Keyless Licensing LLC v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc. et al

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THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MARSHALL DIVISION
KEYLESS LICENSING LLC,
v.
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD, and
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA,
INC.,
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CASE NO. 2:24-CV-00464-JRG
CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
On December 15, 2025, the Court held a hearing to determine the proper construction of
disputed terms in United States Patents No. 9,304,602, 10,976,922, and 11,503,144.
Before the Court is the Opening Claim Construction Brief (Dkt. No. 70) filed by Plaintiff
Keyless Licensing LLC (“Plaintiff” or “Keyless”). Also before the Court are the Responsive
Claim Construction Brief (Dkt. No. 72) filed by Defendants Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. and
Samsung Electronics America, Inc. (“Defendants” or “Samsung”), and Plaintiff’s reply (Dkt. No.
77). Further before the Court are the parties’ November 26, 2025 Amended Joint Claim
Construction and Prehearing Statement (Dkt. No. 96) and the parties’ December 3, 2025 Amended
Joint Claim Construction Chart (Dkt. No. 100).
Having reviewed the arguments made by the parties at the hearing and in their claim
construction briefing, having considered the intrinsic evidence, and having made subsidiary factual
findings about the extrinsic evidence, the Court hereby issues this Claim Construction
Memorandum and Order. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(en banc); Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 841 (2015).
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Table of Contents
I. BACKGROUND....................................................................................................................... 3
II. LEGAL PRINCIPLES ........................................................................................................... 4
III. AGREED TERMS................................................................................................................. 7
IV. DISPUTED TERMS IN U.S. PATENT NO. 11,503,144 .................................................... 7
1. “wherein the width of the front surface is substantially shorter than the length” and
“wherein the width of the front surface of the mobile phone is significantly shorter than
the length” ............................................................................................................................. 8
2. “wherein [the/said] housing has a thin thickness” ............................................................... 14
3. “none of said components is noticeably extended out from said housing,” “wherein said
components of the mobile phone are integrated within the body such that none of said
components is significantly extended out from the body,” and “none of said components
is noticeably extended out from said the body” .................................................................. 18
4. “wherein upon providing a sweeping action on said display unit,” “wherein upon
identifying an input corresponding to a sweeping action provided on a touch sensitive
surface of said device,” and “wherein upon providing a predefine[d] interaction with an
icon” .................................................................................................................................... 23
5. “said display unit practically covers the entire front surface of said housing,” “said display
unit practically occupying the entire front surface of the mobile phone,” and “said
display unit occupying practically the entire surface of the front surface of said device” . 27
V. DISPUTED TERMS IN U.S. PATENT NO. 9,304,602 ..................................................... 34
6. “wherein a gliding action provided from outside of the touch screen towards inside of the
touch screen, said gliding action at first interacting with said at least one window on the
touch screen, is processed by said processor” and “wherein said gliding action is
provided from outside the touchscreen towards inside the touch screen, wherein said
gliding action at first interacts with said zone on said touch screen” ................................. 35
7. “a gliding action provided from said zone of the touch screen towards any arbitrary
direction inside the touch screen at first interacts with said zone” ..................................... 39
8. “substantial portion of an edge of the touch screen” / “substantial portion of said edge” .... 42
9. “substantially equal to a length of the gliding action” ......................................................... 45
10. “said at least one window comprises more than one window located on one or more
edges of the touch screen” and “said bar comprises more than one bar located on one or
more edges of the touch screen” ......................................................................................... 48
VI. DISPUTED TERMS IN U.S. PATENT NO. 10,976,922 .................................................. 52
11. “wherein upon interacting with the interface of any of said applications, the focus of the
system is given to the interacted application” .................................................................... 52
12. “a search application activated by interacting with a button of said keyboard” ................. 55
13. “use at least one keyword typed through said keyboard” ................................................... 57
VII. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................. 58
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I. BACKGROUND
Keyless alleges infringement of United States Patents No. 9,304,602 (the “’602 Patent”),
10,976,922 (the “’922 Patent”), and 11,813,144 (the “’144 Patent”). Dkt. No. 70, Exs. A-C.
The ’602 Patent, titled “System for Capturing Event Provided From Edge of Touch
Screen,” issued on April 5, 2016, and bears an earliest priority date of December 20, 2009. Plaintiff
submits that “[t]he ’602 Patent solves the problem of reliably recognizing gestures originating off
the touchscreen,’ and “[i]t teaches detecting a ‘gliding action’ that begins outside the screen, first
interacts with a defined on-screen window or zone, and is then processed to trigger context-
sensitive functions . . . .” (Dkt. No. 70, at 2.) The Abstract of the ’602 Patent states:
A data entry system, having an input interface adapted to identify a plurality of user
interactions. The system includes a processor adapted to associate user interactions
identified by the input interface with a plurality of letters of the alphabet, such that
all the letters of the alphabet are assigned to at most eight user interactions. Most
of the letters are assigned to specific user interactions according to one or more
features of their shape in their printed form, such that most of the letters assigned
to each user interaction have the same shape feature.
The ’922 Patent, titled “Data Entry Systems,” issued on April 13, 2021, and bears an
earliest priority date of February 17, 2013. Plaintiff submits that “[t]he ’922 Patent addresses
seamless multitasking on a single touchscreen by partitioning screen real estate among multiple
applications.” (Dkt. No. 70, at 2.) The Abstract of the ’922 Patent states:
A system is described with a plurality of keys, five of the keys representing all of
the letters of an alphabet. The five keys are arranged to form two to three rows of
keys. A first row includes two of the five keys and a second row includes at least
two other keys of the five keys. The keys are hard keys and/or virtual keys.
The ’144 Patent, titled “Systems to Enhance Data Entry in Mobile and Fixed
Environment,” issued on November 15, 2022, and bears an earliest priority date of April 18, 2003.
Plaintiff submits that “[t]he ’144 patent addresses improved mobile-device form factors and user
interfaces to improve portability, comfortable use, and ease of interaction.” (Dkt. No. 70, at 1.)
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The Abstract of the ’144 Patent states:
A mobile phone device includes a housing having a substantially rectangular shape
wherein its height dimension substantially corresponds to a distance between an ear
and a mouth of a user and wherein its width dimension is less than its height
dimension. A display unit is integrated within the front surface of the mobile phone
device. The display unit substantially entirely covers the front surface of the mobile
phone device. The mobile phone device does not include a physical key on the front
surface.
II. LEGAL PRINCIPLES
“It is a ‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention to
which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.’” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312 (quoting
Innova/Pure Water Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
Claim construction is clearly an issue of law for the court to decide. Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 970–71 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). “In
some cases, however, the district court will need to look beyond the patent’s intrinsic evidence and
to consult extrinsic evidence in order to understand, for example, the background science or the
meaning of a term in the relevant art during the relevant time period.” Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 841
(citation omitted). “In cases where those subsidiary facts are in dispute, courts will need to make
subsidiary factual findings about that extrinsic evidence. These are the ‘evidentiary
underpinnings’ of claim construction that we discussed in Markman, and this subsidiary
factfinding must be reviewed for clear error on appeal.” Id. (citing 517 U.S. 370).
To determine the meaning of the claims, courts start by considering the intrinsic evidence.
See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313; see also C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 388 F.3d 858, 861
(Fed. Cir. 2004); Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Commc’ns Group, Inc., 262 F.3d 1258,
1267 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The intrinsic evidence includes the claims themselves, the specification,
and the prosecution history. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314; C.R. Bard, 388 F.3d at 861. Courts
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give claim terms their ordinary and accustomed meaning as understood by one of ordinary skill in
the art at the time of the invention in the context of the entire patent. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–
13; accord Alloc, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 342 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
The claims themselves provide substantial guidance in determining the meaning of
particular claim terms. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. First, a term’s context in the asserted claim can
be very instructive. Id. Other asserted or unasserted claims can aid in determining the claim’s
meaning because claim terms are typically used consistently throughout the patent. Id.
Differences among the claim terms can also assist in understanding a term’s meaning. Id. For
example, when a dependent claim adds a limitation to an independent claim, it is presumed that
the independent claim does not include the limitation. Id. at 1314–15.
“[C]laims ‘must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part.’” Id. at 1315
(quoting Markman, 52 F.3d at 979). “[T]he specification ‘is always highly relevant to the claim
construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a
disputed term.’” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90
F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)); accord Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313,
1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002). This is true because a patentee may define his own terms, give a claim term
a different meaning than the term would otherwise possess, or disclaim or disavow the claim scope.
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316. In these situations, the inventor’s lexicography governs. Id. The
specification may also resolve the meaning of ambiguous claim terms “where the ordinary and
accustomed meaning of the words used in the claims lack sufficient clarity to permit the scope of
the claim to be ascertained from the words alone.” Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1325. But, “[a]lthough
the specification may aid the court in interpreting the meaning of disputed claim language,
particular embodiments and examples appearing in the specification will not generally be read into
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the claims.” Comark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1187 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(quoting Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1988)); accord
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323.
The prosecution history is another tool to supply the proper context for claim construction
because a patent applicant may also define a term in prosecuting the patent. Home Diagnostics,
Inc. v. Lifescan, Inc., 381 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“As in the case of the specification, a
patent applicant may define a term in prosecuting a patent.”). “[T]he prosecution history (or file
wrapper) limits the interpretation of claims so as to exclude any interpretation that may have been
disclaimed or disavowed during prosecution in order to obtain claim allowance.” Standard Oil
Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 452 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
Although extrinsic evidence can be useful, it is “less significant than the intrinsic record in
determining the legally operative meaning of claim language.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Technical dictionaries and treatises may help a
court understand the underlying technology and the manner in which one skilled in the art might
use claim terms, but technical dictionaries and treatises may provide definitions that are too broad
or may not be indicative of how the term is used in the patent. Id. at 1318. Similarly, expert
testimony may aid a court in understanding the underlying technology and determining the
particular meaning of a term in the pertinent field, but an expert’s conclusory, unsupported
assertions as to a term’s definition are entirely unhelpful to a court. Id. Generally, extrinsic
evidence is “less reliable than the patent and its prosecution history in determining how to read
claim terms.” Id.
The Supreme Court of the United States has “read [35 U.S.C.] § 112, ¶ 2 to require that a
patent’s claims, viewed in light of the specification and prosecution history, inform those skilled
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in the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty.” Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig
Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2129 (2014). “A determination of claim indefiniteness is a
legal conclusion that is drawn from the court’s performance of its duty as the construer of patent
claims.” Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Nautilus, 134
S. Ct. 2120. “Indefiniteness must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.” Sonix Tech. Co.
v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 844 F.3d 1370, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
III. AGREED TERMS
In their November 26, 2025 Amended Joint Claim Construction and Prehearing Statement,
the parties submit that they “have not come to an agreement on the construction of any of the terms
. . . in dispute.” (Dkt. No. 96, at 1.)
IV. DISPUTED TERMS IN U.S. PATENT NO. 11,503,144
As a threshold matter, Plaintiff argues that “[t]he fact that the examiner, the parties, and
their experts applied these terms during prosecution and in the IPR further supports a conclusion
that the claims are not indefinite” (Dkt. No. 70, at 17), but an Inter Partes Review (“IPR”) petition
cannot assert indefiniteness. See 35 U.S.C. § 311(b); see also Cuozzo Speed Tech., LLC v. Lee,
136 S. Ct. 2131, 2141–42 (2016); Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc. v. Prisua Eng’g Corp., 948 F.3d 1342,
1355 (Fed. Cir. 2020). Also, the Federal Circuit has found that “indefiniteness of a claim does not
always imply inability to conduct a prior-art analysis needed for an inter partes review.” See
Cochlear Bone Anchored Sols. AB v. Oticon Medical AB, 958 F.3d 1348, 1359–60 (Fed. Cir. 2020)
(citation omitted). The IPR proceedings cited by Plaintiff therefore do not significantly affect the
Court’s analysis.
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1. “wherein the width of the front surface is substantially shorter than the length” and
“wherein the width of the front surface of the mobile phone is significantly shorter than the
length”
“wherein the width of the front surface is substantially shorter than the length”
(’144 Patent, Claim 1)
“wherein the width of the front surface of the mobile phone is significantly shorter than
the length”
(’144 Patent, Claim 9)
Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction Defendants’ Proposed Construction
Plain and ordinary meaning. Not indefinite. Indefinite
(Dkt. No. 96, Ex. A, at 34; Dkt. No. 100, Ex. A, at 6.)
(a) The Parties’ Positions
Plaintiff argues that “substantially” is a permissible word of approximation and that the
intrinsic record and the “technological context” provide reasonable clarity. (Dkt. No. 70, at 4–5.)
For example, Plaintiff refers to “the well-known rectangular form factor” for mobile devices,
which can facilitate a user operating the device with one hand as well as “fit[ting] in a user’s pocket
and easily slid[ing] in and out of the user’s pocket.” (Id. at 6–8.)
Defendants respond that “[t]hese limitations are terms of degree that lack an objective
boundary in the intrinsic or extrinsic evidence for determining what constitutes ‘substantially
shorter’ or ‘significantly shorter,’ rendering these limitations indefinite.” (Dkt. No. 72, at 4
(citation omitted).) Defendants argue, for example, that “[t]he ’144 patent also lacks explanation
of how ‘substantially shorter’ differs from ‘significantly shorter.’” (Id. (citation omitted); see id.,
at 4–5.) Further, Defendants argue that “[t]he other potential metrics that Keyless identifies are
not objective boundaries because they depend on the particular user or the clothes that the user is
wearing.” (Id., at 7.) Finally, Defendants submit that “Keyless and its expert cannot rely on the
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figures to provide guidance on the objective boundaries on the relative dimensions of the body
when the ’144 patent states that the drawings are not to scale.” (Id., at 8.)
Plaintiff replies that quantitative boundaries are not required and that “[a] POSITA of
mobile phones would know with reasonable certainty the approximate length between the ear and
the mouth of a user.” (Dkt. No. 77, at 1 (citation omitted).) Plaintiff also argues that “[a] POSITA
would understand the claimed ‘mobile phone’ is a handheld device limiting width with respect to
a human hand as shown in the ’144 patent’s figures,” and “[c]orrelating width to the size of a
human hand is sufficient to render this term definite under Federal Circuit precedent.” (Id.
(citations omitted).)
At the December 15, 2025 hearing, the parties presented oral arguments. Defendants
argued for example that the claims here at issue are not tied to one-handed use. Defendants also
noted that hand sizes and pocket sizes vary and that the specification, though lengthy, does not
describe dimensions or form factor. Plaintiff responded that person-to-person variation in hand
size, for example, does not undermine definiteness because the dimensions at issue are objectively
measurable, not subjective.
(b) Analysis
Claim 1 of the ’144 Patent, for example, recites (emphasis added):
1. A mobile phone device, comprising:
a practically rectangular-shaped housing within which the components of a
mobile phone are integrated, said housing having a front surface, a back surface
and four side surfaces, wherein the length of the front surface approximately
corresponds to the distance between the ear and the mouth of a user and wherein
the width of the front surface is substantially shorter than the length and wherein
the housing has a thin thickness; and
a display unit integrated within the front surface of said housing wherein
said display unit practically covers the entire front surface of said housing;
wherein said mobile phone device does not include a physical key on the
front surface, and
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wherein said components of the mobile phone are integrated within said
housing such that none of said components is noticeably extended out from said
housing.
Claim 7, which depends from Claim 1, provides an example by reciting:
7. The device of claim 1, wherein the width of the device is approximately half of
said length.
On one hand, “a term of degree fails to provide sufficient notice of its scope if it depends
‘on the unpredictable vagaries of any one person’s opinion.’” Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL,
Inc., 766 F.3d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc.,
417 F.3d 1342, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has “rejected the proposition
that claims involving terms of degree are inherently indefinite.” Sonix Tech. Co. v. Publ’ns Int’l,
Ltd., 844 F.3d 1370, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2017). “[W]ords of approximation, such as ‘generally’ and
‘substantially,’ are descriptive terms commonly used in patent claims to avoid a strict numerical
boundary to the specified parameter.” Anchor Wall Sys., Inc. v. Rockwood Retaining Walls, Inc.,
340 F.3d 1298, 1310–11 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see Verve LLC v. Crane Cams, Inc., 311 F.3d 1116,
1120 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Expressions such as ‘substantially’ are used in patent documents when
warranted by the nature of the invention, in order to accommodate the minor variations that may
be appropriate to secure the invention.”); see also Deere & Co. v. Bush Hog, LLC, 703 F.3d 1349,
1359 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“This court has repeatedly confirmed that relative terms such as
‘substantially’ do not render patent claims so unclear as to prevent a person of skill in the art from
ascertaining the scope of the claim.”); see, e.g., Exmark Mfg. Co. Inc. v. Briggs & Stratton Power
Prods. Grp., LLC, 879 F.3d 1332, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“substantially straight”).
Also, the Figures of the ’144 Patent provide context that assists in understanding the
disputed terms. The claims here at issue are directed to “mobile phone” devices, and dozens of
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Figures of the ’144 Patent illustrate mobile phones and similar devices. See ’144 Patent at Figs.
3, 6, 7, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18a, 18b, 18c, 18d, 18e, 18f, 18g, 18h, 19, 20, 21a, 21b, 22a, 22b, 24b,
25b, 26, 27, 27b, 31, 60, 64b, 65a, 65b, 66, 68 & 71c. Admittedly, the specification notes that “the
drawings are not necessarily drawn to scale” and “are merely conceptual in nature” (id. at 24:64–
66), and the Federal Circuit has stated that “it is well established that patent drawings do not define
the precise proportions of the elements and may not be relied on to show particular sizes if the
specification is completely silent on the issue.” Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc. v. Avia Grp. Int’l,
Inc., 222 F.3d 951, 956 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Yet, this principle merely cautions against relying on the
“precise” proportions illustrated. Defendants cite no authority precluding relying on Figures for
context, and Phillips explains that patent claims are read “in the context of the entire patent.” 415
F.3d at 1313.
As is evident from these above-cited Figures, and as Plaintiff’s expert persuasively opines,
a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that having width substantially shorter than
length facilitates a user interacting with the device, especially one-handed interaction. (Dkt. No.
75-2, Aug. 1, 2025 Malek Decl. ¶ 40; see also ’144 Patent at 17:38–47 (“[s]aid user may use only
one hand to hold said device 1300 in his hand and in the same time manipulate its keypad 1303”);
id. at 18:55–63 (similar) & 21:45–50 (similar).) Even though these claims do not recite one-
handed interaction as a limitation, these claims do recite a “mobile phone,” and in that context
these disclosures are informative.
Moreover, the form factors associated with the phrase “mobile phone” have been well
known not only to persons of ordinary skill in the art but also to lay persons. See Phillips, 415
F.3d at 1314 (“In some cases, the ordinary meaning of claim language as understood by a person
of skill in the art may be readily apparent even to lay judges, and claim construction in such cases
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involves little more than the application of the widely accepted meaning of commonly understood
words.”). Defendants cite Interval Licensing, 766 F.3d at 1371, as support for rejecting Plaintiff’s
reliance on reference points that vary from user to user, such as a human hand, but Defendants cite
no authority that warrants finding indefiniteness based on well-known variations between physical
attributes of human users.
Also, Claim 9 (as well as Claim 5, which depends from Claim 1) recites “when the device
is used . . . in landscape position and in portrait position,” which provides additional context for
understanding the degree to which the width must be shorter than the length. Although Defendants
note that landscape and portrait orientations of the display do not necessarily reflect the dimensions
of the overall device because “[t]he size of the body need not be completely commensurate with
the size of the display unit,” these references to landscape and portrait orientations nonetheless
reinforce the context provided by the above-cited Figures and by the understanding of persons of
skill in the art and of lay persons familiar with mobile phones.
Defendants emphasize that whereas above-reproduced Claim 1 uses the word
“substantially,” Claim 9 uses the word “significantly” (emphasis added):
9. A mobile phone, comprising:
a body having a practically rectangular shape, said body having a front
surface, a back surface and four side surfaces, wherein the length of the front
surface of the mobile phone corresponds to the distance between the ear and the
mouth of a user and wherein the width of the front surface of the mobile phone is
significantly shorter than the length, and wherein said body has a thin thickness;
a touch sensitive display unit;
a virtual keyboard to enter text; and
a microphone and a speaker;
wherein said display unit, practically occupying the entire front surface of
the mobile phone, is integrated within said mobile phone and wherein said front
surface of the mobile phone does not have a physical button and wherein said
mobile phone does not have a physical keyboard to enter text, and
wherein said display unit is adapted to display text, entered through the
virtual keyboard, in landscape direction and in portrait direction when the mobile
phone is used, respectively, in landscape position and in portrait position.
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“In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, we must presume that the use of these
different terms in the claims connotes different meanings.” CAE Screenplates Inc. v. Heinrich
Fiedler GmbH & Co. KG, 224 F.3d 1308, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
Nonetheless, indefiniteness is analyzed on a claim-by-claim basis, and “[t]he art of
claiming sometimes involves drafting claims in a variety of ways to encompass the disclosed
subject matter.” Vascular Sols. LLC v. Medtronic, Inc., 117 F.4th 1361, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2024)
(citation omitted). The usage of different words in different claims therefore does not necessarily
demonstrate any lack of reasonable certainty. See id.
Defendants cite the Court’s indefiniteness finding as to the term “substantially blur free”
in Clear Imaging Research, LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., et al., No. 2:19-CV-00326, 2020
WL 6384731, at *20 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2020) (Payne, J.). The Court noted that “both ‘blur free’
and ‘substantially blur free’ are used in the patents and the distinction between these two terms is
not clear.” See id., at *20–*21. The Court noted an apparent distinction in the patent “that
‘substantially blur free’ is not the same as ‘clear and sharp’ but rather that ‘blur free’ is ‘clear and
sharp.’” Id., at *20. Defendants also cite the indefiniteness finding in In re Taasera Licensing
LLC Patent Litig., No. 2:22-MD-3042, 2023 WL 8628323, at *20–*21 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 13, 2023)
(Gilstrap, J.) (“substantially real time” found indefinite, noting usage of “both ‘real time’ and
‘substantially real time’” without adequate explanation of “where one ends and the other begins”).
Those distinctions in Clear Imaging Research and Taasera, however, were different than
the issue in the present case regarding the relationship between width and length, and, as discussed
above, the specification informs the meaning of the disputed terms. Although the words
“substantially” and “significantly” are not mathematically precise, the definiteness standard of
Nautilus does not require mathematical precision. See Niazi Licensing Corp. v. St. Jude Med. S.C.,
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30 F.4th 1339, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (“While there must be objective boundaries, we have
explained that a patentee need not define his invention with mathematical precision in order to
comply with the definiteness requirement. . . . Indeed, patentees often use descriptive words . . . to
avoid a strict numerical boundary to the specified parameter.”) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Sonix, 844 F.3d at 1378–79. “[A] sound claim construction need not
always purge every shred of ambiguity,” and “[t]he resolution of some line-drawing problems . . .
is properly left to the trier of fact.” See Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., 483 F.3d 800, 806 (Fed.
Cir. 2007) (citing PPG Indus. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 156 F.3d 1351, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1998);
Eon Corp. IP Holdings LLC v. Silver Spring Networks, Inc., 815 F.3d 1314, 1318–19 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (citing PPG, 156 F.3d at 1355; citing Acumed, 483 F.3d at 806).
The Court therefore hereby expressly rejects Defendants’ indefiniteness argument.
Defendants present no alternative proposed construction, and no further construction is necessary.
The Court accordingly hereby construes “wherein the width of the front surface is
substantially shorter than the length” and “wherein the width of the front surface of the mobile
phone is significantly shorter than the length” to have its plain meaning.
2. “wherein [the/said] housing has a thin thickness”
“wherein the housing has a thin thickness”
“wherein said body has a thin thickness”
(’144 Patent, Claims 1, 9)
Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction Defendants’ Proposed Construction
Plain and ordinary meaning. Not Indefinite. Indefinite
(Dkt. No. 96, Ex. A, at 38; Dkt. No. 100, Ex. A, at 7.)
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(a) The Parties’ Positions
Plaintiff argues that this term is reasonably clear because “the ’144 patent’s specification
has metrics and figures that illustrate mobile phones with a ‘thin thickness.’” (Dkt. No. 70, at 9.)
“For example,” Plaintiff argues, “the patent discloses the importance of the mobile phone being
thin enough such that a user can hold a mobile phone in one hand while allowing a user to use a
thumb to push buttons on the front of the phone, including the far side . . . .” (Id. (citations
omitted).) As additional examples, Plaintiff submits that the specification discloses a device that
is “about as thin as a user’s thumb, which the specification illustrates in connection with a PDA,”
and “[a]nother metric in the specification is that the mobile phone has ‘a thin thickness’ if it fits in
a user’s pocket.” (Id. at 10 (citations omitted).) Further, Plaintiff notes that “[t]he figures provide
side views that use well-known, standardized connections such as USB ports and microphone
jacks.” (Id. at 13.)
Defendants respond that “[t]he term ‘thin thickness’ is a term of degree that lacks an
objective boundary in the intrinsic and extrinsic evidence for determining what constitutes a ‘thin
thickness,’ rendering these limitations indefinite.” (Dkt. No. 72, at 8 (citation omitted).) For
example, Defendants argue that “under principles of claim differentiation, ‘thin thickness’ is
presumptively broader than claim 8 and, therefore, includes devices with thickness not less than
20 percent of the width . . . [y]et, there is no guidance in the independent claims or the specification
on how much thicker than 20% would still be a ‘thin thickness.’” (Id., at 9 (citations omitted))
Also, Defendants argue, “[t]he specification also provides no guidance for the necessary thickness
of the device to constitute ‘thin.’” (Id.) Further, Defendants argue that “the size of a hand as a
metric is subjective, as hand size depends on the user,” and “[p]ockets come in various sizes and
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do not provide skilled artisans with an objective boundary for the ‘thin thickness’ term.” (Id., at
9–10).
Plaintiff replies that quantitative boundaries are not required and that “the ’144 patent has
numerous figures showing ‘thin’ mobile phones that can be used with one hand, including Figure
22b correlating a thin thickness to thumb size.” (Id. at 3 (citation omitted).)
At the December 15, 2025 hearing, the parties presented oral arguments.
(b) Analysis
Claim 1 of the ’144 Patent recites (emphasis added):
1. A mobile phone device, comprising:
a practically rectangular-shaped housing within which the components of a
mobile phone are integrated, said housing having a front surface, a back surface
and four side surfaces, wherein the length of the front surface approximately
corresponds to the distance between the ear and the mouth of a user and wherein
the width of the front surface is substantially shorter than the length and wherein
the housing has a thin thickness; and
a display unit integrated within the front surface of said housing wherein
said display unit practically covers the entire front surface of said housing;
wherein said mobile phone device does not include a physical key on the
front surface, and
wherein said components of the mobile phone are integrated within said
housing such that none of said components is noticeably extended out from said
housing.
The “thin thickness” terms are not indefinite based on essentially the same analysis set
forth above as to the “substantially/significantly shorter” terms discussed above. See ’144 Patent
at 17:38–47 (“[s]aid user may use only one hand to hold said device 1300 in his hand and in the
same time manipulate its keypad 1303”) & 21:45–50 (similar); see also id. at Figs. 13, 14, 18a &
31. Defendants note that hand size varies from user to user, and Defendants also note that thickness
is not the only factor in whether a user can operate a device with one hand (Dkt. No. 72, at 9–10),
but the disclosures and illustrations of one-handed operation are readily understandable reference
points for persons of ordinary skill as well as lay persons.
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Also, dependent Claim 8 provides a reference point by reciting: “The device of claim 1,
wherein the thickness of the device is less than 20 percent of said width.” Defendants argue that
“[t]his creates additional uncertainty as to whether ‘thin thickness’ in claims 1 and 9 is an absolute
dimension, a relative dimension compared to the other dimensions of the body, or both,” but
Defendants do not demonstrate any restriction in this regard in Claim 1. The Teva decision cited
by Defendants does not suggest otherwise. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 789 F.3d 1335,
1345 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (noting that there are multiple ways of measuring molecular weight, that the
specification did not define molecular weight, and that “[t]he claims do not indicate which measure
to use”).
Moreover, Figures 27 and 27b provide additional context by illustrating a side of a device
having thickness in relation to “ports 2706,” and the specification discloses that those ports “may
be the standard ports such as a microphone jack or USB port.” Id. at 26:39–40. This reference to
“standard” ports underscores that a person of ordinary skill in the art would readily view Figures
27 and 27b as illustrating an example of thickness. Although, as Defendants argue, the disclosure
of this example does not set an upper boundary for how much thickness is still “thin,” these Figures
nonetheless are informative as part of “the context of the entire patent.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313.
Thus, whether a device is “thin” in the context of this patent and these claims is a factual
question regarding infringement. See Acumed, 483 F.3d at 806 (“[t]he resolution of some line-
drawing problems . . . is properly left to the trier of fact”) (citing PPG, 156 F.3d at 1355).
The Court therefore hereby expressly rejects Defendants’ indefiniteness arguments.
Defendants present no alternative proposed construction, and no further construction is necessary.
The Court accordingly hereby construes “wherein the housing has a thin thickness” and
“wherein said body has a thin thickness” to have their plain meaning.
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3. “none of said components is noticeably extended out from said housing,” “wherein said
components of the mobile phone are integrated within the body such that none of said
components is significantly extended out from the body,” and “none of said components is
noticeably extended out from said the body”
“none of said components is noticeably extended out from said housing”
(’144 Patent, Claim 1)
“wherein said components of the mobile phone are integrated within the body such that
none of said components is significantly extended out from the body”
(’144 Patent, Claim 14)
“none of said components is noticeably extended out from said the body”
(’144 Patent, Claim 19)
Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction Defendants’ Proposed Construction
Plain and ordinary meaning. Not Indefinite. Indefinite
(Dkt. No. 96, Ex. A, at 40–41; Dkt. No. 100, Ex. A, at 9.)
(a) The Parties’ Positions
Plaintiff argues that these terms are reasonably clear and that “[i]f the mobile phone retains
its rectangular form factor despite any component extending out, then the component does not
extend out ‘noticeably’ or ‘significantly.’” (Dkt. No. 70, at 14 (citation omitted).) Plaintiff also
argues that “the specification and figures disclose components that extend ‘significantly’ and
‘noticeably’ out, such as an ‘extendable’ microphone or ‘extendable’ display (shown in yellow
below), each of which ‘significantly’ and ‘noticeably’ extend from the housing to alter the overall
form factor of the device so that the mobile phone has a T-shape or irregular shape, instead of a
‘practically rectangular shape’ as required by the claims.” (Id., at 14.)
Defendants respond that “[t]he terms ‘noticeably extended’ and ‘significantly extended’
are subjective terms that lack an objective boundary in the intrinsic or extrinsic evidence for
determining the metes and bounds of what constitutes ‘noticeable’ and ‘significant.’” (Dkt. No.
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72, at 11.) Defendants argue, for example, that “[n]either the ’144 patent nor its file history
provides any guidance on how to objectively determine where the boundary is,” and “the figures
are not a reliable source of determining what is a noticeable or significant extension because they
are not drawn to scale.” (Id., at 12 (citation omitted).)
Plaintiff replies that “the components must be integrated into the housing so that no
components extend out from the body disrupting the rectangular form factor.” (Dkt. No. 77 at 3.)
At the December 15, 2025 hearing, the parties presented oral arguments.
(b) Analysis
Claim 14 of the ’144 Patent depends from Claim 9, and Claims 9 and 14 recite (emphasis
added):
9. A mobile phone, comprising:
a body having a practically rectangular shape, said body having a front
surface, a back surface and four side surfaces, wherein the length of the front
surface of the mobile phone corresponds to the distance between the ear and the
mouth of a user and wherein the width of the front surface of the mobile phone is
significantly shorter than the length, and wherein said body has a thin thickness;
. . . .
* * *
14. The mobile phone of claim 9, wherein said components of the mobile phone are
integrated within the body such that none of said components is significantly
extended out from the body.
As Plaintiff notes, Claim 9 recites “a practically rectangular shape,” which provides context
for evaluating whether the components of an accused product “significantly extend[] out from the
body.” Further, the specification provides additional context by referring to an “extendable”
microphone and an “extendable” display. See ’144 Patent at 20:45–49, 21:1–22:43 & 25:25–54;
see also id. at Figs. 18a, 18d, 18f, 24b & 25b.
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The claims and the specification thus provide sufficient context for understanding
“significantly extended” with reasonable certainty. The Court therefore hereby expressly rejects
Defendants’ indefiniteness argument as to “wherein said components of the mobile phone are
integrated within the body such that none of said components is significantly extended out from
the body” in Claim 14 of the ’144 Patent. Defendants present no alternative proposed construction,
and no further construction is necessary.
The phrase “noticeably extended out” appears in Claim 1 and also in Claim 19, which
depends from Claim 15. Claims 1, 15, and 19 recite (emphasis added):
1. A mobile phone device, comprising:
a practically rectangular-shaped housing within which the components of a
mobile phone are integrated, said housing having a front surface, a back surface
and four side surfaces, wherein the length of the front surface approximately
corresponds to the distance between the ear and the mouth of a user and wherein
the width of the front surface is substantially shorter than the length and wherein
the housing has a thin thickness; and
a display unit integrated within the front surface of said housing wherein
said display unit practically covers the entire front surface of said housing;
wherein said mobile phone device does not include a physical key on the
front surface, and
wherein said components of the mobile phone are integrated within said
housing such that none of said components is noticeably extended out from said
housing.
* * *
15. A mobile phone device, comprising:
a body having a practically rectangular shape;
a processor; and
a display unit, said display unit occupying practically the entire surface of
the front surface of said device is integrated within said device;
wherein plurality of icons corresponding to a plurality of applications are
displayed by said processor on said display unit; and
wherein upon identifying an input corresponding to a sweeping action
provided on a touch sensitive surface of said device, said processor displays
plurality of other icons corresponding to plurality of other applications on said
display unit.
* * *
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19. The device of claim 15, wherein said components of the mobile phone are
integrated within the body such that none of said components is noticeably extended
out from said the body.
Unlike the phrase “significantly extended out” in Claim 9 (discussed above), Claims 1 and
19 recite “noticeably,” which connotes perception, namely whether something would be noticed
by someone. This is analogous to Interval Licensing, in which the Federal Circuit found that the
phrase “unobtrusive manner” was too subjective to be reasonably clear. See 766 F.3d at 1369–74.
Claim 6 compounds the confusion by reciting: “The device of claim 1, wherein at least one button
is barely extended from at least one of the side surfaces of the housing.” Although “the language
of a dependent claim cannot change the scope of an independent claim whose meaning is clear on
its face,” Multilayer Stretch Cling Film Holdings, Inc. v. Berry Plastics Corp., 831 F.3d 1350,
1360 (Fed. Cir. 2016), this dependent claim demonstrates that the patentee understood
“noticeably” to be something greater than “barely,” but Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the
patent provides any objective boundaries. The opinions of Plaintiff’s expert, subjectively
characterizing various components as either noticeable or not noticeable, are unpersuasive. (See
Dkt. No. 75-2, Aug. 1, 2025 Malek Decl. ¶¶ 69–79; see also id. ¶¶ 82–84 (citing, e.g., dictionary
definitions of “noticeable” as “very obvious,” “worthy of notice,” or “easily seen”).)
Plaintiff’s reliance on the Figures is insufficient as to “noticeably extended.” The
specification states that “the drawings are not necessarily drawn to scale” and “are merely
conceptual in nature” (id. at 24:64–66), and also “it is well established that patent drawings do not
define the precise proportions of the elements and may not be relied on to show particular sizes if
the specification is completely silent on the issue.” Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc. v. Avia Grp. Int’l,
Inc., 222 F.3d 951, 956 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Although the specification and the Figures provide
sufficient objective reference points for interpreting “significantly extended out from the body,”
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the word “noticeably” is “‘purely subjective’ and depends ‘on the unpredictable vagaries of any
one person’s opinion.’” Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 902 F.3d 1372, 1381
(Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1350–51 (Fed.
Cir. 2005)).
Plaintiff also cites prosecution history in which, when the “noticeably extended” and
“significantly extended” limitations were added during prosecution, the patentee stated that the
components must not be “noticeably extended” from the housing so as to be “cumbersome”:
Claims 1, and 8, also describe that none of the components of the mobile phone
extends out from its housing, permitting to use the device easily and comfortably
in portrait position as well as in landscape position. In addition, this also permits to
ease the portability of the device as it can be inserted in the user’s pocket without
being cumbersome.
(Dkt. No. 77, Ex. O, Aug. 16, 2020 Amendment, at p. 7 of 8 of Ex. O.) This prosecution history,
however, does not address the word “noticeably,” let alone demonstrate that “noticeably” has any
objective boundaries.
Finally, as noted above, Plaintiff’s reliance on statements by Defendants or Defendants’
expert in IPR proceedings is unpersuasive.
The Court therefore hereby construes these disputed terms as set forth in the following
chart.
Term Construction
“none of said components is noticeably
extended out from said housing”
(’144 Patent, Claim 1)
Indefinite
“wherein said components of the mobile phone
are integrated within the body such that none
of said components is significantly extended
out from the body”
(’144 Patent, Claim 14)
Plain meaning
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“none of said components is noticeably
extended out from said the body”
(’144 Patent, Claim 19)
Indefinite
4. “wherein upon providing a sweeping action on said display unit,” “wherein upon
identifying an input corresponding to a sweeping action provided on a touch sensitive surface
of said device,” and “wherein upon providing a predefine[d] interaction with an icon”
“wherein upon providing a sweeping action on said display unit”
(’144 Patent, Claims 3, 12)
“wherein upon identifying an input corresponding to a sweeping action provided on a
touch sensitive surface of said device”
(’144 Patent, Claims 15)
“wherein upon providing a predefine interaction with an icon”
(’144 Patent, Claims 4, 13)
“wherein upon providing a predefined interaction with an icon”
(’144 Patent, Claim 17)
Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction Defendants’ Proposed Construction
Plain and ordinary meaning. Not Indefinite. Indefinite
(Dkt. No. 96, Ex. A, at 44–45; Dkt. No. 100, Ex. A, at 11.)
(a) The Parties’ Positions
Plaintiff argues that Defendants cannot meet their burden to show indefiniteness for these
terms because Defendants have not submitted any expert opinion in support, and, “[f]urther,
Defendants’ IPR expert admitted that a POSITA would understand these terms, and applied them
to the prior art without issue . . . .” (Dkt. No. 70, at 16 (citations omitted).)
Defendants respond that these claims are improper mixed method-apparatus claims
because they are “unclear whether infringement occurs when one creates a mobile device that
allows the action to be performed, or whether infringement occurs when the user actually performs
the claimed action.” (Dkt. No. 72, at 21 (citation omitted).)
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Plaintiff replies that “none of the disputed terms require a human ‘user’ to perform any
action.” (Dkt. No. 77 at 5.) Plaintiff argues that “in context, the cited claim language is reciting
the capability of a structure, the ‘processor,’ in the claimed apparatus and is thus not indefinite.”
(Id. at 7 (citations omitted).) Plaintiff also argues that “dependent claims 3–4 and 12–13 claim the
capability of the ‘display unit’ in response to user input but do not claim any action by a user.”
(Id. at 7–8.)
At the December 15, 2025 hearing, the parties presented oral arguments.
(b) Analysis
As a threshold matter, as noted above, Plaintiff’s reliance on Defendants’ statements in IPR
proceedings is unpersuasive.
Turning to the dispute regarding purported mixed method-apparatus claiming, the Federal
Circuit has stated:
A single patent may include claims directed to one or more of the classes of
patentable subject matter, but no single claim may cover more than one subject
matter class. IPXL Holdings[, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc.], 430 F.3d [1377,] 1384
[(Fed. Cir. 2005)] (holding indefinite a claim covering both an apparatus and a
method of using that apparatus).
Microprocessor Enhancement Corp. v. Tex. Instruments Inc., 520 F.3d 1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir.
2008); see H-W Tech, L.C. v. Overstock.com, Inc., 758 F.3d 1329, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (finding
claim indefinite because “it is unclear when infringement occurs”).
Here, Claim 3 of the ’144 Patent, which Defendants submit is representative (Dkt. No. 72,
at 21), depends from Claim 1, and Claims 1 and 3 recite (emphasis added):
1. A mobile phone device, comprising:
a practically rectangular-shaped housing within which the components of a
mobile phone are integrated, said housing having a front surface, a back surface
and four side surfaces, wherein the length of the front surface approximately
corresponds to the distance between the ear and the mouth of a user and wherein
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the width of the front surface is substantially shorter than the length and wherein
the housing has a thin thickness; and
a display unit integrated within the front surface of said housing wherein
said display unit practically covers the entire front surface of said housing;
wherein said mobile phone device does not include a physical key on the
front surface, and
wherein said components of the mobile phone are integrated within said
housing such that none of said components is noticeably extended out from said
housing.
* * *
3. [The] device of claim 1, wherein plurality of icons corresponding to plurality of
applications are displayed on said display unit, and wherein upon providing a
sweeping action on said display unit, plurality of other icons corresponding to
plurality of other applications are displayed on said display unit.
Claims 15 and 17 recite (emphasis added):
15. A mobile phone device, comprising:
a body having a practically rectangular shape;
a processor; and
a display unit, said display unit occupying practically the entire surface of
the front surface of said device is integrated within said device;
wherein plurality of icons corresponding to a plurality of applications are
displayed by said processor on said display unit; and
wherein upon identifying an input corresponding to a sweeping action
provided on a touch sensitive surface of said device, said processor displays
plurality of other icons corresponding to plurality of other applications on said
display unit.
* * *
17. The device of claim 15, wherein upon providing a predefined interaction with
an icon, the corresponding application is opened on the screen.
Plaintiff does not appear to dispute that the “sweeping action” and the “predefined
interaction with an icon” would be performed by a user. To whatever extent this is in dispute, the
context provided by surrounding claim language is sufficiently clear.
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The parties dispute whether these limitations are directed to the configuration of the
claimed device or, instead, recite method steps such that these are impermissible mixed method-
apparatus claims.
The H-W Technology case cited by Defendants is unpersuasive because, in the present case,
these claims recite how the device responds, so it is not “unclear when infringement occurs.” H-W
Tech., 758 F.3d at 1335. Because these claims recite how the device responds “wherein upon” a
particular user action occurs, these claims “merely use permissible functional language to describe
the capabilities of the claimed system” such that “it is clear that infringement occurs when one
makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells the claimed system.” Mastermine Software, Inc. v. Microsoft
Corp., 874 F.3d 1307, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see id. (“While these claims make reference to user
selection, they do not explicitly claim the user’s act of selection, but rather, claim the system’s
capability to receive and respond to user selection.”); see also Microprocessor Enhancement, 520
F.3d at 1375 (“apparatus claims are not necessarily indefinite for using functional language”).
The Court therefore hereby expressly rejects Defendants’ indefiniteness arguments.
Defendants present no alternative proposed construction, and no further construction is necessary.
The Court accordingly hereby construes “wherein upon providing a sweeping action on
said display unit,” “wherein upon identifying an input corresponding to a sweeping action provided
on a touch sensitive surface of said device,” and “wherein upon providing a predefine[d]
interaction with an icon” to have their plain meaning.
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5. “said display unit practically covers the entire front surface of said housing,” “said display
unit practically occupying the entire front surface of the mobile phone,” and “said display
unit occupying practically the entire surface of the front surface of said device”
“said display unit practically covers the entire front surface of said housing”
(’144 Patent, Claim 1)
“said display unit practically occupying the entire front surface of the mobile phone”
(’144 Patent, Claim 9)
“said display unit occupying practically the entire surface of the front surface of said
device”
(’144 Patent, Claim 15)
Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction Defendants’ Proposed Construction
Plain and ordinary meaning. Not Indefinite. Indefinite
(Dkt. No. 96, Ex. A at 48; Dkt. No. 100, Ex. A, at 13–15.)
(a) The Parties’ Positions
Plaintiff argues that “[t]he intrinsic evidence sets forth clear metrics that ‘said display unit
practically covers/occupying the entire front surface’ is met when the size of the display unit is not
limited by the presence of separate components like push-button keys, microphones, or speakers
occupying real estate on the front surface of the device.” (Dkt. No. 97, at 1.) Plaintiff submits that
“[t]he ’144 patent claims priority to 2003, which is 4 years before the release of the first iPhone
and 6 years before the release of the first Samsung Galaxy phone,” and Plaintiff argues that the art
at that time included several front-facing components, such as a keypad, microphone, and speaker,
that limited the available space for a front-facing display. (Id., at 1–2.) Plaintiff also submits that
the specification discloses using “soft keys” on the display screen as well as moving the speaker
and microphone to an earpiece. (See id., at 2–4.) Further, Plaintiff argues that “[a] POSA would
understand that, in manufacturing and assembling mobile phones, there often has to be a bezel or
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physical structure around the display on the front surface to hold it in place and integrate the
display unit into the structure of the device.” (Id., at 5 (citation omitted).) Finally, Plaintiff argues
that “[s]ince Figure 68a [of the ’144 Patent] indisputably has a bezel preventing the display unit
from covering the entirety of the front surface, it is clear that Plaintiff is not reading ‘practically’
out of the claims and requiring that the display unit ‘fully cover’ the entire front surface.” (Id.,
at 7.)
Defendants respond that these “practically” terms are terms of degree, and “[t]he
specification provides no guidance on how much can be uncovered/unoccupied and still fall within
the scope of the claims.” (Dkt. No. 98, at 2; see id., at 3–4.) Defendants also argue that, in IPR
proceedings, “Keyless rooted its argument on the presence of any components on the front surface
[in cited references], effectively removing the term ‘practically’ from the claims.” (Id.)
Defendants urge that “[a] POSITA, trying to reconcile the claim language and the figures in the
’144 patent with Keyless’s IPR arguments, is left without any reasonable certainty about when
components that occupy real estate on the front surface take the device outside the scope of the
claims and when they do not.” (Id., at 6 (citation omitted).) Finally, Defendants argue that their
expert’s opinions in the IPR proceedings do not undermine Defendants’ indefiniteness argument
because “the law distinguishes between claims with a ‘wholly undefined claim element’—which
‘cannot be compared to the prior art for purposes of an invalidity analysis’—and claims whose
scope is indefinite but nonetheless can be challenged because the prior art indisputably reads on
the claims.” (Id., at 8 (quoting Cochlear Bone, 958 F.3d at 1359-60).)
At the December 15, 2025 hearing, the parties presented oral arguments.
(b) Analysis
Claim 1 of the ’144 Patent, for example, recites (emphasis added):
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1. A mobile phone device, comprising:
a practically rectangular-shaped housing within which the components of a
mobile phone are integrated, said housing having a front surface, a back surface
and four side surfaces, wherein the length of the front surface approximately
corresponds to the distance between the ear and the mouth of a user and wherein
the width of the front surface is substantially shorter than the length and wherein
the housing has a thin thickness; and
a display unit integrated within the front surface of said housing wherein
said display unit practically covers the entire front surface of said housing;
wherein said mobile phone device does not include a physical key on the
front surface, and
wherein said components of the mobile phone are integrated within said
housing such that none of said components is noticeably extended out from said
housing.
In IPR2025-00528, Plaintiff argued as follows regarding the “Bast” and “Wedel” references:
Making the display “as large as possible” and using “all the available space” on the
front surface is merely relative to what is “possible” and “available” for Bast’s
device; yet it still falls short of a display that “practically covers the entire front
surface of said housing” as claimed.
Bast’s front face contains (at least) a screen 2 that is constrained by a microphone
3 disposed below the screen and a loudspeaker 4 disposed above the screen. Both
the speaker and the microphone occupy real estate on Bast’s front surface
preventing Bast’s screen from practically covering the entire front surface. Thus,
while Bast states that the screen is “as large as possible” and that “the screen uses
all the space available,” Bast’s screen does not practically cover the entire front
surface of the housing, as claimed. Bast’s screen is bound and limited by the other
components on its front surface that prevent the claimed coverage.
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* * *
Petitioner’s proposed combination of Bast and Wedel neglects to address the
microphones and speaker outlets occupying real estate on the front surface and
preventing their respective displays from practically covering the entire front
surface of the housing as claimed.
(Dkt. No. 98, Ex. 2, IPR2025-00528, July 9, 2025 Patent Owner Preliminary Response, at 17–18
& 24–25 (citations omitted).) Similarly, in IPR2025-00529, Plaintiff argued as follows regarding
the “Pensjo” reference:
[A] POSA would have understood that features such as a speaker, a microphone,
and/or buttons to power the device on or off, adjust a volume of the device, or return
the display to a home screen with a home button were commonly located on the
front surface, above, below, or to the sides of the display. However, Pensjo does
not show these components anywhere—not because these common features are not
present in the device, but because Pensjo’s specification is narrowly drafted to
describe only the pen detection mechanism.
. . . As shown in Pensjo’s Figures 1, 3, and 5, the display covers a portion of the
front surface, but there are spaces above and below the display that would
accommodate common components such as buttons, microphones, and/or speakers.
Indeed, theses [sic] spaces would reasonable [sic] teach a POSA that such
components would occupy this real estate above and below the display on the front
surface of Pensjo’s device. Accordingly, Pensjo does not disclose that the display
unit practically covers the entire front surface of the housing.
(Id., Ex. 3, IPR2025-00529, July 9, 2025 Patent Owner Preliminary Response, at 21–22.)
These statements by Plaintiff in IPR proceedings can be considered during claim
construction because a patent owner’s statements in an IPR proceeding are part of an examination
of the patent. See Aylus Networks, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 856 F.3d 1353, 1360–62 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Defendants characterize these IPR statements as interpreting the claims to require a display
unit that covers all of the front surface of the housing. In evaluating Defendants’ argument, three
legal principles are noteworthy. First, “[a]llowing a patentee to argue that physical structures and
characteristics specifically described in a claim are merely superfluous would render the scope of
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the patent ambiguous, leaving examiners and the public to guess about which claim language the
drafter deems necessary to his claimed invention and which language is merely superfluous,
nonlimiting elaboration.” Bicon, Inc. v. Straumann Co., 441 F.3d 945, 950 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Second, “[c]laims may not be construed one way in order to obtain their allowance and in a
different way against accused infringers.” Southwall Techs., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d
1570, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Third, “the scope of surrender is not limited to what is absolutely
necessary to avoid a prior art reference; patentees may surrender more than necessary.” Tech.
Props. Ltd. LLC v. Huawei Techs. Co., Ltd., 849 F.3d 1349, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citation
omitted).
Even when considering these principles, though, these IPR statements do not give rise to
any lack of reasonable certainty in the claim language because the statements are expressly directed
to: the “screen 2,” “microphone 3,” and “loudspeaker 4” of Bast; and the speaker, microphone,
power button, volume button(s), and home button that Plaintiff infers are present in Pensjo. This
point is emphasized by the Patent Owner Preliminary Response in IPR2025-00528 having
reproduced Figure 1 of Bast. (Dkt. No. 98, Ex. 2, IPR2025-00528, July 9, 2025 Patent Owner
Preliminary Response, at 18.) Indeed, Plaintiff there expressly argued that “Bast’s screen is bound
and limited by the other components on its front surface that prevent the claimed coverage.” (Id.,
at 17 (emphasis added).)
To whatever extent Defendants’ interpretation of Plaintiff’s statements is plausible, the
existence of multiple reasonable interpretations undercuts Defendants’ reliance on these
statements. Tech. Props. Ltd. LLC v. Huawei Techs. Co., Ltd., 849 F.3d 1349, 1357–58 (Fed. Cir.
2017); see id. (“If the challenged statements are ambiguous or amenable to multiple reasonable
interpretations, prosecution disclaimer is not established.”) (citation omitted); see also Golight,
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Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 355 F.3d 1327, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Because the statements in
the prosecution history are subject to multiple reasonable interpretations, they do not constitute a
clear and unmistakable departure from the ordinary meaning of the term . . . .”) (citation omitted);
Omega Eng’g Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“prosecution disclaimer
promotes the public notice function of the intrinsic evidence and protects the public’s reliance on
definitive statements made during prosecution”) (emphasis added). The opinions of Defendants’
expert in this regard are likewise unpersuasive. (Dkt. No. 76-1, Aug. 1, 2025 Terveen ¶¶ 62–64.)
Also, the Teva case, cited by Defendants, noted prosecution statements that defined molecular
weight in conflicting ways, but the finding of indefiniteness was based on there being multiple
known ways of measuring “molecular weight,” and Teva is therefore not analogous to the present
case. See Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 789 F.3d 1335, 1341–45 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see
also Infinity Comput. Prods., Inc. v. Oki Kata Ams., Inc., 987 F.3d 1053, 1059–60 (Fed. Cir. 2021)
(discussing Teva, and cited here by Defendants).
The specification provides context for understanding “practically” by disclosing
modifications to “the mobile phone which is now used [(as of the earliest listed priority date, in
2003)] for the tasks such as text messaging and the internet[] and [which] is predicted to become
a mobile computing device”:
[T]he (complicated) data entry systems of the mobile phones require the use of
many keys, using a substantial surface of the phone, providing slow data entry, and
leaving a small area for a small (e.g. narrow) display unit.
’144 Patent at 69:21–29; see id. at Fig. 66 (illustrating various devices). As for a speaker and a
microphone, the specification discloses that an “ear-integrated unit” can be used. Id. at 32:3–8.
As for a keypad, the specification discloses for example using “soft” keys, which are shown on a
touchscreen display. Id. at 77:26–29 (“[I]t is understood that other kinds of keys such as virtual
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(soft) keys may be used with the data entry system of the invention.”); see id. at 91:49–52 (“instead
of physical keys (e.g. 6501-6506), virtual (e.g. soft) keys may be defined on a display unit . . .”);
see also id. at 72:65–73:2 (“virtual (e.g. soft) keys”). Alternatively, the specification discloses that
using a “standalone keypad may permit to integrate a display unit covering substantially a whole
side of said electronic device.” Id. at 78:11–12.
The specification also provides an example, illustrated in Figure 68a, of a display that
“substantially covers” a surface:
Figure 68a shows an electronic device 6810 using the tilting data entry system of
the invention, and wherein a large display 6811 substantially covers the surface of
at least one side of said electronic device.
Id. at 98:2–6 (emphasis added). Figure 68a is reproduced here:
Plaintiff’s expert persuasively opines that Figure 68a illustrates a bezel around the display
6811, which Plaintiff’s expert persuasively explains is often necessary for manufacturing reasons:
A POSA would understand that the claim term “practically” addresses the reality
that, in manufacturing mobile phones, there often has to be a bezel or physical
structure around the display on the front surface to hold it in place and integrate it
into the structure of the device as a whole. That is reflected in the ’144 patent’s
figures such as 68a where the display practically covers the entire front surface of
the device and the display unit is limited only by the bezel required for physical
assembly of the device.
(Dkt. No. 97-9, Nov. 28, 2025 Malek Suppl. Decl. ¶ 35.)
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Plaintiff thus persuasively argues that, for example, “a display unit practically covers or
occupies the entire front surface when the size of the display extends across the front surface and
is not limited by the presence of separate components like push-button keys, microphones, or
speakers that occupy their own distinct space on the front surface (i.e., not embedded or integrated
with the display unit).” (Dkt. No. 97, at 6.) “[A]bsolute or mathematical precision is not required.”
Interval Licensing, 766 F.3d at 1370.
Finally, Defendants note that the patentee amended Claim 1 to change “substantially
entirely covers said front surface” to “practically covers the entire front surface,” but this change
occurred amidst many amendments to the claim language, and Defendants identify no statements
by the patentee regarding any purported significance of removing “substantially” and adding
“practically.” See Dkt. No. 98, Ex. 4, Amendment (p. 11 of 16 of Ex. 4).
The Court therefore hereby expressly rejects Defendants’ indefiniteness argument.
Defendants present no alternative proposed constructions, and any remaining disputes regarding
“practically” pertain to factual disputes regarding infringement rather than any legal dispute for
claim construction. See, e.g., PPG, 156 F.3d at 1355.
The Court accordingly hereby construes “said display unit practically covers the entire
front surface of said housing,” “said display unit practically occupying the entire front surface of
the mobile phone,” and “said display unit occupying practically the entire surface of the front
surface of said device” to have their plain meaning.
V. DISPUTED TERMS IN U.S. PATENT NO. 9,304,602
As a threshold matter, Plaintiff argues that “[t]he fact that the examiner, the parties, and
their experts applied these terms during prosecution and in the IPR further supports a conclusion
that the claims are not indefinite” (Dkt. No. 70, at 26), but an IPR petition cannot assert
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indefiniteness. See 35 U.S.C. § 311(b); see also Cuozzo Speed, 136 S. Ct. at 2141–42; Samsung,
948 F.3d at 1355. Also, the Federal Circuit has found that “indefiniteness of a claim does not
always imply inability to conduct a prior-art analysis needed for an inter partes review.” See
Cochlear Bone, 958 F.3d at 1359–60 (citation omitted). The IPR proceedings cited by Plaintiff
therefore do not significantly affect the Court’s analysis.
6. “wherein a gliding action provided from outside of the touch screen towards inside of the
touch screen, said gliding action at first interacting with said at least one window on the touch
screen, is processed by said processor” and “wherein said gliding action is provided from
outside the touchscreen towards inside the touch screen, wherein said gliding action at first
interacts with said zone on said touch screen”
“wherein a gliding action provided from outside of the touch screen towards inside of the
touch screen, said gliding action at first interacting with said at least one window on the
touch screen, is processed by said processor”
(’602 Patent, Claim 1)
Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction Defendants’ Proposed Construction
Plain and ordinary meaning. Not Indefinite. Indefinite
Alternatively:
“wherein a gliding action determined to
start outside of the touch screen, to continue
onto the touch screen, and to first contact the
touch screen within said at least one window is
processed by said processor”
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“wherein said gliding action is provided from outside the touchscreen towards inside the
touch screen, wherein said gliding action at first interacts with said zone on said touch
screen”
(’602 Patent, Claim 33)
Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction Defendants’ Proposed Construction
Plain and ordinary meaning. Not Indefinite. Indefinite
Alternatively:
“wherein said gliding action determined to
start outside of the touch screen, to continue
onto the touch screen, and to first interact with
the touch screen within said zone is processed
by said processor”
(Dkt. No. 96, Ex. A, at 1; Dkt. No. 100, Ex. A, at 1.)
(a) The Parties’ Positions
Plaintiff argues that Defendants cannot meet their burden to show indefiniteness for these
terms because Defendants have not submitted any expert opinion in support, and Plaintiff also
submits that “the specification repeatedly describes a ‘gliding action’ that moves from outside the
touchscreen towards the inside of the touchscreen.” (Dkt. No. 70, at 18.) Plaintiff also argues that
“Defendants’ alternative construction introduces more ambiguity into the claim.” (Id., at 20
(citation omitted).)
Defendants respond that these claims are improper mixed method-apparatus claims
because “these gliding actions require user action,” and “[t]he claimed ‘gliding action’ is not tied
to any structure recited in the claims.” (Dkt. No. 72, at 23.) Defendants argue: “For example, the
claims do not specify any structure outside of the touch screen or specify how any part of the
system would know whether a gliding action was provided from outside of the touch screen or was
instead provided from the edge of the touch screen. This shows that infringement depends on
whether the user performs the required gliding action (a method step), rather than any system
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capabilities.” (Id.) Further, Defendants argue that “[t]his system cannot distinguish between
gliding actions that start from the edge of the touch screen and gliding actions that start from
outside of the touch screen,” and “[w]hether the ‘gliding action’ requirements of claims 1 and 33
are satisfied therefore depends solely on whether the user performs a gliding action starting outside
the touch screen, not any system capability.” (Id. (citations omitted).) Defendants urge:
“Keyless’s ‘plain and ordinary meaning’ construction fails to explain how the processor could
process ‘a gliding action provided from outside of the touch screen’ without determining whether
a gliding action starts outside of the touch screen. To hold otherwise either confirms that the
gliding action is a method step divorced from any recited structure and requires user action, or
reads ‘provided from outside of the touch screen’ out of the claim.” (Id., at 25.)
Plaintiff replies that “none of the disputed terms require a human ‘user’ to perform any
action.” (Dkt. No. 77 at 5.) Plaintiff argues that “these ‘wherein’ clauses are properly describing
capabilities of the ‘processor’ and the system’s capability to receive and respond to a user selection
and are thus not indefinite.” (Id. at 8 (citations omitted).)
At the December 15, 2025 hearing, the parties presented oral arguments. Defendants
argued that these terms recite actions without being tied to any particular structure. Plaintiff
responded that these terms recite capabilities of the recited processor.
(b) Analysis
Claim 1 of the ’602 Patent, for example, recites (emphasis added):
1. A system for capturing an event provided from an edge of a touch screen
comprising:
a device having a touch screen;
at least one window located in the touch screen on an edge of the touch
screen, wherein said at least one window functions independently of an interface of
an application in use on the touch screen; and
a processor;
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wherein a gliding action provided from outside of the touch screen towards
inside of the touch screen, said gliding action at first interacting with said at least
one window on the touch screen, is processed by said processor to cause an action
assigned to said window, and wherein said at least one window is located on the
touch screen before said gliding action begins.
Much like for the above-discussed “sweeping” and “interaction” terms discussed above as
to the ’144 Patent, the H-W Technology case cited by Defendants is unpersuasive because the
claims recite how the gliding action is used by the claimed system. It is therefore not “unclear
when infringement occurs.” H-W Tech., 758 F.3d at 1335. These disputed terms in Claims 1 and
33 of the ’602 Patent recite “wherein a gliding action . . . is processed by said processor to cause
an action” (Claim 1) and “wherein a gliding action . . . interacts with” a “zone on said touch screen”
(Claim 33), so these claims “merely use permissible functional language to describe the
capabilities of the claimed system” such that “it is clear that infringement occurs when one makes,
uses, offers to sell, or sells the claimed system.” Mastermine, 874 F.3d at 1316; see Microprocessor
Enhancement, 520 F.3d at 1375 (“apparatus claims are not necessarily indefinite for using
functional language”).
Likewise, the determination of whether a gliding action is “provided from outside of the
touch screen” is a determination by the recited system. Defendants’ alternative proposed
constructions are directed to this but should be modified to explicitly recite that the determination
is “by the system.” This is also consistent with disclosure in the specification. See ’602 Patent at
60:43–49 (“If the user desired to change the location of (a portion of) said keypad, he may provide
a gliding action 311006 departing from the edge 313012 of the screen (e.g. obviously, the gliding
action may begin from out of the screen but the system considers the departing point from the edge
of the screen) towards his desired location inside the screen.”); see also id. at Fig. 25A; id. at
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33:65–67 (“In some embodiments of the invention, each sweeping gesture must begin from a state
in which the user’s finger does not touch the screen 320.”).
The Court therefore hereby construes these disputed terms as set forth in the following
chart:
Term Construction
“wherein a gliding action provided from
outside of the touch screen towards inside of
the touch screen, said gliding action at first
interacting with said at least one window on
the touch screen, is processed by said
processor”
(’602 Patent, Claim 1)
“wherein a gliding action, determined by
the system to have started outside of the
touch screen, to have continued toward and
onto the touch screen, and to have first
interacted with the touch screen within said
at least one window, is processed by said
processor”
“wherein said gliding action is provided from
outside the touchscreen towards inside the
touch screen, wherein said gliding action at
first interacts with said zone on said touch
screen”
(’602 Patent, Claim 33)
“wherein a gliding action, determined by
the system to have started outside of the
touch screen, to have continued toward and
onto the touch screen, and to have first
interacted with said touch screen by
interacting with said zone, is processed by
said processor”
7. “a gliding action provided from said zone of the touch screen towards any arbitrary
direction inside the touch screen at first interacts with said zone”
“a gliding action provided from said zone of the touch screen towards any arbitrary
direction inside the touch screen at first interacts with said zone”
(’602 Patent, Claim 19)
Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction Defendants’ Proposed Construction
Plain and ordinary meaning. Not Indefinite. Indefinite
(Dkt. No. 96, Ex. A, at 7; Dkt. No. 100, Ex. A, at 2.)
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(a) The Parties’ Positions
Plaintiff argues that Defendants cannot meet their burden to show indefiniteness for these
terms because Defendants have not submitted any expert opinion in support, and Plaintiff urges
that “[t]o the extent [Defendants’ argument] is based on ‘arbitrary direction,’ a POSITA, as well
as a layman, would understand that this just means any direction, which is consistent with the
intrinsic evidence.” (Dkt. No. 70, at 21 (citation omitted).)
Defendants respond that this is an improper mixed method-apparatus claim because “the
‘gliding action’ limitation is a method step requiring user interaction and is divorced from any
structure or any other function of the claimed system.” (Dkt. No. 72, at 25.)
Plaintiff replies that “none of the disputed terms require a human ‘user’ to perform any
action.” (Dkt. No. 77 at 5.)
At the December 15, 2025 hearing, the parties presented oral arguments.
(b) Analysis
Legal principles regarding mixed method-apparatus claims are set forth as to the “sweeping
action” and “predefined interaction” terms in the ’144 Patent, discussed above.
Claim 19 of the ’602 Patent (as set forth in a Certificate of Correction dated February 16,
2021) recites (emphasis added):
19. A system for capturing an event provided from an edge of a touch screen
comprising:
a device having a touch screen;
a zone in form of a bar located in the touch screen on an edge of the touch
screen; and
a processor;
wherein a gliding action provided from said zone of the touch screen
towards any arbitrary direction inside the touch screen at first interacts with said
zone, and wherein the processor executes a function related to said zone, and
wherein said zone is present on said edge regardless of the interface of an
application on said touch screen, and wherein said zone is located on the touch
screen before said gliding action begins.
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As with the above-discussed “gliding action” terms in Claims 1 and 33 of the ’602 Patent,
Claim 19 recites how the gliding action is used by the system (by the processor executing a
function related to the zone with which the gliding action “interacts”). Defendants argue that
“[t]here is no recited trigger for the processor executing the function” (Dkt. No. 72 at 26), but the
claim need not recite a “trigger” for the claim to be sufficiently clear that a relationship exists
between the gliding action, a zone, and the processor. The existence of this relationship is a matter
of system configuration, and it is therefore not “unclear when infringement occurs.” H-W Tech,
758 F.3d at 1335. This claim thus “merely use[s] permissible functional language to describe the
capabilities of the claimed system” such that “it is clear that infringement occurs when one makes,
uses, offers to sell, or sells the claimed system.” Mastermine, 874 F.3d at 1316; see Microprocessor
Enhancement, 520 F.3d at 1375 (“apparatus claims are not necessarily indefinite for using
functional language”).
The Power Integrations case cited by Defendants is distinguishable in light of the presently
recited relationship between the gliding action, a zone, and the processor. See Power Integrations,
Inc. v. ON Semiconductor Corp., No. 16-CV-06371-BLF, 2018 WL 5603631, at *15 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 26, 2018) (Freeman, J.) (“said control signal being provided when no feedback signal is
provided at said feedback input and said duty cycle signal is in said high state”; finding that “[a]
review of th[e] relevant case law makes clear that the disputed term is indefinite because it recites
functional language divorced from any recited structure”) (discussing, e.g., Rembrandt Data
Techs., LP v. AOL, LLC, 641 F.3d 1331, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
The Court therefore hereby expressly rejects Defendants’ indefiniteness arguments.
Defendants present no alternative proposed construction, and no further construction is necessary.
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The Court accordingly hereby construes “a gliding action provided from said zone of the
touch screen towards any arbitrary direction inside the touch screen at first interacts with said
zone” to have its plain meaning.
8. “substantial portion of an edge of the touch screen” / “substantial portion of said edge”
“substantial portion of an edge of the touch screen”
“substantial portion of said edge”
(’602 Patent, Claims 4, 16, 36)
Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction Defendants’ Proposed Construction
Plain and ordinary meaning. Not Indefinite. Indefinite
(Dkt. No. 96, Ex. A, at 12; Dkt. No. 100, Ex. A, at 2.)
(a) The Parties’ Positions
Plaintiff argues that “substantial” is a permissible word of approximation and that “[a]
POSITA would reasonably understand these terms in the context of the ’602 patent.” (Dkt. No.
70, at 22 (citation omitted); see id. at 22-24.)
Defendants respond that these are terms of degree and that “[t]he intrinsic and extrinsic
evidence fails to provide such an objective boundary here, rendering the claims indefinite.” (Dkt.
No. 72, at 13 (citation omitted).) In particular, Defendants argue that “[t]he ’602 patent lacks any
guidance for determining an objective boundary where the bar/window/zone occupies a portion of
the screen but is no longer ‘substantial.’” (Id. (citation omitted).) Defendants urge that although
mathematical precision is not required, here there are no objective boundaries at all. (Id. at 14.)
Plaintiff replies that quantitative boundaries are not required and that, based on the claim
language, “[a] POSITA would thus understand ‘substantial portion’ to encompass a portion of the
touch screen that allows the gliding action to interact with the bar and be processed by the
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processor thereby ‘allow[ing] the claim’s purpose to be effectuated.’” (Dkt. No. 77 at 4 (citing
Ironburg Inventions Ltd. v. Valve Corp., 64 F.4th 1274, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2023).)
At the December 15, 2025 hearing, the parties presented oral arguments. Defendants
argued that this term is not reasonably clear as to a lower boundary for how much is necessary so
as to be “substantial.”
(b) Analysis
Claim 4 of the ’602 Patent, for example, depends from Claim 3, and Claims 3 and 4 recite
(emphasis added):
3. The system of claim 1, wherein said at least one window comprises at least one
bar located on said edge of the screen.
4. The system of claim 3, wherein said at least one bar extends along a substantial
portion of an edge of the touch screen.
Defendants argue that the ’602 Patent sets forth no “objective boundary,” particularly as to
how large a “portion” must be in order to qualify as a “substantial portion.” (Dkt. No. 72, at 14
(quoting Interval Licensing, 766 F.3d at 1371); citing Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1364
(Fed. Cir. 2018)).)
The Federal Circuit has “rejected the proposition that claims involving terms of degree are
inherently indefinite.” Sonix, 844 F.3d at 1377. “[W]ords of approximation, such as ‘generally’
and ‘substantially,’ are descriptive terms commonly used in patent claims to avoid a strict
numerical boundary to the specified parameter.” Anchor Wall, 340 F.3d at 1310–11; see Verve,
311 F.3d at 1120 (“Expressions such as ‘substantially’ are used in patent documents when
warranted by the nature of the invention, in order to accommodate the minor variations that may
be appropriate to secure the invention.”); see also Deere, 703 F.3d at 1359 (“This court has
repeatedly confirmed that relative terms such as ‘substantially’ do not render patent claims so
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unclear as to prevent a person of skill in the art from ascertaining the scope of the claim.”); see,
e.g., Exmark, 879 F.3d at 1347 (“substantially straight”); ESCO Grp. LLC v. Deere & Co., No.
1:20-CV-1679-RGA-JLH, 2022 WL 1025967, at *8 (D. Del. Apr. 6, 2022) (“substantially along
an entire length of the socket”).
In the present case, the understanding of a person of skill in the art would be informed by
the specification providing context regarding manners and objectives of interactions with an edge
of the touch screen, and in particular Plaintiff cites Figure 25A and associated disclosures in the
specification regarding “portions.” ’602 Patent at 60:10–61:8; see Ironburg Inventions Ltd. v.
Valve Corp., 64 F.4th 1274, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“The need to meet the purpose of the claimed
invention . . . helps inform one of ordinary skill’s understanding of the scope of the claims with
reasonable certainty.”); see also Exmark, 879 F.3d at 1345–47. On balance, this is sufficient,
especially when considering that the definiteness standard of Nautilus does not require
mathematical precision. See Niazi, 30 F.4th at 1347 (“While there must be objective boundaries,
we have explained that a patentee need not define his invention with mathematical precision in
order to comply with the definiteness requirement. . . . Indeed, patentees often use descriptive
words . . . to avoid a strict numerical boundary to the specified parameter.”) (internal quotations
and modifications omitted); see also Sonix, 844 F.3d at 1378–79.
Finally, Defendants cite Plaintiff’s infringement contentions (Dkt. No. 72, at 14 (citing id.,
Ex. 1, at 33–35, 50–51 & 61–62)), but whatever “line-drawing” might be necessary in evaluating
alleged infringement is a question of fact for the finder of fact and does not warrant any finding of
indefiniteness. Acumed LLC, 483 F.3d at 806 (“[t]he resolution of some line-drawing problems
. . . is properly left to the trier of fact”) (citing PPG, 156 F.3d at 1355); Eon, 815 F.3d at 1318–19
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(citing PPG, 156 F.3d at 1355; citing Acumed, 483 F.3d at 806). The opinions of Defendants’
expert in this regard are unpersuasive. (Dkt. No. 76-1, Aug. 1, 2025 Terveen Decl. ¶¶ 21–27.)
The Court therefore hereby expressly rejects Defendants’ indefiniteness arguments.
Defendants present no alternative proposed construction, and no further construction is necessary.
The Court accordingly hereby construes “substantial portion of an edge of the touch
screen” and “substantial portion of said edge” to have their plain meaning.
9. “substantially equal to a length of the gliding action”
“substantially equal to a length of the gliding action”
(’602 Patent, Claims 8, 11, 26, 30, 35)
Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction Defendants’ Proposed Construction
Plain and ordinary meaning. Not Indefinite. Indefinite
(Dkt. No. 96, Ex. A, at 16; Dkt. No. 100, Ex. A, at 3.)
(a) The Parties’ Positions
Plaintiff argues that “substantial” is a permissible word of approximation and that “[a]
POSITA would reasonably understand these terms in the context of the ’602 patent.” (Dkt. No. 70,
at 22 (citation omitted); see id. at 22–24.)
Defendants respond that “[t]hese claims each recite a term of degree because they require
a length of a portion of an interface to be ‘substantially equal to a length of the gliding action.’”
(Dkt. No. 72, at 15 (citation omitted).) Defendants argue that the specification “says nothing about
either the length of the gliding action or the length of the portions of the keypad shown on the
screen, let alone whether they are ‘equal’ or ‘substantially equal.’” (Id., at 16 (citation omitted).)
Plaintiff replies that objective boundaries are not required and that “[a] POSITA would
find the ‘substantially equal’ terms easily understandable as the plain language describes
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displaying a portion of an interface along with the movement of a finger gliding on the touch
screen.” (Dkt. No. 77 at 5 (citation omitted).)
At the December 15, 2025 hearing, the parties presented oral arguments. Defendants
argued that this term is indefinite both because “substantially equal” is an unclear term of degree
and because the “length of the gliding action” is unclear.
(b) Analysis
Claim 8 of the ’602 Patent, for example, depends from Claim 7, which in turn depends
from Claim 5, which in turn depends from Claim 3, which in turn depends from Claim 1. Claims 1,
3, 5, 7, and 8 recite (emphasis added):
1. A system for capturing an event provided from an edge of a touch screen
comprising:
a device having a touch screen;
at least one window located in the touch screen on an edge of the touch
screen, wherein said at least one window functions independently of an interface of
an application in use on the touch screen; and
a processor;
wherein a gliding action provided from outside of the touch screen towards
inside of the touch screen, said gliding action at first interacting with said at least
one window on the touch screen, is processed by said processor to cause an action
assigned to said window, and wherein said at least one window is located on the
touch screen before said gliding action begins.
* * *
3. The system of claim 1, wherein said at least one window comprises at least one
bar located on said edge of the screen.
* * *
5. The system of claim 3, wherein said bar is in a form of a line.
* * *
7. The system of claim 5, wherein said action is displaying a portion of an interface
on the screen.
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8. The system of claim 7, wherein during said gliding action, a length of the portion
of the interface being displayed is substantially equal to a length of the gliding
action.
As for “substantially equal,” the claim recites a relationship between “a length of the
portion of the interface being displayed” and “a length of the gliding action.” Defendants argue
that the ’602 Patent “provides no examples from which a skilled artisan could determine an
objective boundary for this term.” (Dkt. No. 72, at 15 (citing Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1364).)
Legal principles regarding “substantial” are set forth as to the terms “substantial portion of an edge
of the touch screen” and “substantial portion of said edge,” above, and the Court reaches the same
conclusion here that this “substantially” term is not indefinite. See, e.g., Anchor Wall, 340 F.3d at
1310–11 (“[W]ords of approximation, such as ‘generally’ and ‘substantially,’ are descriptive terms
commonly used in patent claims to avoid a strict numerical boundary to the specified parameter.”);
Verve, 311 F.3d at 1120; Deere, 703 F.3d at 1359; Acumed LLC, 483 F.3d at 806 (“[t]he resolution
of some line-drawing problems . . . is properly left to the trier of fact”) (citing PPG, 156 F.3d
at 1355). The opinions of Defendants’ expert in this regard are unpersuasive. (Dkt. No. 76-1,
Aug. 1, 2025 Terveen Decl. ¶¶ 28–30 & 32.)
As for the length of the recited “gliding action provided from outside of the touch screen
towards inside of the touch screen,” Defendants’ expert opines as to uncertainty regarding whether
the length of the “gliding action” is measured from an edge of the screen or from somewhere
outside of the screen. Id. at ¶ 31 (citing ’602 Patent at 60:43–49). The claim language, however,
is sufficiently clear that the length is measured from the edge of the screen, and the portion of the
specification cited by Defendants’ expert likewise discloses:
If the user desired to change the location of (a portion of) said keypad, he may
provide a gliding action 311006 departing from the edge 313012 of the screen (e.g.
obviously, the gliding action may begin from out of the screen but the system
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considers the departing point from the edge of the screen) towards his desired
location inside the screen.
’602 Patent at 60:43–49 (emphasis added). At the December 15, 2025 hearing, Defendants urged
that this disclosure is merely an example and is not reflected by the claim language, which recites
a gliding action that starts outside of the touch screen. This disclosure, however, informs how a
person of ordinary skill in the art would understand the claim language, and Defendants identify
nothing in the claims or the specification stating or implying a capability of measuring a length
that begins outside of the touch screen. The illustration of arrows starting outside of the touch
screen in Fig. 25A, cited by Defendants at the hearing, is unpersuasive because the arrows can be
readily understood as illustrating origins (and directions) of movement rather than any
measurements of length.
The Court therefore hereby expressly rejects Defendants’ indefiniteness arguments.
Defendants present no alternative proposed construction, and no further construction is necessary.
The Court accordingly hereby construes “substantially equal to a length of the gliding
action” to have its plain meaning.
10. “said at least one window comprises more than one window located on one or more edges
of the touch screen” and “said bar comprises more than one bar located on one or more
edges of the touch screen”
“said at least one window comprises more than one window located on one or more edges
of the touch screen”
(’602 Patent, Claim 15)
Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction Defendants’ Proposed Construction
Plain and ordinary meaning. Not Indefinite. “each of the more than one window located on
one or more edges of the touch screen is
processed by the processor to cause the same
action”
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“said bar comprises more than one bar located on one or more edges of the touch screen”
(’602 Patent, Claim 22)
Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction Defendants’ Proposed Construction
Plain and ordinary meaning. Not Indefinite. “each of the more than one bar located on one
or more edges of the touch screen is processed
by the processor to perform the same function”
(Dkt. No. 96, Ex. A, at 19; Dkt. No. 100, Ex. A, at 4.)
(a) The Parties’ Positions
Plaintiff argues that “Defendants do not allege lexicography or disavowal; and Defendants’
construction is clearly not the plain meaning of the claim language.” (Dkt. No. 70, at 25.) Plaintiff
argues that “Defendants’ construction attempts to read limitations into the claims from
specification passages regarding duplicate keyboards, which do not even concern the claims at
issue in the ’602 patent.” (Id. (citations omitted).)
Defendants respond that “Keyless provides a non-construction, accusing Defendants of
adding words to the claims without showing any error in Defendants’ constructions.” (Dkt. No. 72,
at 17.) Defendants argue that their proposal is consistent with the syntax of the claims as well as
“the ’602 patent’s embodiment in Figure 25A having a bar on the left and right edges of the touch
screen. (Id., at 18 (citations omitted).)
At the December 15, 2025 hearing, the parties presented oral arguments.
(b) Analysis
Claim 15 of the ’602 Patent depends from Claim 1, and Claims 1 and 15 recite (emphasis
added):
1. A system for capturing an event provided from an edge of a touch screen
comprising:
a device having a touch screen;
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at least one window located in the touch screen on an edge of the touch
screen, wherein said at least one window functions independently of an interface
of an application in use on the touch screen; and
a processor;
wherein a gliding action provided from outside of the touch screen towards
inside of the touch screen, said gliding action at first interacting with said at least
one window on the touch screen, is processed by said processor to cause an action
assigned to said window, and wherein said at least one window is located on the
touch screen before said gliding action begins.
* * *
15. The system of claim 1, wherein said at least one window comprises more than
one window located on one or more edges of the touch screen.
Defendants assert:
Dependent claim 15 depends from claim 1, which requires that a particular gliding
action “at first interacting with said at least one window on the touch screen[] is
processed by said processor to cause an action assigned to said window.” ’602
patent, claim 1 (emphases added). The term “said window” refers back to the earlier
instance in claim 1 of “at least one window located in the touch screen on an edge
of the touch screen.” Claim 15 adds that “said at least one window comprises more
than one window located on one or more edges of the touch screen.” Substituting
the “at least one window” language in claim 1 with the additional requirements of
claim 15 results in a requirement that a particular gliding action “at first interacting
with [the more than one window] on the touch screen[] is processed by said
processor to cause an action assigned to [the more than one window].” Because the
claim recites “an action” assigned to the more than one window, each of the more
than one window in claim 15 is processed by the processor to cause the same action
of claim 1. This same analysis also applies to dependent claim 22, which depends
from independent claim 19.
(Dkt. No. 72, at 17–18.)
Defendants do not persuasively demonstrate, for the “more than one window” in Claim 15,
that interaction with each such window must cause the same “action” recited in Claim 1. The
recital of “at least one window” does not compel otherwise. Instead, a fair reading of Claim 1 as
a whole is that, if there is more than one window, then a different action could be assigned to each
window. Defendants cite disclosure in the specification as referring to multiple “portions” having
the same function. ’602 Patent at 60:39–59 (“chang[ing] the location of (a portion of)”); see also
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id. at Fig. 25A. Defendants’ citations are unpersuasive because this is a feature of a particular
disclosed embodiment that should not be imported into the claim. See Comark, 156 F.3d at 1187.
The same analysis applies to Claim 22 of the ’602 Patent, which depends from Claim 19.
The Court therefore hereby expressly rejects Defendants’ proposed construction,
particularly as to Defendants’ proposals of “cause the same action” and “perform the same
function,” and no further construction is necessary. See U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103
F.3d 1554, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Claim construction is a matter of resolution of disputed
meanings and technical scope, to clarify and when necessary to explain what the patentee covered
by the claims, for use in the determination of infringement. It is not an obligatory exercise in
redundancy.”); see also O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., Ltd., 521 F.3d 1351,
1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Finjan, Inc. v. Secure Computing Corp., 626 F.3d 1197, 1207 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (“Unlike O2 Micro, where the court failed to resolve the parties’ quarrel, the district court
rejected Defendants’ construction.”); ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 694
F.3d 1312, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Summit 6, LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 802 F.3d 1283,
1291 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Bayer Healthcare LLC v. Baxalta Inc., 989 F.3d 964, 977–79 (Fed. Cir.
2021).
The Court therefore hereby construes these disputed terms as set forth in the following
chart:
Term Construction
“said at least one window comprises more than
one window located on one or more edges of
the touch screen”
(’602 Patent, Claim 15)
Plain meaning
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“said bar comprises more than one bar located
on one or more edges of the touch screen”
(’602 Patent, Claim 22)
Plain meaning
VI. DISPUTED TERMS IN U.S. PATENT NO. 10,976,922
As a threshold matter, Plaintiff argues that “[t]he fact that the examiner, the parties, and
their experts applied these terms during prosecution and in the IPR further supports a conclusion
that the claims are not indefinite” (Dkt. No. 70, at 30), but an IPR petition cannot assert
indefiniteness. See 35 U.S.C. § 311(b); see also Cuozzo Speed, 136 S. Ct. at 2141–42; Samsung,
948 F.3d at 1355. Also, the Federal Circuit has found that “indefiniteness of a claim does not
always imply inability to conduct a prior-art analysis needed for an inter partes review.” See
Cochlear Bone, 958 F.3d at 1359–60 (citation omitted). The IPR proceedings cited by Plaintiff
therefore do not significantly affect the Court’s analysis.
11. “wherein upon interacting with the interface of any of said applications, the focus of the
system is given to the interacted application”
“wherein upon interacting with the interface of any of said applications, the focus of the
system is given to the interacted application”
(’922 Patent, Claims 2)
Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction Defendants’ Proposed Construction
Plain and ordinary meaning. Not Indefinite. Indefinite
(Dkt. No. 96, Ex. A, at 23–24; Dkt. No. 100, Ex. A, at 5.)
(a) The Parties’ Positions
Plaintiff argues that Defendants cannot meet their burden to show indefiniteness for these
terms because Defendants have not submitted any expert opinion in support, and Plaintiff also
argues that the context is reasonably clear regarding “allow[ing] seamless multitasking, such as
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typing in a chat application (e.g., WhatsApp) in the regular application area when the chat
application is in focus and then switching to a photo-editing or video-chat application such that
the input is now focused on this second application (e.g., photo-editing or video-chat application).”
(Dkt. No. 70, at 26–27 (citations omitted).)
Defendants argue that these are improper mixed method-apparatus claims because “[t]he
‘interacting’ referred to in this step refers to an action performed by a user,” and “[b]y requiring
user interaction, the system claim recites a method step.” (Dkt. No. 72, at 27.)
Plaintiff replies that this claim is directed to the system’s capability “to change the focus
of the system,” and “none of the disputed terms require a human ‘user’ to perform any action.”
(Dkt. No. 77 at 5 & 10.)
At the December 15, 2025 hearing, the parties presented oral arguments.
(b) Analysis
Legal principles regarding mixed method-apparatus claims are set forth as to the “sweeping
action” and “predefined interaction” terms in the ’144 Patent, discussed above.
Claim 2 of the ’922 Patent, for example, depends from Claim 1, and Claims 1 and 2 recite
(emphasis added):
1. A system for using multiple applications on a screen of a device, comprising:
an electronic device having a touchscreen;
an on-screen keyboard for entering text in a first application running within
said device wherein a first zone of said touchscreen is assigned to an interface of
said first application and a second zone of said touchscreen is assigned to said
keyboard; and
wherein based on accomplishment of a condition under the control of said
keyboard, the system activates a second application and displays an interface of the
second application and a reduced interface corresponding to said keyboard on at
least a portion of said second zone, and wherein said interface of said first
application, said interface of said second application, and the reduced interface
corresponding to said keyboard are simultaneously displayed on said touchscreen.
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2. The system of claim 1, wherein upon interacting with the interface of any of said
applications, the focus of the system is given to the interacted application.
The recital in Claim 2 of “wherein upon interacting,” read in the context of the system
recited in Claim 1 (from which Claim 2 depends), demonstrates that the “interacting” recited in
Claim 2 is functional language that relates to a configured responsive of the system and thus does
not set forth a distinct method step. The H-W Technology case cited by Defendants is therefore
unpersuasive because it is not “unclear when infringement occurs.” H-W Tech., 758 F.3d at 1335;
see id. (“receiving from said server a list of merchants matching said search criteria and
information regarding each of said merchants in said list; wherein said user completes a transaction
with at least one of said merchants listed without the need to generate a voice call; wherein said
information received by said user comprises a variety of offers, wherein said user selects one of
said variety of offers associated with said one of said merchants listed, wherein said selected offer
is transmitted to said one of said merchants listed electronically;”).
This claim therefore “merely use[s] permissible functional language to describe the
capabilities of the claimed system” such that “it is clear that infringement occurs when one makes,
uses, offers to sell, or sells the claimed system.” Mastermine, 874 F.3d at 1316; see Microprocessor
Enhancement, 520 F.3d at 1375 (“apparatus claims are not necessarily indefinite for using
functional language”).
The Katz and Power Integrations cases cited by Defendants are thus also distinguishable.
In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (as to
“interface means for providing automated voice messages . . . to certain of said individual callers,
wherein said certain of said individual callers digitally enter data,” finding that “Katz’s claims . . .
create confusion as to when direct infringement occurs because they are directed both to systems
and to actions performed by ‘individual callers’); Power Integrations, 2018 WL 5603631, at *15
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(“said control signal being provided when no feedback signal is provided at said feedback input
and said duty cycle signal is in said high state”; finding that “[a] review of th[e] relevant case law
makes clear that the disputed term is indefinite because it recites functional language divorced
from any recited structure”).
Defendants also argue that the recital that “the focus of the system is given to the interacted
application” is an additional indication of action, but the use of the passive voice (“is given”)—
particularly when read as part of this “wherein” clause reciting how the system is configured to
behave “upon interacting with the interface of any of said applications”—is likewise functional
language that relates to configuration of the system and does not set forth a method step.
The Court therefore hereby expressly rejects Defendants’ indefiniteness arguments.
Defendants present no alternative proposed construction, and no further construction is necessary.
The Court accordingly hereby construes “wherein upon interacting with the interface of
any of said applications, the focus of the system is given to the interacted application” to have its
plain meaning.
12. “a search application activated by interacting with a button of said keyboard”
“a search application activated by interacting with a button of said keyboard”
(’922 Patent, Claim 8)
Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction Defendants’ Proposed Construction
Plain and ordinary meaning. Not Indefinite. Indefinite
(Dkt. No. 96, Ex. A, at 27; Dkt. No. 100, Ex. A, at 5.)
(a) The Parties’ Positions
Plaintiff argues that Defendants cannot meet their burden to show indefiniteness for these
terms because Defendants have not submitted any expert opinion in support, and Plaintiff also
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argues that this term “simply requires activating a search application by interacting with a
keyboard button” and that “[t]he specification teaches activating applications and functions by
interacting with buttons on a keyboard.” (Dkt. No. 70, at 28-29 (citations omitted).)
Defendants respond that this is an improper mixed method-apparatus claim because “the
‘interacting’ referred to in this step refers to an action performed by a user,” and Defendants refer
to their arguments as to Claim 2 of the ’922 Patent, which is addressed above. (Dkt. No. 72, at 29
(citation omitted).)
Plaintiff replies that “none of the disputed terms require a human ‘user’ to perform any
action.” (Dkt. No. 77 at 5.) Plaintiff argues: “This is not claiming a method step performed by a
‘user.’ Rather, it is specifying the type of ‘second application’ (i.e., ‘search application’)
referenced in claim 1.” (Id. at 10.)
At the December 15, 2025 hearing, the parties presented oral arguments.
(b) Analysis
Legal principles regarding mixed method-apparatus claims are set forth as to the “sweeping
action” and “predefined interaction” terms in the ’144 Patent, discussed above.
Claim 8 of the ’922 Patent depends from Claim 1, which is reproduced above. Claim 8
recites:
8. The system of claim 1, wherein said second application is a search application
activated by interacting with a button of said keyboard assigned to activating said
search application.
This claim presents essentially the same dispute as the term “wherein upon interacting with
the interface of any of said applications, the focus of the system is given to the interacted
application” in Claim 2 of the ’922 Patent, which is addressed above. For the same reasons, this
disputed term recites functional configuration rather than a distinct method step, and the Court
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hereby expressly rejects Defendants’ indefiniteness arguments. Defendants present no alternative
proposed construction, and no further construction is necessary.
The Court accordingly hereby construes “a search application activated by interacting with
a button of said keyboard” to have its plain meaning.
13. “use at least one keyword typed through said keyboard”
“use at least one keyword typed through said keyboard”
(’922 Patent, Claim 9)
Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction Defendants’ Proposed Construction
Plain and ordinary meaning. Not Indefinite. Indefinite
(Dkt. No. 96, Ex. A, at 31–32; Dkt. No. 100, Ex. A, at 5.)
(a) The Parties’ Positions
Plaintiff argues that Defendants cannot meet their burden to show indefiniteness for these
terms because Defendants have not submitted any expert opinion in support, and Plaintiff also
argues that “[t]his phrase covers a simple concept, which is using a keyword typed using a
keyboard.” (Dkt. No. 70, at 29-30.)
Defendants respond that this is an improper mixed method-apparatus claim because “[t]he
language ‘at least one keyword typed through said keyboard’ recites a method step,” and
“[b]ecause the system claim includes the method step of entering a keyword, it is indefinite.” (Dkt.
No. 72, at 30.)
Plaintiff replies that “none of the disputed terms require a human ‘user’ to perform any
action.” (Dkt. No. 77, at 5.) Plaintiff argues that “claim 9 limits the functionality of the ‘search
application’ in claim 8, but plainly does not require any ‘user’ actions as Defendants contend.”
(Id., at 10.)
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At the December 15, 2025 hearing, the parties presented oral arguments.
(b) Analysis
Legal principles regarding mixed method-apparatus claims are set forth as to the “sweeping
action” and “predefined interaction” terms in the ’144 Patent, discussed above.
Claim 9 of the ’922 Patent recites:
9. The system of claim 8, wherein said search application use [sic] at least one
keyword typed through said keyboard.
This claim presents essentially the same dispute as the term “wherein upon interacting with
the interface of any of said applications, the focus of the system is given to the interacted
application” in Claim 2 of the ’922 Patent, which is addressed above. For the same reasons, this
disputed term recites functional configuration rather than a distinct method step, and the Court
hereby expressly rejects Defendants’ indefiniteness arguments. Defendants present no alternative
proposed construction, and no further construction is necessary.
The Court accordingly hereby construes “use at least one keyword typed through said
keyboard” to have its plain meaning.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Court adopts the constructions set forth in this opinion for the disputed terms of the
patent-in-suit. The parties are ordered that they may not refer, directly or indirectly, to each other’s
claim construction positions in the presence of the jury. Likewise, the parties are ordered to refrain
from mentioning any portion of this opinion, other than the actual definitions adopted by the Court,
in the presence of the jury. Any reference to claim construction proceedings is limited to informing
the jury of the definitions adopted by the Court.
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____________________________________
RODNEY GILSTRAP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
So ORDERED and SIGNED this 12th day of January, 2026.
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