Owens v. TransUnion, LLC et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SHERMAN DIVISION

SEAN V OWENS

Vv. NO. 4:20-CV-00665-SDJ-BD

MMMM M

TRANSUNION, LLC, et al.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Defendant Trans Union, LLC, moved for a sanction of attorneys’ fees against pro se plaintiff

Sean Owens. Dkt. 296. The motion will be denied.

BACKGROUND

Earlier in this litigation, another defendant moved for sanctions against Owens, arguing that he
had engaged in vexatious and harassing conduct and used abusive language toward opposing
counsel. Dkt. 172. The court denied that motion in January of last year but noted that “Owens
should not . . . construe the denial of [the] motion as approval of his conduct . . . . [E]ven when the
parties or their attorneys disagree, they must treat each other with respect and courtesy.” Dkt. 232
at 3.

Several months later, Owens moved to compel discovery. Dkt. 264. Because he had not
complied with the court’s procedures for resolving discovery disputes laid out in the scheduling
order, the court struck his motion. Dkt. 268. That order instructed the parties to contact chambers
if they have a discovery dispute, zd., which they did, so the court ordered Owens and Trans Union
to confer face-to-face, Dkt. 270. The court also ordered the parties, if they were unable to resolve
their issues, to file a joint submission outlining the remaining disputes. Jd. at 2-3.

Trans Union filed a unilateral submission stating that Owens had engaged in misconduct by
refusing to confer face-to-face. Dkt. 278 at 39. The submission requested attorneys’ fees. Jd.

According to the submission and Trans Union’s motion for sanctions, in May 2025, Owens

stated that his son had discovered boxes in the Michigan home of Owens’s former wife that might

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

GPO

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contain documents responsive to its discovery requests. Dkts. 278-8 at 3. According to Trans
Union, Owens agreed to have his son look through the boxes. Id.
Later that month, Owens supplemented his discovery responses and sat for a deposition.
Dkts. 278-9, 278-10, 278-11. During his deposition, Owens said that his son was still looking
through the boxes but had not found anything yet. Dkt. 278-11 at 5. He also noted that he “may
have some” responsive documents. Id. at 14. Trans Union’s counsel, Paul Myers, emailed Owens
proposing that they meet and confer on June 11, but Owens refused to do so. Dkt. 278-20 at 3.
The next month, Trans Union notified the court of its dispute with Owens, and the court issued
its previously noted face-to-face order the same day. Dkt. 270. On July 8, Myers emailed Owens
again, suggesting that they confer at 1:00 p.m. on July 11. Dkt. 278-21 at 4–5. Owens responded
that he was not available that day, that Myers did not “get to randomly pick a date for [them] to
meet without first inquiring of [his] availability,” and that he did not expect to have anything new
to say at the conference. Dkt. 278-15 at 5. But he added that he was available during the last week
of July and that Myers was “welcome to propose dates during that week.” Id. Myers then offered
to meet at 8:00 a.m. or 9:00 a.m. on July 15 and on the morning of July 16 (the day the joint
submission was due). Id. at 4. Owens responded:
The court’s ORDER states the guidelines for parties to follow regarding discovery
disputes. COURTS DO NOT DETERMINE WHEN PARTIES CONDUCT
THEIR FACE-TO-FACE/MEET-AND-CONFER!!! I DO NOT WORK
FOR YOU!! I AM NOT YOUR EMPLOYEE!! I DO NOT ANSWER TO
YOUR 	DEMANDS 	BASED 	ON 	WHEN 	YOU 	WANT 	TO 	DO
SOMETHING!!
You did not inquire when I’d be available to confer. Your email on July 2, 2025, was
IMPROPER!
Discovery closed on July 3, 2025, and a pending motion to extend has no force
or effect on that date. You cannot engage in discovery or make requests of a party
once discovery closes!! Your communication qualifies for Rule 16(f) sanctions for
violating the scheduling order. The court did not grant the defendants’ motion until
July 9, 2025. Therefore, I had no legal obligation to respond or illegally entertain
your post-discovery expectation because it is moot by operation of law. Equally,
your July 8, 2025, email, deserved no response because you continued to
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violate federal rules, local rules, and the initial amended scheduling order post-
discovery. As such, no legal communications took place.
If the court had granted the motion to extend prior to your email communications,
your request to confer would still be YOUR PROPOSED dates to confer. And, your
proposed timeline to “exchange the list of issues and authorities by noon on Friday, July
11, 2025” has nothing to do with the court because the court did not establish ANY
dates within its ORDER which you are trying to falsely infer. Whatever the court
has available on July 14, 2025, is based on their schedule and based on what YOU
suggested to them. In fact, any and all communications that you’ve had with
chambers is considered ex-parte communications! You cannot do that!!!
You keep lying and trying to force your games on me. I will not tolerate that from
you or anybody! I have not reviewed nor have I had the time to do anything related
to your information. As such, the date that we must confer has not been mutually
agreed upon in good faith or determined. This is not a one-sided process and the
court has stated that you will be sanctioned if you fail to follow its order.
I am not available, as previously stated last Friday, until the last week of July. Hence,
that is the reason why I preferred July 28 to mediate based on my schedule.
Therefore, and again, you can propose dates during the last week of July or anytime
thereafter.
Id. at 2–3 (emphasis in original).
On the day the parties’ joint submission was due, Owens served supplemental discovery
responses. Dkts. 278-18, 278-19. On August 7, Owens and Trans Union met, Dkt. 296 at 5, and a
week later the court held a hearing on their remaining disputes, Minute Entry for Aug. 15, 2025.
The court resolved those disputes during the hearing, and it accepted Owens’s representation that
he had produced all responsive documents in his possession, including all responsive documents
from the Michigan boxes. Id.
At the end of the hearing, the court mentioned the language that Owens had used in the email
to Myers quoted above. Id. The court recounted its earlier admonishment of Owens for hostile and
abusive language, Dkt. 232 at 3, then stated:
As we’re sitting here today in the courtroom, Mr. Owens, I don’t see any abusive
language that you’re using. But then I look at the submissions that you’re making,
including emails that are attached to filings that came after the order that I was just
reading from, and I see all caps, I see red, exclamation marks. That’s the kind of
language I was talking about in that previous order. . . . Let me read you some: This
is from Docket 278-15 at page 2. . . . [The court read parts of the email quoted
above.] . . . That’s the language I’m talking about. That’s not appropriate. You
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wouldn’t come in here and say that, I don’t think; it doesn’t seem like you would.
So, to the extent that there was any uncertainty about what my order was saying
would be inappropriate language, I’ve just read you an example of it. And again, by
continuing to file language like that, you’re risking an award of sanctions.
Minute Entry for Aug. 15, 2025. Owens stated that, in his view, the quoted passage responded to
what he saw as inappropriate language from Myers. Id. On its inquiry, the court told Trans Union
that it was free to file a motion for sanctions as a separate motion. Id.
Trans Union did so, seeking its relevant attorneys’ fees. Dkt. 296. Owens did not formally
respond but moved to strike the motion. Dkt. 303; see Dkts. 308 (response), 310 (reply).
LAW
I. 	Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37
Rule 37 authorizes the court to impose discovery sanctions. Subsection (a) of that rule
authorizes parties to file motions to compel discovery and authorizes an award of attorneys’ fees
to the party that prevails on a motion to compel:
(a) Motion for an Order Compelling Disclosure or Discovery.
(1) In General. On notice to other parties and all affected persons, a party may
move for an order compelling disclosure or discovery. The motion must include
a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer
with the person or party failing to make disclosure or discovery in an effort to
obtain it without court action.
. . .
(5) Payment of Expenses; Protective Orders.
(A) If the Motion Is Granted (or Disclosure or Discovery Is Provided After
Filing). If the motion is granted—or if the disclosure or requested
discovery is provided after the motion was filed—the court must, after
giving an opportunity to be heard, require the party or deponent whose
conduct necessitated the motion, the party or attorney advising that
conduct, or both to pay the movant’s reasonable expenses incurred in
making the motion, including attorney’s fees. But the court must not
order this payment if:
(i) the movant filed the motion before attempting in good faith to
obtain the disclosure or discovery without court action;
(ii) the opposing party’s nondisclosure, response, or objection was
substantially justified; or
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(iii) other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
Rule 37(b) permits a court to impose sanctions for a party’s failure to comply with a court order:
(b) Failure to Comply with a Court Order.
. . .
(2) Sanctions Sought in the District Where the Action Is Pending.
(A) For Not Obeying a Discovery Order. If a party or a party’s officer,
director, or managing agent—or a witness designated under Rule 30(b)(6)
or 31(a)(4)—fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery,
including an order under Rule 26(f), 35, or 37(a), the court where the
action is pending may issue further just orders. They may include the
following:
(i) directing 	that 	the 	matters 	embraced 	in 	the 	order 	or 	other
designated facts be taken as established for purposes of the action, as
the prevailing party claims;
(ii) prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or opposing
designated claims or defenses, or from introducing designated matters
in evidence;
(iii) striking pleadings in whole or in part;
(iv) staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed;
(v) dismissing the action or proceeding in whole or in part;
(vi) rendering a default judgment against the disobedient party; or
(vii) treating as contempt of court the failure to obey any order except
an order to submit to a physical or mental examination.
. . .
(C) Payment of Expenses. Instead of or in addition to the orders above, the
court must order the disobedient party, the attorney advising that party,
or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused
by the failure, unless the failure was substantially justified or other
circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
A court “has broad discretion in fashioning its sanction” under that rule. L. Funder, L.L.C. v.
Munoz, 924 F.3d 753, 758 (5th Cir. 2019), as revised (June 6, 2019). The Fifth Circuit generally
“require[s] the district court to determine the sanctions are ʻjust’ and ʻrelated to the particular
“claim” which was at issue in the order to provide discovery.’” Id. (quoting Compaq Comput. Corp.
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v. Ergonome Inc., 387 F.3d 403, 413 (5th Cir. 2004)). But to support an award of litigation-ending
sanctions, a “district court must make four additional findings . . . : (1) the discovery violation was
committed willfully or in bad faith; (2) the client, rather than counsel, is responsible for the
violation; (3) the violation ʻsubstantially prejudice[d] the opposing party’; and (4) a lesser sanction
would not ʻsubstantially achieve the desired deterrent effect.’” Id. at 758–59 (quoting FDIC v.
Conner, 20 F.3d 1376, 1380–81 (5th Cir. 1994)).
The Fifth Circuit categorizes Rule 37 motions under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), Merritt v. Int’l
Bhd. of Boilermakers, 649 F.2d 1013, 1016–17 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981). That provision permits a
magistrate judge to issue an order, subject to review for clear error, as long as the sanction imposed
does not dismiss a claim or defense. Brown v. Bridges, No. 12-cv-4947-P, 2015 WL 410062, at *3
(N.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 2015).
II. Inherent Authority
In addition to exercising power vested in it by rule, a court may sanction a party or counsel
based on its inherent power. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 47–50 (1991). The inherent
power to sanction should be exercised “with great restraint and caution.” Nat. Gas Pipeline Co. of
Am. v. Energy Gathering, Inc., 86 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 1996). The court should impose only those
sanctions “reasonable and appropriate” to “achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition” of
the court’s docket. Id.
DISCUSSION
I. 	Rule 37
As noted, Rule 37(a)(5)(A) provides that
[i]f [a motion to compel] is granted—or if the disclosure or requested discovery is
provided after the motion was filed—the court must, after giving an opportunity to
be heard, require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion, the
party or attorney advising that conduct, or both to pay the movant’s reasonable
expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney’s fees.
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A fee award under that rule is available only to a party that prevails on a motion to compel. See
Lopez v. Don Herring Ltd., 327 F.R.D. 567, 585 (N.D. Tex. 2018). Because Trans Union did not file
a motion to compel, much less prevail on one, Rule 37(a)(5)(A) cannot support a sanctions award.
Trans Union did not invoke Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2), but that Rule also
authorizes a fee award in certain circumstances:
[i]f a party . . . fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, . . . the court
must order the disobedient party, the attorney advising that party, or both to pay
the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the failure, unless the
failure was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses
unjust.
In other words, fees are mandatory unless the litigant’s conduct was substantially justified. Seven
Arts Pictures, Inc. v. Jonesfilm, 512 F. App’x 419, 422 n.4 (5th Cir. 2013). Discovery conduct is
“substantially justified” if “it is a response to a ʻgenuine dispute, or if reasonable people could
differ as to the appropriateness of the contested action.’” Keplar v. Google, LLC, 346 F.R.D. 41, 53
(N.D. Tex. 2024) (quoting SEC v. Kiselak Cap. Grp., LLC, No. 4:09-cv-256-A, 2012 WL 369450,
at *5 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 3, 2012)).
By failing to timely confer with Trans Union and contribute to a joint submission, Owens
violated the court’s order to confer. Dkt. 270. But Rule 37(b)(2) applies only when a party violates
“an order to provide or permit discovery.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2); see Trenado v. Cooper Tire &
Rubber Co., 274 F.R.D. 598, 600 (S.D. Tex. 2011). The order at issue here did not instruct either
party to turn over any documents, sit for a deposition, answer an interrogatory, or otherwise
provide or permit discovery. It instead instructed the parties to meet, confer, and prepare a joint
submission. See Shumpert v. City of Tupelo, No. 1:16-cv-120-SA-DAS, 2017 WL 6803364, at *1
(N.D. Miss. June 7, 2017) (finding that a “Case Management Order” that “describes a procedure
to be followed before filing a motion for a discovery-related order” was not an “an order to provide
or permit discovery”), aff’d, 905 F.3d 310 (5th Cir. 2018). Sanctions are therefore not available
under Rule 37(b)(2) in this scenario.
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II. Inherent Power
The other source of authority that Trans Union proposes is the court’s inherent power to
impose sanctions. Dkt. 296 at 6. A court may sanction a party or his counsel based on its inherent
power even without an authorizing rule. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 47–50. “Because of the potency of
inherent powers and the limited control of their exercise, however, they must be used with great
restraint and caution.” Nat. Gas Pipeline Co., 86 F.3d at 467. Any sanctions awarded based on the
court’s inherent power must be “reasonable and appropriate” to “achieve the orderly and
expeditious disposition” of the case. Id.
Although this is a close case, an exercise of the court’s inherent power to sanction is not
warranted here. When viewed in proper context, Owens’s conduct does not sufficiently support a
finding of bad faith. And at the hearing, the court admonished Owens but declined to impose
sanctions for the abusive language Trans Union highlights.
A. Owens’s conduct
Trans Union’s motion offers a narrative of events leading up to and following the court’s order
to confer. Dkt. 296 at 2–6. In Trans Union’s view, Owens evaded his discovery obligations and
willfully disobeyed the court’s order. However, Trans Union’s exhibits, which were originally
attached to its unilateral submission, Dkt. 278, tell a slightly different story. Viewing those exhibits
from Owens’s perspective, his conduct was not sufficient to merit an exercise of the court’s
inherent power to sanction, in part because Trans Union contributed to the parties’ joint failure to
comply with the face-to-face order.
Trans Union first asserts that Owens’s second supplemental discovery responses “did not
comply with the Rules or the parties[’] meet and confer agreements. Instead, [Owens] added new
objections and argumentative responses.” Dkt. 296 at 2. That is just a restatement of the parties’
discovery disputes, which were resolved at the hearing. Sanctions are not appropriate just because
the parties had a discovery dispute.
Trans Union then asserts that, during his deposition, Owens “testified, for the first time, that
he had boxes in his garage containing responsive documents and information but had not fully
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reviewed them.” Dkt. 296 at 3. In fact, Owens testified that he “may have some” responsive
documents. Dkt. 296-3 at 5. And at the hearing, Owens told the court that he had produced all
responsive documents in his possession and that there were no more responsive documents in the
boxes. Minute Entry for Aug. 15, 2025. The court accepted that representation as true. Id.
Trans Union also notes that, on June 4th, it reached out to Owens to schedule a conference,
and he refused to do so. Dkt. 296 at 3. But at that point, Owens and Trans Union had already
conferred once about their disputes and the court had not yet ordered the parties to meet face to
face. Dkt. 268. Although parties should always confer regarding discovery disputes, Trans Union
has not identified a rule or order that required Owens to do so at that time. Owens’s June 4th email
does not contemplate a discovery motion, Dkt. 296-4 at 2, but to the extent that it could be
construed as a failure to satisfy meet-and-confer requirements before his June 20th motion to
compel, Dkt. 264, that likewise does not support an award of attorneys’ fees. Arguably, Owens had
already satisfied those requirements during previous conferences, and the court already imposed
the penalty it would ordinarily impose for failure to satisfy those requirements—it struck the
motion. Dkt. 268.
Trans Union next asserts that, “without providing the agreed-upon supplementation, Plaintiff
withdrew his agreement to appear for his second deposition.” Dkt. 296 at 3. But at the hearing,
Owens explained that, when he agreed to sit for a second deposition, he was unaware of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 30(d)(1), which provides that, “[u]nless otherwise stipulated or ordered
by the court, a deposition is limited to 1 day of 7 hours.” Owens is not a lawyer and withdrew his
agreement when he learned of that rule. Minute Entry for Aug. 15, 2025. Although the court
determined that additional time was warranted, it was not unreasonable for Owens to insist on
compliance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Trans Union also states that, after the court ordered the parties to confer, Owens “[o]n
numerous occasions . . . refused to exchange the information and conduct the face-to-face meeting
required by the Court’s Order.” Dkt. 296 at 4. A copy of the exchange is attached to the motion
and Trans Union’s unilateral submission. Dkts. 278-15, 296-7. To be sure, Owens’s language was
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inappropriately abrasive. See infra Part II.B. But to say that Owens “refused” to meet and confer
is to read the exchange only from Trans Union’s perspective.
Myers told Owens, “I suggest we agree to exchange the list of issues and authorities by noon
on Friday, July 11, 2025, and schedule the face-to-face meet and confer conference for 1:00 PM on
Monday, July 14, 2025.” Dkt. 296-7 at 5. Owens responded:
Let’s 	set 	things 	straight 	for 	the 	record. 	I 	am 	not 	available 	on 	Monday.
Professionally, you don’t get to randomly pick a date for us to meet without first
inquiring of my availability, in good faith, which you did not do. The extension of
discovery was by your doing. Therefore, you’ve subjected yourself to scheduling
conflicts by all parties and nobody is required to just drop their professional and
personal obligations on your short notice. Therefore, I have no availability until the
last week of July. As such, you are welcome to propose dates during that week.
Id. at 5. In his response to that email, Myers told Owens: “I will make myself available to conduct
the meet and confer conference via Zoom beginning at 8:00 AM or 9:00 AM on Tuesday, July 15,
2025. However, you must agree, to also be available on the morning of July 16, 2025, to finalize the
joint submission.” Id. at 4. Owens’s next email was the one quoted in the background section of
this order. It ends with “I am not available, as previously stated last Friday, until the last week of
July. Hence, that is the reason why I preferred July 28 to mediate based on my schedule. Therefore,
and again, you can propose dates during the last week of July or anytime thereafter.” Id. at 2.
Again, much of the language Owens used in the balance of that message was unprofessional
and inappropriate. But extracting only the substance, the parties’ exchange proceeded as follows:
Myers suggested a specific time and date to meet and confer. Owens said that he was not available
on that date and would not be available until the last week of July. Myers then suggested a different
specific date and time (not during the last week of July), but only if Owens would also meet the
next day. Owens reiterated that he was not available until the last week of July.
That exchange reflects that either party could have requested an extension of the deadline in
the court’s face-to-face order. The blame does not lie solely with Owens.
Finally, Trans Union claims that, on the day the parties’ joint submission was due, Owens
“strategically served his third supplemental discovery responses.” Dkt. 296 at 4. Trans Union does
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not explain why it emphasized that word. But in Owens’s view, the third supplemental discovery
responses resolved the parties’ outstanding disputes, mooting any need for further court
involvement. Dkt. 281 at 2, 4. And indeed, the responses did add a meaningful amount of new
information, Dkts. 278-18, 278-19, facilitating resolution of the parties’ dispute at the hearing,
Minute Entry for Aug. 15, 2025. Giving Owens the benefit of the doubt, that was his intention. See
Legion Sys., LLC v. Valiant Glob. Def. Servs., Inc., No. 8:20-cv-2321-KKM-MRM, 2022 WL
18493478, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 2022) (noting that “the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . .
require and assume a good-faith effort to resolve any discovery disputes”); SCO Grp., Inc. v. Int’l
Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 2:03-cv-294 DAK, 2005 WL 318784, at *7 (D. Utah Feb. 9, 2005) (noting
that “the court assumes the good faith of all litigants before it” even as it “urges both sides to
renew their efforts in cooperating with each other”).
Trans Union, of course, did not agree with Owens’s view of his third supplement. Dkt. 287.
But that does not alone warrant sanctions. If anything, the fact that Owens believed his third
supplement would moot the parties’ discovery dispute supports a conclusion that his failure to
confer was justified.
Everything discussed so far was brought to the court’s attention before the hearing through
Trans Union’s unilateral submission, Dkt. 278, Owens’s response to that submission, Dkt. 281,
and Trans Union’s reply, Dkt. 287. At the hearing, the parties discussed their dispute
appropriately and productively, and their outstanding issues were resolved without the need for a
motion to compel. Minute Entry for Aug. 15, 2025.
The record here reflects an unfortunate level of animosity between Owens and Trans Union.
The court has done its best to lower the temperature and explain its expectations. It will not at this
point take the next step of using its inherent power to impose sanctions based on Owens’s litigation
conduct.
B. Owens’s language
Owens’s rhetoric is a different matter. As the court has noted in the past, even when the parties
or their attorneys disagree, they must treat each other with respect and courtesy. See Loc. R. AT-3;
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Whitehead v. Food Max of Miss., Inc., 332 F.3d 796, 805 (5th Cir. 2003). The court has specifically
ordered Owens to “refrain from using hostile or abusive language in his filings with this court and
his correspondence with opposing counsel.” Dkt. 232 at 4. Failure to comply with that order
subjects Owens to sanctions. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43–51.
Owens’s language corresponding with Myers, particularly that in his July 14 email, is hostile
and abusive and violates the order that he refrain from using such language. However, the court
already addressed that issue at the hearing. Minute Entry for Aug. 15, 2025. It again chose to give
Owens the benefit of the doubt, allowing that the meaning of “hostile and abusive” could be
unclear, especially to a nonlawyer. So the court read from Owens’s email and advised him that,
“to the extent that there was any uncertainty about what my order was saying would be
inappropriate language, I’ve just read you an example of it.” Id. But it declined to impose sanctions,
instead warning Owens that if he continued to use that kind of language, he would be sanctioned.
Trans Union has not presented a reason to revisit that ruling.
* 	* 	*
In short, the events described in Trans Union’s motion do not warrant sanctions at this time.
But this order should stand as another warning to Owens: The order that he “refrain from using
hostile or abusive language in his filings with this court and his correspondence with opposing
counsel,” Dkt. 232 at 4, stands, and the court has pointed out an example of “hostile or abusive”
language.
CONCLUSION
It is ORDERED that Trans Union’s motion for attorneys’ fees, Dkt. 296, is DENIED.
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