Ashour v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, LLC et al

4:25-cv-01097Txed30 de mar. de 2026

Abrir fonte

Texto completo

United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SHERMAN DIVISION
HANI MOHAMMAD ASHOUR,
individually and as representative of
THE ESTATE OF DALAL HAMMAD
ASHOUR,
Plaintiffs,
v.
24 HOUR FITNESS USA, LLC, and
PARKER CENTRAL PLAZA LTD.
Defendants.
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
Civil Action No. 4:25-cv-1097
Judge Mazzant
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Corrected Motion to Remand (the “Motion”)
(Dkt. #7). Having considered the Motion and the relevant pleadings, the Court finds that the
Motion should be DENIED.
BACKGROUND
This is a wrongful death case. On or about June 16, 2025, Dalal Hammad Ashour (the
“Decedent”) drowned to death in a swimming pool owned by 24 Hour Fitness USA, LLC
(“24HR”). On August 15, 2025, Plaintiff filed suit in the 471st Judicial District Court of Collin
County, Texas, seeking recovery for Decedent’s death (Dkt. #1-3 at p. 2). On October 7, 2025,
24HR removed the case to this Court pursuant to this Court’s diversity jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. §1332 and in accordance with Local Rule CV-81 (Dkt. #1 at p. 1). In its argument for
removal, 24HR alleged that Defendant Parker Central Plaza LTD (“Parker Central”) was
improperly joined to defeat diversity jurisdiction (Dkt. #7 at p. 4). On November 6, 2025, Plaintiff
filed the present Motion, seeking to remand the case to state court (Dkt. #7). Defendants filed a
Case 4:25-cv-01097-ALM Document 18 Filed 03/30/26 Page 1 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>
2
response (Dkt. #8). Following a cursory inspection of Plaintiff’s pleadings, the Court granted
Plaintiff leave to amend her original petition to better conform to federal pleading standards
(Dkt. #14). Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on March 11, 2026 (Dkt. #15). The Court is now
tasked with determining whether Plaintiff’s amendment was sufficient to state a claim against
Parker Central.
LEGAL STANDARD
“‘Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,’ possessing ‘only that power authorized
by Constitution and statute.’” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013) (quoting Kokkonen v.
Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)). “Only state-court actions that originally
could have been filed in federal court may be removed to federal court by the defendant.”
Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)). “In an action that
has been removed to federal court, a district court is required to remand the case to state court if,
at any time before final judgment, it determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction.” Humphrey
v. Tex. Gas Serv., No. 1:14-CV-485, 2014 WL 12687831, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 11, 2014). The Court
“must presume that a suit lies outside [its] limited jurisdiction,” Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243
F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir. 2001), and “[a]ny ambiguities are construed against removal and in favor of
remand to state court.” Mumfrey v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 719 F.3d 392, 397 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing
Manguno v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 2002)). “When considering
a motion to remand, ‘the removing party bears the burden of showing that federal jurisdiction exists
and that removal was proper.’” Humphrey, 2014 WL 12687831, at *2 (citation modified) (quoting
Manguno, 276 F.3d at 723).
Case 4:25-cv-01097-ALM Document 18 Filed 03/30/26 Page 2 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>
3
ANALYSIS
I. Diversity Jurisdiction
Plaintiff contends that remand is proper because Defendants have failed to establish
complete diversity of citizenship (Dkt. #7 at p. 7). If successful, Plaintiff’s argument would warrant
remand of the case, as subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 only exists where there is
complete diversity of citizenship between the parties. Vantage Drilling Co. v. Hsin-Chi Su, 741 F.3d
535, 537 (5th Cir. 2014). For diversity purposes, an individual is a citizen of the state where they
are domiciled. MidCap Media Fin., L.L.C. v. Pathway Data, Inc., 929 F.3d 310, 313–14 (5th Cir.
2019). A corporation is a citizen of the state, or states, of its incorporation and the state where its
principal place of business is located. Id. The citizenship of a limited liability company and a limited
partnership is determined by considering the citizenship of all the members and partners. Harvey
v. Grey Wolf Drilling Co., 542 F.3d 1077, 1080 (5th Cir. 2008); Temple Drilling Co. v. La. Ins. Guar.
Ass’n, 946 F.2d 390, 393 (5th Cir. 1991). The party invoking jurisdiction under § 1332 is responsible
for showing that the parties are completely diverse. See Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d
507, 511 (5th Cir. 1980).
A. Plaintiff’s Citizenship
Plaintiff is an individual who is domiciled in Texas (Dkt. #1-3 at p. 3; Dkt. #7 at p. 7). As a
result, Plaintiff is a citizen of Texas for diversity purposes. See MidCap, 929 F.3d at 313–14.
B. Defendants’ Citizenship
24HR is a California limited liability company (Dkt. #1 at p. 4). None of its members are
citizens of Texas (Dkt. #1 at p. 4). Thus, 24HR’s citizenship is sufficiently diverse from Plaintiff’s
to satisfy the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332. See Grey Wolf, 542 F.3d at 1080.
Case 4:25-cv-01097-ALM Document 18 Filed 03/30/26 Page 3 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>
4
The Court’s analysis cannot stop there, however, as “[t]he diversity statute requires
complete diversity of citizenship. A federal court cannot exercise diversity jurisdiction if one of the
plaintiffs shares the same citizenship as any one of the defendants” Stiftung v. Plains Mktg., L.P.,
603 F.3d 295, 297 (5th Cir. 2010) (citation modified) (internal citation omitted).
Parker Central is a Texas limited partnership with at least one member who is a citizen of
Texas (Dkt. #1-3 at p. 4; Dkt. #1 at p. 5). Hence, Parker Central shares a common state of citizenship
with Plaintiff: Texas. See id.; Grey Wolf, 542 F.3d at 1080. This shared citizenship risks
compromising this Court’s diversity jurisdiction. If Defendants are unable to establish improper
joinder as to Parker Central, diversity is destroyed and the Court must remand the case for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Narvaiz v. Wal-Mart Stores Tex., LLC, No. 2:13-CV-195, 2013
WL 4677811, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2013) (“If Defendants fail to establish improper joinder,
then there is not complete diversity of citizenship among the parties, and the Court must remand
the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.”).
II. Improper Joinder
“The party seeking removal bears a heavy burden of proving that the joinder of the in-state
party was improper.” Smallwood v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 385 F.3d 568, 574 (5th Cir. 2004). The
removing party must show either (1) there has been actual fraud in the pleading of jurisdictional
facts; or (2) “that there is no possibility of recovery by the plaintiff against a nondiverse defendant,
which stated differently means that there is no reasonable basis for the district court to predict that
the plaintiff might be able to recover against a nondiverse defendant.” Id. at 573; Int’l Energy
Ventures Mgmt., L.L.C. v. United Energy Grp., Ltd., 818 F.3d 193, 199–200 (5th Cir. 2016) (citation
modified) (quoting Smallwood, 385 F.3d at 573). Defendants seek to prove the latter, and must do
so by clear and convincing evidence. See Grassi v. Ciba–Geigy, Ltd., 894 F.2d 181, 186 (5th Cir.
Case 4:25-cv-01097-ALM Document 18 Filed 03/30/26 Page 4 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>
5
1990). Not only that, but the Court must “evaluate all of the factual allegations in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, resolving all contested issues of substantive fact in favor of the plaintiff.”
B., Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 663 F.2d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 1981).
In her original state court petition, Plaintiff alleged that “at all relevant times, the premises,
the subject pool, its equipment, enclosures, and appurtenances were owned, operated, controlled,
and managed” by either 24HR or Parker Central (Dkt. #1-3 at p. 4). Her petition further alleged
that either party was responsible for “the creation of policies and procedures related to safety,
construction, design, training, hiring, selection, supervision, pool surveillance, and occupancy
limits that contributed to the drowning” (Dkt. #1-3 at p. 5). She brought multiple causes of action
against both parties, including negligence, negligence per se, gross negligence, and premises
liability (Dkt. #1-3 at pp. 5–6).
Defendants argue that Parker Central was improperly joined solely to defeat jurisdiction
because Plaintiff cannot recover against it on any of her theories (Dkt. #8 at p. 1). In support of
their argument, Defendants have produced “undisputed lease and construction documents,”
which they claim conclusively show that Parker Central is not liable to Plaintiff (Dkt. #8 at p. 5). In
light of Defendants’ response, the Court turns to Plaintiff’s Motion in search of a reasonable basis
to predict that Plaintiff might be able to recover against Parker Central in state court. See Int’l
Energy, 818 F.3d at 199–200.
A. Appropriate Test for Improper Joinder
The Fifth Circuit has set out two avenues for determining whether there is a reasonable
basis to predict that a plaintiff might recover against a defendant under state law. See Smallwood,
385 F.3d at 573–74. “[A] court may choose to use either one of these two analyses, but it must use
one and only one of them, not neither or both.” Int’l Energy, 818 F.3d at 207. Importantly, this
Case 4:25-cv-01097-ALM Document 18 Filed 03/30/26 Page 5 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>
6
decision “lies within the discretion of the trial court.” Flagg v. Stryker Corp., 819 F.3d 132, 137 (5th
Cir. 2016) (citation modified).
The first test involves a simple “Rule 12(b)(6)-type analysis, looking initially at the
allegations of the complaint to determine whether the complaint states a claim under state law
against the in-state defendant.” Smallwood, 385 F.3d at 573. Under this test, the Court utilizes
federal pleading standards in its analysis. Int’l Energy, 818 F.3d at 208 (“Our precedent is clear: A
federal court must apply the federal pleading standard.”). The second test is less common and is
appropriate in cases where “a plaintiff has stated a claim, but has misstated or omitted discrete facts
that would determine the propriety of joinder.” Smallwood, 385 F.3d at 573. It is also appropriate
where a plaintiff’s “original state court petition contains only broad allegations against the
‘defendants’ collectively and does not allege any specific factual allegations against [either
defendant].” Centaurus GF Cove, LLC v. Lexington Ins. Co., No. CIV. A. H-10-836, 2010 WL
2710390, at *3 (S.D. Tex. July 7, 2010); see also Campos v. Starbucks Corp., No. 7:25-CV-00125, 2025
WL 3124017, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2025). Such an inquiry “is appropriate only to identify the
presence of discrete and undisputed facts that would preclude plaintiff’s recovery against the
in-state defendant.” Smallwood, 385 F.3d at 573–74.
Here, the Court exercises its discretion and applies the first test—the 12(b)(6) type
inquiry—to the relevant pleadings.1 Thus, Plaintiff will be found to have improperly joined Parker
Central if it has not pleaded “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell
1 Facts similar to those currently before the Court have led other district courts to apply the second test—the
summary inquiry—to the relevant pleadings. See, e.g., Centaurus, 2010 WL 2710390, at *3; see also Campos, 2025
WL 3124017, at *3. While the application of that test under these specific circumstances may be a valid exercise of
discretion, the Court finds that improper joinder is an inevitability under either test and thus declines Defendant’s
invitation to pierce the pleadings (Dkt. #8 at p. 5).
Case 4:25-cv-01097-ALM Document 18 Filed 03/30/26 Page 6 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>
7
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a
sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. In conducting its analysis, “[t]he ‘court
accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.’” In
re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (citation modified) (quoting
Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004)).
Finally, the Court recognizes that Plaintiff’s “negligent undertaking” and “premises
liability” causes of action each appear to be based on the same facts. This cannot be, as “[u]nder
Texas Supreme Court authority this alone is fatal to her negligent undertaking theory.” Okokon v.
Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 4:22-CV-3438, 2025 WL 593379, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 24, 2025) (citing
Occidental Chem. Corp. v. Jenkins, 478 S.W.3d 640, 644 (Tex. 2016) (holding a plaintiff may plead
either a negligence claim or a premises-liability claim)). However, in the interest of a complete and
fair review of the pleadings, the Court sees fit to address both causes of action in kind.
B. Negligent Undertaking
Plaintiff first alleges the possibility of liability against Parker Central under a negligent
undertaking cause of action (Dkt. #15 at p. 6).2 Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not pleaded
specific facts to support her negligent undertaking claim, and further contend that Parker Central
2 The Amended Complaint broadly labels this cause of action as “Negligence, Negligence Per Se, and Gross
Negligence” (Dkt. #15 at p. 6). However, all parties have interpreted this section as supporting a claim for negligent
undertaking alone (See Dkt. #7 at p. 8; Dkt. #8 at pp. 10–11).
Case 4:25-cv-01097-ALM Document 18 Filed 03/30/26 Page 7 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>
8
cannot be liable for its negligent failure to repair the pool, only for any actual negligent repairs it
might have attempted. Defendants insist that because Plaintiff “alleges . . . no negligent repairs”
were made on the relevant property, Plaintiff cannot prevail (Dkt. #8 at p. 8). Because the Court
agrees that Plaintiff has failed to adequately plead negligent undertaking, it finds this cause of action
insufficient to defeat Defendants’ improper joinder argument.
Generally, a negligent undertaking duty arises when (1) a defendant undertakes to perform
services it knew or should have known were necessary for the plaintiff’s protection; (2) the
defendant failed to exercise reasonable care in performing those services; and (3) the plaintiff relied
on the defendant’s performance or the defendant’s performance increased the plaintiff’s risk of
harm. Robison v. Cont’l Cas. Co., No. 1:17-CV-508, 2022 WL 336901, at *8 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2022)
(citing Nall v. Plunkett, 404 S.W.3d 552, 556 (Tex. 2013)), aff’d, No. 22-40071, 2022 WL 17819601
(5th Cir. Dec. 20, 2022); see also Johnson Cnty. Sheriff’s Posse v. Endsley 926 S.W.2d 284, 285 (Tex.
1996) (“[A] lessor who makes repairs may be liable for injuries resulting from the lessor’s
negligence in making the repairs.”).
Negligent undertaking may arise under either physical actions or contractual obligations,
such as the lease agreement entered into the record by Defendant. See Millsaps v. Cont’l Cas. Co.,
No. 1:23-CV-00147-MJT, 2023 WL 9645471, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 20, 2023), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 1:23-CV-00147-MJT, 2024 WL 1283710 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2024).
In her Amended Complaint, however, Plaintiff does not even “simply parrot[] the elements of a
negligent-undertaking cause of action” and instead provides neither fact nor allegation in favor of
Parker Central’s liability under that theory. Castillo v. JLG Indus., Inc., No. 5:18-CV-00041, 2018
Case 4:25-cv-01097-ALM Document 18 Filed 03/30/26 Page 8 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>
9
WL 11428843, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 17, 2018). Specifically, Plaintiff relies entirely on three
allegations to support her negligent undertaking claim, arguing that Parker Central is liable for:
(a) “failing to inspect, maintain, and/or provide adequate safety
equipment”;
(b) “failing to properly train [or supervise] their employees”; and
(c) “failing to timely and/or adequately react to Decedent’s drowning”
(Dkt. #15 at p. 6).
The first element of the claim is simply absent from the pleadings altogether, as Plaintiff
(a) has not pleaded that Parker Central took any specific negligent actions in any attempted
maintenance of the pool; and (b) only implicitly argues for the existence of a duty by emphasizing
Parker Central’s repeated “failure” to act or provide a service. This issue applies in equal strength
to the other elements of negligent undertaking, as Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint fails to
detail any facts related to Parker Central’s knowledge that a service it offered to perform was
“necessary for the plaintiff’s protection,” how Parker Central performed any alleged “service,” or
how Parker Central’s performance may have “increased the plaintiff’s risk of harm.” Robison, 2022
WL 336901, at *8.
A thorough review of Plaintiff’s pleadings has provided this Court with more than enough
confidence to determine that Plaintiff has not properly offered “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face” regarding her negligent undertaking claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570. Thus, Defendants have carried their burden to show that Parker Central was not properly
joined on account of this cause of action.
C. Premises Liability
Plaintiff next argues that she has shown a possibility of recovery on her premises liability
claim against Parker Central (Dkt. #7 at p. 9). Defendants respond that Plaintiff has failed to plead
Case 4:25-cv-01097-ALM Document 18 Filed 03/30/26 Page 9 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>
10
a viable claim because she has not provided any facts to support the requisite “duty” element under
that cause of action (See Dkt. #8 at p. 7). To that end, Defendants make repeated reference to the
legal consequences of Parker Central’s unique status as a landlord under Texas law and emphasize
its resulting protection from liability.
The pleadings indicate that Parker Central is a lessor to 24HR of all property relevant to
this case (Dkt. #1 at p. 7; Dkt. #1-7). Plaintiff does not dispute this characterization. Thus, the
Court finds it appropriate to treat Parker Central as a lessor under Texas law. Importantly, “[a]
lessor generally has no duty to tenants or their invitees for dangerous conditions on the leased
premises.” Johnson Cnty., 926 S.W.2d at 285. There are a few limited exceptions to this rule,
including: (1) when the lessor’s negligence in making repairs injures an invitee; (2) when the lessor
conceals defects on the leased premises of which they were aware; and (3) when an invitee is injured
by a defect on a portion of the premises that remained under the lessor’s control. Id.
Plaintiff argues that she has availed herself of two exceptions. First, Plaintiff alleges that her
premises liability claim rests on Parker Central’s negligent repair of the property (Dkt. #7 at
pp. 9–10). Second, Plaintiff alleges that her premises liability claim rests on Parker Central’s
continued control of the property (Dkt. #7 at pp. 9–10). In the face of Defendants’ arguments,
however, both arguments are insufficient to warrant remand.
1. Parker Central’s Alleged Failure to Repair
The Texas Supreme Court addressed the negligent repair exception to a landlord’s
immunity to suit in detail in Flynn v. Pan Am. Hotel Co., 183 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. 1944). There, it found
that when a “landlord, although he may be under no obligation to make repairs, does undertake to
make them, he is liable for injuries resulting from his negligence or that of his servants or employees
in making the repairs.” Id. at 448. In Flynn, the Texas Supreme Court held that a landlord defendant
Case 4:25-cv-01097-ALM Document 18 Filed 03/30/26 Page 10 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>
11
was not liable to a plaintiff who was injured by a malfunctioning elevator because there was “no
evidence” that the landlord “ever undertook to repair the broken [elevator part] and was negligent
in repairing it.” Id. This was found to be the case despite the landlord retaining the right to make
repairs or improvements at will. Id. at 449–50. The Texas Supreme Court reiterated this point over
50 years later, holding that “if [landlords] agree to make repairs, they have a duty to complete them
with care. But they do not become liable for existing premises defects merely by retaining the right
to re-enter the premises to make alterations.” Shell Oil Co. v. Khan, 138 S.W.3d 288, 297 (Tex.
2004).
Plaintiff has not alleged that Parker Central repaired or otherwise even made an attempt to
repair the relevant property. Plaintiff has instead alleged the opposite, claiming that Parker Central
is liable for “failing to inspect, maintain, and repair the subject pool, pool area, enclosures, gates,
and/or pool equipment” (Dkt. #15 at p. 6 (citation modified) (emphasis added)). Thus, Parker
Central’s liability must arise, if at all, in its hypothetical agreement to make repairs or
improvements to the property associated with the Decedent. However, as indicated above,
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint omits any reference or allegation related to Parker Central’s
contractual duty to provide repairs or improvements to any part of the premises. It includes no
specific facts related to any agreement by Parker Central to repair the pool property—further, it
never goes so far as to detail the specific cause of Decedent’s death beyond “drowning,” so no
connection can be drawn between the cause of harm and Parker Central. The Amended Complaint
instead contains only insufficient and “conclusionary allegations, wholly lacking in specific factual
support.” Jernigan v. Ashland Oil Inc., 989 F.2d 812, 817 (5th Cir. 1993).
Case 4:25-cv-01097-ALM Document 18 Filed 03/30/26 Page 11 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>
12
As a result, the Court must conclude that Plaintiff simply “did not include particularized
facts and particularized allegations” against Parker Central that are “sufficient to establish a
reasonable possibility of recovery.” Centaurus, 2010 WL 2710390, at *3. Thus, Defendants have
carried their burden to show that this exception does not apply to Plaintiff’s premises liability claim
against Parker Central.
2. Parker Central’s Alleged Control
Texas law provides that, “[g]enerally, a landlord who retains control over a part of the
premises that the tenant is entitled to use owes a duty to exercise ordinary care.” Stein v. Gill, 895
S.W.2d 501, 502 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no writ). Further, a landlord’s “[r]ight to control
may be shown by explicit contractual assignment or actual exercise of control.” Khan, 138 S.W.3d
at 292. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint alleges in part that Parker Central “owned, operated,
controlled, [and] managed” the subject pool and premises (Dkt. #15 at p. 3). Plaintiff argues that
control is a “question of fact that cannot be resolved at this stage,” and thus her Amended
Complaint is enough to warrant remand (Dkt. #7 at p. 10). This “argument,” however, is little more
than an incorrect statement of law, as “entirely general” allegations are insufficient to defend
against a properly pleaded improper joinder attack. Badon v. R J R Nabisco Inc., 224 F.3d 382, 392
(5th Cir. 2000).
Importantly, Plaintiff does not identify or offer any facts to support the notion that Parker
Central failed to “‘relinquish[] possession or occupancy of the premises’” to 24HR. Campos, 2025
WL 3124017, at *3 (quoting Endsley, 926 S.W.2d at 285). “Nowhere does the [Amended Complaint]
allege any particular or specific activity [or] agreement” between Parker Central and 24HR that
could suffice to provide factual support to its conclusory statements. Badon, 224 F.3d at 392.
Instead, Plaintiff offers only bare assertions and legal conclusions to support her claim that the
Case 4:25-cv-01097-ALM Document 18 Filed 03/30/26 Page 12 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>
13
landlord exercised control over the pool property. In other words, Plaintiff has been unable to
adequately and “specifically state facts that point to the allegedly wrongful conduct” by Parker
Central. Rodriguez v. State Farm Lloyds, No. 3:13-CV-3505-G, 2014 WL 3406961, at *4 (N.D. Tex.
July 14, 2014). “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be
supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 664. As a result, Plaintiff has failed to “allege
sufficient facts to ‘nudge’ the claim[] ‘across the line from conceivable to plausible’” and thus
cannot rely upon this avenue for support against Defendant’s improper joinder argument. Cessna
v. Ryobi Techs., Inc., No. 1:17-CV-358, 2017 WL 11450258, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 21, 2017) (first
quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; and then quoting Leal v. McHugh, 731 F.3d 405, 410 (5th Cir.
2013)).
D. Statutory Obligations
Plaintiff’s final argument against improper joinder is that Parker Central has “nondelegable
statutory duties as the pool owner” (Dkt. #7 at p. 2). In support of her claim, Plaintiff cites to a
relevant portion of the Texas Administrative Code which holds that:
A staffing plan specifying the number of on-duty lifeguards must be prepared by the
pool operator, lifeguard supervisor, or pool owner, and must provide adequate
supervision and close observation of all users at all times. A copy of the plan must
be available on-site and be provided to a DSHS or local regulatory authority
inspector upon request.
25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 265.191.
Plaintiff posits that Parker Central, as the “owner” of the pool, owed Decedent a duty to
create and maintain a staffing plan under that portion of the code. In response, Defendant grapples
with the definitions of “pool owner” and “pool operator,” which is unnecessary at this stage, as
the Court “must resolve any uncertainties as to the current state of controlling substantive law in
favor of the plaintiff.” B., 663 F.2d at 549.
Case 4:25-cv-01097-ALM Document 18 Filed 03/30/26 Page 13 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>
14
Setting aside the statutory differences between the “owner” and “operator” of a public
pool, the Court favors Defendant’s ultimate interpretation of Plaintiff’s statutory duty theory. Not
only is Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint free from any mention of the Texas Administrative Code,
but that pleading makes no reference to Parker Central’s statutory duty to maintain a “staffing
plan” at all. At best, Plaintiff alleges, in exact and identical prose, that each “Defendant” failed “to
enforce adequate safety policies and/or procedures” and “to comply with the applicable
ordinances, regulations, laws, and industry standards” (Dkt. #15 at ¶¶ 13, 15). This collection of
vague accusations, however, does not present “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” Int’l Energy, 818 F.3d at 208; Martinez v. City of N. Richland Hills, 846 F. App’x 238,
243 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“The court disregards bare assertions of collective
responsibility, unsupported by concrete factual allegations.”). Defendants have therefore carried
their burden to prove that Plaintiff has failed to state “a reasonable possibility of recovery, not
merely a theoretical one,” against Parker Central. Ross v. Citifinancial, Inc., 344 F.3d 458, 462 (5th
Cir. 2003).
E. Plaintiff’s Amendment
The Court concludes this Memorandum Opinion and Order with an acknowledgment of
prior procedural matters. On February 25, 2026, the Court issued an Order permitting Plaintiff to
conform her original state petition to federal pleading standards (Dkt. #14). Even after requesting
and receiving leave to amend her original state petition, Plaintiff’s new allegations are insufficient
to support remand. At their most useful, they swap Plaintiff’s interchangeable use of
“Defendants” for copy-and-paste cause of actions (See Dkt. #15 at ¶¶ 10, 11). At their least, they
succeed only in adding descriptive fluff to conclusory statements—turning phrases such as
“owned, operated, controlled, and managed” to “controlled, managed, maintained, staffed,
Case 4:25-cv-01097-ALM Document 18 Filed 03/30/26 Page 14 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>
15
supervised, and exercised day-to-day control over the subject pool and pool area, including safety
policies . . . .” (Compare Dkt. #1-3 at ¶ 10, with Dkt. #15 at ¶ 11). However, there is no amount of
conclusory language that can substitute the glaring absence of factual support for any of Plaintiff’s
allegations against Parker Central. Indeed, “[t]he Federal Rules do require a plaintiff to plead actual
facts in support of its claims.” SC & E Admin. Servs., Inc. v. Deloitte, No. A-05-CA-929-SS, 2006
WL 6747974, at *5 (W.D. Tex. July 25, 2006). As a result, this case will not be remanded on account
of the allegations contained in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint.
CONCLUSION
It is therefore ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Corrected Motion to Remand (Dkt. #7) is
hereby DENIED.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against Parker Central Plaza Ltd. are hereby DISMISSED
without prejudice as improperly joined.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Case 4:25-cv-01097-ALM Document 18 Filed 03/30/26 Page 15 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>

Continue sua pesquisa no ChatGPT ou Claude

Conecte o Omnilex para pesquisar o corpus jurídico pelo seu assistente de IA.