Jackson v. Chick and Seafood Inc et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
CHANTOVIA JACKSON, 	§
§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
V. 	§ 	No. 3:22-cv-1687-N-BN
§
CHICK AND SEAFOOD INC., ET AL., 	§
§
Defendants. 	§
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff (and Judgment Creditor) Chantovia Jackson moves the Court to
appoint a receiver to assist in the collection of her judgment against Defendants
Grand HBL, LLC and Linda Henderson (“Defendants”). See Dkt. Nos. 82 & 83; see
also Dkt. Nos. 74-78. Senior United States District Judge David C. Godbey referred
this 	lawsuit 	to 	the 	undersigned 	United 	States 	magistrate 	judge 	for 	pretrial
management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). See Dkt. No. 36; see also Gaiters v. City of
Catoosa, 226 F. App’x 826, 829 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[A] district court may refer post-
judgment matters to a magistrate judge under the ‘additional duties’ provision of 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(3), so long as the district judge retains the ultimate responsibility for
decision making.” (citation omitted)). And, for the reasons explained below, the Court
should deny Jackson’s motion.
Applicable Background
The Court previously accepted the undersigned’s recommendations to grant
Jackson’s motion for default judgment against Defendants and award specified
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damages, see Jackson v. Chick & Seafood Inc., No. 3:22-cv-1687-N-BN, 2024 WL
3402651 (N.D. Tex. June 12, 2024), rec. accepted, 2024 WL 3405555 (N.D. Tex. July
12, 2024); Jackson v. Chick & Seafood Inc., No. 3:22-cv-1687-N-BN, 2025 WL 2646873
(N.D. Tex. June 1, 2025), as supplemented, 2025 WL 2646851 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 8,
2025), rec. accepted, 2025 WL 2646155 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 15, 2025).
And, so, the Court entered default judgment against Defendants, jointly and
severally, and awarded Jackson damages of $195,758.82 and applicable pre-judgment
and post-judgment interest. See Dkt. No. 78.
Jackson now explains in the pending motion that since entry of judgment, she
has been unable to locate any assets of either Henderson or Grand HBL
to satisfy Plaintiff’s Judgment. Henderson and/or Grand HBL, however,
are the franchisor(s) for a franchise operation in the Dallas, Texas
metropolitan area with multiple locations. According to Henderson, the
franchisees pay a royalty payment for their respective franchises. To aid
in 	collection 	of 	her 	Judgment, 	Plaintiff 	seeks 	to 	have 	a 	Receiver
appointed by this Court to take all legal and necessary steps to collect
Plaintiff’s Judgment from the various franchisees.
Dkt. No. 82 at 1.
Legal Standards
A federal court may enforce a money judgment “in accordance with the practice
and procedure of the state in which the district court is held.” FED . R. CIV. P. 69(a).
The Texas Turnover Statute “is ‘the procedural device [in this state] by which
judgment creditors may reach assets of a debtor that are otherwise difficult to attach
or levy on by ordinary legal process.’” Af-Cap, Inc. v. Republic of Congo, 462 F.3d 417,
426 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting Beaumont Bank, N.A. v. Buller, 806 S.W.2d 223, 224
(Tex. 1991)).
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Under the Texas Turnover Statute, a judgment creditor is “entitled to aid from
a court of appropriate jurisdiction ... to obtain satisfaction on the judgment if the
judgment debtor owns property ... that (1) cannot readily be attached or levied on by
ordinary legal process; and (2) is not exempt from attachment, execution, or seizure
for the satisfaction of liabilities.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & R EM. CODE § 31.002(a).
“To obtain relief under the turnover statute, a judgment creditor must prove:
(1) the judgment debtor owns property, including present or future rights to property;
(2) the property is not exempt from attachment, execution, or seizure; and (3) the
property cannot readily be attached or levied on or by ordinary legal process.” Maiden
Biosciences, Inc. v. MPM Med. Inc., No. 3:18-cv-1354-D, 2021 WL 1056458, at *3 (N.D.
Tex. Mar. 18, 2021) (cleaned up).
The Texas Turnover Statute permits a court to “order the judgment debtor to
turn over nonexempt property that is in the debtor’s possession or is subject to the
debtor’s control, together with all documents or records related to the property, to a
designated sheriff or constable for execution.” TEX. CIV. P RAC. & REM. CODE §
31.002(b)(1).
The statute also provides that the court may “appoint a receiver with the
authority to take possession of the nonexempt property, sell it, and pay the proceeds
to the judgment creditor to the extent required to satisfy the judgment.” TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & R EM. CODE § 31.002(b)(3).
And Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 64.001(a) provides that “[a] court
of competent jurisdiction may appoint a receiver: … (2) in an action by a creditor to
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subject any property or fund to his claim.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 64.001(a)(2).
But Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 64.001(b) provides that the party
seeking appointment of a receiver under Section 64.001(a)(2) “must have a probable
interest in or right to the property or fund, and the property or fund must be in danger
of being lost, removed, or materially injured.” T EX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §
64.001(b).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has explained that “a
receivership is a remedy for taking possession of a judgment debtor’s property.”
Netsphere, Inc. v. Baron, 703 F.3d 296, 306 (5th Cir. 2012). That is, “receivership may
be an appropriate remedy for a judgment creditor who seeks to set aside allegedly
fraudulent conveyances by the judgment debtor, or who has had execution issued and
returned unsatisfied, or who proceeds through supplementary proceedings pursuant
to Rule 69, or who seeks to subject equitable assets to the payment of his judgment,
or who otherwise is attempting to have the debtor’s property preserved from
dissipation until his claim can be satisfied.” Santibanez v. Wier McMahon & Co., 105
F.3d 234, 241 (5th Cir. 1997) (cleaned up).
But the Fifth Circuit has explained that “[r]eceivership is an extraordinary
remedy that should be employed with the utmost caution and is justified only where
there is a clear necessity to protect a party’s interest in property, legal and less drastic
equitable remedies are inadequate, and the benefits of receivership outweigh the
burdens on the affected parties.” Netsphere, 703 F.3d at 305 (cleaned up); accord
Estate of Price, 528 S.W.3d 591, 593-94 (Tex. App. – Texarkana 2017, no pet.) (“Even
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though [a] receiver appointed pursuant to section 64.001(a) and (b) of the Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code is not required to show that no other adequate remedy
exists, [t]he appointment of a receiver is a harsh, drastic, and extraordinary remedy,
which must be used cautiously.” (cleaned up)); see also Cap. Funding, LLC v. TLTX
Holdings, LLC, No. 2:20-cv-5-Z, 2020 WL 264106, at *4-*5 & n.1 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 17,
2020).
“Factors that courts have considered as indicating the need for a receivership
include the following: a valid claim by the party seeking the appointment; the
probability that fraudulent conduct has occurred or will occur to frustrate that claim;
imminent danger that property will be concealed, lost, or diminished in value;
inadequacy of legal remedies; lack of a less drastic equitable remedy; and likelihood
that appointing the receiver will do more good than harm.” Santibanez, 105 F.3d at
241-42 (cleaned up).
Analysis
Jackson has not shown that the Court should grant the extraordinary remedy
of appointing a receiver.
That is because Jackson first offers no evidence that a receivership is necessary
to prevent Defendants from dissipating property before they satisfy Jackson’s
judgment against them.
Nor does Jackson offer evidence or facts to support finding that any non-
exempt property or funds are in danger of being lost, removed, materially injured,
concealed, or diminished in value without appointment of a receiver to seize them.
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And 	Jackson 	offers 	no 	evidence 	or 	facts 	to 	support 	finding 	that 	this
extraordinary remedy is clearly necessary to protect her interest in non-exempt
assets or property that can be used to satisfy the judgment.
And, even if that lack of evidence did not alone provide a basis to deny the
motion, Jackson also fails to meet her burden to provide “some substantive, probative
evidence establishing the turnover statute’s requirement[]” to establish “that the
judgment debtor owns nonexempt property,” D’Arcy Petroleum, LLC v. Mink, No.
3:19-cv-2770-M-BT, 2024 WL 2885326, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 30, 2024) (cleaned up),
rec. accepted, 2024 WL 2885904 (N.D. Tex. June 7, 2024), at least where she argues
that the franchisee royalty payments that she would like “the receiver [ ] to assume
exclusive jurisdiction over” are “monies [that] are not exempt from attachment,
execution, or seizure,” Dkt. No. 82 at 3.
Recommendation
The Court should deny Plaintiff Chantovia Jackson’s motion to appoint a
receiver [Dkt. No. 82].
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on
all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these
findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections
within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED . R. CIV.
P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or
recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and
specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation
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where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by
reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure
to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the
factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or
adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v.
United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
DATED: January 14, 2026
_________________________________________
DAVID L. HORAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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