ORIBEL PTE LTD. v. CARTERS INC.

2:24-cv-00977Txed23 de abr. de 2026

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MARSHALL DIVISION
ORIBEL PTE LTD.,
Plaintiff,
v.
THE WILLIAM CARTER COMPANY,
CARTER’S RETAIL INC., AND SKIP HOP,
INC.,
Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:24-CV-00977-JRG
MEMORANDUM CLAIM CONSTRUCTION OPINION AND ORDER
In this patent case, Oribel PTE Ltd. alleges infringement by Carter’s Retail Inc., The Wil-
liam Carter Company, and Skip Hop Inc. (together, “Defendants”) of claims from U.S. Patent
10,736,437 (the “’437 Patent”). The ’437 Patent relates “to a portable activity center that can be
used by a child for participating in different activities.” ’437 Patent at 1:7–8.
The parties dispute the scope of three terms from these claims. Having considered the par-
ties’ briefing, along with arguments of counsel at a February 19, 2026 hearing, the Court resolves
those disputes as follows.
I. 	BACKGROUND
The ’437 Patent purports to address “ongoing consumer interest for a new and improved
apparatus for young children that is easily portable, lightweight, safe, and compact for easy storage
and transportation, provides a child with the ability to engage in a variety of activities and is rela-
tively inexpensive to manufacture[.]” ’437 Patent at 1:24–30. To that end, the patent discloses a
portable activity center with a frame, a tray coupled to the frame with an opening, a seat support
surrounding the opening, and a seat within the opening that is securely attached to the seat support.
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A cover interchangeable with the seat and positioned within the opening operates to convert the
activity center into a table. Id. at [57].
FIG. 27 (left) of the ’437 Patent shows a seat support (110) and
seat (112) in the opening (109). FIG. 32 (right) shows the seat
support and seat removed and a cover (238) over the opening.
Figure 1 (above) “is a perspective view of a preferred embodiment of the portable activity
center shown in its seating configuration.” ’437 Patent at 3:1–3. The embodiment (100) has a frame
supported by foldable telescoping legs (104), a tray (106) attached to the frame, a seat support
(110) that supports a seat (112), and a support ring (140) attached to each leg by a strap (138). See
generally id. at 6:12–7:37.
As shown more clearly in Figure 26 (below), the tray “includes a plurality of apertures 220
for receiving the attachment end 222 of an interchangeable playgroup accessory 224, such as [a]
snap-in toy (i.e. a rattle, toy figure, or other conventional snap-in children’s toy), book support, a
drawing system, bucket, and a playhouse.” ’437 Patent at 9:45–51. The attachment ends have
plates (230) that can bend “inwardly toward each other such that they easily insert[] into apertures
220 and are biased outwardly . . . away from each other [after insertion] to provide a frictional fit.”
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Id. at 9:55–58. “When the interchangeable playgroup accessory 224 is pulled upwardly, the parallel
plates 230 are pushed inwardly towards each other to facilitate removal of the interchangeable
playgroup accessory 224.” Id. at 9:59–62. Figures 34–38 show various interchangeable playgroup
accessories removably mounted to the tray. Id. at 12:4–18.
FIG. 26 of the ’437 Patent
The disputed terms concern Claims 3, 4, and 11, all of which indirectly depend from Claim
1. Claims 1–3 recite:
1. 	A portable activity center for use by a young child comprising:
a frame;
a plurality of legs for supporting the frame;
a tray mounted to the frame, the tray having an opening;
a seat support mounted to the tray;
a seat positioned within the opening, the seat having a top annu-
lar section, a lower crotch section and mid section between
the top annular section and the lower crotch section, wherein
the seat is positioned securely attached, via the top annular
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section, to the seat support; and
at least one elastic portion in the mid section of the seat that op-
erate to permit the seat to support a child placed within the
seat and to permit vertical reciprocating movement with re-
spect to the frame in response to bouncing movement by the
child.
2. 	The portable activity center of claim 1 further comprising a
cover placed over the opening to convert the portable activity
center into a table structure.
3. 	The portable activity center of claim 2, further comprising one
or more removable interchangeable playgroup accessories that
are removably secured to the tray or the cover.
’437 Patent at 12:65–13:21 (emphasis added). Claims 10–11 recite:
10. The portable activity center of claim 1 wherein the tray includes
a horizontal radial surface circumferentially surrounding the seat
support and provides a support surface for objects placed on the
tray.
11. The portable activity center of claim 10 wherein the horizontal
radial surface slopes radially inwardly towards the seat.
Id. at 13:49–55 (emphasis added). Claims 13, 18, and 21 include the same terms. See id. at 14:1–
4 (requiring, in Claim 13, the tray of Claim 1 to “include[] a plurality of apertures adapted for
receiving an attachment end of a removable interchangeable playgroup accessory”), 14:27–28
(reciting, in Claim 18, “at least one interchangeable playgroup accessory removably secured to
said cover”), 14:36–38 (requiring, in Claim 21, the tray of Claim 18 to have “a surface that slopes
radially inwardly towards said opening”).
II. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
A. 	Generally
“[T]he claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to
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exclude.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). As such, if the
parties dispute the scope of the claims, the court must determine their meaning. See, e.g., Verizon
Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 503 F.3d 1295, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Gajarsa, J., concur-
ring in part); see also Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996), aff’g, 52
F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
Claim construction, however, “is not an obligatory exercise in redundancy.” U.S. Surgical
Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Rather, “[c]laim construction is a
matter of [resolving] disputed meanings and technical scope, to clarify and when necessary to
explain what the patentee covered by the claims . . . .” Id. A court need not “repeat or restate every
claim term in order to comply with the ruling that claim construction is for the court.” Id.
When construing claims, “[t]here is a heavy presumption that claim terms are to be given
their ordinary and customary meaning.” Aventis Pharm. Inc. v. Amino Chems. Ltd., 715 F.3d 1363,
1373 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13). Courts must therefore “look to the
words of the claims themselves . . . to define the scope of the patented invention.” Id. (citations
omitted). The “ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would
have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the
effective filing date of the patent application.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313. This “person of ordinary
skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in the context of the particular claim in
which the disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including the specifica-
tion.” Id.
Intrinsic evidence is the primary resource for claim construction. See Power-One, Inc. v.
Artesyn Techs., Inc., 599 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312). For
certain claim terms, “the ordinary meaning of claim language as understood by a person of skill in
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the art may be readily apparent even to lay judges, and claim construction in such cases involves
little more than the application of the widely accepted meaning of commonly understood words.”
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314; see also Medrad, Inc. v. MRI Devices Corp., 401 F.3d 1313, 1319 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (“We cannot look at the ordinary meaning of the term . . . in a vacuum. Rather, we must
look at the ordinary meaning in the context of the written description and the prosecution history.”).
But for claim terms with less-apparent meanings, courts consider “those sources available to the
public that show what a person of skill in the art would have understood disputed claim language
to mean . . . [including] the words of the claims themselves, the remainder of the specification, the
prosecution history, and extrinsic evidence concerning relevant scientific principles, the meaning
of technical terms, and the state of the art.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314.
B. 	Indefiniteness
“[A] patent is invalid for indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the specification de-
lineating the patent, and the prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those
skilled in the art about the scope of the invention.” Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572
U.S. 898, 901 (2014). The claims “must be precise enough to afford clear notice of what is
claimed” while recognizing that “some modicum of uncertainty” is inherent due to the limitations
of language. Id. at 909. “Indefiniteness must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.” Sonix
Tech. Co. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 844 F.3d 1370, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
III. 	THE LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART
The level of ordinary skill in the art is the skill level of a hypothetical person who is pre-
sumed to have known the relevant art at the time of the invention. In re GPAC, 57 F.3d 1573, 1579
(Fed. Cir. 1995). In resolving the appropriate level of ordinary skill, courts consider the types of
and solutions to problems encountered in the art, the speed of innovation, the sophistication of the
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technology, and the education of workers active in the field. Id. Importantly, “[a] person of ordinary
skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550
U.S. 398, 421 (2007).
Here, neither party addresses the level of ordinary skill in the art in its briefing. Accord-
ingly, the Court will address that level of skill only to the extent necessary to resolve the disputes.
IV. 	THE DISPUTED TERMS
A. 	“playgroup accessor[y]/[ies]” (’437 Patent, Claims 3, 13, 18)
Oribel’s Construction 	Defendants’ Construction
Not indefinite
“a conventional children’s snap-in toy, a bucket, a book
support, a drawing system, or a playhouse”
“conventional children’s snap-in toy(s), bucket(s), book
support(s), drawing system(s), and/or playhouse(s)”
Indefinite
Defendants say this term is indefinite because the intrinsic record fails to provide objective
boundaries for the term, and a skilled artisan would not be reasonably certain of its meaning. Dkt.
No. 56 at 4. Defendants note certain dependent claims and the written description provide exam-
ples, but assert those examples fail to cabin the scope’s term. Id. at 4–5. And “[b]ecause the spec-
ification provides only a handful of non-limiting examples for what may constitute ‘playgroup
accessories’ while also remaining open to infinite other possibilities,” id. at 8, the term is indefinite.
Nor does extrinsic evidence help. Id. at 5 (citing playgroup, Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary,
Dkt. No. 56-2, and playgroup, Cambridge Dictionary, Dkt. No. 56-3).
Oribel gives three reasons why the term is definite. First, the patent “repeatedly describes
and illustrates the different forms the playgroup accessories can take,” and explains that accesso-
ries provide educational or entertainment value for children. Dkt. No. 60 at 5. Second, the patent
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examiner identified book supports and drawing systems as “playgroup accessories,” which shows
the term has a definite meaning. Id. at 6. Finally, Defendants’ senior product-development manager
had no issue recognizing the term’s scope, so neither would a skilled artisan reviewing the speci-
fication. Id.
This term is not indefinite. A term without an ordinary meaning might not be indefinite if
its scope can be fairly inferred from the intrinsic record. IQASR LLC v. Wendt Corp., 825 F. App’x
900, 904 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“The failure to define [a] term is . . . not fatal, for if the meaning of the
term is fairly inferable from the patent, an express definition is not necessary.” (quoting Bancorp
Servs., L.L.C. v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 359 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). Here, the patent
explains the portable activity center of the claims “can be used for participating in different activ-
ities.” ’437 Patent at 1:7–8. The patent also explains these accessories “provide educational and/or
entertainment activities for a child.” Id. at 12:37–38.
Importantly, the patent never uses “playgroup accessories” without the “interchangeable”
modifier, indicating the “playgroup accessories” must also be something that is a part of the “port-
able activity center for use by a young child.” Given that, there is no risk a skilled artisan would
think a jump rope or scissors, for example, would fall within the scope of the term, as those are
not “interchangeable.”1 See Dkt. No. 56 at 5 (asking “[a]re books or puzzles considered ‘playgroup
accessories’ simply because they can be placed somewhere on the tray or table? What about scis-
sors or snack trays?”); Hr’g Tr., Dkt. No. 71 at 7:6–7 (asking “[i]s a jump rope a playgoup acces-
sory?”).
Moreover, Defendants provide no evidence of the level of ordinary skill at the time of
1 The Court addresses the scope of “interchangeable” infra.
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invention, much less evidence of why a skilled artisan would be unable to determine the bounds
of the claim language. That’s problematic given Defendants’ burden to prove indefiniteness by
clear and convincing evidence. Sonix Tech., 844 F.3d at 1377 (“Indefiniteness must be proven by
clear and convincing evidence.”). Because Defendants have not met that burden, the Court con-
strues “playgroup accessory” as “accessory designed to provide educational or entertainment ac-
tivities for a child.”
B. 	“interchangeable playgroup accessor[y/ies]” (437 Patent, Claims 3, 13, 18)
Oribel’s Construction 	Defendants’ Construction
Not indefinite
“an interchangeable conventional children’s
snap-in toy, bucket, book support, drawing sys-
tem, or playhouse”
“interchangeable conventional children’s snap-
in toy(s), bucket(s), book support(s), drawing
system(s), and/or playhouse(s)”
Indefinite
If “playgroup accessories” is not indefinite,
then “playgroup accessor[y]/[ies] that can be
exchanged in place of other playgroup acces-
sory[y]/[ies]”
Defendants frame this dispute as whether an accessory that can merely be repositioned is
“interchangeable.” Dkt. No. 56 at 9. According to Oribel, “interchangeability means that one play-
group accessory can be exchanged for another playgroup accessory that can be used somewhere
on the tray or cover.” Dkt. No. 60 at 9. It does not, however, “require that the replacement occupy
the same physical position as the original.” Id. Defendants respond that “an ‘interchangeable’ ac-
cessory is distinct from an accessory that can simply be repositioned[.]” Dkt. No. 56 at 9. In fact,
Defendants, at least in their briefing, suggest that for two accessories to be “interchangeable” they
must have the same function. See id. at 9 n.1 (asserting that, “while both a bell and a basket are
bicycle accessories, they are not ‘interchangeable’ as they have different functions and cannot be
exchanged in place of each other”); see also id. at 10 (citing interchangeable, Cambridge
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Dictionary, Dkt. No. 56-4 (“able to be exchanged with each other without making any difference
or without being noticed”)).
As the parties clarified at the hearing, this dispute is about imposing a “position limitation”
on the word “interchangeable.” See Hr’g Tr., Dkt. No. 71 at 24:18–23 (noting that, with their con-
struction, Defendants try to “clarify the distinction between [1] a removable accessory or one that
can be repositioned with [2] an interchangeable accessory which needs to be exchanged with—in
place of—some sort of other playgroup accessory” and “[i]t’s that position limitation that we’re
trying to get at”). In Defendants’ view, although two “interchangeable playground accessories”
don’t have to attach in the exact same way, they do “have to be able to fit in the same general area.”
Id. at 23:5–8; see also id. at 19:12–15 (asserting “[i]f I put an activity center in front of you and it
has a playgroup accessory on one side and then I add a playgroup accessory to the other side, that’s
not interchangeable; that’s just an activity center that has multiple playgroup accessories on top of
[it]”). Oribel, however, resists “the notion that the interchanging required by the claims is an inter-
changing with another one of the group of playgroup accessories.” Id. at 26:14–17. Thus, the Court
must decide if “interchangeable playgroup accessories” are simply “playgroup accessories that can
be exchanged,” id. at 26:20–23, or whether they must be “exchangeable with other playgroup ac-
cessories.”
Based on the patent, the latter option is the better choice. For one, the specification is re-
plete with examples of “interchangeable playgroup accessories” with the same type of “attachment
ends” that fit into the same set of disclosed apertures. Thus, the specification shows “interchange-
able” means “interchangeable” with other playgroup accessories, not simply removable or reposi-
tionable. This is consistent with the ordinary meaning of “interchangeable.” See interchangeable,
Cambridge Dictionary, Dkt. No. 56-4 (“able to be exchanged with each other without making any
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difference or without being noticed”). This is also consistent with the presumption that different
claim terms, like “removable” and “interchangeable,” have different scope. See Symantec Corp. v.
Comput. Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 522 F.3d 1279, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting “the general assumption
is that different terms have different meanings”). This also gives “interchangeable” the same mean-
ing when used elsewhere in the claims. See Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314,
1334 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[W]e presume, unless otherwise compelled, that the same claim term in
the same patent or related patents carries the same construed meaning.”).
Oribel’s main argument against Defendants’ position is that “being interchangeable with
other playgroup accessories” reads out embodiments. For example, according to Oribel, Figure 32
shows a book support attached to the cover, which Oribel suggests would mean, under Defendants’
construction, it is not “interchangeable” with the other playgroup accessories disclosed in the pa-
tent. Hr’g Tr., Dkt. No. 71 at 30:15–19; see also id. at 29:7–11 (suggesting Defendants’ position
“would eliminate [the] embodiment from figure 36 from satisfying claim 18,” which “only requires
that at least one interchangeable playgroup accessory be removably secured to the cover”).
On that point, the Court agrees with Oribel that “interchangeable” does not require the
accessories to have the exact same footprint. For example, the patent discloses the cover is inter-
changeable with the seat, and those are two fundamentally different components with different
attachment mechanisms and different footprints. But in the disputed phrase, “interchangeable”
suggests some characteristic common to each of the accessories—something more than they can
just be positioned on the top of the tray. The Court will address that commonality with its con-
struction of “playgroup accessor[y]/[ies] that can be exchanged with other playgroup acces-
sor[y]/[ies].”
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C. 	“slopes radially inwardly” (’437 Patent, Claims 11, 21)
Oribel’s Construction 	Defendants’ Construction
Plain and ordinary meaning 	“slants continuously toward a central point”
Claims 1, 10, and 11 recite:
1. 	A portable activity center for use by a young child comprising:
a frame;
. . .
a tray mounted to the frame, the tray having an opening;
a seat support mounted to the tray; [and]
a seat positioned within the opening . . . .
* * *
10. The portable activity center of claim 1 wherein the tray includes
a horizontal radial surface circumferentially surrounding the seat
support and provides a support surface for objects placed on the
tray.
11. The portable activity center of claim 10 wherein the horizontal
radial surface slopes radially inwardly towards the seat.
’475 Patent at 12:65–13:14, 13:49–55 (emphasis added); id. at 14:36–38 (requiring, in Claim 21,
a tray with an opening that has “a surface that slopes radially inwardly towards said opening”).
The parties dispute whether the recited radially inward slope of the “horizontal radial sur-
face” must be “continuous.” Saying it must, Defendants point to the specification’s description of
an embodiment, shown in Figure 8 (below), in which “the horizontal planar portion 180 slopes
inwardly such that the likelihood of toys, containers, and other such objects resting on the planar
portion 180 will not easily slide or roll off the tray 106 or out of reach of a child positioned in the
seat 112.” Dkt. No. 56 at 14 (quoting ’437 Patent at 8:65–9:3). Defendants also cite dictionary
definitions for “radially inwardly” and “slope.” Id. Citing Oribel’s infringement contentions,
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Defendants accuse Oribel of claiming a vertical ridge separating two horizontal surfaces meets this
limitation. Id. at 15.
FIG. 8 of the ’437 Patent as annotated by Oribel, Dkt. No. 55 at
14, with the red line showing the profile of the horizontal surface
Oribel contests that “slopes radially inward” requires the surface to “slant continuously” or
have a central point. Dkt. No. 60 at 14. In its view, the disputed phrase “means [only] that the tray
and/or the horizontal radial surface of the tray around the seat/opening is sloped.” Id. Oribel asserts
Defendants’ construction would confuse the jury because it is nonsensical in the context of the
claims. Id. at 15.
At the hearing, Defendants clarified it was not asserting the “central point” of its construc-
tion necessarily requires that point to be at “the exact center.” See Hr’g Tr., Dkt. No. 71 at 48:2–
15 (indicating Oribel should “not be worried about the opening for the seat not being directly in
the physical center of the table”). Nor does it contend that a curved surface, as opposed to a straight
“slant,” is outside the scope of the term “slope.” Id. at 47:2–4 (“We’re not suggesting it’s a straight
line. We’re not ruling out the possibility of curves.”). Thus, so far as the Court can tell, the parties
only dispute whether a “vertical ridge separating two horizontal surfaces”—that is, a “step”
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profile—literally meets this limitation.
Oribel contends the highlighted surface, which accordingly to
Defendants assert is a vertical surface or ridge, slopes radially
inward towards the seat. See Infringement Contentions, Dkt.
No. 56-7 at 47–48.
The Court struggles to see how it could. If, as Oribel acknowledges, a vertical ridge does
not slope radially inwardly, see Hr’g Tr. at 43:25–44 (“[a] vertical ridge in isolation may not nec-
essarily be something that slopes radially inwardly”), it’s hard to see how two horizontal surfaces
(each with no slope) separated by a vertical surface (which does not “slope radially inwardly”)
could combine to, as a whole, “slope radially inwardly.” To make that argument, one would seem-
ingly have to take the starting and ending points of this “step” profile, draw a line between them,
and claim the slope of that line is the “slope” of the recited horizontal surface. Moreover, that
argument would rely on a “step” profile having two horizontal surfaces, each with no slope. Still,
as Oribel cautions, this is more of an infringement question than one of disputed scope, and the
Court will reserve judgment until that phase of the proceeding.
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A “step” profile (blue) with two horizontal surfaces separated
by a vertical surface. The red dashed line connects the ends of
the profile and would have radially inward slope toward the
opening.
That said, the jury would benefit from some explanation of what this technical phrase
means. To that end, given Defendants’ agreement that the term does not exclude curves, the Court
construes “slopes radially inwardly” as “slopes downward toward a central point.”
V. 	CONCLUSION
Disputed Term 	The Court’s Construction
“playgroup accessor[y]/[ies]”
(’437 Patent, Claims 3, 13, 18)
“accessor[y]/[ies] designed to provide educa-
tional or entertainment activities for a child”
“interchangeable playgroup accessor[y/ies]”
(’437 Patent, Claims. 3, 13, 18)
“playgroup accessor[y]/[ies] that can be ex-
changed with other playground acces-
sor[y]/[ies]”
“slopes radially inwardly”
(’437 Patent, Claims 11, 21) “slopes downward toward a central point”
The Court ORDERS each party not to refer, directly or indirectly, to its own or any other
party’s claim-construction positions in the presence of the jury. Likewise, the Court ORDERS the
parties to refrain from mentioning any part of this opinion, other than the actual positions adopted
by the Court, in the presence of the jury. Neither party may take a position before the jury that
contradicts the Court’s reasoning in this opinion. Any reference to claim construction proceedings
is limited to informing the jury of the positions adopted by the Court.
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____________________________________
RODNEY GILSTRAP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
So ORDERED and SIGNED this 22nd day of April, 2026.
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