Thompson v. Fedex Ground

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
GARY THOMPSON, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
V. § No. 3:24-cv-2642-E-BN
§
FEDEX GROUND, § Consolidated with:
§ No. 3:24-cv-2786-E-BN
Defendant. §
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Gary Thompson filed a pro se complaint against Defendant Fedex
Ground alleging “abusive and pervasive . . . racial, offensive slurs and hostile . . .
treatment after engaging in protected activity.” Dkt. No. 3 (some caps omitted).
Thompson filed a second case against Fed Ex Ground two weeks later alleging
violations of Title VII related to his termination. Thompson v. Fed Ex Ground, No.
3:24-cv-2786-E-BN, Dkt. No. 3. The two cases were consolidated. See Dkt. No. 7. And
United States District Judge Ada Brown referred this lawsuit to the undersigned
United States magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)
and a standing order of reference.
And the undersigned enters these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
recommendation that the Court should deny the motion to appeal evidence and
motion to amend [Dkt. No. 16, 17] and the motion for summary judgment [Dkt. No.
12].
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Motions to Amend
Rule 15(a) allows parties to amend their complaints once as a matter of course
with certain limitations and otherwise requires that leave to amend be granted freely
“when justice so requires.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(1), (2). And, because this rule provides
a “strong presumption in favor of granting leave to amend,” Fin. Acquisition Partners,
LP v. Blackwell, 440 F.3d 278, 291 (5th Cir. 2006), the Court must do so “unless there
is a substantial reason to deny leave to amend,” Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 660
F.2d 594, 598 (5th Cir. 1981).
One such reason is futility: “If the [pleading], as amended, would be subject to
dismissal, then amendment is futile and the district court [is] within its discretion to
deny leave to amend.” Martinez v. Nueces Cnty., Tex., 71 F.4th 385, 391 (5th Cir.
2023) (quoting Ariyan, Inc. v. Sewage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 29 F.4th 226, 229
(5th Cir. 2022)).
The futility analysis “mimics that of a motion to dismiss.” Id. So, in a civil case,
“the court must determine whether the plaintiff has pleaded ‘factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged’ such that he has ‘“state[d] a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.”’” Id. at 388-89 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting, in
turn, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007))).
After the two cases were consolidated, the undersigned gave Thompson “leave
to file an amended complaint combining the claims from the consolidated cases
against FedEx Ground and asserting all “facts sufficient to show” that the claims
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asserted – employment discrimination or otherwise – have “substantive plausibility,”
so that the operative complaint contains allegations that show that Thompson is
entitled to relief. Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 12 (2014) (per curiam).”
Dkt. No. 9. And presumably in response to that order, Thompson filed an amended
complaint on December 13, 2024. See Dkt. No. 10.
Before the amended complaint was filed, Thompson had filed a motion to
submit evidence. See Dkt. No. 8. The undersigned construed it as a motion to
supplement the complaint by attaching additional evidence and denied it as mooted
by the filing of the amended complaint. See Dkt. No. 14. Thompson then filed a
document titled Motion to “Appeal” Evidence. See Dkt. No. 16. Because at this stage
of the case, it is not necessary to submit trial evidence or witness testimony to the
Court or to seek any rulings about admissibility of such evidence at trial, the
undersigned construes the motion as a motion to amend the complaint.
Thompson asserts that he should be allowed to submit the evidence because
his cases have been consolidated. See id. at 2. But Thompson has already been
provided the opportunity to amend his complaint to combine all claims from the
consolidated cases. See Dkt. No. 9. And he provides no explanation why he did not
attach any evidence required at this stage of the case to his amended complaint. So,
Thompson’s construed motion to supplement his complaint by attaching additional
evidence should be denied.
Thompson also seeks leave to amend apparently to add a reference to
additional caselaw. See Dkt. No. 17. The motion does not appear to allege any new
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claims, only additional legal arguments in support of Thompson’s existing claims. So,
the proposed amendment should be denied as futile.
Summary Judgment Motion
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is proper “if the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A factual “issue is
material if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action.” Weeks Marine, Inc.
v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 340 F.3d 233, 235 (5th Cir. 2003). “A factual dispute is
‘genuine,’ if the evidence is such that a reasonable [trier of fact] could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party.” Crowe v. Henry, 115 F.3d 294, 296 (5th Cir. 1997). The
Court is required to consider all evidence and view all facts and draw all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and resolve all disputed
factual controversies in favor of the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., Inc., 402 F.3d 536, 540
(5th Cir. 2005).
If “the movant bears the burden of proof on an issue, either because he is the
plaintiff or as a defendant he is asserting an affirmative defense, he must establish
beyond peradventure all of the essential elements of the claim or defense to warrant
judgment in his favor.” Fontenot v. Upjohn Co.,780 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th Cir. 1986).
The “beyond peradventure” standard imposes a “heavy” burden. Cont’l Cas. Co.
v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., No. 3:04-cv-1866-D, 2007 WL 2403656, at *10 (N.D.
Tex. Aug. 23, 2007); accord Wilson v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 3:18-cv-34-G-BN,
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2020 WL 825819, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2020) (“[B]eyond peradventure” means
“beyond doubt.” (cleaned up)), rec. accepted, 2020 WL 821034 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 18,
2020).
The Fifth Circuit has explained that “[s]ummary judgment assumes some
discovery,” Brown v. Miss. Valley State Univ., 311 F.3d 328, 333 (5th Cir. 2002), and
such motions should not “ordinarily be granted before discovery has been completed,”
Ala. Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Co., Inc. v. Am. Fid. Life Ins. Co., 606 F.2d 602, 609 (5th
Cir. 1979). So courts have denied plaintiffs’ summary judgment motions where they
were filed before the defendant answered or while the court was in the process of
conducting preliminary screening under § 1915. See, e.g., Johnson v. Gutierrez, No.
9:21-cv-46, 2021 WL 6693938, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 16, 2021) (concluding plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment was premature, where plaintiff filed it before
defendants had been served with process and answered), rec. adopted sub nom.
Rayford v. Gutierrez, 2022 WL 233194 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 25, 2022); Williams v. Taylor
Cnty. Jail, No. 1:20-CV-00266-BU, 2021 WL 3434992, at *1 (N.D. Tex. July 1, 2021)
(recommending denial of plaintiff’s summary judgment motion where judicial
screening remained pending, summons had not yet issued, and defendants had not
answered), rec. adopted, 2021 WL 3421416 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 5, 2021).
Because screening is still pending and defendant has not yet been served or
answered in this case, Thompson’s motion for summary judgment should be denied
without prejudice as premature.
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Recommendation
The Court should deny Plaintiff Gary Thompson’s construed motion for leave
to amend [Dkt. No. 16] and his motion for leave to amend [Dkt. No. 17] as futile and
deny his motion for summary judgment [Dkt. No. 12] without prejudice as premature.
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on
all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these
findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections
within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV.
P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or
recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and
specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation
where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by
reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure
to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the
factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or
adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v.
United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
DATED: January 20, 2026
_________________________________________
DAVID L. HORAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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