USA v. Leaven

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 	EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
versus
CHARLES TERRANCE LEAVEN
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CASE NO. 1:25-CR-49-MAC
ORDER ADOPTING THE
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the undersigned is a Motion to Suppress filed by the Defendant, Charles
Terrance Leaven (#19). The United States filed a response to the Defendant’s motion (#29), and
the Defendant filed a reply (#32). 	This motion was referred to United States Magistrate Judge
Christine L. Stetson for review, hearing if necessary, and submission of a report with
recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667,
681-84 (1980); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and E.D. TEX . LOCAL R. CR-59(a). 	Judge
Stetson heard testimony and oral argument on December 9, 2025. Judge Stetson concluded that
the search and seizure was lawful. (#35.) Therefore, she recommended denying the Defendant’s
motion. (Id.)
The Defendant objected to Judge Stetson’s1 findings arguing that consent by the
Defendant was invalid, no exigency existed, and critical facts were omitted (#38).
1 Throughout the objections, the Defendant refers to Judge Stetson as the “magistrate.” The title “magistrate” no
longer exists in federal court, having been changed from “magistrate” to “magistrate judge” in 1990. See Judicial
Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (“After the enactment of this Act, each United
States magistrate . . . shall be known as a United States magistrate judge.”). The word “magistrate” is therefore
no longer appropriately used as a noun in federal courts, but only as an adjective indicating the type of judge to
which one is referring.
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CONSENT
The Defendant asserts that his question, “why are ya’ll going in my house, though” shows
that he was not giving consent for the officer to enter his home and that Brittany Balka (“Balka”)
did not have actual or apparent authority to allow entry. The court finds this objection meritless
because consent is not a determinative issue when applying an exigent circumstance. The court
agrees with Judge Stetson’s 	application of the emergency aid exception to the warrant
requirement. Therefore, consent is a non-issue.
EXIGENCY
Next, the Defendant argues that an exigency did not exist because there was no probable
cause to believe that a crime occurred inside the home or that it was reasonable to enter to give
Balka aid. The Defendant points to various facts that were not known to the officer at the time
of entry to argue this point, such as that the assault occurred in the yard and that Balka broke
into the Defendant’s home. The emergency aid exception is based upon an objectively reasonable
basis and the circumstances known to the officer at the time he enters the home to render aid.
United States v. Jackson, No. 24-30233, 2025 WL 2806743, at *3 (5th Cir. Oct. 2, 2025).
At the time of entry, Officer Allen knew of the prior 911 call regarding a domestic
disturbance between Balka and the Defendant in his truck. 	When Officer Allen arrived at the
Defendant’s home, he did not know that the prior assault occurred in the yard. 	Balka was
standing in the home, she stated to Officer Allen that she had been assaulted, and she had visible
blood on her hands. 	The Defendant (who was standing outside near the door) and Balka
continued to argue while the officers were present, and the Defendant would not move further
away from Balka. 	The verbal argument showed a continuing threat between the parties. 	The
court agrees with Judge Stetson’s findings that there was probable cause to believe that an assault
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had occurred, and the totality of the circumstances support an objectively reasonable basis to
believe that Balka needed immediate aid in separating her from the Defendant to protect her
against additional harm and in assessing her need for medical attention. 	As cited by Judge
Stetson, in Jackson, the Fifth Circuit stated, “[d]omestic disputes often involve high emotions
and can quickly escalate to violence, even from a situation that is seemingly calm at officers’
arrival.” 	United States v. Jackson, No. 24-30233, 2025 WL 2806743, at *3 (5th Cir. Oct. 2,
2025) (quoting United States v. Rodriguez, 601 F.3d 402, 408 (5th Cir. 2010)).
OMITTED FACTS
Finally, the Defendant argues that the following facts were omitted from Judge Stetson’s
report and recommendation—Balka drove the Defendant’s vehicle without permission; Balka
assaulted the Defendant in the vehicle; and Balka entered his home without permission. 	These
facts, however, do not bear upon the exigency at hand.
Officer Allen was unaware of how Balka had entered the home prior to his decision to
enter the home to speak with her apart from the Defendant. 	Neither the Defendant nor Balka
told the officers those facts until much later after Officer Allen had entered the home. 	The
Defendant admits this in his objections (#38, p. 3). Further, it is not uncommon for a domestic
disturbance to involve violence by both parties. 	This fact does not render the exigent
circumstances exception less applicable. 	An officer does not necessarily need to determine the
“initial” aggressor before assisting someone who is presently injured or threatened with further
injury. 	The officer’s purpose is to de-escalate the situation and assist the injured. 	“Because it
is essentially a factual determination, there is no set formula for determining when exigent
circumstances may justify a warrantless entry.” United States v. Blount, 123 F.3d 831, 837–38
(5th Cir. 1997). 	Further, due to the nature of emergencies, the exception is “case specific.”
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Lange v. California, 594 U.S. 295, 302 (2021). 	The court also finds this objection without
merit.
CONCLUSION
The court conducted a de novo review of the objections in relation to the parties’ filings
and the applicable law. 	See FED . R. CRIM . P. 59; 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 	After careful
consideration, the court finds the objections are without merit and that Judge Stetson correctly
concluded that the search and seizure was lawful.
Accordingly, the Defendant’s objections are OVERRULED. 	Judge Stetson’s findings,
conclusions, and analysis are correct, and her report is ADOPTED. 	It is further ORDERED
that the Defendant’s Motion to Suppress (#19) is DENIED.
________________________________________
MARCIA A. CRONE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
SIGNED at Beaumont, Texas, this 14th day of January, 2026.
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