Dahlheimer v. Commissioner of Social Security

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NOTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
LESTER JOHN DAHLHEIMER, 	§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
V. 	§ 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:24-CV-03142-D
§
COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY §
ADMINISTRATION, 	§
Defendant. 	§
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
AND
NOTICE AND ORDER
This case was referred to the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to provisions under
Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b). The Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation
of the United States Magistrate Judge are as follows:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
I. 	STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff Lester John Dahlheimer (“Dahlheimer”) filed this action pursuant to Section
405(g) of Title 42 of the United States Code for judicial review of a final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security denying his claims for a period of disability and disability
insurance benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act (“SSA”). On July 26, 2021,
Dahlheimer filed his application, alleging that his disability began on November 13, 2020.
(Transcript (“Tr.”) 14; see Tr. 182-88.) 	After his application was denied initially and on
reconsideration, Dahlheimer requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). (Tr.
14; see Tr. 62-80, 96-97.) On March 8, 2024, the ALJ held a telephone hearing and, on May 15,
2024, found that Dahlheimer was not disabled within the meaning of the SSA. 	(Tr. 14-61.)
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Dahlheimer then filed a request for review of the ALJ’s decision with the Appeals Council. (Tr.
180-81.) 	On October 31, 2024, the Appeals Council denied Dahlheimer’s request, leaving the
ALJ’s decision as the final decision of the Commissioner. 	(Tr. 1-6.) 	Dahlheimer subsequently
filed this civil action seeking review of the ALJ’s decision.
II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
Disability insurance is governed by Title II, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-434 of the SSA. In addition,
numerous regulatory provisions govern disability insurance. 	See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404 (disability
insurance). Although technically governed by different statutes and regulations, “[t]he law and
regulations governing the determination of disability are the same for both disability insurance
benefits and SSI.” Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir. 1994). The SSA defines a
disability as a medically determinable physical or mental impairment lasting at least twelve months
that prevents the claimant from engaging in substantial gainful activity. 	42 U.S.C. § 423(d);
McQueen v. Apfel, 168 F.3d 152, 154 (5th Cir. 1999).
To determine whether a claimant is disabled, and thus entitled to disability benefits, a five-
step analysis is employed. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. First, the claimant must not be presently
working at any substantial gainful activity. See id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). Substantial gainful activity
is defined as work activity involving the use of significant physical or mental abilities for pay or
profit. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572. Second, the claimant must have an impairment or combination of
impairments that is severe. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), (c); see also Stone v. Heckler, 752
F.2d 1099, 1101 (5th Cir. 1985). Third, disability will be found if the impairment, or combination
of impairments, meets or equals an impairment listed in the Listing of Impairments (“Listing”), 20
C.F.R. Pt. 404 Subpt. P, App. 1. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(iii), (d).1 Fourth, if disability cannot
1 Before moving from the third to the fourth step of the inquiry, the Commissioner assesses the claimant’s
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to determine the most the claimant is able to do notwithstanding her physical
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be found based on the claimant’s medical status alone, the impairment or impairments must prevent
the claimant from returning to his past relevant work. 	20 C.F.R. § 404.l520(a)(4)(iv), (f). And
fifth, the impairment or impairments must prevent the claimant from doing any work, considering
the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), age, education, and past work experience. Id.
§ 404.l520(a)(4)(v), (g); Crowley v. Apfel, 197 F.3d 194, 197-98 (5th Cir. 1999). At steps one
through four, the burden of proof rests upon the claimant to show she is disabled. Crowley, 197
F.3d at 198. If the claimant satisfies this responsibility, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to
show that there is other gainful employment the claimant is capable of performing in spite of his
existing impairments. Id. If the Commissioner meets his burden, it is up to the claimant to then
show that she cannot perform the alternate work. See Carey v. Apfel, 230 F.3d 131, 135 (5th Cir.
2000).
A denial of disability benefits is reviewed only to determine whether the Commissioner
applied the correct legal standards, and whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence
in the record as a whole. Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 564 (5th Cir. 1995); Hollis v. Bowen, 837
F.2d 1378, 1382 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion. Boyd v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 698, 704 (5th Cir.
2001). 	It is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. 	Id. 	A finding of no
substantial evidence is appropriate only if no credible evidentiary choices or medical findings
support the decision. Id. (emphasis added). An ALJ’s decision is not subject to reversal, even if
there is substantial evidence in the record that would have supported the opposite conclusion, so
long as substantial evidence supports the conclusion that was reached by the ALJ. 	Dollins v.
and mental limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4), (e). The claimant’s RFC is used at both the fourth and fifth steps
of the five-step analysis. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4). At step four, the claimant’s RFC is used to determine if the claimant
can still do her past relevant work. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). At step five, the claimant’s RFC is used to determine
whether the claimant can adjust to other types of work. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v).
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Astrue, No. 4:08-CV-00503-A, 2009 WL 1542466, at *5 (N.D. Tex. June 2, 2009). 	This Court
may neither reweigh the evidence in the record nor substitute its judgment for the Commissioner’s,
but it will carefully scrutinize the record to determine if substantial evidence is present. Harris v.
Apfel, 209 F.3d 413, 417 (5th Cir. 2000); Hollis, 837 F.2d at 1383.
III. 	ISSUE
In his brief, Dahlheimer presents one issue: Whether substantial evidence supports the
ALJ’s mental RFC determination because it does not include his finding of moderate limitations
with respect to Plaintiff’s concentration, persistence, and maintaining pace. 	(Plaintiff’s Brief
(“Pl.’s Br.”) at 3, 16-25.)
IV. 	ALJ DECISION
As set forth above, in a decision dated May 15, 2024, the ALJ concluded that Dahlheimer
was not disabled within the meaning of the SSA. (Tr. 14-26.) At Step One, the ALJ found that
Dahlheimer met the insured status requirement of the SSA through December 31, 2025, and had
not engaged in substantial gainful activity since November 13, 2020, the alleged onset date of his
disability. 	(Tr. 16-17.) At Step Two, the ALJ found that Dahlheimer had the following severe
impairments: “cardiovascular disorder, neurocognitive disorder, depressive disorder, [and] anxiety
disorder.” (Tr. 17.) Thereafter, at Step Three, the ALJ determined that Dahlheimer did not have
an impairment or combination of impairments that met or was medically equivalent to the severity
of any impairment in the Listing. (Tr. 17-19.)
As to Dahlheimer’s RFC, the ALJ stated:
After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that the claimant has the
residual functional capacity to perform medium work as defined in 20 CFR
404.1567(c) except that he can understand, remember, and carry out simple tasks
and instructions. . . .
. . . .
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. . . . The claimant has experienced syncope/lightheadedness, fatigue, and
malaise due to a cardiovascular disorder, with a history of heart attack. However,
he generally maintained intact strength, gait, sensation, and coordination. As such,
the claimant can perform medium work. He has also experienced symptoms of a
neurocognitive disorder, with depression and anxiety, including impaired memory,
limited attention and concentration, distractibility, poor focus, dyslexia, and trouble
with numbers. Therefore, he is limited to simple tasks and instructions.
(Tr. 19, 23 (emphasis omitted).)
At Step Four, the ALJ found that Dahlheimer was not able to perform his past relevant
work as “vice president, sales.” (Tr. 23-24.) Subsequently, the ALJ categorized Dahlheimer, who
was born on June 15, 1960, as an individual closely approaching retirement age on the alleged
disability onset date of November 13, 2020, as he was 60 years old.2 (Tr. 24.) 	In addition, the
ALJ noted that Dahlheimer had “at least a high school education.” 	(Id.) 	That said, the ALJ
described Dahlheimer’s transferable job skills as immaterial to his decision-making because the
Medical-Vocational Guidelines still support a finding of 	“not disabled.” 	(Id.) 	Finally, at Step
Five, the ALJ concluded that Dahlheimer could perform “jobs that exist in significant numbers
[with]in the national economy” based on his age, education, work experience, and RFC
assessment. (Tr. 24-25.) Specifically, relying on the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”), the
ALJ determined that Dahlheimer could perform the medium, unskilled work of a dietary aide,
laundry worker, and hospital cleaner. (Id.) Accordingly, the ALJ found that Dahlheimer was not
disabled as defined in the SSA from November 13, 2020, through the date of the decision. (Tr.
25.)
2 A person closely approaching retirement age is 60 or older. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(e).
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V. 	DISCUSSION
In his brief, Dahlheimer argues that the ALJ erred in formulating his RFC assessment by
not 	incorporating 	moderate 	limitations 	as 	to 	Dahlheimer’s 	concentration, 	persistence, 	or
maintaining pace. (Pl.’s Br. at 16-21; see also Tr. 18.) Specifically, Dahlheimer claims that the
ALJ “provides an analysis as to why those [mental] restrictions fail to meet the requirements of
any Listing,” but then “omit[s] any restrictions congruent with his finding of moderate limitations
in the final RFC without further explanation.” (Pl.’s Br. at 16; see also Plaintiff’s Reply (“Pl.’s
Reply”) at 1-5.) According to Dahlheimer, an ALJ’s finding of moderate limitations shapes the
RFC assessment; thus, such findings “need to be considered in the RFC.” 	(Pl.’s Reply at 1.)
Dahlheimer further contends that, “[w]hile the ALJ does discuss Plaintiff’s psychological
consultative evaluation . . . , he appears to improperly focus on mostly benign details . . . ,
sprinkling in some mildly detrimental findings to feign consideration of the severity of Plaintiff’s
cognitive decline.” 	(Pl.’s Br. at 16-17.) 	In sum, Dahlheimer argues that the medical evidence
“shows high congruence [with] Plaintiff’s testimony,” thus warranting remand. (Id. at 18.)
In response, the Commissioner argues that the ALJ properly considered and accounted for
Dahlheimer’s moderate limitations in the RFC determination. (Defendant’s Brief (“Def.’s Br.”) at
4-6.) The Commissioner states that “the limitations in concentration, persistence, and maintaining
pace reflect the ALJ’s rating of [Plaintiff’s] mental condition using the special technique required
by the regulations to evaluate the severity of his mental impairment at step two and step three of
the [five-step] sequential evaluation process.” 	(Id. at 4-5.) 	That evaluation under the special
technique, according to the Commissioner, is not considered an RFC assessment under the
agency’s formal policy. 	(Id. at 5 (quoting SSR 96–8P, 1996 WL 374184, at *4 (S.S.A. July 2,
1996)).) 	The Commissioner further states that, “[i]t is the ALJ’s RFC assessment, and not the
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broad preliminary finding at steps two and three, that constitutes the ALJ’s assessment of what,
specifically, the claimant is able to do despite his impairments.” (Id.) The Commissioner argues
that the ALJ properly accounted for Dahlheimer’s moderate limitations by specifying in the RFC
that he is limited to “understand[ing], remember[ing], and carry[ing] out simple tasks and
instructions.” (Id.; see also Tr. 19.)
Federal regulations require the ALJ to follow mandatory steps when evaluating the severity
of a claimant’s mental impairments, known as the “special technique.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.l520a(b);
see Hogue v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 3:24-CV-1926-K, 2025 WL 2232339, at *9 (N.D.
Tex. July 8, 2025). 	The ALJ, in evaluating mental impairments, first considers a claimant’s
symptoms, signs, and laboratory findings to decide whether they suffer from a medically
determinable impairment. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(b)(1). For most mental impairment listings,
the ALJ must evaluate the degree of functional limitation resulting from the claimant’s mental
impairments pursuant to criteria identified in paragraphs A and B or A and C of the adult mental
disorders contained in the Listings.3 See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 12.00; 20 C.F.R.
404.1520a(b)(2), (c). 	“Paragraph B” contains four broad functional areas: (1) understanding,
remembering, or applying information; (2) interacting with others; (3) concentrating, persisting,
or maintaining pace; and (4) adapting and managing oneself. 	See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c)(3)-
(4); see 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 12.00E. To satisfy the criteria in paragraph B, the
claimant’s impairment must result in one extreme limitation or two marked limitations.4 See 20
3 “Listing 12.05 has two paragraphs that are unique to that listing (see 12.00A3); [the claimant’s] mental
disorder must satisfy the requirements of either paragraph A or paragraph B.” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1
§ 12.00A.2.
4 The five-point scale that the ALJ uses to rate a claimant’s degree of limitation is as follows: none, mild,
moderate, marked, and extreme. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c)(4). “If [the ALJ] rate[s] the degrees of [a claimant’s]
limitation as ‘none’ or ‘mild,’ [they] will generally conclude that [the] impairment is not severe . . . .” 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520a(d)(1).
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C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 12.00(A)(2)(b). The ALJ’s written decision must incorporate
pertinent findings and conclusions based on the technique, along with a specific finding of the
limitation’s degree in each of the functional areas described. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(e)(4).
After the ALJ rates the degree of functional limitation resulting from any mental
impairment, the ALJ determines the severity of such impairment. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(d).
If the ALJ finds the mental impairment is severe at Step Two, then the ALJ must determine at Step
Three if it meets or equals a listed mental disorder in the Listing. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 1520a(d)(2).
If the impairment is severe but does not meet or equal a listed mental impairment, then the ALJ
must conduct an RFC assessment. See 20 C.F.R. 404.1520a(d)(3).
Applying the “special technique,” the ALJ, as relevant here, found that Dahlheimer had
moderate 	limitations 	in 	“understanding, 	remembering, 	or 	applying 	information” 	and
“concentrating, persisting or maintaining pace” as well as mild limitations in interacting with
others and adapting or managing oneself. (Tr. 18.) The ALJ went on to find that, “[b]ecause the
claimant’s mental impairments do not cause at least two ‘marked’ limitations or one ‘extreme’
limitation, the ‘paragraph B’ criteria are not satisfied.” (Tr. 19.) The ALJ further clarified that any
limitations identified under “paragraph B” were not an RFC assessment. 	(Id.) 	Then, the ALJ
determined that Dahlheimer had the mental RFC to “understand, remember, and carry out simple
tasks and instructions.” (Tr. 19.) Relying on the RFC opinions of two State Agency Psychological
Consultants (“SAPCs”), the ALJ noted that they “reported that [Dahlheimer] could understand,
remember, and carry out simple instructions, make basic decisions, perform simple tasks, interact
with others, and respond to changes.” (Tr. 23; see Tr. 62-69, 71-79.) In addition, the ALJ noted
that the SAPCs’ assessments were consistent with the evidence of record, including a consultative
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examiner’s notation that Dahlheimer “showed impaired recall, limited attention and concentration,
and low memory scores on objective testing.” (Tr. 23; see Tr. at 796-801.)
As noted above, Dahlheimer contends that the ALJ erred by not incorporating the moderate
limitation in concentrating, persisting, and maintaining pace found by the “special technique” into
the RFC assessment. (Pl.’s Br. at 16-25.) The Court, however, disagrees. In this case, the ALJ
clearly recognized in his RFC determination that he must evaluate Dahlheimer’s severe mental
impairments, which should “reflect[ ] the degree of limitation [he] found” in the “special
technique.” 	(Tr. 17-23.) 	The ALJ, in considering a range of medical evidence, accepted the
SAPCs’ assessment of Dahlheimer’s impaired recall and limited concentration, describing their
opinion (among others) as “persuasive.” (Tr. 23.) Then, relying on other substantial evidence in
the record, the ALJ implicitly found that evidence of Dahlheimer’s impaired recall and
concentration “[was] consistent with a limitation to simple tasks/instructions.” (Id.) Accordingly,
the ALJ proceeded to Step Five and identified three jobs that exist in significant numbers within
the national economy that Dahlheimer could perform. (Tr. 24-25.) Because the record shows that
the ALJ considered and incorporated Dahlheimer’s paragraph B moderate limitations into his
mental RFC assessment as a limitation to understanding, remembering, and carrying out simple
tasks and instructions, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s final decision. See Smith v. Colvin,
No. 3:13-CV-1884-N-BN, 2014 WL 1407437, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 24, 2014) (“[C]ourts in this
circuit have held that an RFC limited to ‘simple work’ reasonably incorporates a moderate or even
marked limitation in concentration, persistence, or pace.”); see also Cornejo v. Colvin, No. EP-11-
CV-470-RFC, 2013 WL 2539710, at *9 (W.D. Tex. June 7, 2013) (“[T]he limitations on which the
RFC is based are not required to be included verbatim in the RFC or in a hypothetical to the
vocational expert.”) (emphasis added). “This Court has repeatedly found that an ALJ does not err
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in failing to include in the RFC the specific words ‘moderate restriction in the area of
concentration, persistence or pace’ where the decision showed that the ALJ considered those
limitations in reaching the RFC determination.” Smith, 2014 WL 1407437, at *5.
In a separate but related argument, Dahlheimer also claims that the ALJ’s failure to address
moderate limitations in the RFC assessment “is exacerbated by [his] reliance on the VE’s testimony
that Plaintiff could work unskilled jobs at SVP 2[,] which contemplates an ability to carry out more
detailed, longer instructions.” (Pl.’s Br. at 21.) Dahlheimer, citing Kevin T. v. King,5 argues that
he cannot perform any job identified by the VE because the ALJ misstated his limitations. (Pl.’s
Reply at 3-4.) The Court again disagrees.
In this case, the ALJ acknowledged that, although Dahlheimer “suffered in terms of
cognition following his heart attack and resulting coma,” his psychological test scores support the
notion that he could perform the “types of simple-work jobs contemplated by the [RFC]
assessment.” (Tr. 22.) The ALJ relied on a consultative examiner’s report, which concluded that
Dahlheimer “presented with adequate attention and concentration[,] . . . completed all requested
tasks[; and] appeared to give his best effort.” 	(Id.; see Tr. 798.) Thus, taking that consultative
examiner’s opinion and other evidence into account, the ALJ found Dahlheimer’s claims regarding
his neurocognitive symptoms as inconsistent with the evidence of record. (Tr. 21-22.)
Moreover, Dahlheimer, in attempting to show that a direct conflict exists, draws an analogy
where none exists—conflating the judicial findings in Kevin T. with the facts at hand. As noted in
Kevin T., limiting a claimant to “short and simple” tasks is inconsistent with a job in the national
economy that requires level two reasoning where the claimant must “carry out detailed but
uninvolved” instructions. Kevin T., 2025 WL 678544, at *5 (emphasis added). “[D]etail and length
5 No. 3:24-cv-00268-BT, 2025 WL 678544, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2025).
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are highly correlated. Generally, the longer the instructions, the more detail they include.” 	Id.
(emphasis omitted). Here, there is no such direct or apparent conflict.
In this case, the ALJ confined Dahlheimer to “simple tasks and instructions,” not to short
and simple tasks and instructions. (Tr. 19.) From there, the ALJ, relying on the VE’s testimony,
identified three jobs in the national economy that Dahlheimer could perform—each of which has
a reasoning level of two or three. (Tr. 24-25; see also Def.’s Br. at 7.) Numerous courts within the
Fifth Circuit, as Dahlheimer acknowledges,6 have found that “there is no direct or apparent conflict
between an RFC limiting a [P]laintiff to ‘simple’ instructions and a VE’s testimony that a [P]laintiff
may perform work at a reasoning level of two.” Smith, 2014 WL 1407437, at *6. Indeed, “[t]he
weight of . . . authority supports a determination that a limitation to ‘simple, repetitive, and routine
tasks’ could support work with a reasoning level of two or three.” Id. Therefore, the ALJ did not
err, and remand is not required as to this issue.7
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Commissioner’s decision be
AFFIRMED.
6 See Pl.’s Br. at 22 (recognizing that “Kevin T. does also note that restriction to simple instructions and tasks
is not necessarily a conflict with SVP 2”).
7 Dahlheimer also argues that the ALJ erred by not adopting the VE’s response to a hypothetical that
contemplated him receiving “hourly reminders from lead workers or supervisors regarding procedures or tasks.” (Pl.’s
Br. at 24; see also Tr. 57-58.) According to the VE, “the frequency of such reminders would preclude all competitive
employment on a sustained basis.” (Pl.’s Br. at 24; see also Tr. 58.) Here, the ALJ simply posed that hypothetical to
the VE at the hearing before the ALJ because it “might also be supported by the evidence.” (Tr. 57.) In his decision,
however, which the ALJ drafted after the hearing, the ALJ did not find that the evidence supported that Plaintiff needed
to receive such hourly reminders as the ALJ did not include such a limitation in the RFC determination. (Tr. 19-23.)
Instead, as set forth above, the ALJ determined, based on substantial evidence in the record, that Dahlheimer had the
RFC to perform medium work, except he could only understand, remember, and carry out simple tasks and
instructions. 	(“Tr. 19.) 	“[An] ALJ’s [hypothetical] question to the VE is sufficient if it tracks the ALJ’s RFC
assessment and if the RFC assessment is supported by substantial evidence.” Fields v. Berryhill, No. 7:17-CV-00078-
O-BP, 2018 WL 3104236, at *6 (N.D. Tex. June 7, 2018); see Bordelon v. Astrue, 281 F. App’x 418, 422 (5th Cir.
2008) “Because the ALJ properly articulated [the claimant’s] specific functional limitations in the hypothetical
question to the VE, the hypothetical question was valid.”). Thus, the ALJ did not err in relying on the VE’s testimony
at Step Five that an individual with Dahlheimer’s RFC could perform medium level, unskilled jobs. (Tr. 57; see Tr.
24-25.) Accordingly, remand is not required as to this issue.
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NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT TO PROPOSED
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
AND CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO OBJECT
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), each party to this action has the right to serve and file specific
written objections in the United States District Court to the United States Magistrate Judge’s
proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation within fourteen (14) days after the party has
been served with a copy of this document. The United States District Judge need only make a de
novo determination of those portions of the United States Magistrate Judge’s proposed findings,
conclusions, and recommendations to which specific objection is timely made. 	See 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1). 	Failure to file by the date stated above a specific written objection to a proposed
factual finding or legal conclusion will bar a party, except upon grounds of plain error or manifest
injustice from attacking on appeal any such proposed factual findings and legal conclusions
accepted by the United States District Judge. See Douglass v. United Services Auto Ass’n, 79 F.3d
1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)
(extending the time to file objections to 14 days).
ORDER
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636, it is hereby ORDERED that each party is granted until November
24, 2025, to serve and file written objections to the United States Magistrate Judge’s proposed
findings, conclusions, and recommendation. It is further ORDERED that if objections are filed
and the opposing party chooses to file a response, the response shall be filed within seven (7) days
of the filing date of the objections.
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It is further ORDERED that the above-styled and numbered action, previously referred to
the United States Magistrate Judge for findings, conclusions, and recommendation, be and hereby
is returned to the docket of the United States District Judge.
SIGNED November 10, 2025.
____________________________________
JEFFREY L. CURETON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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