Doe et al v. Prosper Independent School District

United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SHERMAN DIVISION
JANE AND JOHN DOE, AS NEXT
FRIENDS OF JANIE DOE 1 AND
JANIE DOE 2, MINOR CHILDREN,
Plaintiffs,
v.
PROSPER INDEPENDENT SCHOOL
DISTRICT AND ANNETTE
PANIAGUA EX REL. THE ESTATE
OF FRANK PANIAGUA,
Defendants.
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
Civil Action No. 4:22-cv-814
Judge Mazzant
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court is Defendant Prosper Independent School District’s Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint (the “Motion to Dismiss”) (Dkt. #96). Having
considered the Motion to Dismiss and the relevant pleadings, the Court finds that the Motion to
Dismiss should be DENIED as moot.
BACKGROUND
During the 2021–2022 school year, eight-year-old Janie Doe 1 and six-year-old Janie Doe 2
(the “Doe Children”) attended school in the Prosper Independent School District (“Prosper
ISD”). The Doe Children rode a bus driven by Frank Paniagua (“Paniagua”) to school three to
four times a week. Plaintiffs allege that Paniagua, every morning after picking up the Doe Children
but before picking up other children, would drive the bus off route and make an unscheduled stop.
During 2 this stop, Paniagua would touch the Doe Children’s chests, vaginas, and anuses under the
guise of readjusting their seatbelts. According to the allegations, the sexual abuse was captured on
school-bus surveillance video. Plaintiffs allege that after the Doe Children disclosed the abuse to
Case 4:22-cv-00814-ALM Document 120 Filed 01/08/26 Page 1 of 4 PageID #:
<pageID>

2
their mother, Jane Doe, she promptly reported it to Prosper ISD’s Transportation Department and
the Prosper ISD Police Department. On May 9, 2022, Prosper ISD police extracted the surveillance
video from Paniagua’s bus, reviewed it, and then sent the footage to Prosper Police Department.
The next day, the Doe Children underwent forensic interviews. Soon after, Paniagua was arrested
on charges of aggravated sexual assault of a child, continuous sexual abuse of a child victim under
14, and indecency with a child sexual contact. Paniagua attempted suicide by jumping off the second
floor of the jail, paralyzing himself, and later died on June 10, 2022. Jane and John Doe
(“Plaintiffs”) filed this lawsuit on behalf of themselves and the Doe Children, seeking to hold
Defendants Prosper ISD, Holly Ferguson (the Superintendent of Prosper ISD), Annamarie
Hamrick (the former Director of Prosper ISD Transportation Department), and the Estate of Frank
Paniagua responsible for Paniagua’s actions (Dkt. #27).
Since the removal of this lawsuit to federal court, Plaintiffs have filed several amended
complaints (Dkt. #14; Dkt. #27; Dkt. #72; Dkt. #95). Prosper ISD and the Estate of Frank Paniagua
are the only remaining defendants in the live complaint, and Plaintiffs now seek relief only on behalf
of the Doe Children (Dkt. #95). On April 10, 2025, Prosper ISD moved to dismiss the case under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (Dkt. #96). Plaintiffs filed a response and Prosper ISD
replied (Dkt. #98; Dkt. #103). The Estate of Frank Paniagua filed a “Notice of Joinder” in Prosper
ISD’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. #97). However, Prosper ISD’s Motion to Dismiss requests
dismissal only as to the claims against Prosper ISD.
Prosper ISD has now moved for summary judgment based on substantially the same
grounds upon which it seeks dismissal (Dkt. #119). The Motion for Summary Judgment is not ripe.
Case 4:22-cv-00814-ALM Document 120 Filed 01/08/26 Page 2 of 4 PageID #:
<pageID>

3
LEGAL STANDARD
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that each claim in a complaint include a “short
and plain statement . . . showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Each
claim must include enough factual allegations “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion allows a party to move for dismissal of an action when the complaint
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). When considering a
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the
plaintiff’s complaint and view those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Bowlby v. City
of Aberdeen, 681 F.3d 215, 219 (5th Cir. 2012). The Court may consider “the complaint, any
documents attached to the complaint, and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that
are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint.” Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays
Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010). The Court must then determine whether the
complaint states a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. “A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “But where the well-pleaded facts do not
permit the [C]ourt to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679
(quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).
In Iqbal, the Supreme Court established a two-step approach for assessing the sufficiency
of a complaint in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. First, the Court should identify and
Case 4:22-cv-00814-ALM Document 120 Filed 01/08/26 Page 3 of 4 PageID #:
<pageID>

4
disregard conclusory allegations, for they are “not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 664. Second, the Court “consider[s] the factual allegations in [the complaint] to determine
if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” Id. “This standard ‘simply calls for enough facts
to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary claims or
elements.’” Morgan v. Hubert, 335 F. App’x 466, 470 (5th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). This
evaluation will “be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Thus, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
ANALYSIS
Prosper ISD’s Motion for Summary Judgment is based on substantially the same grounds
that the Motion to Dismiss seeks dismissal, and the parties have now engaged in extensive
discovery. The Court will therefore address Prosper ISD’s arguments when the Motion for
Summary Judgment becomes ripe. Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss will be denied as moot.
CONCLUSION
It is therefore ORDERED that Defendant Prosper Independent School District’s Motion
to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint (Dkt. #96) is hereby DENIED as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Case 4:22-cv-00814-ALM Document 120 Filed 01/08/26 Page 4 of 4 PageID #:
<pageID>