USA v. Davila

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AMARILLO DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	§
§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	2:25-CR-131-Z-BR
§
DENISE ANN DAVILA, 	§
§
Defendant. 	§
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION
FOR PRETRIAL DETENTION
Defendant initially appeared before the undersigned on December 5, 2025 in connection
with a criminal complaint alleging that she has violated 18 U.S.C. § 1513(b)(2) by “Obstructing
Justice by Retaliating Against a Witness, Victim, or Informant.” (ECF 5 and ECF 1 at 1). Now
before the Court is the Government’s motion to detain Defendant pending trial under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3142. (ECF 3). The parties appeared and argued the motion before the undersigned at a detention
hearing on December 15, 2025. (See ECF 17) (minute entry). Each side proffered evidence, and
Defendant called two witnesses to testify—the Defendant’s bail bondsman in a separate state court
proceeding, and the Defendant’s prospective third-party custodian in this proceeding. (ECF 18 at
1) (Exhibit and Witness List).
Having considered the motion, the evidence and arguments of the parties, and the
applicable law, the Court finds for the following reasons that the Government’s motion should be
DENIED. Defendant will be ORDERED released at a hearing on Monday, December 22, 2025
at 11:15 a.m., subject to the conditions established by the forthcoming Order Setting Conditions
of Release, an unsigned copy of which is attached to this Order.
Case 2:25-cr-00131-Z-BR Document 24 Filed 12/19/25 Page 1 of 13 PageID <pageID>

2
I. 	BACKGROUND
This case is related to another in this Court, United States v. Macias et al., No. 2:23-cr-062.
The first of two defendants1 in that case, Angela Macias, was sentenced on December 4, 2025 to
one hundred and seventy-five months imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release,
for the offense of Distribution and Possession with Intent to Distribute Methamphetamine. Macias
is Defendant’s sister, and the alleged victim in this case was a potential witness against Macias.
(ECF 1 at 3).
The criminal complaint alleges that on March 21, 2025, the victim was assaulted by
Defendant in the parking lot of a gas station and convenience store. (Id. at 2). The victim reported
the assault three days later, on March 24. (Id.). The complaint details that “[d]uring further
interview of the victim, the victim explained . . . [that Defendant] called the victim a ‘snitch’ and
accused the victim of being a witness against [Defendant’s] sister.” (Id.).
The altercation in question was captured on video, without audio, by the convenience
store’s surveillance cameras, and the video was admitted into evidence at the detention hearing as
Government Exhibit 1. (See ECF 18 at 1). In the video, the victim can be seen walking away from
the convenience store and toward the gas pumps when the front half of a red sedan pulls into the
frame from the left. The victim continues walking, but keeps her face turned towards the vehicle.
The Defendant enters the frame from the same area as the vehicle, pointing a finger at the victim
and approaching her.
As the distance between the two closes, the vehicle slowly pulls farther into the frame, and
the victim changes course, attempting to back away from the Defendant without turning her back.
1 The other defendant in that case, Kathy Teresa Davila, is also referenced in the arguments of the parties, as further
explained below.
Case 2:25-cr-00131-Z-BR Document 24 Filed 12/19/25 Page 2 of 13 PageID <pageID>

3
Once she is within a few feet of the victim, the Defendant begins to swing her arms at the victim,
pulls the victim to the ground, bites her, and then stands up, continuing to strike the prone victim
with her hands and feet. As the altercation proceeds near the fenced outer edge of the parking lot,
the red sedan slowly pulls between it and the rest of the parking lot. When she moves away from
the victim, the Defendant jogs to the passenger side of the red sedan, opens the door, and moves
to sit in the vehicle while the victim is standing up. The video then cuts off abruptly.
A still image from a different angle, showing Defendant standing on the passenger side of
a red Toyota sedan, was admitted as Government Exhibit 2. (Id.). Photographs purporting to show
the victim’s injuries from the altercation were admitted as Government Exhibits 4–6. (Id.). These
include an image of fresh bruises on the back of the victim’s left shoulder2 that the Government
attributes to Defendant biting the victim (Government Exhibit 4), an image of the same bruises
after some weeks had passed (Government Exhibit 6), and an image of fresh bruising and abrasions
on the victim’s wrist (Government Exhibit 5).
Defendant is currently the subject of an unrelated state court proceeding for theft, State of
Texas v. Davila, No. 34526A in the 47th District Court of Randall County, Texas. At the detention
hearing before the undersigned, the parties discussed the issuance and subsequent surrender of a
bail bond in that proceeding. The Court admitted Government Exhibit 3 under seal, comprising
several documents related to the issuance and surrender of that bail bond. (See ECF 18 at 1).
Defendant called Joshua Daniel Wilson, the owner and operator of Bomb City Bail Bonds, to
testify that the bond was surrendered only on account of Defendant’s arrest and detention for this
2 Initially, the two images of this injury appear to show different shoulders of the victim; the Court perceives that this
is because the victim took the first photograph herself by pointing the rear-facing camera of her cellular phone at a
mirror behind her, while the second photograph was taken by a person pointing the camera directly at the back of the
victim’s shoulder.
Case 2:25-cr-00131-Z-BR Document 24 Filed 12/19/25 Page 3 of 13 PageID <pageID>

4
federal matter, which could otherwise have led to Defendant’s forfeiting the bond. (Id.). Wilson
testified that, if Defendant were ordered released in this proceeding, he would work with Defendant
to secure a new bail bond for her state court proceeding.
At the detention hearing, counsel for Defendant proffered that state court assault charges
for the altercation at issue here had been rejected by the county, and that the victim in this case is
currently herself incarcerated on unrelated charges. Defendant also called Merce Barnes, one of
Defendant’s sisters and her prospective third-party custodian, to testify that Defendant would be
able to stay with her in Pampa, Texas3 throughout these proceedings and that Defendant’s
employer is currently holding her job for her. (Id.).
Both sides point to the detention history in the Macias case to support their positions in
this case. Both defendants in that case, Davila4 and Macias, are Defendant’s sisters. Government
motions to detain Macias and Davila were both denied in that case, and both defendants were
released on conditions.
Davila performed well on release, making all required court appearances and complying
with all conditions, and ultimately agreed to plead guilty to Distribution and Possession with Intent
to 	Distribute 	Methamphetamine. 	As 	a 	drug 	crime 	with 	a 	maximum 	sentence 	including
imprisonment for ten years or more, that plea subjected Davila to mandatory detention pending
sentencing under 18 U.S.C. 3143(a)(2), unless she could show she was neither a flight risk nor a
danger to the community and that exceptional circumstances justified her continued release. See
18 U.S.C. 3145. She was ultimately able to show exceptional circumstances, and so was continued
3 Pampa, Gray County, Texas is a smaller community approximately fifty-five miles northeast of Amarillo, Texas, the
seat of this Judicial Division.
4 The Court refers to the defendant in this case as Defendant, and references in this order to “Davila” are to Kathy
Teresa Davila.
Case 2:25-cr-00131-Z-BR Document 24 Filed 12/19/25 Page 4 of 13 PageID <pageID>

5
on conditions of release until sentencing. United States v. Davila, 2024 WL 1337869 (N.D. Tex.
Mar. 28, 2024). She was eventually sentenced to a term of five years’ probation in lieu of
imprisonment.
Macias, like her sister, initially complied with the Court’s conditions of release and agreed
to plead guilty to Distribution and Possession with Intent to Distribute Methamphetamine. At her
rearraignment hearing on January 2, 2024, however, Davila did not appear as required, and a bench
warrant was issued for her arrest. She successfully evaded capture for almost a year and a half,
until she was found in May of 2025 in her son’s home while he was being investigated for a
separate criminal matter.5 She ultimately moved forward with her original plea agreement, was
sentenced as noted above, and is now incarcerated.
Defendant argues that her family, especially her sister Merce Barnes as third-party
custodian, will support her in complying with conditions of release the same way her sister Davila
did. The Government, by contrast, argues that Defendant’s family was complicit in Macias’
violation of conditions and subsequent evasion of arrest. At Defendant’s detention hearing, the
Government proffered that Defendant lied to the United States Marshal Service regarding Macias’
whereabouts while she was at large, and that jail calls have recorded Defendant and her family
conversing about lying to the Court during Macias’ sentencing and working to agree on a fictitious
explanation for the altercation at issue in this matter.
5 United States v. Macias, 2:25-cr-064-Z-BR.
Case 2:25-cr-00131-Z-BR Document 24 Filed 12/19/25 Page 5 of 13 PageID <pageID>

6
II. 	APPLICABLE LAW
Once a person has been arrested for a federal crime and brought before a judicial officer,
federal law requires that officer6 to determine whether the person should be “be released or
detained, pending judicial proceedings[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3141.
In keeping with the presumption of innocence until guilt is proven, the standard is to release
the person on their personal recognizance, or upon execution of an unsecured appearance bond in
an amount set by the Court. Id. at § 3142(b); see also Chavez v. Cockrell, 310 F.3d 805, 808 (5th
Cir. 2002) (“The presumption of innocence, although not articulated in the Constitution, is a basic
component of a fair trial under our system of criminal justice.”) (quoting Estelle v. Williams, 425
U.S. 501, 503 (1976)). The sole conditions attaching to such release are those that apply in all
cases; the defendant must cooperate in providing a DNA sample, if the law authorizes one to be
taken, and must not violate any laws while on release. Id. at § 3142(b).
The law only permits a judicial officer to deviate from that standard if “such release will
not reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required or will endanger the safety of any
other person or the community.” Id. The first of these elements, the reasonable assurance of the
person as required, is commonly evaluated in terms of a defendant’s “flight risk.” The second, the
danger posed by a defendant’s release to the safety of other persons and the community, is often
paraphrased as a defendant’s “dangerousness.”
If a defendant’s flight risk and dangerousness do not permit release on personal
recognizance or an unsecured bond, the law requires they be released “subject to the least
restrictive further condition, or combination of conditions, that” will reasonably account for the
defendant’s flight risk and dangerousness. Id. at § 3142(c)(1)(B). The statute then lists fourteen
6 The term “judicial officer” is used here because federal law permits a wide variety of federal, state, and local officials
to perform this function. 18 U.S.C. § 3041.
Case 2:25-cr-00131-Z-BR Document 24 Filed 12/19/25 Page 6 of 13 PageID <pageID>

7
different examples of such conditions, the last of which is “any other condition that is reasonably
necessary to assure the appearance of the person as required and to assure the safety of any other
person and the community.” Id. at 3142(c)(1)(B)(i)–(xiv). Some of these conditions are mandatory
in cases involving minor victims or failure to register as a sex offender, and no financial conditions
can be imposed in any case that would result in pretrial detention of those too poor to satisfy it;
otherwise, conditions of release are left to the discretion of the judicial officer, who may amend
them at any time. Id. at 3142(c)(1–3).
None of the options described above—release on personal recognizance, on an unsecured
bond, or on conditions of release—require a prior hearing. The judicial officer must hold a hearing,
however, before ordering any person detained before trial. Id. at 3142(e)(1). A government
attorney can request a detention hearing in limited categories of cases. Id. at 3142(f)(1)–(2). If the
Government does not move for a detention hearing, the judicial officer can only hold one if there
is “a serious risk that [the defendant] will flee[,] or a serious risk that [the defendant] will [or will]
attempt to obstruct justice, or threaten, injure, or intimidate . . . a prospective witness or juror.” Id.
at 3142(f)(2)(A)–(B) (internal numbering omitted).
The law sets various standards for the detention hearing. It must occur within a specified
time, and the defendant has the right to be represented by counsel. Id. at 3142(f). Though the rules
for the admissibility of evidence do not apply to the hearing, and the law makes no specific
provisions for the Government to offer evidence, it does reserve to the defendant the rights to
testify, present witnesses, cross-examine witnesses who appear, “and to present information by
proffer or otherwise.” Id.
A judicial officer must order a defendant detained pending trial only if, “after a hearing
. . ., the judicial officer finds that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure
Case 2:25-cr-00131-Z-BR Document 24 Filed 12/19/25 Page 7 of 13 PageID <pageID>

8
the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community.”
Id. at 3142(e)(1). The facts used to support a finding on dangerousness must “be supported by clear
and convincing evidence.” Id. at 3142(f). The statute is silent as to the evidentiary standard for
flight risk, and courts in this Circuit evaluate that element using a preponderance of the evidence
standard. See United States v. Fortna, 769 F.2d 243, 250 (5th Cir. 1985)
In some cases, the law imposes a presumption that the defendant should be detained, and
requires the defendant to rebut that presumption. Id. at 3142(e)(2)–(3). Even in those cases,
however, there is no “burden of persuasion” on the defendant, who is required merely to produce
evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption. United States v. Flores, 53 F.4th 313, 315 (5th Cir.
2022) (quoting United States v. Hare, 873 F.2d 796, 798 (5th Cir. 1989)).
When deciding whether to release or detain a defendant, and whether to impose conditions
on that release, the law requires judicial officers to consider certain factors. These include:
the available information concerning the nature and circumstances of the offense
charged, including whether the offense is a crime of violence . . . or involves a
minor victim or a controlled substance, firearm, explosive, or destructive device;
the weight of the evidence against the person; the history of and characteristics of
the person, . . . and the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the
community that would be posed by the person’s release.
18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(1)–(4) (internal numbering and punctuation omitted). The “history and
characteristics of the” defendant are specified to include a wide range of details, including7
character, physical and mental state, substance abuse history, employment, community ties, past
conduct, criminal history, and any pending criminal proceedings under federal, state, or local law.
Id. at 3142(g)(3)(A)–(B).
To summarize, in keeping with the presumption of innocence, the law imposes a strong
bias in favor of releasing defendants while their case proceeds. A defendant may be ordered
7 The statute does not limit the Court to considering the defendant’s history and characteristics in only the listed ways.
Case 2:25-cr-00131-Z-BR Document 24 Filed 12/19/25 Page 8 of 13 PageID <pageID>

9
detained pending trial only if, after a hearing at which they were given legal counsel and were
permitted to produce their own evidence, the preponderance of evidence precludes a reasonable
assurance that they would appear in court when ordered to do so, and clear and convincing
evidence precludes a reasonable assurance that they would not pose a danger to other people or
the community.
III. 	ANALYSIS
In this case, the Government based its motion for a pretrial detention hearing on the risk
that the Defendant will flee or will obstruct justice, threaten, injure, or intimidate a prospective
witness or juror, or will attempt to do so.8 (ECF 3 at 1); see 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(A)–(B). This
is not a rebuttable presumption case. See 18 U.S.C. 3142(e)(2)–(3). The Government argues that
detention is justified by both flight risk and dangerousness. (ECF 3 at 2). For the following reasons,
the Court disagrees.
The preponderance of the evidence in this case does not indicate that Defendant will fail to
appear as required. The Government’s evidence, submitted by proffer, shows only that some
members of Defendant’s family have engaged in unscrupulous behavior. There are vague
allegations that Defendant herself has lied to government officials, but the Government did not
present sufficient details or evidence for these allegations to overcome Defendant’s evidence
relevant to flight risk, including her family and community ties and employment status.
There is also not clear and convincing evidence in this case to show that Defendant will
pose a danger to the safety of other persons or the community if released. The Government’s
argument on this prong focuses on the nature and circumstances of the offense charged. The
8 The Court notes in passing that the latter basis is probably an inappropriate duplication of the offense charged in this
case; there has been no allegation that Defendant intends to obstruct justice or threaten, injure, or intimidate a
prospective witness or juror in this or any other still-pending proceeding.
Case 2:25-cr-00131-Z-BR Document 24 Filed 12/19/25 Page 9 of 13 PageID <pageID>

10
circumstances of this case, however, amount to an isolated instance of violence targeting a now-
inaccessible victim for a reason that no longer applies. The victim is now incarcerated, and so
cannot be threatened or harmed by Defendant while on release, and the criminal matter in which
she was allegedly expected to testify9 is now resolved.
Defendant’s criminal history, though admittedly lengthy, does not include the necessary
evidence that the Defendant will pose a flight risk or a danger to the community. Defendant has
only ever been charged for a violent crime one other time, for Injury to a Child with Intentional
Bodily Injury in 1998, when she was eighteen years old; the ultimate disposition of that charge is
not known to the Court. The twenty-seven years of intervening criminal history comprises only
minor drug or property charges, many of which were never prosecuted.
This case is unusual in that the Defendant’s strong and local family ties, which are a factor
to be considered under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(3)(A), have been invoked by the Government as
weighing in favor of detention. Ordinarily, such ties would weigh against flight risk and in favor
of release, because a defendant with strong local family ties is less likely to flee the locality. If the
Court is to consider that Defendant’s sisters might provide her an example in this case, though,
there is no reason to expect she will emulate Macias, who violated conditions and is now serving
a lengthy prison sentence, rather than emulating Davila, who complied with conditions and is now
on probation.
Moreover, Defendant’s sister, Merce Barnes, has volunteered to serve as a third-party
custodian for Defendant, and she lives in the same community where Defendant has a job waiting.
She appears to be a fully qualified candidate for third-party custodian, she has no criminal record,
9 The government has not produced any evidence that the victim was an informant or had agreed to testify in any trial,
and such evidence is not required at this stage because it goes to the question of Defendant’s guilt of the offense
charged, not to any factor in pretrial release.
Case 2:25-cr-00131-Z-BR Document 24 Filed 12/19/25 Page 10 of 13 PageID <pageID>

11
and Defendant’s attorney relays that she was involved in their sister Kathy Davila’s success on
pretrial release.
The Court finds a helpful comparison to a case in another judicial circuit, United States v.
Harris, No. 2:17-cr-167, 2018 WL 318465 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 5, 2018). The defendant in that case,
Harris, had spent the evening with friends at a bar, and was leaving with two of them while the
third, a man named Lazcon, remained behind. Id. at *2. Very shortly after they parted ways, Lazcon
placed a phone call to the others, telling them to, “Come back! That guy who did my bro is here[.]”
Id. Harris and the others returned and together the group confronted a person whom Lazcon
announced to bar patrons was “the snitch who told on [his] brother[.]” Id. The targeted individual
fled the bar, successfully evading the group’s attempts to strike him. Id. As he drove away, Harris
fired a shot that allegedly struck the rear driver’s side door of the target’s vehicle. Id. at *3. Harris
was charged with Conspiracy to Retaliate Against an Informant, Obstruction of Justice by
Attempting to Kill an Informant, and Discharge of a Firearm During a Crime of Violence. Id. at *1.
The magistrate judge in that case initially ordered Harris to be detained pending trial. Id.
The district judge overturned that decision. Id. at *6. In doing so, the court noted that “[t]he parties
expend[ed] most of their energy vigorously disputing what actually occurred on” the evening in
question. Id. at *4. Those events were “relevant to whether the statutory presumption of detention
arises,” and to “the nature of the offense, which is undoubtedly serious, and the strength of the
government’s case[.]” Id. This was inadequate, however, to provide clear and convincing evidence
that Harris would be dangerous while on release. Id.
As the district judge in Harris aptly stated, “What is critically lacking in the government’s
proffer . . . is some argument translating the offense conduct into future dangerousness.” Id. at *4.
Harris, like Defendant in this case, was gainfully employed, had no history of violence, and was
Case 2:25-cr-00131-Z-BR Document 24 Filed 12/19/25 Page 11 of 13 PageID <pageID>

12
enmeshed in the community by strong family ties. Id. at *4–5. Though the circumstances
surrounding his arrest were “reckless” and involved “gravely concerning” decisions, they did not
indicate that Harris would be a danger to the community if released during proceedings. Id. at *5.
The Court finds the same to be true of Defendant in this case.
As a final matter, the Court notes that an arrest warrant has been issued for Defendant in
connection with the surrender of her bail bond in the unrelated state court proceeding referenced
above, State of Texas v. Davila, No. 34526A in the 47th District Court of Randall County, Texas.
Defendant’s bond was surrendered only due to this federal proceeding, and the Court has evidence
that a renewed bond will be available in state proceedings if Defendant is ordered released. The
Court finds that the state arrest warrant will not interfere with Defendant’s appearance as necessary
for this matter, particularly if the Court sets as condition of release that Defendant must satisfy all
requirements necessary to obtain release on bond in her state proceedings.
In addition to that condition, the Court finds that the following combination of conditions
is the least restrictive that will reasonably assure Defendant’s appearance as required and the safety
of other persons and the community while Defendant is on release. To address the Government’s
concern regarding Defendant’s flight risk, the Court will impose a location restriction program on
the Defendant with a curfew and location monitoring technology as directed by the pretrial services
office or supervising officer. If pretrial services determines it is appropriate to reasonably assure
the safety of other persons and the community, Defendant may be directed to participate in a
program of counseling.10 Finally, the Court intends to impose the other conditions indicated in the
unsigned Order Setting Conditions of Release that is attached to this Order. At the hearing to set
10 The Court finds that this condition adequately addresses the Government’s concerns arising out of the altercation at
issue in this case; Defendant’s actions on that occasion indicate that she may benefit from anger management
counseling.
Case 2:25-cr-00131-Z-BR Document 24 Filed 12/19/25 Page 12 of 13 PageID <pageID>

13
conditions of release, the Court will permit either party to request additions or modifications to the
terms indicated here.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Having reviewed the parties’ arguments and evidence, and the applicable law, it has not
been shown by the preponderance of the evidence that no combination of conditions could
reasonably assure the appearance of Defendant as required, nor by clear and convincing evidence
that no combination of conditions could reasonably assure and the safety of other persons and the
community if Defendant is released. Accordingly, the Government’s motion to detain Defendant
pending trial is DENIED. The Defendant will be ORDERED released at a hearing on Monday,
December 22, 2025 at 11:15 a.m., subject to the conditions established by the forthcoming Order
Setting Conditions of Release. An unsigned version of that forthcoming Order has been attached
to this Order to provide notice to the parties.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
ENTERED on December 19, 2025.
Case 2:25-cr-00131-Z-BR Document 24 Filed 12/19/25 Page 13 of 13 PageID <pageID>