USA v. SEALED

4:21-cr-00077Txed7 de abr. de 2026

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SHERMAN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
SHAYLA DENISE DAVIS
§
§
§
§
§
NO. 4:21-CR-00077-ALM-BD-2
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Through her counsel, defendant Shayla Denise Davis filed a motion to dismiss her indictment.
Dkt. 157; see Dkt. 158 (response); Dkt. 159 (referral order). The court will recommend that the
motion be denied.
BACKGROUND
Davis asserts that
[t]he Government indicted [her] on April 15, 2021. There were two charges:
(1) Conspiracy to Possess with Intent to Distribute Marijuana, and (2) Conspiracy
to Commit Money Laundering. Despite being indicted in April 2021, the
Government took no action against [her] for over FOUR AND ONE-HALF years.
Instead, when Ms. Davis learned of the Indictment in early October 2025, she
immediately and voluntarily surrendered. On October 9, 2025, Ms. Davis was
arraigned and pled not guilty.
Dkt. 157 at 1. Based on those facts, Davis asserts violations of the Sixth Amendment and Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(b). She requests dismissal of her indictment with prejudice.
DISCUSSION
I. 	Sixth Amendment
The Sixth Amendment provides that, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy . . . trial.” The court considers four factors to determine whether that right
has been violated: (1) the length of pretrial delay, (2) the reason for that delay, (3) the defendant’s
assertion of her speedy-trial right, and (4) any prejudice to the defendant. Barker v. Wingo, 407
U.S. 514, 530 (1972). No single one of those “Barker factors” is determinative; they “must be
considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant.” Id. at 533. Courts weigh
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the first three factors against the fourth. United States v. Serna-Villarreal, 352 F.3d 225, 230 (5th
Cir. 2003). In other words, “the less prejudice [the] defendant experiences, the less likely it is that
a denial of a speedy trial right will be found.” Id.
The length of delay between Davis’s indictment and her surrender in lieu of arrest gives rise to
a presumption of prejudice and requires analysis of the three remaining Barker factors. The
government has stated credible and uncontradicted reasons for the delay, so the second factor
weighs in its favor. Davis delayed asserting her speedy-trial right for more than four months after
she learned of the indictment; failed to oppose two continuances successfully sought by a co-
defendant in the interim; and sought dismissal of her indictment, not a speedy trial. Those facts all
favor the government on the third factor. Davis therefore needed to show prejudice. She did not,
so she is not entitled to relief.
A. Length of delay
The first Barker factor “functions as a triggering mechanism.” United States v. Duran-Gomez,
984 F.3d 366, 374 (5th Cir. 2020). “As a threshold consideration, the length of the delay must be
examined and found to be presumptively prejudicial.” Jamerson v. Estelle, 666 F.2d 241, 243 (5th
Cir. 1982) (quotation marks omitted). “Otherwise, inquiry into the other considerations is
unnecessary.” Id. In the Fifth Circuit, “courts generally view a delay of approximately one year as
sufficient to require a full Barker analysis.” Goodrum v. Quarterman, 547 F.3d 249, 257 (5th Cir.
2008). Any delay caused by the defendant’s own requests for continuance should, however, be
subtracted from the calculation. See United States v. Jackson, 549 F.3d 963, 970 (5th Cir. 2008).
Once a presumptively prejudicial delay is established, a court looks to how long the trial was
delayed beyond the one-year threshold, with the understanding that “the presumption that pretrial
delay has prejudiced the accused intensifies over time.” Amos v. Thornton, 646 F.3d 199, 206 (5th
Cir. 2011) (quoting Dogett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 (1992)). The facts and circumstances
of a given case, however, can give this factor varying weight. Compare, e.g., United States v. Gordon,
93 F.4th 294, 307 (5th Cir. 2024) (weighing the first factor in favor of the defendant because more
than one year had passed), Divers v. Cain, 698 F.3d 211, 218 (5th Cir. 2012) (same), and Goodrum,
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547 F.3d at 258 (weighing the first Barker factor in favor of the defendant when the delay exceeded
two-and-a-half years), with United States v. Scully, 951 F.3d 656, 669 (5th Cir. 2020) (engaging in a
Barker analysis because the delay between two superseding indictments was three years, but not
explicitly weighing the first factor in the defendant’s favor), United States v. Harris, 566 F.3d 422,
432 (5th Cir. 2009) (weighing the first factor against the defendant because the delay was less than
five years), United States v. Parker, 505 F.3d 323, 328–29 (5th Cir. 2007) (explaining that the Fifth
Circuit “ha[s] held that delays of less than five years are not enough, by duration alone, to presume
prejudice”), and United States v. Hernandez, 457 F.3d 416, 421 (5th Cir. 2006) (stating that a
fourteen-month delay “is far too short to weigh in favor of presuming prejudice”).
As noted, Davis points to a four-and-a-half-year delay between her indictment and surrender
in lieu of arrest. Although she argues that “courts have dismissed indictments for . . . delays”
similar to the one in this case “as well as for shorter delays,” Dkt. 157 at 2, the cases she cites
involved longer delays, see Dogett, 505 U.S. at 648 (eight-and-a-half years); United States v.
Cardona, 302 F.3d 494, 497 (5th Cir. 2002) (over five years). In any event, the first factor, which
weighs in Davis’s favor, is just the analytical gateway; the presumptive prejudice it engenders
necessitates a full Barker analysis. See Duran-Gomez, 984 F.3d at 374; Jamerson, 666 F.2d at 243.
So the court will consider the other factors.
B. Reason for delay
“In analyzing the second [Barker] factor,” the court asks “whether the government or the
criminal defendant is more to blame” for the delay in bringing the case to trial, Gordon, 93 F.4th at
307, and “[t]he burden is on the Government to assign reasons to justify the delay,” Amos, 646
F.3d at 207 (quotation marks omitted). “If the government diligently pursues a defendant from
indictment to arrest, a speedy trial claim will always fail without a showing of actual prejudice.”
United States v. Bergfeld, 280 F.3d 486, 489 (5th Cir. 2002). On the other hand, if the government
intentionally delays prosecution “to gain some impermissible advantage at trial,” that fact weighs
heavily against the government. Dogett, 505 U.S. at 656. “The middle ground between diligent
prosecution and bad-faith delay is government negligence in bringing an accused to trial.” Cardona,
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302 F.3d at 497; see also Dogett, 505 U.S. at 657 (describing six years of “inexcusable oversights”
by the government); United States v. Shepherd, 511 F.2d 119, 122 (5th Cir. 1975) (explaining that
“neutral factors causing the delay are to be weighed less heavily against the government than an
attempt by the government to prejudice the defense by delay”).
Naturally enough, a defendant “is not to be taxed for invoking his speedy trial right only after
his arrest” if he was previously unaware of the indictment. Dogett, 505 U.S. at 654; see Bergfeld,
280 F.3d at 489 (finding that the second Barker factor weighed in the defendant’s favor where the
defendant did not know about the indictment until after it was unsealed). But “pretrial delay is
often both inevitable and wholly justifiable,” Dogett, 505 U.S. at 656, and the amount of delay is
usually proportional to the complexity of the case, United States v. Bieganowski, 313 F.3d 264, 284
(5th Cir. 2002). “[T]he delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably less
than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 531; see Duran-Gomez, 984
F.3d at 380 (finding that the second Barker factor weighed against the government when the
defendant “was originally charged alongside five co-defendants” for allegedly running “an
international, multi-year human-smuggling operation” in which “he allegedly killed two men and
committed several capital crimes”).
In this case, Davis was charged alongside six co-defendants for: (1) conspiracy to possess with
the intent to distribute at least 1,000 kilograms of a mixture or substance containing a detectable
amount of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846; and (2) conspiracy to commit
money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), 1956(a)(2)(A)
and 1956(a)(2)(B)(i). Dkt. 10 at 1–2. The indictment alleged both domestic and international
criminal activity. Id. at 3–5. That qualifies as “a serious, complex conspiracy charge.” Barker, 407
U.S. at 531.
Davis asserted in her motion that “[t]he Government has failed to explain the delay,” so she
could not “evaluate the so-called reason(s) for the delay.” Dkt. 157 at 4. The government,
however, did explain the delay in its response, stating that it “has more fugitives to locate and
arrest than it has personnel and resources to deploy. Davis was arrested after the US Marshal
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Service made a specific attempt to resolve aging warrants.” Dkt. 158 at 3. Davis did not file a reply
offering an evaluation of that credible reason for the delay. If the government had offered no
explanation at all, this factor might “weigh[] against the [government], albeit not heavily.”
Goodrum, 547 F.3d at 259. But in light of the government’s unrebutted reason and the nature of
the charges against Davis and her alleged co-conspirators, the second factor weighs in the
government’s favor here.
C. Assertion of the right
“Under the third factor, the defendant’s assertion of his speedy trial right receives strong
evidentiary weight, while failure to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove
that he was denied a speedy trial.” Gordon, 93 F.4th at 308 (quotation marks omitted). “An
assertion of [a speedy-trial right] is a demand for a speedy trial, which will generally be an objection
to a continuance or a motion asking to go to trial.” Id. (alteration in original). “[A] defendant who
waits too long to assert his right will have his silence weighed against him,” id., and he cannot
complain about any unobjected-to delays sought by his co-defendants, see, e.g., United States v.
McLauren, No. 94-30601, 1995 WL 535005, at *1–2 (5th Cir. Aug. 18, 1995); United States v. Lamb,
No. 5:19-cr-25, 2020 WL 6482977, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 2020), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 5:19-cr-25-RWS, 2020 WL 5269535 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 4, 2020); Moreno-Dominguez v.
United States, Nos. 7:15-CV-268, 7:08-CR-1697-4, 2017 WL 3190728, at *7 (S.D. Tex. May 25,
2017), report and recommendation adopted, Nos. M-15-268, M-08-1697-4, 2017 WL 3168362 (S.D.
Tex. July 25, 2017); see also Barker, 407 U.S. at 534–35 (finding that a defendant did not actually
want to be tried when he did not object to his trial being continued multiple times over three years
and did not request an immediate trial).
The court has found that a delay of nearly four months in asserting a right to a speedy trial
undermined a defendant’s assertion that he diligently pursued the right. United States v. Cornwell,
No. 4:24-CR-00027-SDJ, 2024 WL 4311473, *4 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2024); see also Parker, 505
F.3d at 330 (finding a defendant’s delay of eight months before first indicating a desire to proceed
to trial and another six months before asserting the right to a speedy trial weighed against the
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defendant); United States v. Harvey, 897 F.2d 1300, 1303 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding that a defendant
who waited three months to assert his speedy-trial right was not prejudiced by the alleged delay in
scheduling proceedings against him), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Lambert, 984
F.2d 658, 662 (5th Cir. 1993). By contrast, the Fifth Circuit found in Amos that the third factor
strongly favored a defendant who “initially asserted [his speedy-trial right] on the day he was
arrested” and reasserted the right “twice over the next five weeks.” 646 F.3d at 207. A delay of
even a few weeks would typically also weigh in the defendant’s favor. See United States v. Miranda,
No. EP-15-CR-01946-FM(5), 2023 WL 8285225, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2023). That said, the
court “assesses the totality of the proceedings in considering the amount of time that passed before
a defendant should have raised his speedy trial rights.” Gordon, 93 F.4th at 308.
Here, Davis asserts that she “first learned of her indictment on or about October 2, 2025, when
a friend saw on social media that the DEA considered [her] a fugitive. [She] promptly hired
counsel, who actively sought out the U.S. Marshals to coordinate [her] self-surrender . . . on
October 9, 2025.” Dkt. 157 at 6; see also id. at 4–5 (Davis’s description of her interactions with law
enforcement and her travel between the time of her indictment and her surrender). Davis did not
assert her speedy-trial right, however, until she filed her motion to dismiss on that basis on
February 12, 2026, Dkt. 157 at 1—more than four months after she surrendered. And between the
time of her surrender and the filing of her motion to dismiss, Davis lodged no objection to two
continuances granted at the request of a co-defendant. See Dkts. 144, 145, 146, 147.
An assertion of speedy-trial rights must “manifest [the defendant’s] desire to be tried
promptly.” United States v. Frye, 489 F.3d 201, 212 (5th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted). “A
motion to dismiss the indictment . . . is not evidence of such a desire.” Harris, 566 F.3d at 432.
Davis has given no indication that she truly wants a speedy trial, as opposed to dismissal of her
indictment, so this factor also weighs in the government’s favor.
D. Prejudice
As noted, “[t]he fourth [Barker] factor is the prejudice suffered by the defendant due to the
delay.” Gordon, 93 F.4th at 309. “Prejudice may be presumed where the first three factors weigh
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heavily in the defendant’s favor.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). But when only one of those
factors weighs heavily in the defendant’s favor, with the other two weighing in her favor only
slightly, “no presumption of prejudice is warranted.” Amos, 646 F.3d at 208; see Miranda, 2023
WL 8285225, at *5 (finding the presumption of prejudice inapplicable “[b]ecause the first three
[Barker] factors d[id] not weigh heavily in [the defendant’s] favor” (citing Harris, 566 F.3d at 433,
with emphasis added)).
Here, only the first factor weighs in Davis’s favor, so prejudice cannot be presumed. That
means “the burden of demonstrating . . . prejudice rests on [Davis].” Serna-Villarreal, 352 F.3d at
230.
“Actual prejudice is assessed in light of the three following interests of the defendant: (1) to
prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and
(3) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired,” Harris, 566 F.3d at 433 (quotation
marks omitted), “by dimming memories and loss of exculpatory evidence,” Dogett, 505 U.S. at
654. Davis asserts neither pretrial incarceration nor anxiety or concern. She instead claims that her
defense will be impaired, stating that, “[b]etween her April 2021 indictment and her October 2025
self-surrender, four potential witnesses have died: (1) her stepdaughter (April 2023), (2) a paternal
uncle (September 2024), (3) a paternal aunt (February 2025), and (4) a paternal uncle (June
2025).” Dkt. 157 at 7 (spacing altered). But she provides only the vaguest indication of what those
potential witnesses might have said, asserting that they “would have supported her defense.” Id.
That is insufficient. Davis does not describe what relevant knowledge, if any, the potential
witnesses had. She attached no evidence to her motion. She did not request an evidentiary hearing.
And as already noted, she did not file a reply to the government’s response to her motion to
dismiss. She has therefore not met her burden to show prejudice. See Gordon, 93 F.4th at 309
(concluding that the defendant failed to support his allegations of oppressive conditions with
evidence); Goodrum, 547 F.3d at 263 (explaining that the defendant failed to “demonstrate[] that
the anxiety he felt was of such an extreme degree that it differed in any way from that which would
naturally be expected to accompany a defendant’s awareness of pending charges”); Frye, 489 F.3d
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at 213 (rejecting a claim of “oppressive pretrial incarceration” as “conclusory and not supported
by evidence specifying harm”); United States v. Weidenburner, No. 4:02-CR-40053-JPG, 2011 WL
6056923, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 6, 2011) (concluding that the court could resolve a motion to dismiss
without holding a hearing where the defendant failed to identify “any disputed facts relevant to a
speedy trial violation”).
II. Rule 48(b)
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(b) authorizes the court to “dismiss an indictment . . .
if unnecessary delay occurs in: (1) presenting a charge to a grand jury; (2) filing an information
against a defendant; or (3) bringing a defendant to trial.” But Rule 48(b) “clearly is limited to post-
arrest situations.” United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 319 (1971). Davis cites Marion but fails to
acknowledge that limitation. She also fails to support her Rule 48(b) argument with any other
authority. Because her motion is based on a pre-arrest situation—that is, a delay between her
indictment and surrender in lieu of arrest—rather that a “post-arrest situation[],” her Rule 48(b)
argument fails without further analysis under Supreme Court precedent. Id.; see United States v.
Agreda, 612 F. Supp. 153, 159 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
In any event, any analysis under Rule 48(b) would be guided by the Barker factors. United States
v. Murta, No. 23-20276, 2024 WL 64764, at *7 (5th Cir. Jan. 5, 2024) (citing United States v.
Harrison, 918 F.2d 469, 474 (5th Cir. 1990)). Those factors favor the government. See supra Part I.
RECOMMENDATION
It is RECOMMENDED that the motion to dismiss, Dkt. 157, be DENIED.
* 	* 	*
Within 14 days after service of this report, any party may serve and file written objections to
the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).
A party is entitled to a de novo review by the district court of the findings and conclusions
contained in this report only if specific objections are made. Id. § 636(b)(1). Failure to timely file
written objections to any proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendations contained in this
report will bar an aggrieved party from appellate review of those factual findings and legal
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conclusions accepted by the district court, except on grounds of plain error, provided that the party
has been served with notice that such consequences will result from a failure to object. Id.; Thomas
v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985); Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir.
1996) (en banc), superseded by statute on other grounds; 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the time to
file objections from 10 to 14 days).
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