USA v. Johnson

4:12-cr-00080Txed18 de dez. de 2025

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA §
§
versus § CASE NO. 4:12-CR-80(1)
§
DIETRICK LEWIS JOHNSON §
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Pending before the court is Dietrick Lewis Johnson’s (“Johnson”) Emergency Motion for
Reduction in Sentence Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) (#194) wherein Johnson seeks
compassionate release for the third time. The Government filed a response in opposition to the
motion (#197). Johnson filed a Reply to the Government’s response (#199). United States
Probation and Pretrial Services (“Probation”) supplemented its prior investigations and
recommends that the court deny Johnson’s third motion for compassionate release. Having
considered the pending motion, the Government’s response, Johnson’s reply, Probation’s
recommendation, the record, and the applicable law, the court is of the opinion that the motion
should be denied.
I. Background
Johnson’s offense of conviction is summarized, as follows:
In early 2011, Johnson met a woman—the victim—on an Internet dating website.
After the victim ended the relationship in December 2011, Johnson began stalking
the victim by going to her residence and her place of employment. Johnson
repeatedly contacted her by phone and text. Johnson was warned by the police on
numerous occasions to stay away from the victim. From December 18, 2011, to
January 16, 2012, the victim called the police ten times to report that Johnson was
harassing her.
The victim subsequently installed video equipment on the exterior of her home.
On January 28, 2012, Johnson was observed in her backyard with a flashlight,
attempting to enter her garage. The police were called, and Johnson was located
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approximately one block from the victim’s residence. Johnson admitted to being
in the victim’s backyard and was arrested. Johnson was charged with Third
Degree Stalking, and an Emergency Protective Order was issued, ordering Johnson
to stay away from the victim.
On March 21, 2012, at approximately 6:45 a.m., Johnson went to the victim’s
place of employment. As the victim exited her vehicle, Johnson grabbed her at
gunpoint, forcing her into the passenger’s seat as he drove away in her car.
Johnson forced the victim to call her boss to say she would not be coming to work.
Thereafter, Johnson drove to a nearby parking lot to retrieve his vehicle and forced
the victim to get into his car. Johnson drove them to his apartment where he
instructed the victim to call the District Attorney’s Office to drop the charges.
Johnson further told the victim to call his mother and inform her that the charges
had been dismissed and that Johnson and the victim were reconciling. Fearing for
her life, the victim gave into Johnson’s demands for sex. Johnson raped the victim,
who suffered serious bodily injury. Eventually, Johnson took the victim back to
her vehicle. Johnson was arrested on March 27, 2012, at his apartment, and a
search of his vehicle revealed a loaded firearm.
On April 12, 2012, a grand jury in the Eastern District of Texas, Sherman Division,
returned a three-count Indictment against Johnson in Cause No. 4:12-CR-80 in which he was
charged in Count One with Carjacking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119; in Count Two with
Possession of a Firearm During and in Relation to a Crime of Violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c); and in Count Three with Felon in Possession of a Firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1). On August 7, 2012, Johnson pleaded guilty to Count One of Cause No. 4:12-CR-80
and agreed to a 240-month term of imprisonment pursuant to a binding plea agreement. The
statutory maximum for this offense was 25 years’ imprisonment (300 months).
While in custody, Johnson’s outgoing mail was intercepted. Johnson asked a family
member to send a firearm through the mail to another inmate who was going to kill the victim.
Johnson was subsequently interviewed by law enforcement and acknowledged he wrote the letters.
Johnson admitted that he asked his cousin to send a gun to a fellow inmate who was willing to
“take care of Johnson’s problem.” Based on Johnson’s conduct, he was indicted in Cause No.
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4:13-CR-88 for Tampering with a Witness, Victim, or Informant, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1512(a)(2)(A). On October 15, 2013, Johnson pleaded guilty in Cause No. 4:13-CR-88 pursuant
to a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement that called for a 125-month term of imprisonment, which
would run consecutively to his term of imprisonment in Cause No. 4:12-CR-80.
On November 15, 2013, Johnson was sentenced to a 365-month term of imprisonment,
consisting of 240 months’ imprisonment for Cause No. 4:12-CR-80 and 125 months’
imprisonment for Cause No. 4:13-CR-88, such terms to run consecutively to one another, 5 years’
supervised release, and a special assessment of $100.00. In June 2015, Cause No. 4:13-CR-88
was dismissed and the 125-month sentence vacated because the Indictment was returned after the
grand jury’s term had expired. A Second Amended Judgment (#201) was entered on December
12, 2025, clarifying that Johnson was sentenced in Cause No. 4:12-CR-80 to a term of 240
months’ imprisonment, followed by 5 years of supervised release, to run concurrently with certain
state sentences previously imposed in Collin County and Dallas County, Texas. Johnson’s 240-
month term of imprisonment in Cause No. 4:12-CR-80 remains in force today. Johnson is now
housed at Federal Correctional Institution Butner Medium II (“FCI Butner Medium II”), located
in Butner, North Carolina, with a projected release date of December 27, 2030.
On July 21, 2020, Johnson filed his original motion for compassionate release (#142),
which the court denied on September 2, 2020 (#144). On August 17, 2021, Johnson filed a second
pro se request for compassionate release and motion for appointment of counsel (#158), which the
court denied on September 29, 2021 (#168). In his current “Emergency Motion” (#194), Johnson
again requests the appointment of counsel to represent him and raises a number of medical
conditions and other issues that he contends entitle him to compassionate release. He claims that
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he presents “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for compassionate release due to his age,
length of time served, changes in the law, unusually harsh prison conditions, programming,
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(5), rehabilitation, and end-of-life medical issues as set forth in the separate
suggestions filed in support of his motion. His medical complaints listed in a document entitled
“Defendant’s Suggestions in Support of an Emergency Motion for Reduction of Sentence Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)” (#194-1) include metastatic bladder cancer, diabetes mellitus
(Type II), obesity, hiatal hernia, the use of a walker for mobility, vertigo, cataracts, and
inadequate medical care in prison. He also claims that he is eligible for compassionate release
under the “catchall provision” of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(5) and further qualifies due to the length
of his sentence, his allegedly unusually harsh prison conditions, his rehabilitation, and his
purportedly no longer posing a danger to society.
In his reply brief, Johnson reiterates many of the same arguments and suggests that he
exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to maladies that were merely mentioned as part
of his medical records but that he did not specifically bring to the attention of the warden. His
contentions are not cognizable under the exhaustion doctrine nor are they properly raised in his
reply brief. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly held that
claims or arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief should not be considered by the court.
See United States v. Ramirez, No. 25-50109, 2025 WL 3555129, at *1 (5th Cir. Dec. 11, 2025);
United States v. Barrera Rivera, No. 25-40047, 2025 WL 3527439, at *2 (5th Cir. Dec. 9, 2025);
Conway v. United States, 647 F.3d 228, 237 n.8 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. Rodriguez, 602
F.3d 346, 360-61 (5th Cir. 2010). The Fifth Circuit has also consistently applied this position in
the context of motions for compassionate release. See United States v. Jurdi, No. 24-40281, 2025
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WL 1000165, at *1 (5th Cir. Apr. 3, 2025); United States v. Zuniga Hernandes, No. 22-50796,
2023 WL 3267856, at *1 (5th Cir. May 5, 2023); United States v. Cogdell, 855 F. App’x 976,
977 (5th Cir. 2021).
II. Appointment of Counsel
Johnson requests the appointment of counsel to assist him in filing his third motion for
compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). There is no constitutional right to appointed
counsel in post-conviction proceedings. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) (“The
right to appointed counsel extends to the first appeal of right, and no further.”); see Garza v.
Idaho, 586 U.S. 232, 245-46 (2019); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494-95 (1991); Albarran
v. White, No. 24-2758, 2025 WL 1625537, at *1 (9th Cir. June 9, 2025); United States v. Jones,
No. 24-11675, 2025 WL 733234, at *2 (11th Cir. Mar. 7, 2025); Pettis v. United States, 129
F.4th 1057, 1063 (7th Cir. 2025) (“There is no constitutional right to counsel in postconviction
proceedings.”); Tong v. Lumpkin, 90 F.4th 857, 863 n.2 (5th Cir. 2024); United States v.
Manso-Zamora, 991 F.3d 694, 696 (6th Cir. 2021) (finding that “every federal court of appeals
to address the issue has agreed that there is no constitutional (or statutory) right to appointed
counsel in § 3582(c) proceedings”); Whitaker v. Collier, 862 F.3d 490, 501 (5th Cir. 2017).
Specifically, the Supreme Court of the United States has stated:
Our cases establish that the right to appointed counsel extends to the first appeal of
right, and no further. Thus, we have rejected suggestions that we establish a right
to counsel on discretionary appeals. We think that since a defendant has no federal
constitutional right to counsel when pursuing a discretionary appeal on direct
review of his conviction, a fortiori, he has no such right when attacking a
conviction that has long since become final upon exhaustion of the appellate
process.
Finley, 481 U.S. at 555 (internal citations omitted).
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The court may, however, in the interest of justice, appoint counsel to assist a defendant in
the pursuit of post-conviction relief where a defendant has raised nonfrivolous claims with
factually and/or legally complex issues. See United States v. Whitebird, 55 F.3d 1007, 1011 (5th
Cir. 1995) (“After [a defendant’s first appeal], the decision whether to appoint counsel rests in the
discretion of the district court.”); accord United States v. Garza, No. 24-40425, 2025 WL
429978, at *1 (5th Cir. Feb. 7, 2025); United States v. Hereford, 385 F. App’x 366, 368 (5th Cir.
2010).
The exercise of discretion in this area is guided . . . by certain basic principles.
When applying this standard and exercising its discretion in this field, the court
should determine both whether the petition presents significant legal issues, and if
the appointment of counsel will benefit the petitioner and the court in addressing
this claim.
United States v. Molina-Flores, No. 3:16-CR-130-N (19), 2018 WL 10050316, at *2 (N.D. Tex.
Feb. 13, 2018) (quoting Jackson v. Coleman, No. 3:11-cv-1837, 2012 WL 4504485, at *4 (M.D.
Pa. Oct. 2, 2012)); see Scoggins v. MacEachern, No. 04-10814-PBS, 2010 WL 3169416, at *1
(D. Mass. Aug. 10, 2010) (“In order to obtain appointed counsel, ‘an indigent litigant must
demonstrate exceptional circumstances in his or her case to justify the appointment of counsel.’
The rare cases warranting appointment of counsel in the interests of justice typically involve
nonfrivolous claims with factually and/or legally complex issues and a petitioner who is severely
hampered in his ability to investigate the facts.” (quoting Cookish v. Cunningham, 787 F.2d 1,
2 (1st Cir. 1986))).
Johnson is not entitled to the appointment of counsel to assist him with seeking
compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582. See Finley, 481 U.S. at 555; Whitebird, 55 F.3d
at 1010-11 (declining to recognize constitutional or statutory right to assistance of counsel in
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bringing § 3582(c)(2) motion for sentence reduction); United States v. Vasquez, No. CR
2:18-1282-S-1, 2020 WL 3000709, at *3 (S.D. Tex. June 2, 2020) (“There is no right to counsel
in § 3582 or other post-appellate criminal proceedings.”). Moreover, Johnson provides no basis
for the court to conclude that the appointment of counsel would benefit him or the court in
addressing his claims. A motion “for compassionate release is not particularly complex factually
or legally.” United States v. Drayton, No. 10-200018, 2020 WL 2572402, at *1 (D. Kan. May
21, 2020); see United States v. Wilfred, No. 07-351, 2020 WL 4698993, at *1 (E.D. La. Aug.
13, 2020). In this situation, he has failed to raise any potentially viable claims or any factually
or legally complex issues that could arguably justify the appointment of post-conviction counsel.
Johnson is 60 years old and there is no indication that he is mentally or physically impaired such
that he is unable to proceed pro se in this matter. He has previously filed numerous motions pro
se both in this court and in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, including two
prior motions for compassionate release and scores of motions challenging his conviction and
sentence in this case. Thus, the court finds that the discretionary appointment of counsel is not
warranted. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2) (allowing appointment of counsel under certain
circumstances when “the court determines that the interests of justice so require”). Accordingly,
Johnson’s motion for appointment of counsel is denied.
III. Analysis
A. Controlling Law
A judgment of conviction that imposes a sentence of imprisonment is a “‘final judgment’
and may not be modified by a district court except in limited circumstances.” Dillon v. United
States, 560 U.S. 817, 824 (2010) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(b)); accord Freeman v. United
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States, 564 U.S. 522, 526 (2011); see 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). Section 3582(c)(1)(A) embodies a
rare exception to a conviction’s finality. This statute gives the court discretion, in certain
circumstances, to reduce a defendant’s term of imprisonment. The First Step Act of 2018 (“the
Act”), Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, in part, amended 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), which
currently provides:
(A) the court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons [(“BOP”)], or
upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all
administrative rights to appeal a failure of the [BOP] to bring a motion on the
defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the
warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of
imprisonment (and may impose a term of probation or supervised release with or
without conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term
of imprisonment), after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a)1 to the
extent that they are applicable, if it finds that—
(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction; or
(ii) the defendant is at least 70 years of age, has served at least 30 years in
prison, pursuant to a sentence imposed under section 3559(c), for the
offense or offenses for which the defendant is currently imprisoned, and a
determination has been made by the Director of the [BOP] that the
defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or the
community, as provided under section 3142(g);
and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements
issued by the Sentencing Commission . . . .
1 Section 3553(a) directs courts to consider: the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
defendant’s history and characteristics; the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote
respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; the need to deter criminal conduct; the
need to protect the public; the need to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; the kinds of sentences and
sentencing ranges established for defendants with similar characteristics under applicable United States
Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.” or “Guidelines”) provisions and policy statements; any pertinent policy
statement of the United States Sentencing Commission in effect on the date of sentencing; the need to avoid
unwarranted disparities among similar defendants; and the need to provide restitution to the victim.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
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18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). This provision is commonly referred to as “compassionate release.”
See, e.g., United States v. Escajeda, 58 F.4th 184, 186 (5th Cir. 2023) (“We often refer to this
as ‘compassionate release’ because courts generally use it for prisoners with severe medical
exigencies or infirmities.”).
Rather than define “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” Congress elected to delegate
its authority to the United States Sentencing Commission (“Commission”). See 28 U.S.C.
§ 994(t) (directing the Commission to “describe what should be considered extraordinary and
compelling reasons for sentence reduction, including the criteria to be applied and a list of specific
examples”); United States v. Jean, 108 F.4th 275, 278 (5th Cir. 2024), abrogated on other
grounds by United States v. Austin, 125 F.4th 688, 692 (5th Cir. 2025); United States v. Jackson,
27 F.4th 1088, 1090 (5th Cir. 2022); United States v. Cooper, 996 F.3d 283, 287 (5th Cir. 2021);
United States v. Shkambi, 993 F.3d 388, 392 (5th Cir. 2021). Although the Commission issued
a policy statement prior to the passage of the Act that described the reasons that qualify as
extraordinary and compelling, that policy statement referenced only those motions filed by the
Director of the BOP—thus, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and other
courts held that it was inapplicable to motions filed by defendants on their own behalf. See
Jackson, 27 F.4th at 1090; Cooper, 996 F.3d at 287-88; Shkambi, 993 F.3d at 392.
Effective November 1, 2023, the Commission—responding to, among other things, the
Act—amended the Guidelines to extend the applicability of the policy statement set forth in
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 to defendant-filed motions and to broaden the scope of what qualifies as
“extraordinary and compelling” reasons potentially warranting compassionate release. See
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. Section 1B1.13(b), as amended, identifies six categories of circumstances
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that may qualify as “extraordinary and compelling.” Id. § 1B1.13(b). These categories are:
(1) the medical circumstances of the defendant;
(2) the age of the defendant;
(3) the family circumstances of the defendant;
(4) whether the defendant was a victim of abuse while in custody;
(5) other reasons similar in gravity to those previously described; and
(6) an unusually long sentence.
Id. § 1B1.13(b)(1)-(6).
As a result, a prisoner seeking compassionate release or a sentence reduction on his own
motion must satisfy the following hurdles:
(1) the defendant must have exhausted his administrative remedies;
(2) “extraordinary and compelling reasons” must justify the reduction of his
sentence or he must satisfy the requirements of § 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii);
(3) the reduction must be consistent with the Commission’s applicable policy
statements; and
(4) the defendant must convince the court to exercise its discretion to grant the
motion after considering the § 3553(a) factors.
Jackson, 27 F.4th at 1089; Shkambi, 993 F.3d at 392; accord United States v. Rollins, 53 F.4th
353, 358 (5th Cir. 2022); see Austin, 125 F.4th at 692.
B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Section 3582(c)(1)(A)’s plain language makes it clear that the court may not grant a
defendant’s motion for compassionate release or sentence reduction unless the defendant has
complied with the administrative exhaustion requirement. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); United
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States v. Garrett, 15 F.4th 335, 337 (5th Cir. 2021) (“[T]o file a proper motion for compassionate
release in the district court, a prisoner must first exhaust the available administrative avenues.”);
United States v. Franco, 973 F.3d 465, 467 (5th Cir. 2020) (holding that the statutory requirement
that a defendant file a request with the BOP before filing a motion for compassionate release in
federal court “is not jurisdictional, but that it is mandatory”). The exhaustion requirement applies
whether the motion is styled as one for compassionate release or merely for a reduction of sentence
under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Accordingly, before seeking relief from the court, a defendant
must first submit a request to the warden of his facility to move for compassionate release or a
sentence reduction on his behalf and then either exhaust his administrative remedies or wait for
the lapse of 30 days after the warden received the request. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); Garrett,
15 F.4th at 338 (“[A]n inmate has two routes by which he may exhaust his administrative
remedies. Both begin with ‘requesting that the [BOP] bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf.’”
(quoting Franco, 973 F.3d at 467)).
Although this requirement is said to be mandatory, the Fifth Circuit has treated it as “a
nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule.” Franco, 973 F.3d at 468. “Mandatory but
nonjurisdictional procedural filing requirements may be waived.” United States v. McLean, Nos.
21-40015, 21-40017, 2022 WL 44618, at *1 (5th Cir. Jan. 5, 2022); see United States v. Harden,
No. 4:11-CR-127-SDJ, 2025 WL 562716, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2025). Therefore, if the
Government fails to “invoke § 3582(c)(1)(A)’s exhaustion requirement as a basis for denying
relief,” that argument is deemed waived. McLean, 2022 WL 44618, at *1.
A defendant’s motion for compassionate release must be based on the same circumstances
as those raised in his request for release to the warden of the facility where he is housed. United
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States v. Dodd, No. 4:13-CR-182-SDJ, 2020 WL 7396527, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 2020)
(stating that “[i]n order to exhaust her administrative remedies, a prisoner must first present to the
BOP the same grounds warranting release that the prisoner urges in her motion”); accord United
States v. Thomas, No. 4:19-CR-28-SDJ, 2023 WL 5279457, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2023)
(citing United States v. Mendoza-Garibay, No. 4:13-CR-00281, 2023 WL 307459, at *1 (E.D.
Tex. Jan. 18, 2023)). Hence, the facts asserted in an inmate’s request to the warden and in his
motion for compassionate release must be consistent. United States v. Scott, No. CR 17-114,
2024 WL 2187849, at *2 (E.D. La. May 14, 2024); see United States v. Gonzalez, 849 F. App’x
116, 117 (5th Cir. 2021). Further, “the exhaustion requirement applies to new arguments or
grounds for compassionate release developed after an earlier request for compassionate release.”
United States v. Cantu, No. 7:17-cr-01046-2, 2022 WL 90853, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 2022)
(citing United States v. Rivas, 833 F. App’x 556, 558 (5th Cir. 2020)); accord Mendoza-Garibay,
2023 WL 307459, at *2.
Here, the Government invokes § 3582(c)(1)(A)’s exhaustion requirement as a basis for
denying relief. The court is without authority to waive the exhaustion of administrative remedies
or the 30-day waiting period. Franco, 973 F.3d at 468 (“Congress has commanded that a ‘court
may not modify a term of imprisonment’ if a defendant has not filed a request with the BOP.”);
see United States v. Harper, No. 24-30275, 2024 WL 4664018, at *1 (5th Cir. Nov. 4, 2024)
(“[B]ecause the Government properly raised the rule requiring exhaustion in the district court,
“the court must enforce the rule.”); United States v. Alam, 960 F.3d 831, 832 (6th Cir. 2020)
(“[B]ecause this exhaustion requirement serves valuable purposes (there is no other way to ensure
an orderly processing of applications for early release) and because it is mandatory (there is no
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exception for some compassionate-release requests over others), we must enforce it.”); United
States v. Gomez, No. 2:17-cr-41-KS-MTP, 2025 WL 420531, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 6, 2025)
(“Congress used clear language: all requests for compassionate release must be presented to the
[BOP] before they are litigated in the federal courts.”); United States v. York, No. 17-00086-BAJ-
RLB, 2024 WL 3771442, at *3 (M.D. La. Aug. 13, 2024) (recognizing that a court may not
modify a term of imprisonment if a defendant has not filed a request with the BOP); United States
v. Garcia, No. CR 2:18-1337, 2020 WL 3000528, at *3 (S.D. Tex. June 2, 2020) (“While the
Court sympathizes with Defendant’s plight, because he has failed to comply with the exhaustion
requirements under § 3582, his motion is not ripe for review, and the Court is without jurisdiction
to grant it.”); see also Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 639 (2016) (“[J]udge-made exhaustion
doctrines . . . remain amenable to judge-made exceptions,” whereas “mandatory exhaustion
statutes . . . establish mandatory exhaustion regimes, foreclosing judicial discretion.”).
Here, Johnson appears to have exhausted his administrative remedies only in part. He
submitted to the court a copy of an email dated November 7, 2024, addressed to BTF/Social
Worker that also states “To: Mr. Jones,” with the Subject listed as “Request to Staff,” which
reads:
Dear Mr. Jones:
I previously had written to you requesting to file another “Compassionate
Release” with the current Warden at this facility. Therefore, I am giving you a
little information that can be submitted in that request as follows:
1. I transferred from USP Hazelton, West Virginia, to the Federal Medical
Center (FMC) Butner on January 19, 2022. At that time I was classified as a care
level IV (4) individual in need of two chemotherapy treatments for reoccurring
Bladder tumors since 2004. I saw the physician on January 24, 2022, who was
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awaiting an in-house urology consultation but presumed I would be scheduled for
six (6) installations of Bacillus Calmette-Guerin via cystoscopy.
2. However, due to me filling [sic] an injury tort claim against my PA, and
other staff. My care level was decreased by this provider in June of 2022 to a care
level III (3). Then I was transferred to FCI-2, without ever having the much
needed six (6) months installations of Bacillus Calmett-Guerin treatments.
3. Furthermore, since being at the FCI-2 Facility my health has went down to
where to where I nearly died at Duke University Cancer Center September 26,
2024. I have become a diabetic, got high blood pressure, high cholesterol,
glaucoma, blood clots and my low grade bladder cancer had metastasized to my left
kidney since my care level was decreased.
4. I had surgery at Duke University Cancer Center on September 23, 2024,
where my kidney, ureter and a portion of my bladder had to be removed.
Thereafter, I had to have chemotherapy administered, which dropped blood
pressure to 60 over 20 and nearly killed me.
5. The pathology report on the kidney that was removed the cancer also came
back low grade. The doctor was shocked, because he never seen a case like mines
[sic] before, because he was certain that the center of the kidney would come back
high grade cancer.
6. I was told that all the delayed medical treatments over the years was the
cause to my current medical condition.
7. I am now having difficulties with my liver.
Mr. Jones I am running out of time on the computer, but for further
information please review my medical files.
On February 26, 2024, L.B. Kelly, Warden of FCI Butner II, North Carolina, responded
to Johnson’s request for a reduction in sentence. Warden Kelly states:
This memorandum is in response to your request to staff dated January 17, 2024,
in which you requested to be considered for a reduction in sentence under medical
conditions criteria.
At this time, you do not meet the guidelines outlined in Program Statement
5050.50, Compassionate Release/Reduction in Sentence: Procedures for
Implementation of 18 U.S.C. 3582 (c)(1)(A) and 4205(g), Section 3a., Terminal
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Medical Condition, Section 3b., Debilitated Medical Condition and Section 4b.,
Elderly with Medical Conditions. You do not have a terminal illness, with a life
expectancy of less than 18 months and you are independent with your self-care.
You do not have a debilitated medical condition and you are independent of your
activities of daily living and your current medical conditions remain under control.
Also, you do not meet age under elderly with medical conditions criteria.
Accordingly, your RIS request is denied at this time.
At present, you are receiving appropriate medical care and treatment by Health
Services staff. We are committed to providing you with the necessary and
appropriate care for your medical needs.
If you are not satisfied with this response to your request, you may commence an
appeal of this decision via the administrative remedy process by submitting your
concerns on the appropriate form (BP-9) within 20 days of the receipt of this
response.
There is no indication in the file that Johnson commenced an appeal of the warden’s decision via
the administrative remedy process.
Thus, in this instance, Johnson has exhausted his administrative remedies only with respect
to his claims regarding metastatic bladder cancer, diabetes mellitus (Type II), and the quality of
medical care in prison. He did not raise any claims to the warden based on his age, the length of
his sentence, changes in the law, unusually harsh prison conditions, programming, the “catchall
provision” of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(5), rehabilitation, end-of-life medical issues, obesity, hiatal
hernia, use of a walker, vertigo, cataracts, or no longer posing a danger to society. In his
response, Warden Kelly addressed Sections 3a (Terminal Medical Condition) and 3b (Debilitated
Medical Condition) of Program Statement 5050.50. The warden also referenced Section 4b of
Program Statement 5050.50 (Elderly with Medical Conditions), which applies only to inmates age
65 and older and generally corresponds to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(2), clarifying that extraordinary
and compelling reasons exist as to a defendant’s age when:
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AGE OF THE DEFENDANT.—The defendant (A) is at least 65 years old; (B) is
experiencing a serious deterioration in physical or mental health because of the
aging process; and (C) has served at least 10 years or 75 percent of his or her term
of imprisonment, whichever is less.
Johnson is ineligible for relief under this provision because he is just 60 years of age.
Therefore, Johnson has exhausted his administrative remedies only with respect to a small
portion of his claims. Moreover, while Johnson may have complied with the exhaustion
requirement, at least in part, before filing his motion for compassionate release, nothing in the
motion indicates that extraordinary and compelling reasons exist to reduce his sentence or release
him from confinement at this time.
C. Criteria for Compassionate Release or Sentence Reduction
With respect to a defendant’s medical circumstances, §§ 1B1.13(b)(1)(A), (B), and (C) of
the United States Sentencing Guidelines state that extraordinary and compelling reasons exist if
the defendant’s motion presents the following circumstances:
(A) The defendant is suffering from a terminal illness (i.e., a serious and
advanced illness with an end-of-life trajectory). A specific prognosis of life
expectancy (i.e., a probability of death within a specific time period) is not
required. Examples include metastatic solid-tumor cancer, amyotrophic
lateral sclerosis (ALS), end-stage organ disease, and advanced dementia.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)(A).
(B) The defendant is—
(i) suffering from a serious physical or medical condition,
(ii) suffering from a serious functional or cognitive impairment,
or
(iii) experiencing deteriorating physical or mental health because of the
aging process,
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that substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide
self-care within the environment of a correctional facility and from
which he or she is not expected to recover.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)(B).
(C) The defendant is suffering from a medical condition that requires long-term or
specialized medical care that is not being provided and without which the defendant
is at risk of serious deterioration in health or death.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)(C).
D. Medical Conditions at Issue
1. Bladder Cancer
Johnson was first diagnosed with bladder cancer in 2004, well before he committed his
offense of conviction in March 2012. After initially receiving treatment in 2004, his Presentence
Investigation Report (“PSR”) reflects that he was treated again in 2006, 2008, and 2010. His
prognosis was reportedly good in 2012. Johnson’s BOP medical records reveal that his bladder
cancer has been actively monitored and treated over the years while he has been confined in
federal prison. In recent years, Johnson was seen by Adrian Ogle, M.D. (“Dr. Ogle”), a board-
certified urologist, who noted that a CT scan of his abdomen and pelvis on November 6, 2023,
“showed dilation of left renal pelvis, collecting system, and renal pelvis with abnormal soft tissue
attenuation.” Dr. Ogle also commented that Johnson had a urine cytology test on December 29,
2023, that was “atypical.” On March 8, 2024, Johnson consulted with Dr. Ogle after a
surveillance cystoscopy was performed the same day which revealed a “small papillary lesion right
floor.” Dr. Ogle ordered an MRI of Johnson’s abdomen with and without contrast, which was
conducted at Duke Regional Hospital on July 1, 2024.
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Biopsies of Johnson’s bladder and left renal pelvis were performed in July 2024 revealing
“noninvasive papillary urothelial cell carcinoma, low-grade.” On July 26, 2024, Dr. Ogle
determined that further intervention was needed for Johnson’s “now transitional cell carcinoma,
low-grade left renal pelvis, and history of low-grade noninvasive bladder cancer.” Dr. Ogle
recommended for him “to be referred to a tertiary care center as soon as possible for further
treatment.” Shortly thereafter, on August 7, 2024, Johnson consulted with Ankeet Shah, M.D.
(“Dr. Shah”), a board certified urologic oncologist at the Duke Cancer Center. A PET/CT scan
performed on August 2, 2024, had disclosed “no evidence of metastatic disease.” Dr. Shah
discussed with Johnson the various treatment options for the malignancies in his bladder and left
renal pelvis. The medical team determined that the most appropriate treatment option was a
nephroureterectomy—the removal of the left kidney, ureter, and bladder cuff. The procedure was
performed at Duke University Hospital on September 23, 2024. The medical records reflect that
Johnson “tolerated the procedure well and was taken to the stepdown unit, and admitted to the
Urology service in stable condition.” At some point, however, he “because very hypotensive
(60s/40s) and a rapid response was called.” His vitals later returned to normal. On September
28, 2024, Johnson “was found to be neutropenic,” a condition in which a person has an
abnormally low number of neutrophils, a type of white blood cell, which is a common side effect
of chemotherapy treatment. The medical staff at the hospital concluded that Johnson’s hypotensive
condition was a “rare systemic reaction” to a chemotherapy drug (gemcitabine) that had been
administered into his bladder. Johnson “stabilized prior to discharge” and the “rest of his post
operative course was as expected and uneventful.” He was discharged from the hospital on
October 2, 2024, and returned to his prison unit.
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A surveillance cystoscopy performed on January 3, 2025, showed “No recurrence.” On
January 14, 2025, a CT scan conducted on January 14, 2025, contained “finding suspicious for
recurrence and/or metastatic disease in the surgical bed in the left retroperitoneal region.”
Medical notes remarked that those “findings can be further evaluated with PET imaging to
ascertain or confirm these findings.” A PET/CT scan performed on March 6, 2025, reflected
“[n]o suspicious hypermetabolic activity” and noted that Johnson had a “[g]ood response to
therapy.” A physician noted that the “PET scan was reassuring as it did not show any uptake.”
On May 13, 2025, a report of a Cytology urine test stated: “ NO MALIGNANT CELLS
IDENTIFIED. Negative for high grade urothelial carcinoma.” On May 16, 2025, Johnson was
seen by the Urology Department for another “routine surveillance cystoscopy in setting of prior
low grade bladder cancer.” The cystoscopy showed “[n]o recurrence” of bladder cancer and “no
lesions or concerning findings.” On May 18, 2025, Johnson complained of abdominal pain and
urgency and frequency of urination, but he refused the placement of a catheter to measure urine
output, and he went back to his housing unit. On June 3, 2025, Johnson had another checkup that
was unremarkable, and a follow-up surveillance cystoscopy was scheduled for December 5, 2025.
Johnson’s medical records reflect that he is prescribed and receives a variety of medications to
treat his bladder cancer and accompanying symptoms, including oxybutynin, phenazopyridine,
tamsulosin, sulfamethoxazole, nitrofantonin, and gabapentin, as well as ondansetron to prevent
nausea caused by cancer treatments.
2. Diabetes
Johnson’s medical records confirm that he has been diagnosed with Type 2 diabetes
mellitus. A medical record dated April 22, 2025, reflects that his diabetes is “controlled on
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ozempic.” His current list of medications includes semaglutide, the generic name for Ozempic,
metformin, as well as glucose gel and glucose tablets, all prescribed to treat diabetes. He has been
issued a glucose monitor to help regulate his blood sugar level. Johnson also participates in
chronic care clinics, including one for diabetes. A medical record dated April 22, 2025, indicates
that Johnson’s chronic kidney disease is “overall very mild and stable.” His end stage renal
disease risk is “very, very low at this point. He has well-controlled risk factors.” The record
further states, “I would check labs at least every 6 months with a renal function panel, a urine
albumin creatine ratio, and an A1C. We can follow up once a year at this point.” The same
medical record reflects that Johnson’s hypertension [high blood pressure] is “well controlled on
current therapy.” His medication list includes lisinopril and doxazosin, both of which are
prescribed to treat hypertension. Johnson’s prescription for semaglutide also has beneficial effects
regarding his obesity. In addition to these medications, Johnson is prescribed lactulose to treat
his hernia, meclizine for dizziness, apixaban to treat embolism, venal thrombosis, and blood clots,
and atorvastatin for high cholesterol.
3. Quality of Medical Care in Prison
Contrary to his current contentions, Johnson’s extensive medical records over the years
reflect that he has regularly been provided ample medical care by a variety of qualified providers
who are consistently responsive to his litany of concerns. He is seen regularly by providers at
specialized clinics maintained at FCI Butner, has access to the nearby Federal Medical Center, has
consultations with board-certified specialists, and is administered a plethora of prescription
medications for his various ailments. He also receives treatment and testing at Duke University
Hospital, a top-tier, academic medical center that is consistently ranked among the best hospitals
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in the United States by U.S. News & World Report and Newsweek. Although he may have
experienced a rare adverse reaction to a medication at the facility on one occasion, the problem
was quickly rectified and he recovered shortly thereafter. Indeed, the overall quality of the
medical care readily available and furnished to Johnson appears to be superior to that available to
most of the free-world population in the United States.
Hence, Johnson’s myriad medical complaints provide no basis for compassionate release.
He is not suffering from a terminal illness (i.e., a serious and advanced illness with an end-of-life
trajectory). See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)(A). Although Johnson’s recurrent bladder cancer has
caused him some difficulties, both in and out of prison, he has received appropriate and effective
treatment while incarcerated, and currently there is no indication that the condition has returned
after the nephroureterectomy was performed in 2024. As the Government points out, one study
of 422 people who had a radical nephroureterectomy to treat urothelial cancer showed that the
five-year survival rate is over 70% and the 10-year survival rate is over 67%.
https://my.clevelandclinicorg/health/treatments/17164-nephrouretorectomy. This is consistent
with the warden’s statement that Johnson does “not have a terminal illness, with a life expectancy
of less than 18 months.” According to BOP records, Johnson’s projected release date is December
27, 2030, five years from now.
Johnson also is not suffering from a serious physical or medical condition that substantially
diminishes his ability to provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility. See
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)(B). Johnson is classified as a BOP Medical Care Level 3 inmate.
According to the BOP’s Clinical Practice Guidance, dated May 2019, Care Level 3 inmates “are
outpatients who have complex, and usually chronic, medical[,] or mental health conditions and
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who require frequent clinical contacts to maintain control or stability of their condition, or to
prevent hospitalization or complications. They may require assistance with some activities of daily
living (ADLs) that can be accomplished by inmate companions. Stabilization of medical or mental
health conditions may require periodic hospitalization.” While some of Johnson’s conditions may
require specialized medical care, they do not substantially diminish his ability to provide self-care
in the prison setting and do not limit his activities of daily living. Johnson’s inmate profile,
contained in the BOP records, reveals that he is housed in general population, is ambulatory, has
no medical restrictions, has regular duty work assignments, is cleared for food service, and has
a current work assignment in assembly in the UNICOR prison industry. He has been issued a 4-
wheel walker and medical shoes. In a medical record dated March 28, 2025, Romin Bonakdar,
M.D., reported that Johnson related, “Overall, he feels pretty good. He says he works five days
a week.” Moreover, as discussed above, Johnson is not suffering from a medical condition that
requires long-term or specialized medical care that is not being provided. See U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.13(b)(1)(C). In fact, most of his medical conditions are commonplace and are well
managed with a variety of medications and monitoring. When more advanced medical care is
required, it is being supplied by a host of physicians, specialists, and other treatment providers.
Under the circumstances, Johnson’s current medical conditions present no “extraordinary and
compelling” reason warranting a sentence reduction or compassionate release.
E. Section 3553(a) Factors
Moreover, as the court concluded in its prior orders, compassionate release is not merited
in light of the applicable factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)
(requiring courts to consider the § 3553(a) factors before granting compassionate release); United
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States v. Chavez, No. 23-50684, 2024 WL 940263, at *1 (5th Cir. Mar. 5, 2024); Rollins, 53
F.4th at 358-59; United States v. Shorter, 850 F. App’x 327, 328 (5th Cir. 2021) (finding that the
court did not abuse its discretion in denying compassionate release after balancing the § 3553(a)
factors); United States v. Keys, 846 F. App’x 275, 276 (5th Cir. 2021); Shkambi, 993 F.3d at 392;
Thompson, 984 F.3d at 435 n.11 (collecting cases); United States v. Chambliss, 948 F.3d 691,
693-94 (5th Cir. 2020). Section 3553(a)(1) requires the court to consider the nature and
circumstances of the defendant’s offense of conviction as well as the history and characteristics
of the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). Here, neither the nature of Johnson’s offense nor his
history and characteristics warrant a sentence reduction.
Johnson’s offense of conviction entails his commission of carjacking and sexual assault
after he stalked and harassed the female victim whom he had previously dated for several months.
As Probation recounts in a report dated June 4, 2025:
The presentence report reflects that the victim in this case ended a romantic
relationship with Mr. Johnson in December 2011. He also immediately began
stalking her outside her home and in her backyard. He was also going to her place
of employment and calling and texing her frequently. Mr. Johnson was warned by
law enforcement to stay away from the victim. Between December 18, 2011, and
January 16, 2012, the victim called law enforcement ten times regarding
harassment by him. The victim installed a video surveillance unit for the exterior
of her home and on January 28, 2012, Mr. Johnson was seen in her backyard with
a flashlight looking around and attempting to enter her garage. She called the
police and Mr. Johnson was located a block from her home. He was arrested and
charged with Third Degree Stalking and an Emergency Protective Order was
issued.
On March 12, 2012, the victim arrived at her place of employment and was forced
back into her car at gunpoint by Mr. Johnson. He had her call her employer and
state she would not be coming to work that day. He drove her to a nearby parking
lot and forced her into his car so they could drive to his apartment. Once at his
apartment, the victim was locked inside, and Mr. Johnson went through her phone
history while accusing her of having sexual relations with other men. He then
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made her call the district attorney’s office and state she wanted to drop all charges
against him. Mr. Johnson had the victim agree that she still loved him, and they
could stay together. He then asked several times to have sex, and she finally
agreed when he started getting angry stating she feared for her life. Mr. Johnson
also made the victim call his mother and tell her they were staying together and that
all charges against him had been dismissed. He finally took the victim back to her
car and let her go home. Mr. Johnson was arrested on March 27, 2012, and a
loaded revolver was found in the backseat of his car during a search.
On April 4, 2013, federal investigators were made aware of three outgoing letters
written by Mr. Johnson while in the Collin County Jail that had been intercepted.
These letters outlined a plot to have a family member send a firearm through the
United States mail to a fellow inmate who was to use the firearm to kill the victim
of the carjacking offense. The first letter was dated March 28, 2013, and asked the
individual to provide a firearm. The second letter was dated March 29, 2013, and
directed another individual believed to be Mr. Johnson’s cousin to mail the firearm
to James Franklin. The letter states, “Just get that to him and no witness, no case
at trial”. This letter also discusses the fact that Mr. Johnson had a new charge
from an incident where he was caught in possession of a shank or knife-like
weapon while currently incarcerated. The third letter intercepted talked to another
individual about the plan Mr. Johnson had made to make his charges go away. On
Thursday, April 4, 2013, Mr. Johnson was confronted about the three letters and
admitted that he wrote them.
Johnson has an extensive criminal history beginning in his youth, which includes prior
juvenile convictions for sexual assault (in which he admitted he was the “designated rapist” among
3 boys), breaking and entering occupied dwelling (2x), and grand theft auto, and prior adult
convictions for burglary, larceny from a person, armed robbery, aggravated stalking, malicious
destruction of building, aggravated kidnapping with intent to commit sexual abuse, violation of
a protective order involving aggravated assault and bias, and possession of a deadly weapon in a
penal institution. Johnson also failed to comply with a previous term of probation. Like the
prisoner in United States v. Jones, Johnson is “the quintessential career offender.” 852 F. App’x
60, 61 (3d Cir. 2021). He has a long history of criminal behavior since he was a juvenile, in both
Michigan and Texas, “with most gaps in that behavior occurring only during times of
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incarceration.” Id. at 61-62. In short, Johnson’s “criminal history and conduct reflect an
unabated propensity for crime.” United States v. Padilla, No. H-14-174-1, 2021 WL 1517855,
at *5 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 16, 2021).
Although Johnson has expressed a desire to be released to the home of his mother,
“Jerdline” Caston, the PSR reflects that her name is actually Geraldine Caston (“Caston”), as
confirmed by a letter she submitted to the court in support of Johnson’s request for compassionate
release. The PSR indicates that he was raised by Caston in Michigan with the help of her parents.
Johnson lived in Michigan until 2008, where he accumulated all of his juvenile convictions as well
as his burglary, larceny from a person, armed robbery (repeat offender), aggravated stalking, and
malicious destruction of building convictions. Hence, Caston was unable to prevent Johnson from
engaging in serious criminal conduct while he was growing up and under her supervision as a
young man. She is now in her 80’s and resides in an apartment in Novi, Michigan. There is no
reason to believe that Caston could now deter Johnson from continuing to engage in criminal
activity, including crimes of violence, if he were released from confinement at this time and began
serving his 5-year term of supervised release. Probation reports, however, that according to the
Texas Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”), Johnson:
also has a detainer/bench warrant for the 2012 convictions of Aggravated
Kidnapping with Intent to Commit Sexual Abuse, a 1st Degree Felony, Habitual
Offender; and Violation of a Protective Order Involving Aggravated Assault and
Bias with Two Prior Convictions. He was sentenced to 60 years confinement for
each offense. TDCJ records currently show that he has a projected release date of
March 21, 2072, and a parole eligibility date of March 21, 2042.
“[C]ompassionate release is discretionary, not mandatory, and [may] be refused after
weighing the sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Chambliss, 948 F.3d at 693; see
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Rollins, 53 F.4th at 358-60 (upholding the denial of compassionate release of the defendant, who
suffered from a “dire” medical situation stemming from a gunshot wound that required the
amputation of his right leg and left him paralyzed, but deferring to the district court’s balancing
of the § 3553(a) factors, including the defendant’s “history, the serious nature of his offense, and
the danger his release would pose to the community at-large”); United States v. Gharib, No.
21-40779, 2022 WL 1565352, at *1 (5th Cir. May 18, 2022). Where, as here, a prisoner has
engaged in “severe” criminal conduct and has an extensive criminal history, the district court has
discretion to deny compassionate release under the circumstances. Chambliss, 948 F.3d at
693-94; accord Rollins, 53 F.4th at 358-60; Gharib, 2022 WL 1565352, at *1 (refusing to
consider the defendant’s contention that extraordinary and compelling reasons justified
compassionate release due to the defendant’s no longer being subject to the career offender
enhancement when the district court found that the § 3553(a) factors outweighed granting relief);
Keys, 846 F. App’x at 276 (rejecting the defendant’s argument that the court gave too much weight
to his criminal history and finding that “a mere disagreement with the court’s balancing of the
§ 3553(a) factors . . . is not a sufficient ground for reversal”).
In United States v. McKinney, the court denied relief to a prisoner who had end-stage renal
failure and had a portion of his foot amputated despite the Government’s concession that the
defendant had established an “extraordinary and compelling reason” within the meaning of
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), finding that “granting compassionate release would not comport with the
factors enumerated in Section 3553(a).” No. 19-00394-03, 2023 WL 2993020, at *1, 3 (W.D.
La. Apr. 18, 2023). The court pointed to McKinney’s extensive criminal history that included
several drug convictions, firearm convictions, and simple battery. Id. at *3. The McKinney court
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noted that the inmate had repeatedly failed to comply with previous terms of probation and parole
and clearly lacked respect for the law. Id. The court concluded that a reduction in sentence would
not equate to a “just punishment” under § 3553(a)(2)(A). The court expounded: “It is this court’s
belief that a reduced sentence simply would not reflect the seriousness of the offense, would not
promote respect for the law, would not afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, and would
not protect the public from further crimes of this Defendant.” Id. This court has the same belief
in the case at bar. As Johnson’s probation officer commented in the report, “[E]very time Mr.
Johnson has been arrested there was violence involved and he could be considered a danger to the
community.” Clearly, Johnson’s long-standing affliction with bladder cancer since 2004 did not
hamper or prevent him from committing his offense of conviction or his state offenses of
aggravated kidnapping with intent to commit sexual abuse, violation of a protective order
involving aggravated assault and bias with two prior convictions, and possession of a deadly
weapon in a penal institution in 2012. See Rollins, 53 F.4th at 360 (noting that the defendant “had
committed serious crimes while suffering from severe and life-threatening medical
complications”). In view of the nature and circumstances of his offense of conviction and his
extensive criminal history, the court cannot conclude that Johnson’s early release from prison
would afford adequate deterrence or protect the public, as he continues to pose a danger to other
persons and to the community as a whole. As in McKinney, the § 3553(a) factors do not support
Johnson’s release.
On balance, compassionate release is not warranted in this case in light of the applicable
factors set forth in § 3553(a). As the court noted in United States v. Preston, “[t]he best predictor
of how [Defendant] will behave if he were to be released is how he has behaved when released in
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the past, and his track record is a poor one.” No. 3:18-CR-307-K, 2020 WL 1819888, at *4
(N.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 2020) (quoting United States v. Martin, 447 F. Supp. 3d 399, 403 (D. Md.
2020)). Here, Johnson’s track record is abysmal. In this instance, there is no reason to believe
that Johnson would not revert to his prior acts of violence including armed robbery, carjacking,
and aggravated kidnapping, as well as his possession of firearms, if released from prison at this
juncture. See United States v. Wymer, 573 F. Supp. 3d 1208, 1212 (N.D. Ohio 2021). Here,
Johnson’s past behavior and his refusal to recognize the wrongfulness of his actions through his
repeated frivolous filings with the court seeking to set aside his conviction and/or reduce his
sentence give grave cause for concern as to his future conduct. Like the court in United States v.
Lewis, this court concludes that “Defendant’s current term of imprisonment was and remains
appropriate.” No. 17-CR-28-FPG, 2021 WL 4519795, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2021). Johnson
committed a serious offense that justified his sentence, and the circumstances he now identifies do
not render that sentence unjust or inequitable. See id.
After thoroughly reviewing Johnson’s case, Probation concluded in its June 4, 2025,
report:
In summary, it is believed the Bureau of Prison[s] is doing their best to
appropriately screen any inmate they believe should be removed from custody and
placed on home confinement. It is believed Bureau of Prison[s] case management
staff and medical staff are in the best position to consider Mr. Johnson’s status as
it relates to the appropriateness of compassionate release. Mr. Johnson’s extensive
history of violent and sexual offenses is concerning, and the U.S. Probation Office
is of the opinion that the current imprisonment sentence should be served. As
such, we respectfully recommend the motion for compassionate release filed on
May 21, 2025, be denied.
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III. Conclusion
The court concurs with Probation’s assessment of the situation. Johnson has failed to
satisfy his burden of showing the necessary circumstances to warrant relief under the statutory
framework to which the court must adhere. The 240-month sentence of imprisonment imposed
upon Johnson for his carjacking offense comports with the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, and he
has adduced no extraordinary and compelling reasons to lessen his sentence or justify his release
from prison at this time. Neither his health, his age, nor the length of his incarceration merits a
reduction of sentence under these circumstances.
In accordance with the foregoing analysis, Johnson’s Emergency Motion for Reduction in
Sentence Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) (#194) is DENIED.
29
________________________________________
MARCIA A. CRONE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
SIGNED at Beaumont, Texas, this 18th day of December, 2025.
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