Green v. USA

Page 1 of 5
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
JOHN HENRY GREEN, 	§
TDCJ ID# 2401643, 	§
BOP ID # 21431-509, 	§
Movant, 	§
§ 	No. 3:23-CV-271-K
v. 	§ 	(No. 3:20-CR-515-K-1)
§
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	§
Respondent. 	§
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Movant John Henry Green’s Amended Motion Under 28
U.S.C. Section 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody
(Dkt. No. 6). 	Based on the relevant filings and applicable law, the Section 2255
motion 	is 	summarily 	DISMISSED 	WITHOUT 	PREJUDICE 	and, 	liberally
construed 	as 	a 	habeas 	corpus 	petition 	pursuant 	to 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	2254, 	it 	is
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to exhaust state remedies.
I. BACKGROUND
After being charged in a two-count indictment, Green pled guilty to one count
of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in the underlying federal criminal
proceedings. See Crim. Dkt. Nos. 1, 28, 32. The Court sentenced him to 25 months’
imprisonment, to run concurrently with sentences imposed in related Case Nos. F-
2057483 and F-2057484 pending in Dallas County Criminal District Court No. 2 in
Dallas, Texas, and to be followed by three years of supervised release. 	See Crim. Dkt.
No. 38. Green did not appeal his conviction or sentence.
Case 3:23-cv-00271-K Document 10 Filed 01/28/26 Page 1 of 5 PageID <pageID>

Page 2 of 5
Green subsequently sent a letter motion addressed to the undersigned that was
liberally construed as a first motion to vacate sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 	See
Crim. Dkt. Nos. 41-42. 	This Section 2255 action was opened as a result, and the
Court issued a deficiency notice and order in accordance with Castro v. United States,
540 U.S. 375 (2003). 	See Dkt. Nos. 3-4. 	That order directed Green to file either an
amended Section 2255 motion on the appropriate form raising all of his grounds for
relief or a notice of dismissal if he intended to dismiss the newly opened habeas
action. 	See Dkt. No. 4. 	In response to the order, Green filed an amended Section
2255 motion asserting the following grounds for relief relating to his state criminal
proceedings and convictions: (1) involuntary guilty plea; (2) coerced confession; (3)
double jeopardy; and (4) ineffective assistance of state trial counsel. 	See Dkt. No. 6;
Dkt. No. 7 at 3, 5-7.
II. SUMMARY DISMISSAL
Under Rule 4(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the
United States District Courts, “[i]f it plainly appears from the motion, any attached
exhibits, and the record of prior proceedings that the moving party is not entitled to
relief, the judge must dismiss the motion and direct the clerk to notify the moving
party.” 	Having evaluated the substance of Green’s grounds for relief, as detailed in
his brief in support of his Section 2255 motion, to determine whether they are
properly brought only under Section 2255, the Court concludes that they are not.
After conviction and exhaustion or waiver of the right to direct appeal, a
defendant is presumed to be fairly and finally convicted. United States v. Cervantes,
Case 3:23-cv-00271-K Document 10 Filed 01/28/26 Page 2 of 5 PageID <pageID>

Page 3 of 5
132 F.3d 1106, 1109 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing United States v. Shaid, 937 F.2d 228,
231-32 (5th Cir. 1991)). 	“Section 2255 provides the primary means of ‘collaterally
attacking a federal sentence[.]’” 	Padilla v. United States, 416 F.3d 424, 425-26 (5th
Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). 	Post-conviction “[r]elief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is
reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for a narrow range of injuries
that could not have been raised on direct appeal and would, if condoned, result in a
complete miscarriage of justice.” 	United States v. Gaudet, 81 F.3d 585, 589 (5th Cir.
1996) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, even liberally construing Green’s amended Section 2255 motion and
brief in support, his allegations do not present a cognizable basis for relief under
Section 2255. Although Green’s Section 2255 filings reference his federal sentence in
the 	underlying 	criminal 	proceedings 	before 	this 	Court, 	he 	does 	not 	assert 	any
constitutional violation or jurisdictional issue related to same. 	Instead, he complains
only about alleged constitutional violations or deprivations in connection with his
state criminal proceedings, convictions, and sentences. 	Accordingly, because he does
not assert any constitutional or jurisdictional challenges to his federal conviction or
sentence, his amended Section 2255 motion is summarily dismissed.
III. STATE EXHAUSTION
To 	the 	extent 	Green’s 	filings 	challenge 	the 	constitutionality 	of 	his 	state
criminal convictions and sentences, the Court liberally construes the Section 2255
motion as seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which is reserved for habeas
applications on “behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State
Case 3:23-cv-00271-K Document 10 Filed 01/28/26 Page 3 of 5 PageID <pageID>

Page 4 of 5
court.” 	28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Carmona v. Andrews, 357 F.3d 535, 537 (5th Cir. 2004)
(concluding that “Section 2254 confers jurisdiction upon the federal courts to hear
collateral attacks on state court judgments” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).). Even so, Green is not entitled to federal habeas relief.
A petitioner seeking to collaterally attack his state conviction or sentence must
fully exhaust state remedies before seeking federal habeas relief under Section 2254.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). 	Exhaustion requires that a petitioner “present his claims in
a procedurally correct manner” to “the highest court of his state”—namely, the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals (“TCCA”)—in a petition for discretionary review (“PDR”)
or a state application for a writ of habeas corpus. Deters v. Collins, 985 F.2d 789, 795
(5th Cir. 1993); see also Richardson v. Procunier, 762 F.2d 429, 432 (5th Cir. 1985).
A federal district court may raise the lack of exhaustion sua sponte. 	See Shute v.
State of Tex., 117 F.3d 233, 237 (5th Cir. 1997). 	It may dismiss without prejudice a
Section 2254 petition that contains unexhausted grounds for relief. 	See, e.g., Rose v.
Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982). 	As a matter of comity, the state courts must be
given a fair opportunity to hear and consider the claims raised by a petitioner before
those claims are heard in federal court. 	See Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275
(1971).
As Green sought relief in this habeas action under Section 2255, his filings are
silent as to his efforts to exhaust state court remedies for purposes of Section 2254.
A review of available state court records, however, shows that Green has not sought
discretionary review by the TCCA, either through a PDR or state habeas application,
Case 3:23-cv-00271-K Document 10 Filed 01/28/26 Page 4 of 5 PageID <pageID>

Page 5 of 5
on any of the claims raised in this action. 	See Texas Judicial Branch, Case Search,
http://search.txcourts.gov (last visited Jan. 27, 2026). 	He therefore is not entitled to
habeas relief under Section 2254 based on a failure to exhaust state remedies.
Accordingly, liberally construed as a habeas corpus petition under Section 2254,
Green’s amended motion is dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust state
remedies.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, the Amended Motion Under 28 U.S.C. Section
2255, to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody (Dkt. No. 6)
is summarily DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 	See Rule 4(b) of the Rules
Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States District Courts.
To the extent the amended motion is liberally construed as a habeas corpus
petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, it is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for
failure to exhaust state remedies.
SO ORDERED.
Signed January 28 th , 2026.
___________________________________
ED KINKEADE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 3:23-cv-00271-K Document 10 Filed 01/28/26 Page 5 of 5 PageID <pageID>