejudice.” Id.
II. Personal Jurisdiction and Rule 12(b)(2)
In personam, or “personal jurisdiction,” refers to a court’s power over a
defendant’s personal rights and provides the authority necessary to issue decrees
that bind a specific defendant. See Jurisdiction, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed.
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2024); see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985). For a
federal court to hear a case, it must have personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
See, e.g., Lightfoot v. Cendant Mortg. Corp., 580 U.S. 82, 95 (recognizing that a
court must have “power over the parties before it (personal jurisdiction) before it
can resolve a case”); Guidry v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 188 F.3d 619, 623 n.2 (5th Cir.
1999) (“Personal jurisdiction is an essential element of the jurisdiction of a district
court, without which it is powerless to proceed to an adjudication.”).“Federal
courts ordinarily follow state law in determining the bounds of their jurisdiction
over persons.” Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 283 (2014) (Thomas, J.) (quoting
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 124–25 (2014)). This is because a federal
district court’s authority to assert personal jurisdiction in most cases is linked to
service of process on a defendant “who is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of
general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located.” See id. (quoting
Fed. Rule Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A)). Put differently, the Court can only exercise personal
jurisdiction if a Texas state court could do so. See id.; see also Point Landing, Inc.
v. Omni Cap. Int’l, Ltd., 795 F.2d 415, 419 (5th Cir.1986), aff’d sub nom., Omni
Capital Int’l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., Ltd., 484 U.S. 97 (1987).
Texas state courts may exercise jurisdiction if: (1) the Texas long-arm statute
confers personal jurisdiction; and (2) the exercise of personal jurisdiction
comports with the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., Seiferth
v. Helicopteros Atuneros, Inc., 472 F.3d 266, 270 (5th Cir. 2006). Because the
Texas long-arm statute authorizes the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the full
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extent allowed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court
need only determine whether exercising jurisdiction over Rochlin complies with
federal due process. See, e.g., Aviles v. Kunkle, 978 F.2d 201, 203–04 (5th Cir.
1992). Thus, the usual two-step inquiry “collapses into one federal due process
analysis.” See Sangha v. Navig8 ShipManagement Private, Ltd., 882 F.3d 96, 101
(quoting Johnston v. Multidata Sys. Int’l Corp., 523 F.3d 602, 609 (5th Cir.
2008)).
The Due Process Clause “constrains a State’s authority to bind a nonresident
defendant to a judgment of its courts.” Walden, 571 U.S. at 283. Physical presence
in Texas is not required, but a nonresident generally must have certain “minimum
contacts” with Texas “such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” See id. (citation modified)
(quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). A nonresident’s
contacts with the forum may be sufficient “minimum contacts” to assert either
general or specific personal jurisdiction—this case implicates only the latter.4 See
Seiferth, 472 F.3d at 271.
4 “‘Specific’ or ‘case-linked’ jurisdiction ‘depends on an affiliation between the
forum and the underlying controversy’” (i.e., an “activity or an occurrence that
takes place in the forum State and is therefore subject to the State's regulation”).
Walden, 571 U.S. at 283 n.6 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v.
Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011). “This is in contrast to ‘general’ or ‘all purpose’
jurisdiction, which permits a court to assert jurisdiction over a defendant based on
a forum connection unrelated to the underlying suit (e.g., domicile).” Id. Plaintiff
does not suggest that Rochlin is domiciled in Texas but only that Rochlin “targeted
harmful conduct at the forum,” and thus relies on specific jurisdiction only. See
Resp. 2 (ECF No. 32).
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In determining whether there are sufficient “minimum contacts” necessary
to assert specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, the Court
“focuses on the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.”
Walden, 571 U.S. at 284 (citation modified) (emphasis added) (quoting Keeton v.
Hustler Mag., Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 775 (1984). Only when a defendant’s “suit-related
conduct” creates a “substantial connection with the forum state,” is such
relationship sufficient to exercise jurisdiction consistent with due process. Id. Two
“related aspects” of this necessary relationship are relevant here. See id.
First, this relationship “must arise out of contacts that the ‘defendant
himself’ creates with the forum State” because “[d]ue process limits on the State’s
adjudicative authority principally protect the liberty of the nonresident
defendant—not the convenience of plaintiffs or third parties.” Id. (quoting Burger
King Corp., 471 U.S. at 475 and citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286, 291–292 (1980)). The Supreme Court has “consistently rejected
attempts to satisfy the defendant-focused ‘minimum contacts’ inquiry by
demonstrating contacts between the plaintiff (or third parties) and the forum
State.” Id. Put simply, a plaintiff’s contacts with a forum, however significant,
“cannot be ‘decisive in determining whether the defendant’s due process rights are
violated.’” Id. (quoting Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332 (1980)).
Second, the “‘minimum contacts’ analysis looks to the defendant’s contacts
with the forum State itself, not the defendant’s contacts with persons who reside
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there.” Id. “[T]he plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the
forum.” Id.
Where, as here, a defendant moves to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2) and no evidentiary hearing is held, “[t]he plaintiff
bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction but is required to present only prima
facie evidence.” Seiferth, 472 F.3d at 270. “In determining whether a prima facie
case exists,” courts “must accept as true the plaintiff’s uncontroverted allegations
and resolve in [the plaintiff’s] favor all conflicts between the jurisdictional facts
contained in the parties’ affidavits and other documentation.” Pervasive Software
Inc. v. Lexware GmbH & Co. KG, 688 F.3d 214, 219–20 (5th Cir. 2012) (citation
modified) (quoting Freudensprung v. Offshore Tech. Servs., Inc., 379 F.3d 327,
343 (5th Cir. 2004)); Stuart v. Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185, 1192 (5th Cir. 1985)
(“The court may determine the jurisdictional issue by receiving affidavits,
interrogatories, depositions, oral testimony, or any combination of the recognized
methods of discovery.”). But the Court need not “credit conclusory allegations,
even if uncontroverted.” Panda Brandywine Corp. v. Potomac Elec. Power Co.,
253 F.3d 865, 869 (5th Cir. 2001).
Analysis
I. The DOJ’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff asserts three claims against the DOJ—all tort claims under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671–2680. The DOJ
argues, among other things, that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over
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Plaintiff’s FTCA claims because Plaintiff failed to sue the proper defendant and
because Plaintiff has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. DOJ Mot. 4–6
(ECF No. 27). These arguments present a facial attack on the Court’s subject matter
jurisdiction. See Oaxaca v. Roscoe, 641 F.2d 386, 391 (5th Cir. 1981) (noting that
a facial attack challenges sufficiency of the complaint). Thus, all of Plaintiff’s
factual allegations will be accepted as true for the purpose of determining whether
the Court has jurisdiction over her claims. Id.
“In the FTCA, Congress waived the United States’ sovereign immunity for
claims arising from torts committed by federal employees.” Ali v. Fed. Bureau of
Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 217–18 (2008) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1)). But the
FTCA does not authorize a lawsuit against a federal agency, directly. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2679(a); Galvin v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 860 F.2d 181, 183 (5th
Cir. 1988) (“It is beyond dispute that the United States, and not the responsible
agency . . . is the proper party defendant in a [FTCA] suit.”). “Thus, an FTCA claim
against a federal agency . . . as opposed to the United States itself must be dismissed
for want of jurisdiction.” Id. (citing Gregory v. Mitchell, 634 F.2d 199, 204–05 (5th
Cir. 1981). Because Plaintiff asserts her FTCA claims against the DOJ—a federal
agency—rather than the United States itself, Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed
for want of jurisdiction. See, e.g., King v. United States Postal Serv. Agency, No.
3:24-CV-00492-S-BT, 2025 WL 607875, at *3–4 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 14, 2025)
(Rutherford, J.), rec. adopted, 2025 WL 607062 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2025)
(Scholer, J.), aff’d, 2025 WL 2683994 (5th Cir. Sept. 19, 2025); see also Baze v.
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Texas Att’y Gen. Child Support Div., No. 3:23-CV-112-X-BK, 2023 WL 2602770,
at *3 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2023), rec. adopted, 2023 WL 2604811 (N.D. Tex. Mar.
22, 2023) (Starr, J.).
Additionally, subject matter jurisdiction over an FTCA claim “is conditioned
on compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a), which declares that ‘an action shall not be
instituted’ unless the plaintiff has filed an administrative claim and either obtained
a written denial or waited six months.” Price v. United States, 69 F.3d 46, 54 (5th
Cir. 1995) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a)). Until those procedures are followed (i.e.,
administrative remedies are exhausted), “no court has jurisdiction to hear the
claim.” Taylor v. Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd., 661 F. Supp. 1341, 1350 (N.D. Tex.
1986) (Fish, J.). Relevant here, the failure to completely exhaust administrative
remedies prior to filing a suit under the FTCA is a jurisdictional defect that cannot
be cured by administrative exhaustion after suit is filed. See McNeil v. United
States, 508 U.S. 106, 112–13 (1993) (emphasis added). Stated differently, “[a]n
action that is filed before the expiration of the [written denial/waiting period], and
is thus untimely, cannot become timely by the passage of time after the complaint
is filed.” See Price, 69 F.3d at 54 (also noting that “[t]his requirement is
jurisdictional, and may not be waived.”).
In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that she filed an administrative
claim with the DOJ on May 5, 2025, “which remains pending” and she requests a
stay of the action until her FTCA claim ripens. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2, 69, 76 (ECF
No. 20-1). But Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on February 10, 2025, several months
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before submitting that administrative claim. See Original Compl., Feb. 10, 2025
(ECF No. 3). Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust prior to filing suit cannot be cured by
exhaustion after her suit was filed. McNeil, 508 U.S. at 112–13. Accordingly, this
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s FTCA claims because
Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies before filing this action.
For these reasons, Plaintiff’s claims against the DOJ should be dismissed
without prejudice.
II. Defendant Rochlin’s Motion to Dismiss
Rochlin moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for lack of personal jurisdiction.
See Rochlin Mot. Dismiss 4–5 (ECF No. 26). Rochlin contends—and Plaintiff does
not dispute—that Rochlin is not a Texas resident.5 see id.; see also Response 2
(ECF No. 32) (Rochlin “directly targeted Plaintiff in her home state”). Rochlin
further contends that “no action giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims” occurred in this
District. Rochlin Mot. Dismiss 4, 8. Rather, Rochlin’s only alleged contact with this
forum is that, during Rochlin’s prosecution of Plaintiff in Washington D.C.,
Plaintiff resided in Texas6 and allegedly suffered distress, reputational harm, and
business loss here. Id. at 7–8; Am. Compl. ¶¶ 4, 5 (PageID 154) (ECF No. 20-1).
Plaintiff asserts that this Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over
Rochlin because Rochlin “targeted Plaintiff in her home state” by authoring a
5 The certificate of service in Plaintiff’s Original Complaint indicates that Rochlin
has an address in Florida. Original Compl. 18 (ECF No. 3).
6 Plaintiff relocated to Florida in June 2025. See ECF No. 22.
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sentencing memorandum and filing it in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia. See Resp. ¶¶ 4, 5 (ECF No. 32). Plaintiff argues that the
sentencing memorandum “used Plaintiff’s Texas-based speech, business, and
reputation as aggravating factors” and was “disseminated by Dallas media outlets”
“trigger[ing] reputational harm, financial deplatforming and social exclusion
within Texas” and “support[ing] increased surveillance and watchlisting
originating from [Texas].” See id. But these allegations do not support the exercise
of personal jurisdiction over Rochlin.
Rochlin prosecuted the sentencing phase of Plaintiff’s criminal case—in the
District of Columbia and based on events at the U.S. Capitol. See Am. Compl. ¶ 6–
11 (ECF No. 20-1). Because of her criminal prosecution in Washington D.C.,
Plaintiff alleges that she suffered harm in Texas. Id. But to establish sufficient
“minimum contacts,” Rochlin herself must have contacts with this forum, not
merely with persons who reside here. See Walden, 571 U.S. at 285. Nor can the
Court exercise personal jurisdiction over Rochlin based on the unilateral actions of
“Dallas media outlets,” because personal jurisdiction cannot be based on the
“unilateral activity of another party or a third person[.]” See Burger King Corp.,
471 U.S. at 475 (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466
U.S. 408, 417 (1985)).
Plaintiff cites, without elaboration, Calder v. Jones in support of her
argument that this Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over Rochlin.
See Resp. ¶ 4 (ECF No. 32) (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984)). In Calder,
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a California actress brought a libel suit in California state court against a reporter
and an editor, both of whom worked for the National Enquirer at its headquarters
in Florida. Calder, 465 U.S. 783, 783 (1984). The plaintiff’s libel claims were based
on an article written and edited by the defendants in Florida for publication in the
National Enquirer, a national weekly newspaper with a California circulation of
roughly 600,000. Id. at 783, 785. The Supreme Court held that California’s
assertion of jurisdiction over the defendants was consistent with due process based
on the various contacts the defendants had created with California—and not just
with the plaintiff—by writing the allegedly libelous story. Id. at 785–86, 788–90
(identifying significant contacts making phone calls to “California sources” for the
information in their article; causing reputational injury in California by writing an
allegedly libelous article that was widely circulated in the State; and the “brunt” of
that injury was suffered by the plaintiff in that State). “In sum, California [wa]s the
focal point both of the story and of the harm suffered,” and jurisdiction over the
defendants was thus “proper in California based on the ‘effects’ of their Florida
conduct in California.” Id. at 789.
But the Supreme Court has since refined the “effects test” established in
Calder and clarified that jurisdiction cannot be based on the “random, fortuitous,
or attenuated” contacts a defendant has with a forum just because the plaintiff lives
there. See Walden, 571 U.S. at 286 (Thomas, J.). In Walden, the plaintiffs were
professional gamblers and residents of Nevada. Id. at 280. The defendant, Walden,
was a Georgia police officer working as a DEA task force agent at the Atlanta
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airport. Id. at 277. During a layover in Atlanta, Walden seized almost $100,000 in
cash from the plaintiffs. Id. at 280. Walden also drafted an affidavit to help the
government seek forfeiture of the funds. Id. at 280–81. The plaintiffs alleged this
affidavit was false and prepared with the knowledge that it would cause them
financial harm in their home state of Nevada. Id. at 281. The plaintiffs then sued
Walden in a Nevada federal court under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics
Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), alleging Walden “violated their Fourth Amendment
rights.” Id. But the Supreme Court unanimously held that the Nevada court could
not exercise personal jurisdiction over Walden. Id. at 288–289.
The Supreme Court explained that it was significant that all of Walden’s
relevant actions—the seizure of the money and the drafting of the affidavit—
occurred entirely in Georgia. Id. Also, Walden had never been to Nevada, had never
conducted business there, and had no physical presence in the state. Id. 289. The
only connection between Walden and Nevada was the fact that the plaintiffs lived
there and felt the economic “effect” of the seized funds in Nevada. Id. And unlike
the libelous article in Calder, which the defendants widely circulated to third
parties in California, Walden submitted his affidavit to the local U.S. Attorney’s
Office in Georgia; the affidavit was not “tethered” to Nevada in any way other than
the plaintiffs’ location. Id. at 290. “Because [Walden] had no other contacts with
Nevada, and because a plaintiff’s contacts with the forum State cannot be ‘decisive
in determining whether the defendant’s due process rights are violated,’” the court
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in Nevada could not exercise personal jurisdiction over Walden even if he knew the
effects of his conduct would be felt in Nevada. Id. at 279.
Similarly, in this case, Plaintiff does not allege that Rochlin has ever been to
Texas, established any presence here, or conducted business here. Rochlin’s “suit-
related conduct” was the prosecution of Plaintiff in D.C. for an offense committed
on Capitol Hill. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 7–10 (ECF No. 20-1); see also Walden, 571 U.S.
at 284 (“[S]uit-related conduct must create a substantial connection with the
forum.”). Rochlin’s conduct, including the filing of the “sentencing memorandum,”
occurred entirely in the District of Columbia. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 7–10. Rochlin’s
conduct is thus not “tethered” to Texas in any meaningful way other than Plaintiff’s
(former) residence here. See Walden, 571 U.S. at 290. Indeed, Rochlin’s
relationship with this forum does not arise out of any contacts that she herself
created—her connection to Texas is based solely on her contacts with Plaintiff. But
Plaintiff “cannot be the only link” between Rochlin and this forum. See id. at 284.
And even if Rochlin caused injury to Plaintiff in Texas, “mere injury to a forum
resident is not a sufficient connection to the forum.” See id. at 289–290 (“Calder
made clear that mere injury to a forum resident is not a sufficient connection to
the forum.”). Regardless of where Plaintiff “lives or works, an injury is
jurisdictionally relevant only insofar as it shows the defendant has formed contact
with the forum State.” Id. at 290. The “proper question is not where the plaintiff
experienced a particular injury or effect but whether the defendant’s conduct
connects [her] to the forum in a meaningful way.” Id. Rochlin’s conduct does not.
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Thus, Rochlin does not have the “minimum contacts” necessary for this
Court to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over her—Rochlin’s conduct in this
case does not create a “substantial connection” with this forum. See id. at 284.
Accordingly, the District Judge should dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Rochlin
without prejudice under Rule 12(b)(2).
III. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend
Also before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Second Amended
Complaint (ECF No. 30). By her Motion, Plaintiff seeks leave to file a second
amended complaint “to address deficiencies raised in Defendants’ Motions to
Dismiss [], incorporate newly discovered evidence, and clarify claims.” Mot. Leave
¶ 1 (ECF No. 30). Plaintiff asserts that the proposed amended complaint “cures
issues” raised in the Motions to Dismiss, “refines” the Bivens claim against
Rochlin, adds new “John Doe” Defendants, and “names the United States as the
proper FTCA defendant.” Id.
Generally, a pro se litigant should be allowed to amend her complaint before
it is dismissed. Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam).
But where a complaint is dismissed, without prejudice, for a jurisdictional
deficiency, a pro se plaintiff has no right to amend their pleading. See id. at 1054–
55; see also Evans v. Dillard Univ., No. CV 15-6841, 2016 WL 4208548, at *2 n. 3
(E.D. La. Aug. 10, 2016), aff’d on other grounds, 672 Fed. Appx. 505 (5th Cir.
2017). And leave may be denied where the proposed amendment would remain
subject to dismissal i.e., granting leave to amend would be futile. Varela v.
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Gonzales, 773 F.3d 704, 707 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Ackerson v. Bean Dredging
LLC, 589 F.3d 196, 208 (5th Cir. 2009)). The District Judge should deny leave to
amend for several reasons.
First, the proposed amended complaint still fails to allege any facts that
could support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Defendant Rochlin. See
Prop. 2d. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 18–20 (ECF No. 30-1).
Second, even if the United States were substituted as the proper defendant,
the Court would still lack jurisdiction over the proposed FTCA claims. As
discussed, the failure to completely exhaust administrative remedies before filing
an action under the FTCA is a jurisdictional defect that cannot be cured by
administrative exhaustion after suit is filed. See McNeil, 508 U.S. at 112–13
(emphasis added). Plaintiff’s Proposed Amended Complaint alleges that she
“submitted administrative tort claims” to unnamed federal agencies between
March and July of 2025. Prop. 2d. Am. Compl. ¶ 21 (“FCTA Claim Exhaustion
Table”). Again, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on February 10, 2025, before filing any
administrative claim, and she concedes that some claims in her proposed
amendment remain unexhausted. See Prop. 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 21 (requesting a stay
of the case pending exhaustion of administrative remedies). “An action that is filed
before the expiration of the six-month waiting period, and is thus untimely, cannot
become timely by the passage of time after the complaint is filed.” See Price, 69
F.3d at 54 (emphasis added). Accordingly, granting leave to amend to substitute
the United States as the proper defendant would be futile.
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Finally, the proposed amendment seeks to add unnamed “John Doe” federal
agents from the “FBI, DOJ, FinCEN, or related entities” as Defendants. See Prop.
2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 11, 12. But, as Rochlin and DOJ argue, the Court would lack
personal jurisdiction over these fictitious defendants, if joined. See Resp. Mot.
Leave Amend 6 (ECF No. 35); see also Sorrell v. Dallas, Tex. Bridge Shelter, Staff,
Bldg. 2, No. 3:08-CV-1065-G-BH, 2008 WL 3915347, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 25,
2008) (Fish J.) (“[N]either the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor any relevant
statute provides authority for joining fictitious defendants in this suit.”) (citing
Taylor, 661 F. Supp. at 1350)); Silver v. Perez, No. SA-20-MC-0655-JKP, 2020
WL 3790489, at *4 (W.D. Tex. July 7, 2020) (“Federal courts, furthermore, lack
personal jurisdiction over John Doe defendants.”). Moreover, because the
fictitious defendants are all purportedly federal officers acting under color of
federal law, the proposed 42 U.S.C.§ 1985 (3) asserted against them would be
subject to dismissal if leave were granted. See Proposed 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 21
(discussing wrongful conduct by Defendants who acted “under color of federal
authority”); Taylor, 661 F. Supp. at 1345 (“The law in this circuit requires dismissal
of claims brought under subsection (3) of § 1985 against federal officials if they
acted under color of federal law.”) (citing Seibert v. Baptist, 594 F.2d 423, 429 (5th
Cir.), modified on other grounds, 599 F.2d 743 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 918
(1980) and Mack v. Alexander, 575 F.2d 488, 489 (5th Cir. 1978)).
Except to the extent discussed above, the undersigned declines to analyze
the merits of the claims in Plaintiff’s live pleading or the proposed amended
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complaint. Because the District Judge should dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint without
prejudice on jurisdictional grounds, and because granting leave would be futile,
the District Judge should deny leave to amend. See Bazrowx, 136 F.3d at 1054–55;
Chapman, 969 F.3d at 248 (citing Smith, 393 F.3d at 595).
Recommendation
For the reasons stated, the District Judge should GRANT Defendants’
Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 26, 27) and DISMISS Plaintiff’s claims without
prejudice and without leave to file a second amended complaint (ECF No. 30).
SO RECOMMENDED.
February 26, 2026. ____________________________
REBECCA RUTHERFORD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
The clerk of court will send a copy of this report and recommendation to all
parties, and a party who objects to any part of this report and recommendation
must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy.
See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). To be specific, an objection must
identify the specific finding or recommendation, state the basis for the objection,
and specify the place in the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation where
the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by
reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific.
Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from
appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that
are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error.
See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir.
1996), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the
time to file objections to 14 days).
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