Huhtamaki Inc v. Lollicup USA Inc et al

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER – PAGE 1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
HUHTAMAKI, INC., 	§
§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	Civil Action No. 3:25-CV-0207-N
§
LOLLICUP USA INC., and 	§
KARAT PACKAGING INC., 	§
§
Defendants. 	§
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This Order addresses Defendants Lollicup USA Inc. (“Lollicup”) and Karat
Packaging Inc.’s (“Karat Packaging”) (collectively “Defendants”) motion to dismiss [18]
and motion to transfer venue [19]. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies both
motions.
I. O RIGINS OF THE MOTION
Plaintiff Huhtamaki, Inc. (“Huhtamaki”) is a Kansas corporation that manufactures
and distributes molded fiber food and beverage packaging, including a variety of cup
carrying trays. Def.’s Mot. Br. at 5 [19]. Defendant Lollicup is a California corporation
that sells food packaging, containers, tableware, cups, lids, cutlery, and cup carriers. Defs.’
Mot. Br. 7 [18]. Lollicup is a wholly owned subsidiary of co-defendant Karat Packaging,
a Delaware holding company. Id. Huhtamaki sued Defendants for infringing Huhtamaki’s
federal trade dress registration by incorporating ornamental aspects of Huhtamaki’s cup
carrying trays. Pl.’s Resp. at 1. [24]. Defendants moved to dismiss the suit for failure to
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER – PAGE 2
state a claim or, alternatively, seeks transfer from the Northern District of Texas, Dallas
Division, to the Central District of California, Los Angeles Division, where a separate
action by Defendants is pending. 	Defs.’ Mot. Br. 6 [19]. 	Defendants filed this second
action involving two other trade dress registrations owned by Huhtamaki nine days after
Huhtamaki filed the present case in Dallas. Id.
II. R ULE 12(B )(6) L EGAL S TANDARD
When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court must determine whether
the plaintiff has asserted a legally sufficient claim for relief. Blackburn v. City of Marshall,
42 F.3d 925, 931 (5th Cir. 1995). 	“When reviewing a motion to dismiss, a district court
must consider the complaint in its entirety, as well as . . . documents incorporated into the
complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” 	Funk v.
Stryker Corp., 631 F.3d 777, 783 (5th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). 	A
viable complaint must include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). To meet this “facial
plausibility” standard, a plaintiff must “plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A court generally accepts well-pleaded facts as true
and construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. 	Gines v. D.R.
Horton, Inc., 699 F.3d 812, 816 (5th Cir. 2012). But a plaintiff must provide “more than
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations omitted). “Factual allegations must
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER – PAGE 3
all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Id. (internal citations
omitted).
III. T HE COURT D ENIES THE M OTION TO D ISMISS
The Court holds that Huhtamaki’s complaint sufficiently alleges trade dress
infringement. 	Defendants argue that Huhtamaki failed to plausibly plead a likelihood of
confusion about the source of the parties’ respective goods. Defs.’ Br. 7 [19]. In particular,
Defendants argue that Huhtamaki pled no facts relevant to the Court’s likelihood of
confusion analysis, such as Huhtamaki’s channels of trade, the parties’ advertising
practices, and the sophistication of the parties’ customers. Id. at 14-17. However, at this
stage of litigation, a plaintiff need not prove actual confusion in its pleadings. Sadieboo,
Inc. v. MJ Tools Corp., 526 F.Supp.3d 285, 291 (W. D. Mich. 2021) (concluding that
“evidence of actual confusion is not necessary” to overcome a motion to dismiss a
trademark infringement claim). 	Rather, Huhtamaki’s complaint must allege facts that, if
taken as true, allow the court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendants infringed
on its trade dress registration. Id. Huhtamaki’s complaint includes facts alleging both the
possession of a protectable trademark and the likelihood of confusion. Pl.’s Resp. 2 [24].
For example, Huhtamaki alleged that defendants advertised and sold a similar product to
an audience that overlaps with Huhtamaki’s. Id. at 5-7. Thus, Huhtamaki has sufficiently
alleged facts to plausibly state a claim for trade dress infringement. Accordingly, the Court
denies the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER – PAGE 4
IV. L EGAL STANDARD FOR M OTION TO T RANSFER V ENUE
“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district
court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been
brought.” 	28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). 	The Fifth Circuit has adopted the private and public
interest factors first enunciated in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947), as
appropriate for the determination of whether a Section 1404(a) venue transfer is for the
convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice. See Humble Oil & Ref.
Co. v. Bell Marine Serv., Inc., 321 F.2d 53, 56 (5th Cir. 1963).
The private interest factors are: “(1) the relative ease of access to sources of
proof; (2) the availability of compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witnesses; (3) the cost of attendance for willing witnesses; and (4) all other
practical 	problems 	that 	make 	trial 	of 	a 	case 	easy, 	expeditious 	and
inexpensive.” In re Volkswagen AG, 371 F.3d 201, 203 (5th Cir.2004) . . .
(citing Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. [235,] 241 [1981]) . . . The
public interest factors are: “(1) the administrative difficulties flowing from
court congestion; (2) the local interest in having localized interests decided
at home; (3) the familiarity of the forum with the law that will govern the
case; and (4) the avoidance of unnecessary problems of conflict of laws [or
in] the application of foreign law.”
In re Volkswagen of America, 545 F.3d 304, 315 (5th Cir. 2008) (en banc). “[W]hen the
transferee venue is not clearly more convenient than the venue chosen by the plaintiff, the
plaintiff’s choice should be respected.” Id.
The 	Fifth 	Circuit 	has 	also 	rejected 	certain 	considerations 	as 	factors. 	Most
importantly, a plaintiff’s choice of forum is not a factor to be weighed but rather bears on
the movant’s burden of proof. In re Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at 315 n.10 (“A plaintiff’s choice
of forum, however, is not an independent factor within the § 1404(a) analysis. . . . it is
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER – PAGE 5
nonetheless taken into account as it places a significant burden on the movant to show good
cause for the transfer.”).
Thus, when the transferee venue is not clearly more convenient than the
venue chosen by the plaintiff, the plaintiff’s choice should be respected.
When the movant demonstrates that the transferee venue is clearly more
convenient, however, it has shown good cause and the district court should
therefore grant the transfer.
Id. at 315.
V. T HE C OURT D ENIES THE M OTION TO T RANSFER V ENUE
The Volkswagen factors do not favor transfer to Los Angeles. 	First, the public
interest factors do not favor either venue. 	Defendants operate and sell the allegedly
infringing product in both California and Texas. 	Pl.’s Resp. at 1-2 [22]. Thus, the local
interests in vindication do not clearly favor one venue over another. 	Furthermore, the
districts courts are equally familiar with federal trademark law, there is no question of
conflict of laws, and neither court faces unique administrative difficulties in trying the case.
Second, Defendants have not shown that it is clearly more convenient to litigate this
case in the Los Angeles venue. Defendants assert that the cost of attendance for non-party
witnesses and the availability of compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses
favor the Los Angeles venue over Dallas because neither party is based in Texas. 	Defs.’
Br. 11-15 [19]. 	Defendants further argue that several sales, logistics, and finance
employees from their headquarters in Chino, California are knowledgeable about the
factors determining likelihood of confusion. 	Id. at 13. 	However, Defendants also have
several finance and sales employees in the North Texas area that are subject to this Court’s
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER – PAGE 6
subpoena power. Pl.’s Resp. 2-3, 8-9 [22]. Defendants do not suggest that its employees
in California are uniquely knowledgeable about facts relevant to this case or that
Defendants’ employees in Texas could not provide the same information at trial. Thus, the
cost of attendance and availability factors do not weigh in favor of transfer.
Both parties conduct a substantial amount of business in the Northern District of
Texas. 	Furthermore, each party is subject to the same issues concerning the availability
and travel costs for witnesses from the parties’ respective headquarters outside of Texas.
Therefore, both parties will be inconvenienced if they choose to have witnesses travel from
California or Kansas to Dallas for trial. 	Defendants have not demonstrated any other
practical problems that might burden the trial. In re Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at 315. Thus,
defendants cannot overcome plaintiff’s choice of venue. Id. Accordingly, the Court denies
Defendants’ motion to transfer.
C ONCLUSION
The Court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and denies
Defendants’ motion to transfer venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
Signed January 6, 2026.
___________________________
David C. Godbey
Senior United States District Judge
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