Miller v. Director, TDCJ-CID

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
TYLER DIVISION
RAHEEM MARK MILLER
#02091262
§
v. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:25cv507
DIRECTOR, TDCJ-CID §
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Petitioner Raheem Mark Miller, an inmate of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ)
proceeding pro se, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and paid the $5 filing fee. The petition
was transferred to this Court for proper venue and referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate
Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1) and (3) and the Amended Order for the Adoption of Local Rules
for the Assignment of Duties to United States Magistrate Judges.
I. Standard of Review
The Rules Governing Section 2254 case require the Court to “promptly examine” any petition
for writ of habeas corpus and to dismiss the petition “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any
attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief.” Habeas Rule 4. The federal writ of habeas
corpus is available only when an inmate in custody on a state conviction establishes “that he is in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
The role of federal courts in reviewing habeas petitions filed by state prisoners is thus exceedingly
narrow. A prisoner seeking federal habeas corpus review must assert a violation of a federal
constitutional right; federal relief is unavailable to correct errors of state constitutional, statutory, or
procedural law unless a federal issue is also present. See Lowery v. Collins, 988 F.2d 1364, 1367 (5th
Cir. 1993); see also Estelle v. McGuire, 503 F.3d 408, 413 (5th Cir. 2007) (“We first note that ‘federal
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habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.’”) (internal citation omitted). Pro se habeas
petitions are construed liberally and “are not held to the same stringent and rigorous standards as are
pleadings filed by lawyers.” United States v. Elam, 930 F.3d 406, 409 (5th Cir. 2019).
II. Relevant Background
According to the petition, Petitioner was convicted of capital murder in Henderson County,
Texas on August 30, 2016, and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. (Dkt. #3 at
1.) Petitioner asserts that the Twelfth Court of Appeals affirmed his criminal judgment on December
13, 2017. (Id. at 2.) Publicly available records of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals establish that it
denied discretionary review of Petitioner’s direct appeal on April 18, 2018. See Court of Criminal
Appeals Docket for Case: PD-0084-18, available at https://search.txcourts.gov/Case.aspx?cn=PD-
0084-18&coa=coscca (visited Feb. 13, 2026).
Petitioner acknowledges that he did not file any challenge to his conviction other than his direct
appeal (Dkt. #3 at 3), and publicly available state court records confirm that he did not. Petitioner
signed and deposited his federal habeas petition into the prison mail system on December 2, 2025.
(Dkt. #3 at 15.)
On December 17, 2025, the Court observed that a review of the petition indicated that it is
likely time-barred under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and, pursuant to
Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198 (2006), gave Petitioner thirty days to respond to that issue and offer
any argument in favor of timeliness. (Dkt. #8.) The Court expressly cautioned that failure to respond
could “result in the dismissal of the case for the failure to comply with the Court’s orders or for
untimeliness under Section 2244.” (Id. at 2.)
Petitioner has not responded to that Order. Accordingly, the Court finds that he has no
additional information or argument material to the issue of the timeliness of his petition and proceeds
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to apply Rule 4 to the petition.
III. Law and Analysis
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) imposes a one-year limitations
period for habeas petitions brought by prisoners challenging state criminal convictions. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(d). Under this provision, the limitations period runs from the latest of four enumerated events:
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or
the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action
in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the
applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the
Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and
made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have
been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).
Petitioner does not allege any newly-announced constitutional right or newly-discovered
factual predicates as required to trigger subsections (C) or (D) of the statute of limitations. In a
memorandum submitted with his petition, he cites Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016), in
support of his primary claim that he was unconstitutionally sentenced to life without parole for a crime
he committed at age 17. (Dkt. #4 at 3.) But that case was decided in January 2016, months before
Petitioner was convicted. Further, it simply announced that the substantive ruling of Miller v. Alabama,
567 U.S. 460 (2012) (prohibiting mandatory life sentences for juvenile offenders), applies retroactively
to cases on collateral review. Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 212. He also cites Jones v. Mississippi, 593
U.S. 98 (2021). (Dkt. #4 at 3.) But that case was merely an application of Miller, holding that Miller
did not require an on-the-record finding, either explicit or implicit, of permanent incorrigibility before
the imposition of a life sentence. Jones, 593 U.S. at 114. Accordingly, none of these cases would justify
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any delayed commencement of Petitioner’s limitations period under subsection (C).
Nor does Petitioner allege a total lack of access to AEDPA that actually prevented him from
filing a timely federal habeas petition to proceed under subsection (B). See Egerton v. Cockrell, 334
F.3d 433, 438-39 (5th Cir. 2003) (“The State’s failure to make available to a prisoner the AEDPA,
which sets forth the basic procedural rules the prisoner must follow in order to avoid having his habeas
petition summarily thrown out of court, including the newly imposed statute of limitations, is just as
much of an impediment as if the State were to take “affirmative steps” to prevent the petitioner from
filing the application.”).
Accordingly, Petitioner’s limitations period began to run under subsection (A) on July 17, 2018,
when his opportunity to seek certiorari from the United States Supreme Court expired. See Jimenez v.
Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 119–120 (2009) (holding that state convictions are final under
§2244(d)(1)(A) when Supreme Court certiorari is exhausted or when the time for filing a certiorari
petition expires). AEDPA gave him one year from that date—until July 17, 2019—to file a timely
federal habeas petition. Accordingly, Petitioner’s December 2025 filing is more than seven years too
late unless he benefits from extensive tolling of the limitations period.
AEDPA provides that “[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State post-
conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall
not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). But
Petitioner did not file a state habeas petition in this case.
AEDPA’s one-year limitations period may also be subject to equitable tolling in extraordinary
cases. Davis v. Johnson, 158 F.3d 806, 807 (5th Cir. 1998). Equitable tolling is a discretionary doctrine
turning on the facts and circumstances of each case, and a petitioner bears the burden of establishing
entitlement to equitable tolling in the AEDPA context. Felder v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 171 (5th Cir.
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2000); Phillips v. Donnelly, 216 F.3d 508, 511 (5th Cir. 2000); Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 713
(5th Cir. 1999). To be entitled to equitable tolling, a petitioner must show: “(1) that he has been
pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and
prevented timely filing.” Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336 (2007) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). Equity does not benefit those who sleep on their rights. Fisher v. Johnson 174 F.3d
710, 715 (5th Cir. 1999); Coleman v. Johnson, 184 F.3d 398, 403 (5th Cir. 1999), abrogated on other
grounds by Causey v. Cain, 450 F.3d 601, 605–06 (5th Cir. 2006).
In response to inquiry on his habeas petition form about timeliness, Petitioner suggests that his
lateness should be excused due to actual innocence or the ineffective assistance of counsel. (Dkt. #3 at
13.) But actual innocence would not explain a seven-year delay in seeking relief, and it does not
constitute grounds for equitable tolling. See Tate v. Parker, 439 F. App’x 375, 376 (5th Cir. 2011)
(finding that ignorance of the law, lack of knowledge of filing deadlines, a claim of actual innocence,
temporary denial of access to research materials or the law library, and inadequacies in the prison law
library were are not extraordinary circumstances sufficient to warrant equitable tolling). And Petitioner
does not explain how the alleged ineffectiveness of counsel at either trial or on appeal caused him to
delay filing his federal petition; to the contrary, “any ineffective assistance on the part of trial counsel
has no bearing on equitable tolling because it occurred before Petitioner’s conviction became final.”
Harvey v. Lumpkin, No. 5:20-CV-0588-OLG, 2021 WL 3145660, at *2 (W.D. Tex. July 26, 2021).
Petitioner filed his federal habeas petition too late by any calculation, and the record does not
establish any extraordinary circumstance or other excusable cause for Petitioner’s delay. It thus
“plainly appears” that the instant Section 2254 petition is untimely and must be dismissed on that basis.
Rule 4, Rules Gov’g Section 2254 Petitions.
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Certificate of Appealability
An appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from a final order in a habeas corpus
proceeding unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(1)(A). A district court may deny a certificate of appealability sua sponte because the district
court that denies a petitioner relief is in the best position to determine whether the petitioner has made a
substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right on the issues before that court. Alexander v.
Johnson, 211 F.3d 895, 898 (5th Cir. 2000).
To obtain a certificate of appealability, the petitioner must make a substantial showing that the
petitioner has been denied a federal right. Newby v. Johnson, 81 F.3d 567, 569 (5th Cir. 1996). To do
this, he must demonstrate that the issues are debatable among jurists of reason, that a court could
resolve the issues in a different manner, or that the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement
to proceed further. James v. Cain, 50 F.3d 1327, 1330 (5th Cir. 1995).
When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the
prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a certificate of appealability should issue when the prisoner
shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the prisoner states a valid claim
of the denial of a constitutional right, and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the
district court was correct in its procedural ruling. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
Jurists of reason would not find it debatable whether this Court’s procedural ruling in this case is
correct. As a result, Petitioner is not entitled to a certificate of appealability.
RECOMMENDATION
It is accordingly recommended that this action be dismissed with prejudice as barred by the
applicable statute of limitations and that a COA be denied sua sponte.
A copy of these findings, conclusions and recommendations shall be served on all parties in the
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manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these findings, conclusions, and
recommendations must file specific written objections of no more than eight pages within 14 days after
being served with a copy.
In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to
which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the Magistrate Judge’s
proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An
objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the Magistrate Judge is
not specific, and the district court need not consider frivolous, conclusive, or general objections. See
Battle v. United States Parole Commission, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987).
Failure to file specific written objections will bar the objecting party from appealing the factual
findings and legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge which are accepted and adopted by the district
court except upon grounds of plain error. Duarte v. City of Lewisville, 858 F.3d 348, 352 (5th Cir. 2017).
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