Hawkins v. Wells Fargo Bank NA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
CHARLIE D. HAWKINS, 	§
§
Plaintiff-Counterdefendant, 	§
§
VS. 	§
§
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., 	§ 	Civil Action No. 3:25-CV-0201-D
§
Defendant-Counterplaintiff- 	§
Third-Party Plaintiff, 	§
§
VS. 	§
§
CINDY JO HAWKINS, 	§
§
Third-Party Defendant. 	§
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
Following the dismissal of pro se plaintiff-counterdefendant Charlie D. Hawkins’
(“Hawkins’”) claims in this removed action arising from the attempted foreclosure of a
residential property, Hawkins moves to vacate judgment on the grounds of fraud upon the
court, and defendant-counterplaintiff-third-party plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells
Fargo”) moves for summary judgment. For the following reasons, the court denies Hawkins’
motion and grants Wells Fargo’s motion. 	The court vacates the February 17, 2026 trial
setting and directs that Wells Fargo submit a form of final judgment for the court’s
consideration and entry.
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I
In March 1993 Hawkins and his then-wife, third-party defendant Cindy Jo Hawkins
(“Cindy Jo”), purchased real property located in Rowlett, Texas (the “Property”). 1 On
February 10, 2006 Hawkins and Cindy Jo refinanced the Property, obtaining a home equity
loan (“Loan”) in the amount of $181,532.00. In connection with the Loan, Hawkins and
Cindy Jo executed a Texas Home Equity Note (“Note”) and Texas Equity Deed of Trust
(“Deed of Trust”) in favor of World Savings Bank, FSB (“World Savings”). Wells Fargo
is the successor-in-interest to the Loan by virtue of a name change and merger.
After Hawkins and Cindy Jo defaulted on the Loan in May 2009, Wells Fargo sought
to foreclose. In 2017 Hawkins sued Wells Fargo in state court (“2017 Lawsuit”), alleging
that Wells Fargo was barred under the statute of limitations from foreclosing on the Loan.
On January 23, 2019 the state court entered a final judgment that allowed the foreclosure to
proceed. On April 28, 2022 Hawkins filed another lawsuit in state court (“2022 Lawsuit”),
this time alleging, inter alia, that the Loan violated the Texas Constitution and should be
declared invalid. 	By order dated December 20, 2023, the state court granted summary
judgment on Hawkins’ claims and dismissed the 2022 Lawsuit with prejudice.
The instant lawsuit followed. 	In his amended complaint, Hawkins again seeks to
1In recounting the factual background, the court summarizes the evidence in the light
most favorable to Hawkins and Cindy Jo as the summary judgment nonmovants and draws
all reasonable inferences in their favor. See, e.g., Owens v. Mercedes-Benz USA, L.L.C., 541
F.Supp.2d 869, 870 n.1 (N.D. Tex. 2008) (Fitzwater, C.J.) (citing U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v.
Safeguard Ins. Co., 422 F.Supp.2d 698, 701 n.2 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (Fitzwater, J.)).
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prevent Wells Fargo’s non-judicial foreclosure sale, alleging, inter alia, that the Deed of
Trust is void and that Wells Fargo lacks authority to collect on the Note. Wells Fargo asserts
counterclaims against Hawkins and third-party claims against Cindy Jo for judicial
foreclosure, trespass to try title, and a declaration that it is authorized to enforce the Deed of
Trust and proceed with foreclosure of the Property in light of the uncured default.
On May 21, 2025 the court, in pertinent part, granted Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss
Hawkins’ claims on the basis of res judicata. Hawkins v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Hawkins
I), 2025 WL 1457189, at *3 (N.D. Tex. May 21, 2025) (Fitzwater, J.). 	Hawkins filed a
motion for reconsideration, which the court denied. 	Hawkins v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
(Hawkins II), 2025 WL 2174513, at *3 (N.D. Tex. July 31, 2025) (Fitzwater, J.). 	On
September 24, 2025 Hawkins filed a motion entitled, “motion to vacate judgment: on the
grounds of fraud upon the court.” Wells Fargo opposes the motion and separately moves for
summary judgment on its counterclaims against Hawkins and third-party claims against
Cindy Jo—i.e., the only claims remaining in this lawsuit.2 The court is deciding the motions
on the briefs, without oral argument.
II
The court begins by addressing Hawkins’ motion to vacate judgment.
A
It is unclear from Hawkins’ motion which “judgment” he is seeking to vacate. To the
2Hawkins filed a response in opposition to Wells Fargo’s motion on November 7,
2025. Cindy Jo has not responded to the motion.
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extent that Hawkins is seeking to vacate a prior order of this court under Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(b), the motion is denied.
Under Rule 60(b), a district court may grant relief from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly
discovered evidence; (3) fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) a void judgment; or (5) a judgment that has been reversed or otherwise vacated. Rule
60(b)(1)-(5). 	The court can also set aside a judgment for “any other reason that justifies
relief.” Rule 60(b)(6). Relief under this “catch-all” provision is available, however, “only
if extraordinary circumstances are present.” Hess v. Cockrell, 281 F.3d 212, 216 (5th Cir.
2002) (quoting Batts v. Tow-Motor Forklift Co., 66 F.3d 743, 747 (5th Cir. 1995)). 	The
burden of establishing at least one of the Rule 60(b) requirements is on the movant, and a
determination of whether that burden has been met rests within the discretion of the court.
Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 173 (5th Cir. 1990),
abrogated on other grounds by Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 n.14 (5th Cir.
1994) (en banc) (per curiam).
In support of his motion, Hawkins contends that Wells Fargo and its attorneys
engaged in unlawful conduct in relation to Hawkins’ Loan application, which he maintains
“contained forged information,” P. Br. (ECF No. 47) at 2, and violated various procedural
requirements in connection with the foreclosure proceedings and the 2017 Lawsuit. But he
does not contend that Wells Fargo engaged in fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct
before this court or identify any ground that would justify relief under Rule 60(b). As the
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court has already explained,
“the 2024 Lawsuit is based on the same claims as were raised or
could have been raised in the 2022 Lawsuit,” that “Hawkins
could have asserted in the 2022 Lawsuit all of the claims that he
now brings in the instant, 2024 Lawsuit,” and that “Hawkins’
claims in the present case are barred by res judicata.” Hawkins
I, 2025 WL 1457189, at *3. Hawkins has not provided the court
with any reason to reconsider its decision in Hawkins I.
Hawkins II, 2025 WL 2174513, at *3. Nor has Hawkins provided the court with any reason
to reconsider its decision in Hawkins II.
B
To the extent that Hawkins is attempting by his motion to vacate the state-court
judgment entered in either the 2017 Lawsuit or the 2022 Lawsuit, this court lacks jurisdiction
to grant the relief Hawkins seeks.
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, it is clearly established that a district court lacks
jurisdiction to modify or reverse a state-court judgment. 	See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (explaining that the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine prohibits federal subject matter jurisdiction over “cases brought by state-court losers
complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court
proceedings 	commenced 	and 	inviting 	district 	court 	review 	and 	rejection 	of 	those
judgments.”) 	“Reduced to its essence, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine holds that inferior
federal courts do not have the power to modify or reverse state court judgments except when
authorized by Congress.” Truong v. Bank of Am., N.A., 717 F.3d 377, 382 (5th Cir. 2013)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Accordingly, to the extent that Hawkins,
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the “state-court loser,” is asking this court to review and reject the judgments entered in the
2017 Lawsuit or the 2022 Lawsuit, this court lacks jurisdiction to do so. Exxon Mobil Corp.,
544 U.S. at 284. 3 Moreover, even if the court did not lack jurisdiction under the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine,4 the court has already dismissed all of Hawkins’ affirmative claims on res
judicata grounds. 	He cannot, through a motion to vacate, recover damages related to
dismissed claims or claims that have not been pleaded. 	See P. Br. (ECF No. 47) at 8
(requesting, inter alia, a judgment “against Wells Fargo for actual damages, including mental
anguish and statutory penalties”).
Accordingly, Hawkins’ motion to vacate judgment is denied.
III
The court now turns to Wells Fargo’s motion for summary judgment.
A
When, as here, the summary judgment movant will have the burden of proof on a
claim, the movant “must establish ‘beyond peradventure all of the essential elements of the
3Hawkins also cannot collaterally attack either of the state-court judgments through
a motion under Rule 60(b). See, e.g., Ayati-Ghaffari v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2019
WL 1294180, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 8, 2019) (“This Court lacks jurisdiction and may not
consider a motion for reconsideration under Rule 60 challenging the validity of a state court
judgment.”), rec. adopted, 2019 WL 1275337 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 20, 2019); Bruning v.
Nationstar Mortgage, L.L.C., 2018 WL 1135417, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 8, 2018) (Toliver,
J.) (“[T]he Court cannot review the 2012 state court judgment under the guise of a Rule 60(b)
motion”), rec. adopted, 2018 WL 1083621 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 28, 2018) (Lynn, C.J.).
4The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar claims for monetary relief that are
independent of the state-court judgment. See, e.g., Uptown Grill, L.L.C. v. Camellia Grill
Holdings, Inc., 46 F.4th 374, 385 (5th Cir. 2022).
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claim[.]’” Bank One, Tex., N.A. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 878 F. Supp. 943, 962 (N.D.
Tex. 1995) (Fitzwater, J.) (quoting Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th Cir.
1986)). This means that the movant must demonstrate that there are no genuine and material
fact disputes and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Martin v.
Alamo Cmty. Coll. Dist., 353 F.3d 409, 412 (5th Cir. 2003). “The court has noted that the
‘beyond peradventure’ standard is ‘heavy.’” Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. Sowell, 603 F.Supp.2d
914, 923-24 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (Fitzwater, C.J.) (quoting Cont’l Cas. Co. v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 2007 WL 2403656, at *10 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2007) (Fitzwater, J.)).
B
Wells Fargo moves for summary judgment on its counterclaim/third-party claim for
judicial foreclosure. Cindy Jo has not responded to Wells Fargo’s motion. Although her
failure to respond does not permit the court to enter a “default” summary judgment, see, e.g.,
Tutton v. Garland Independent School District, 733 F. Supp. 1113, 1117 (N.D. Tex. 1990)
(Fitzwater, J.), “[a] summary judgment nonmovant who does not respond to the motion is
relegated to [his or] her unsworn pleadings, which do not constitute summary judgment
evidence,” Bookman v. Shubzda, 945 F. Supp. 999, 1002 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (Fitzwater, J.)
(citing Solo Serve Corp. v. Westowne Assocs., 929 F.2d 160, 165 (5th Cir. 1991)). Moreover,
[i]f a party fails . . . to properly address another party’s assertion
of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may . . . (2) consider
the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion [and] (3) grant
summary 	judgment 	if 	the 	motion 	and 	supporting
materials—including the facts considered undisputed—show
that the movant is entitled to it[.]
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Rule 56(e)(2), (3).
C
“To foreclose under a security instrument in Texas with a power of sale, the lender
must demonstrate: (1) a debt exists; (2) the debt is secured by a lien created under Art. 16,
§ 5(a)(6) of the Texas Constitution; (3) the debtor is in default under the note and security
instrument; and (4) the debtor received notice of default and acceleration.” NewRez LLC v.
Jones, 2025 WL 2174508, at *2 (N.D. Tex. July 31, 2025) (Fitzwater, J.) (quoting PennyMac
Loan Servs., LLC v. Beall, 2024 WL 5256503, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 2024) (Toliver, J.),
rec. adopted, 2025 WL 72105 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 10, 2025) (Boyle, J.)). 	Wells Fargo has
introduced undisputed summary judgment evidence that establishes each of these elements
beyond peradventure.
Wells Fargo has also produced undisputed evidence that Cindy Jo is a borrower on
the Loan, and, together with Hawkins, is a signer on the Deed of Trust; that the Deed of Trust
provides for foreclosure in the event of default; that Wells Fargo is a proper party to
foreclose because it holds the mortgage lien; that the Note, by its terms, has a “Maturity
Date” of March 1, 2021; that the Note’s “Maturity Date” has passed and, as a result, the Loan
has matured without the need for notice of default or acceleration, making all amounts due
on the Note; that Hawkins and Cindy Jo have not paid all amounts due and owed under the
Note; and that, as of November 26, 2025, the amount outstanding is $519,331.52.
Hawkins responds with several arguments relating to alleged defects in the Loan
documents and Wells Fargo’s failure to comply with certain procedural requirements in
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connection with the state-court foreclosure proceedings and subsequent lawsuits. 	But he
does not cite any evidence in the summary judgment record that would refute the clear and
objective evidence establishing Wells Fargo’s right to foreclose. Moreover, the court has
already addressed and rejected similar arguments in Hawkins I on the ground that they are
foreclosed under the doctrine of res judicata. See Hawkins I, 2025 WL 1457189, at *3.
Based on Wells Fargo’s undisputed evidence, the court concludes that Wells Fargo
has demonstrated beyond peradventure that it is entitled to summary judgment on its
counterclaim/third-party claim for judicial foreclosure.
IV
Wells Fargo contends that Hawkins is purposely abusing the judicial system to harm
and prejudice it by repeatedly filing frivolous lawsuits containing baseless and stale
allegations in order to delay foreclosure of the Property. 	It maintains that a pre-filing
injunction is warranted to prevent him from further abusing the legal process, and it requests
that the court
(1) permanently enjoin Hawkins from filing any other suits
relating to maters arising out of the Property, the foreclosure
sale of the Property, and/or eviction from the Property . . . unless
Hawkins retains an attorney licensed in the State of Texas or
otherwise authorized to practice in the Northen District of Texas
to represent his interests, or, in the alternative (2) issue a pre-
filing injunction requiring Hawkins to seek leave of this Court
and provide a copy of the proposed complaint, petition or other
pleading before filing any future action against Wells Fargo.
D. Br. (ECF No. 53) at 9-10. Wells Fargo also requests that, in order to fully protect Wells
Fargo, the court enjoin Hawkins from filing both state and federal lawsuits. The court denies
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without prejudice Wells Fargo’s request for a pre-filing injunction.
In Hawkins I the court noted that this is “at least the third lawsuit that Hawkins has
filed against Wells Fargo in an attempt to forestall foreclosure on the Loan,” and that “in
granting summary judgment in the 2022 Lawsuit, the Texas court already put Hawkins on
notice that the doctrine of res judicata barred his claims related to the Loan.” Hawkins I,
2025 WL 1457189, at *3 n.8. 	The court warned Hawkins that “filing further litigation
against Wells Fargo relating to matters arising out of the Property, the foreclosure sale of the
Property, and/or eviction from the Property may subject him to sanctions.” Id. at *3. Wells
Fargo has not demonstrated why this warning is insufficient to prevent Hawkins from filing
future litigation against Wells Fargo related to the Property. Accordingly, while reiterating
the warning it issued in Hawkins I, the court declines at this time to grant the requested
injunctive relief.
V
Wells Fargo seeks a judgment providing for the amount of the debt and “(i) providing
for the judicial foreclosure of such lien encumbering the Property; and (ii) providing an order
of sale issued to any U.S. Marshal, sheriff, or constable within the State of Texas, directing
him to seize and sell the Property as under execution, in satisfaction of the judgment.” D.
Br. (ECF No. 53) at 9. 	It also requests that the court issue a writ of possession against
Hawkins, Cindy Jo, and all persons claiming an interest in the Property under them, and it
requests that an order be issued directing the U.S. Marshal, sheriff, or constable executing
the order of sale to place the purchaser of the Property at the foreclosure sale in possession
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of the Property within 30 days after sale.
The court directs that, within 14 days of the date this memorandum opinion and order
is 	filed, 	Wells 	Fargo 	submit 	via 	Fitzwater_Orders@txnd.uscourts.gov, 	in 	Word 	or
WordPerfect format, a form of judgment for court review and entry that includes all the relief
to which Wells Fargo maintains it is entitled under the court’s rulings in this case.
The court vacates the February 17, 2026 trial setting.
* 	* 	*
Accordingly, for the reasons explained, the court denies Hawkins’ motion to vacate
judgment, grants Wells Fargo’s motion for summary judgment, and directs the entry of
judgment in favor of Wells Fargo.
SO ORDERED.
January 12, 2026.
_________________________________
SIDNEY A. FITZWATER
SENIOR JUDGE
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