Amazon Content Services LLC et al v. Freemon et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
AMAZON CONTENT SERVICES, LLC, §
et al., §
PLAINTIFFS, §
§ CASE NO. 3:24-CV-733-L (BK)
v. §
§
WILLIAM FREEMON,
et al., §
DEFENDANTS. §
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and the district judge’s Order of Reference, Doc. 36, this
matter was referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for pretrial management. Before the
Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Due to Lack of
Standing,1 Doc. 87. For the reasons outlined below, Defendant’s motion should be DENIED.
1 The instant motion is untimely, having been filed many months after the expiration of the
Court’s deadline to file Freemon’s amended answer or risk default judgment, Doc. 24 at 3, and
after the Clerk’s entry of default against Freemon and his co-defendants, Doc. 55. See the
undersigned’s Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation on Defendant’s Motion to Set Aside
Clerk’s Entry of Default, Doc. 83, also filed this day. And while the undersigned recommends
that Freemon’s motion to set aside default be denied, the Court is nevertheless obliged to
consider his arguments that the Court lacks jurisdiction. See Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S.
500, 506 (2006) (“The objection that a federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, see FED.
RULE CIV. PROC. 12(b)(1), may be raised by a party, or by a court on its own initiative, at any
stage in the litigation, even after trial and the entry of judgment.”).
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I. BACKGROUND
In this copyright infringement action, Plaintiffs—producers and distributors of filmed
entertainment—allege that Defendant William Freemon (“Freemon”) and his company, Freemon
Technology Industries LLC (“FTI LLC”), operate “an extensive and commercially scaled
network of illegal streaming services” that infringe upon Plaintiffs’ copyrighted works on a
“massive scale.” Doc. 1, ¶¶ 3, 41.
Plaintiffs assert that Freemon’s infringement began when, between 2016 and 2019, he
sold “illegally modified Fire TV Stick devices” through two websites: firesticksloaded.biz and
firesticksloaded.com (the “Firesticks Loaded websites”). Doc. 1, ¶ 32. According to the
complaint, these devices connected to a user’s television and enabled them to access
unauthorized content. Doc. 1, ¶ 32. Plaintiffs further allege that Freemon promoted the devices
on his personal Facebook and Twitter accounts, advertising them as “loaded” and “jailbroken”
and directing buyers to the Firesticks Loaded websites. Doc. 1, ¶¶ 33–34 (Figs. 2–3). Records
for firesticksloaded.biz reportedly list William Freemon as the website’s registrant and the listed
address matches the principal place of business for FTI LLC and Freemon’s alleged current
residence. Doc. 1, ¶ 35 (Fig. 4).
According to Plaintiffs, Freemon’s connection to these early Firesticks Loaded websites
ultimately revealed his role in a “web of online infringing domains and services.” Doc. 1, ¶ 37.
In 2020, Freemon allegedly transitioned his early business model and began promoting a live TV
subscription alternative. Doc. 1, ¶ 43. Plaintiffs contend that, since that time, Freemon has
owned and operated, or continues to own and operate, four unauthorized online streaming
services—Streaming TV Now, TV Nitro, Instant IPTV, and Cash App IPTV—along with a
reseller service, Live TV Resellers (collectively, the “Accused Services”). Doc. 1, ¶ 20.
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Plaintiffs allege that the Accused Services provide users access to thousands of live television
channels through an Internet Protocol Television (“IPTV”) service2 and more than 27,000
movies and 9,000 television series through a video-on-demand (“VOD”) service, including
works identified by Plaintiffs as their copyrighted content. Doc. 1, ¶ 20.
Based on these alleged activities, Plaintiffs assert claims for direct and secondary
copyright infringement under the Copyright Act (17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.) against Freemon and
the websites and domains through which he allegedly offers the infringing services. Doc. 1, ¶¶
75-108. Freemon, proceeding without the assistance of counsel, moves to dismiss the complaint
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on grounds that Plaintiffs lack Constitutional standing to
assert their claims.3 Doc. 87. Plaintiffs have filed a response, Doc. 103, and the time for
Freemon to file a reply has long since expired. See N.D. Tex. Local Rule 7.1(f) (permitting a
reply brief within 14 days after a response is filed). Accordingly, the motion is ripe for review.
II. APPLICABLE LAW
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) challenges a federal court’s subject matter
jurisdiction. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1). “A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate [it].” Home
Builders Ass’n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998) (citation
omitted). In ruling on a 12(b)(1) motion, the court may base its disposition on “(1) the complaint
2 Evidence submitted by Plaintiffs describes IPTV as “a way to deliver pre-programmed linear
channels of television content over the internet, as opposed to traditional cable, satellite or
terrestrial formats.” Doc. 76-5, ¶ 5 n.2.
3 Although Freemon moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(h)(3), that rule addresses the Court’s continuing obligation to dismiss an action if
at any time it determines that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking. Doc. 87; see FED. R. CIV. P.
12(h)(3). Because Rule 12(b)(1) is the proper procedural vehicle for a party seeking to dismiss
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court construes the motion as brought under 12(b)(1).
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alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by the undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the
complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of disputed facts.” Lane
v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548, 557 (5th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). The party asserting
jurisdiction “constantly bears the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact exist.” Raj v. La.
State Univ., 714 F.3d 322, 327 (5th Cir. 2013).
Article III of the Constitution confines the subject-matter jurisdiction of federal courts to
the resolution of “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. “For there to be a case
or controversy under Article III, the plaintiff must have a ‘personal stake’ in the case—in other
words, standing.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423 (2021) (citing Raines v. Byrd,
521 U.S. 811, 820 (1997)). To demonstrate Article III standing, the party invoking federal
jurisdiction must show “(i) that he suffered an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and
actual or imminent; (ii) that the injury was likely caused by the defendant; and (iii) that the injury
would likely be redressed by judicial relief.” Id. (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
561 (1992)). Moreover, a plaintiff who seeks injunctive relief must also show “a significant
possibility of future harm; it is insufficient to demonstrate only past injury.” Segovia v. Admiral
Realty, Inc., No. 21-CV-2487, 2022 WL 3104849, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 4, 2022) (Lindsay, J.)
(citing O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495 (1974)).
“[E]ach element of Article III standing must be supported in the same way as any other
matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, with the same evidentiary requirements
at that stage of litigation.” Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Dep’t Treas., 946 F.3d 649, 655 (5th
Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). Thus, at the pleading stage, the party invoking jurisdiction must
“clearly . . . allege facts demonstrating” each element. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 339
(2016), as revised (May 24, 2016) (citation omitted). “Failure to establish any one [of the
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elements] deprives the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear the suit.” Rivera v. Wyeth-Ayerst
Labs., 283 F.3d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 2002).
III. ANALYSIS
Freemon’s argument that Plaintiffs’ lack Article III standing centers on the causation
requirement. Doc. 87 at 1-2. Specifically, Freemon argues that Plaintiffs have failed to “connect
him to any infringing activity” and therefore have not shown any “concrete or particularized
injury [that is] traceable to him.” Doc. 87 at 1; Doc. 88 at 2. The Court disagrees.
To satisfy the standing doctrine’s causation requirement, a plaintiff’s alleged injury must
be “fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and not the result of the
independent action of some third party not before the court.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (cleaned
up). Although Article III requires a “causal connection between the injury and the conduct
complained of,” the defendant’s actions need not be “the very last step in the chain of causation.”
Id; Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 169 (1997). Nor is a showing of proximate cause required.
Inclusive Cmtys., 946 F.3d at 655. “Causation, for example, isn’t precluded where the
defendant’s actions produce a ‘determinative or coercive effect upon the action of someone else,’
resulting in injury.” Id. (quoting Bennett, 520 U.S. at 169). To satisfy the traceability
requirement and survive a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, “plaintiffs must only establish
a line of causation between defendants’ action[s] and their alleged harm that is more than
attenuated.’” Turnbow v. Life Partners, Inc., No. 3:11-CV-1030, 2012 WL 4473080, at *6 (N.D.
Tex. Sept. 28, 2012) (Lynn, J.) (citing Maya v. Celotex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 170 (9th Cir.
2011)).
Here, Plaintiffs have adequately alleged concrete and particularized injuries that are fairly
traceable to Freemon’s conduct. The complaint alleges that Freemon “owns and operates”
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several IPTV services which offer “similar infringing content”: (1) Streaming TV Now; (2)
Instant IPTV; (3) Cash App IPTV; (4) Nitro TV; and (5) Live TV Resellers (collectively, the
“Accused Services”). Doc. 1, ¶ 37. Given the scope and structure of the alleged operation,
limited background regarding how the Accused Services function is helpful to assessing their
alleged connection to Freemon. The operation of the Accused Services is described in detail in
the declaration of Plaintiffs’ “IPTV expert,” Nigel Jones. Doc. 92-1, ¶¶ 10-16 (Pls.’ App’x 18).
According to Jones, each of the Accused Services maintained a “front-end website”
which included a homepage that “described the Service’s content offerings and pricing structure
and linked to the Services’ purchase page.” Doc. 92-1, ¶ 11. Once a customer paid for a
subscription, the Service’s front-end website would provide the user access to the Services’ web
player through a link or would direct the user to download a media-player application. Doc. 92-
1, ¶ 11. Users who clicked the web player link on three of the Accused Services’ front-end
websites (Streaming TV Now, Instant IPTV, and Cash App IPTV) would be taken to a different
domain: stncloud.ltd.4 Doc. 92-1, ¶ 12. Alternatively, users who downloaded a third-party
media-player application were instructed to connect the media-player to a “socket,”
stnlive.ltd.80, which in turn connected the user back to the IPTV service’s (e.g., Streaming TV
Now’s) back-end server. Doc. 92-1, ¶ 12. Plaintiffs allege that the “back-end” domain
(stncloud.ltd) and “back-end” server (stnlive.ltd.80) are where subscribers reached the infringing
content. Doc. 91 at 6. Once subscribers entered the subscription credentials provided by the
Accused Services’ front-end websites into the back-end server or domain, they were purportedly
4 The fourth Accused Service, TV Nitro, did not have a link to a web player on its website but is
alleged to have been an early iteration of Streaming TV Now, which introduced the web player
streaming option in 2021. Doc. 92-2, ¶ 12 n.5.
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granted access to “thousands” of live channels and video on demand content, including more
than 27,000 movies and 9,000 television series. Doc. 1, ¶ 6.
Plaintiffs have also alleged extensive facts that show Freemon owned and operated the
Accused Services. First, as Plaintiffs point out, Freemon admitted in a court filing that he owned
Streaming TV Now’s front-end domain until at least September 2021. See Doc. 27 at 2.
Although he alleges that he transferred ownership of the domain in September 2021, Plaintiffs
argue that other facts, along with his failure to produce evidence of the transfer, suggest that he
retained control of the domain after that time. Doc. 103 at 11. In particular, Plaintiffs allege that
one of Freemon’s “Firesticks Loaded” websites, which was registered under his name and
address and which he actively promoted on his personal social media accounts, included a link to
Streaming TV Now on its homepage until it went offline in late 2022. Doc. 103 at 11.
Plaintiffs also point to evidence from the Accused Services’ themselves, which indicate
Freemon’s involvement. Doc. 103 at 11; Doc. 92-1, ¶¶ 56-62. First, according to Jones, all of
the Accused Services’ tutorial pages included an instructional video titled “Amazon One-Click
Purchase Failure Fix,” during which the video’s narrator logs into an Amazon account under the
name “William Freemon.” Doc. 92-1, ¶ 61. Moreover, screenshots of the Accused Services’
homepages show that Streaming TV Now, Instant IPTV, CashApp IPTV, and Nitro TV all
advertised an identical pricing structure and used identical language to describe their content
packages. See Doc. 76-5 at 85-88 (Pls.’ Ex. 16); Doc. 76-6 at 2-35 (Pls.’ Exs. 17-21).
Jones also notes multiple instances in which the Services “referred to each other as
interchangeable versions of the same service.” Doc. 92-1, ¶ 38. For example, in 2021, TV Nitro
announced its move to a new site which linked to Instant IPTV. See Doc. 76-5 at 73-74 (Pls.’
Ex. 13). In 2022, Instant IPTV’s homepage referred to its service as “Streaming TV Now,” and
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in 2024, Cash App TV likewise inadvertently identified itself on its homepage as Streaming TV
Now. See Doc. 76-5 at 85-88 (Pls. Ex. 16); Doc. 76-5 at 23, ¶ 36. Similarly, in 2021, both
Streaming TV Now and the Live TV Reseller websites contained links to one another, offering
users the opportunity to purchase bundles of subscription credits for Streaming TV Now to be
sold to downstream consumers. Doc. 76-5, ¶¶ 21-24. This extensive overlap among the
Accused Services supports the inference of common ownership, and Freemon’s admitted
ownership of Streaming TV Now permits a reasonable inference that he controlled the remaining
services.
Despite these allegations—which represent only a portion of the facts connecting
Freemon to the Accused Services—Freemon argues that Plaintiffs have failed to connect him to
any infringing content. Doc. 87 at 1-2. In support of his argument, Freemon relies on screen-
capture videos produced by Plaintiffs during discovery. Doc. 87 at 1-2. These videos, which
have since been manually submitted to the Court, see Doc. 93,5 purport to show investigators
“(1) accessing each [i]nfringing Service, (2) browsing the Service’s menu of illicit television
channels and motion pictures, and (3) streaming specific copyrighted works.” Doc. 103 at 13.
Freemon argues, however, that the videos actually show infringing content being accessed
through “different URLs not tied to [him] or the listed sites” and that this “disconnect confirms
that [Plaintiffs’] claims are not traceable” to him. Doc. 87 at 2.
5 Freemon’s screenshots are taken from the initial version of the discovery videos, which
contained narrow redactions intended to “conceal personal identifying information and protect
investigator confidentiality.” Doc. 103 at 10. After learning that the redactions had
“inadvertently obscured URLs at short points in the ten-to-twenty” minute videos, Plaintiffs
amended their production to remove the inadvertent redactions and reproduced the videos to
Freemon on July 29, 2025. Doc. 104 at 14 (Pls.’ App. 14). Those amended videos were later
filed with the Court. See Doc. 93.
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Freemon provides five screenshots from the videos, which he argues show
“[d]iscrepancies in URLs used to access IPTV content.” Doc. 87 at 5-9. However, even without
the videos, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have more than met their burden to “clearly . . .
allege facts demonstrating” his connection to the infringing content. Spokeo, Inc., 578 U.S. at
339. Further, they submit declarations that independently corroborate what the Complaint
alleges: that Freemon advertised and sold illicit IPTV subscriptions through his front-end
domains (e.g., Cash App IPTV, Instant IPTV, Streaming TV Now), and then provided
subscribers access to the infringing content through back-end web players (e.g., stncloud.ltd) and
third party media players via sockets (e.g., stnlive.ltd.80) which in turn connected the third-party
player back to Freemon’s back-end server. See Doc. 1, ¶¶ 47-48 & n.12; Doc. 92-1, ¶¶ 10-46;
Doc. 75-6.
Moreover, to the extent Freemon argues that there is insufficient evidence linking him to
the back-end domains and servers, this argument fails for two reasons. First, Plaintiffs have
alleged multiple facts linking Freemon to the back-end sites, supported by declarations from
Nigel Jones and Dani Bacsa, Deputy Chief of Content Protection at the Motion Picture
Association. Doc. 92-1; Doc. 75-6. As noted above, Streaming TV Now’s, Cash App IPTV’s,
and Instant IPTV’s front-end websites all ultimately linked to a web player hosted at the domain
stncloud.ltd. Doc. 92-1, ¶¶ 40-41. Similarly, these three Services directed subscribers to access
application-based streams through the same socket, stnlive.ltd, at some point in time. Doc. 92-1,
¶¶ 43. That three of the four Accused IPTV Services directed subscribers to the same back-end
locations suggests that the Services were interconnected and that their common—Freemon—
likewise controlled those back-entry points. Doc. 92-1, ¶ 43.
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Even more compelling is the connection between the Internet Protocol (“IP”) address
histories of the Accused Services and the back-end sites. Plaintiffs explain that:
An IP address is a unique label that identifies a device connected to the internet.
Like a street address tells mail carriers where to deliver mail, an IP address tells
computers and other devices where to send and receive information over the
internet. Any device that connects to the internet, such as a computer or a server,
gets assigned an IP address. If one server hosts multiple websites, the websites all
share the server’s IP address.
Doc. 1, ¶ 36. Plaintiffs contend, and the Jones and Bacsa declarations corroborate, that all five
Accused Services, as well as the domain stncloud.ltd, were hosted, for a period of time, at the
same IP address: 5:183.209.216.6 Doc. 1, ¶¶ 36-37; Doc. 92-1, ¶ 30; Doc. 75-6, ¶ 12. Jones
avers that because the Services’ front-end websites and web player shared this IP address, they
resided on the same server and were “very likely” managed by a single individual or entity
renting that server. Doc. 92-1, ¶ 31. Notably, the Firesticks Loaded website—the site most
directly tied to Freemon—also operated via this same IP address and server. Doc. 75-6, ¶ 12.
Taken together, these facts establish a reasonable likelihood that Freemon is the single individual
who managed both the Accused Services and their back-end counterparts.
Second, even absent evidence linking Freemon to the back-end domains, Plaintiffs
would still have standing because they assert both direct and secondary copyright claims. Doc.
1, ¶¶ 75-108. As described above, Plaintiffs have alleged extensive facts suggesting that
Freemon owned, controlled, and publicly promoted the front-end domains where users
subscribed, paid for, and were directed to infringing content. Doc. 1, ¶¶ 37-69; Doc. 103 at 16.
By controlling the front-end domains—a fact Freemon does not dispute in the instant motion—
6 The only domain that was never hosted at the 5:183.209.216 IP address is the stnlive.ltd URL
used to access streams via applications. Doc. 75-6, ¶ 12 n. 3. According to Bacsa, however, this
URL can be linked to Streaming TV now and the web player stncloud.ltd, which in turn have all
been linked to the 5:183.209.216 address. Doc. 75-6, ¶ 12 n. 3.
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Freemon facilitated user access to the infringing content, supporting Plaintiffs’ contributory
copyright claim that he “knowingly and materially” contributed to the infringement. Doc. 1, ¶ 88.
Accordingly, even without a direct connection to the back-end domains, Plaintiffs have alleged
injuries that are “fairly traceable” to Freemon’s conduct. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
In short, Plaintiffs have sufficiently established a “line of causation” between Freemon’s
conduct and their alleged harm that is “more than attenuated.” Turnbow, 2012 WL 4473090, at
*6. Through his alleged ownership of the Accused Services’ front-end websites and the
Services’ links to back-end servers hosting infringing content, Plaintiffs have shown an injury-
in-fact that can be fairly traced to Freemon. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. Moreover, Freemon’s
continued ownership of the Services demonstrates “a significant possibility of future harm.”
Segovia, 2022 WL 3104849, at *2. These allegations are more than sufficient to withstand
Freemon’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of standing.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter
Jurisdiction Due to Lack of Standing, Doc. 87, should be DENIED.
SO RECOMMENDED on February 24, 2026.
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the manner
provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and recommendation must file
specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). An objection must identify the finding or recommendation to
which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and indicate where in the magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely
incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific.
Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual
findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district
court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d
1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending
the time to file objections to 14 days).
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