USA v. Williams et al

1:24-cr-00109Txed17 de abr. de 2026

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 	EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 	§
§
versus 	§ 	CASE NO. 1:24-CR-109(2)
§
DARRELL JOSHUA BENDY 	§
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Pending before the court is Defendant Darrell Joshua Bendy’s (“Bendy”) pro se Motion
to Dismiss the Indictment (#446), wherein Bendy “moves to dismiss the indictment through false
testimony, suppression of evidence, and violations of the defendant’s constitutional rights.” The
Government filed a response in opposition (#464), which attached a copy of the transcript of the
grand jury proceedings, and Bendy filed a reply (#486). 	In addition, Bendy filed a Motion for
New Trial (#447). The Government filed a response in opposition (#463), and Bendy filed a reply
(#487). 	Having considered the motions, the Government’s responses, the submissions of the
parties, the record, and the applicable law, the court is of the opinion that the motions should be
denied.
I. 	Background
On November 6, 2024, a federal grand jury in the Eastern District of Texas, Beaumont
Division, returned a thirteen-count Indictment against Bendy and thirteen co-defendants. 	The
Indictment charged Bendy in Count One with Conspiracy to Possess with the Intent to Distribute
50 Grams or More of “Actual” Methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and in Count
Eight with Possession with Intent to Distribute 50 Grams or More of “Actual” Methamphetamine,
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841. 	The case proceeded to a six-day jury trial, beginning on
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November 12, 2025, and Bendy was ultimately found guilty by the jury of both Counts One and
Eight. A sentencing hearing has yet to be set in this matter.
II. 	Vague and Conclusory Assertions
As an initial matter, the court notes that much, if not all, of the contents of Bendy’s
motions lack specificity and clarity as to the alleged errors he asserts. Although pro se motions
are entitled to liberal construction, “pro se litigants are still required to provide sufficient facts in
support of their claims.” Frazier v. Morris, No. 2:11CV104-MPM-DAS, 2014 WL 4686723, at
*4 n.17 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 18, 2014) (citing United States v. Pineda, 988 F.2d 22, 23 (5th Cir.
1993)); accord United States v. Ford, No. CR 21-16-SDD-RLB, 2024 WL 4993385, at *3 (M.D.
La. Dec. 5, 2024); United States v. Obregon, No. CR H-18-533-2, 2023 WL 4494353, at *1
(S.D. Tex. July 10, 2023). 	“Even under the rule of liberal construction, ‘mere conclusory
allegations on a critical issue are insufficient to raise a constitutional issue.’” Frazier, 2014 WL
4686723, at *4 n.17 (quoting Pineda, 988 F.2d at 23); accord Ford, 2024 WL 4993385, at *3;
Obregon, 2023 WL 4494353, at *1. 	Thus, to the extent that Bendy fails to provide sufficient
explanation of the alleged faults he seeks to address, his contentions are properly denied.
III. 	Motion to Dismiss the Indictment
Bendy “moves to dismiss the indictment through false testimony, suppression of evidence,
and violations of the defendant’s constitutional rights.”
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A. 	False and Misleading Testimony
Bendy contends that the Government used false and misleading testimony to “obtain the
indictment and probable cause affidavit.” 1 “The grand jury proceeding is accorded a presumption
of regularity, which generally may be dispelled only upon particularized proof of irregularities in
the grand jury process.” 	United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 75 (1986) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring). A motion alleging a defect in instituting the prosecution, including an error in the
grand jury proceeding or preliminary hearing, must be made before trial if the basis for the motion
is then reasonably available. 	F ED. R. CRIM . P. 12(b)(3). 	A court, however, may excuse a
defendant’s failure to file a timely motion for “good cause.” 	F ED. R. CRIM . P. 12(e). 	Bendy
makes no attempt to show good cause as to why he did not file the pending motion to dismiss until
February 2, 2026, nearly ten weeks after the jury returned its verdict. 2 Nevertheless, even if
Bendy could satisfy the good cause standard, his motion fails to show that dismissal of the
Indictment is warranted.
“As a general matter, a district court may not dismiss an indictment for errors in grand jury
proceedings unless such errors prejudiced the defendant.” 	United States v. Weaver, No.
24-60252, 2025 WL 722683, at *2 (5th Cir. Mar. 6, 2025) (quoting United States v. Cessa, 861
F.3d 121, 141 (5th Cir. 2017)), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 163 (2025); United States v. Whitfield,
590 F.3d 325, 359 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250,
1 Although Bendy mentions “probable cause affidavit,” his arguments and legal authority only
address grand jury proceedings. Accordingly, to the extent that Bendy also intends to challenge a “probable
cause affidavit,” he has provided insufficient explanation of his contention and it is denied.
2 The court observes that Bendy has filed multiple motions to dismiss the Indictment, pre-trial and
post-trial, all of which were denied. See #s 309, 362, 397, 426.
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254 (1988)). “Dismissal of the indictment is appropriate only if it is established that the violation
substantially influenced the grand jury’s decision to indict, or if there is grave doubt that the
decision to indict was free from the substantial influence of such violations.” Weaver, 2025 WL
722683, at *2 (quoting Cessa, 861 F.3d at 141).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has “refuse[d] to adopt the
proposition that, absent perjury or government misconduct, an indictment is flawed simply because
it is based on testimony that may later prove to be questionable.” Weaver, 2025 WL 722683, at
*2 (quoting Cessa, 861 F.3d at 142); United States v. Shows Urquidi, 71 F.4th 357, 366 (5th Cir.
2023). “[W]hen a defendant claims that the prosecution put false information before the grand
jury, [the court] ask[s] two questions: 	(1) did the government ‘knowingly []sponsor[]’ false
information before the grand jury and (2) was that information material, that is, was the
information ‘capable’ of influencing the grand jury’s decision.” Shows Urquidi, 71 F.4th at 366
(quoting Cessa, 861 F.3d at 142).
Bendy alleges that the Government knew that the following evidence presented to the grand
jury was false: “Agent lied about cash app, lied about defendants Bendy and Andrews3 having
jobs, lied about the defendant own[ing] a business, . . . [t]he agent falsely represented drug
quantities that were never seized from defendant, . . . [l]ied about Lpr Hits and weekly trips
before Aug. 14, 2023, . . . [and] lied about Andrews and Bendy selling drugs during Jan. 14,
2023.” Moreover, Bendy appears to contest the validity of the identification of his voice on the
3 Shelby Andrews (“Andrews”) is a co-defendant in this matter and was in a relationship with
Bendy during the times relevant to this case.
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intercepted calls in this case. Bendy maintains that this false evidence precipitated the Indictment.
Each of these assertions, however, is insufficient to warrant dismissal of the Indictment.
1. 	Cash App
With respect to Bendy’s assertion regarding lies “about cash app,” this vague reference
fails to articulate the nature of the purported false information or explain why it was material.
Without more information, the court is unable to evaluate what statements Bendy asserts are false
and whether those statements were material.
2. 	Employment and Business Ownership
Bendy alleges that the agent lied “about defendants Bendy and Andrews having jobs,” and
“about the defendant own[ing] a business.” The agent’s testimony before the grand jury stated:
“We did searches of work history” for Bendy and Andrews, that produced no documentation that
they had a trucking business. Additionally, the agent agreed that his search revealed no significant
employment history for Bendy or Andrews “or anything of note.”
Bendy does not explain how these statements are either false or material. 	Moreover,
during the trial, Special Agent Gianpaolo Marchese testified that his review of the Texas
Workforce Commission (“TWC”) records produced no documentation of employment history for
Bendy. Agent Marchese further testified that although Bendy claimed to have a trucking business,
no such business was reported to the TWC. Further, Bendy had the opportunity to cross-examine
all of the Government’s witnesses, including Agent Marchese, as well as to call his own witnesses.
Bendy did ask Agent Marchese several questions about whether the agent noticed that Bendy kept
an 18-wheeler on his property, which the agent answered in the negative. Bendy did not offer any
evidence to contradict Agent Marchese’s statements. 	Thus, Bendy has failed to show that the
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agent’s statements to the grand jury regarding Bendy’s employment history and business ownership
were false or material. 	See Hernandez v. United States, No. 7:17-CR-1352-1, 2023 WL
11967352, at *29 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2023) (“A petit jury’s guilty verdict generally renders ‘any
error in the grand jury proceeding connected with the charging decision [] harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.’” (quoting United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 70 (1986))), adopted by No.
7:17-CR-1352-1, 2024 WL 4630650 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 7, 2024); United States v. Aldridge, No.
CRIM.A. H-10-185(1), 2011 WL 1811074, at *1 (S.D. Tex. May 10, 2011) (“In cases such as
this that have already proceeded to trial, the Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit have held that
guilty verdicts by a petit jury at trial render grand jury errors harmless because petit juries must
apply a higher standard of guilt to convict than grand juries must employ to indict.”); see also
Wilkerson v. Whitley, 28 F.3d 498, 503 (5th Cir. 1994) (“Moreover, prosecutorial misconduct in
a grand jury proceeding may be deemed harmless if the petit jury convicts.” (citing Mechanik, 475
U.S. at 72)).
3. 	Drug Quantities
Bendy claims that “[t]he agent falsely represented drug quantities that were never seized
from defendant.” Again, Bendy fails to articulate the drug quantities to which he is referring or
how they are material to the grand jury’s decision to indict. Bendy appears to be referring to drug
quantities that were seized from co-defendants, but considering the scale of this conspiracy, the
court cannot discern what events Bendy is challenging.
Moreover, the Government does not need to show that controlled substances were seized
directly from Bendy to implicate him in the conspiracy. See United States v. Martinez, 131 F.4th
294, 309 (5th Cir. 2025) (holding that a defendant may be convicted of conspiracy “even if he
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only played a minor role in the conspiracy” and “a defendant need not know all of the specific
details of the conspiracy . . . and need not have ever physically touched any of the drugs involved
in the conspiracy.” (quoting United States v. Daniels, 723 F.3d 562, 575 (5th Cir.), reh’g granted
in part on other grounds, 729 F.3d 496 (5th Cir. 2013))).
4. 	Drugs Sold from January to August 14, 2023
Bendy also avers that the agent “lied about Andrews and Bendy selling drugs during Jan
— August 14, 2023.” Bendy’s objection is again unclear. During the grand jury proceedings, the
agent detailed several events in chronological order that ultimately supported the Indictment in this
case. 	The first event which highlighted Bendy’s involvement in the conspiracy occurred on
August 14, 2023. Count One of the Indictment, the conspiracy charge, spans from “in or about
December, 2022,” to November 6, 2024. Bendy has previously, without success, challenged the
duration of the conspiracy charge as applied to him. See, e.g., #362 (Motion to Dismiss), #381
(Report and Recommendation), and #405 (Order adopting). 	To the extent that Bendy is
challenging the duration of the conspiracy as applied to him, a conspirator is liable for “all acts
committed by [co-conspirators] in furtherance of the conspiracy, including those acts committed
without his knowledge before he joined the conspiracy.” United States v. Rodriguez-Lopez, 756
F.3d 422, 430 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Marionneaux, 514 F.2d 1244, 1250 (5th
Cir.1975), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438 (1986)); United
States v. Porter, 542 F.3d 1088, 1093 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that defendant “is responsible for
overt 	acts 	completed 	before 	she 	joined 	the 	conspiracy” 	(quoting 	United 	States 	v.
Barksdale–Contreras, 972 F.2d 111, 114 (5th Cir. 1992))); United States v. Blackthorne, 378
F.3d 449, 454 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[O]ne who joins an ongoing conspiracy is deemed to have adopted
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the prior acts and declarations of conspirators, made after the formation and in furtherance of the
conspiracy.” (quoting Barksdale–Contreras, 972 F.2d at 114)); United States v. Davis, 666 F.2d
195, 200 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating that “the prior actions of coconspirators in furtherance of the
conspiracy are attributable to one who later joins the conspiracy”); United States v. Wilson, 500
F.2d 715, 727 (5th Cir. 1974).
5. 	LPR4 Hits and Weekly Trips
Bendy further asserts that the agent “[l]ied about Lpr Hits and weekly trips before Aug.
14, 2023.” Neither the Government nor the court were able to locate mention of “LPR hits” in
the Grand Jury transcript. The agent did, however, state: “Intelligence shows the Andrews and
the vehicle 5 would make weekly trips from Houston to Beaumont, primarily in the afternoon and
late time evenings.” 	Bendy makes no effort to show how this statement was false or material.
Moreover, this information is consistent with testimony and evidence produced during the trial to
establish that Bendy’s co-defendant, Andrews, would make frequent trips between Houston and
Beaumont in the gold Ford Fusion.
The court concludes that Bendy has failed to demonstrate the existence of any false and
material statements made before the grand jury. Accordingly, dismissal of the indictment on these
grounds is not warranted.
4 Although never defined in his motion, the court assumes that by “LPR” Bendy is referring to
License Plate Reader.
5 Referring to the gold Ford Fusion registered to Bendy.
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B. 	Nature of Evidence
Bendy further contends that the grand jury proceedings were flawed because he “was
identified with certainty, no voice exemplar was taken, no authentication was performed under
Rule 901, that the conversations involved drug transactions.” As the Government notes, however,
it is well settled that the Federal Rules of Evidence, other than with respect to privileges, do not
apply to grand jury proceedings. F ED. R. EVID. 1101(d)(2); accord United States v. Walker, 410
F.3d 754, 758 (5th Cir. 2005) (observing that grand jury proceedings “are not bound by the same
rules of evidence as judicial proceedings”); Wilkerson, 28 F.3d at 503 (stating that the grand jury
is “not bound by evidentiary restrictions”). “The Supreme Court has said that grand juries may
initiate investigations based on ‘tips, rumors, evidence offered by the prosecutor, and their own
personal knowledge.’” United States v. McKenzie, 678 F.2d 629, 632 (5th Cir. 1982) (quoting
United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 1, 15 (1973))). 	Accordingly, the Government was not
required to authenticate evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 901 during the grand jury
proceedings.
Further, to the extent Bendy asserts that the Government failed to establish that intercepted
phone calls involved drug transactions, the grand jury merely needed to find probable cause to
believe that a crime was committed. See United States v. Sells Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 423,
(1983). 	“The probable cause decision, by its nature, is hard to undermine, and still harder to
reverse.” 	Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 339 (2014). 	Bendy offers no basis for
challenging the grand jury’s finding, especially after the petit jury returned a guilty verdict as to
both Counts One and Eight, the only counts of the Indictment on which Bendy went to trial. See
Aldridge, 2011 WL 1811074, at *1.
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In addition, Bendy appears to challenge the nature of the Government’s evidence of an
event that occurred on August 14, 2023. 	Specifically, Bendy appears to take issue with the
Government’s presentation of photographs to the grand jury rather than showing the video
recording of the event. Again, Bendy fails to establish that this evidence was “false” or that the
photographic evidence was insufficient to establish probable cause. The Government further notes
that the video recording of the August 14, 2023, event was presented at trial and the jury
ultimately convicted Bendy of both Counts One and Eight, thus weakening any assertion that had
the Government shown the video to the grand jury, it would not have issued the Indictment.
C. 	Discovery Obligations
Under the subheading “Suppression of Brady, Giglio, and Jencks Material,” Bendy
contends that “the Government failed to produce LPR records, wire tap warrants, [and]
minimization logs.” He further asserts that the Government did not produce the “96 page warrant
affidavit . . . until Day 3 of trial.”
With respect to “LPR records,” the Government explains that this data was not gathered
as a documentary file during this investigation. Instead the data was used as a reactionary tool to
enable law enforcement officers to anticipate the arrival of Bendy and his associates in Beaumont
during the investigation. Accordingly, the Government had no LPR records to turn over.
Regarding the Title III wire intercept affidavits, as explained during the trial, Bendy was
provided with notice of the affidavits, copies of the affidavits through counsel, and an opportunity
to review the affidavits with the case agent after he elected to proceed pro se. 	Indeed, the
Government attached several emails and letters to its response documenting its disclosure of the
affidavit to Bendy’s counsel while he was represented by court-appointed counsel, as well as
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notification to Bendy’s stand-by counsel that the affidavit was available for review after Bendy
elected to proceed pro se. 	See #s 464-2, 464-3, 464-4, 464-5, and 464-6. 	Further, the
Government provided the copies of the affidavits to Bendy during the trial proceeding. Bendy’s
continued objection on this ground is without basis.
Concerning “minimization logs,” the Government states that it has complied with the
court’s order requiring it to furnish Bendy with “a copy of the court order and application
authorizing wire, oral or electronic communication interceptions ten (10) days prior to trial.” See
#332. 	The court notes that although Bendy objected to the introduction of several intercepted
phone calls during trial, he did not object on the basis that the intercepted calls were not properly
minimized. See, e.g., #416 (overruling Bendy’s objections to intercepted phone calls). Bendy,
however, did raise the general concept of minimization after the phone calls were admitted into
evidence at trial, but even then he did not specify any particular instance where he questioned the
adequacy of the Government’s minimization efforts. 	Moreover, the Government has provided
documentation that sensitive information, including the Title III application and order, would be
made available for Bendy’s review upon request. See, e.g., #s 464-3, 464-4, 464-6. Accordingly,
Bendy’s complaint regarding disclosure of minimization logs at this stage is unfounded.
To the extent Bendy intends to allege that the Government committed any other discovery
violation under Brady, Giglio, or the Jencks Act, he fails to identify any specific documents,
statements, or other evidence that the Government withheld. 	Regarding Brady material, the
Government avers that it “has identified no Brady material related to Defendant in its case file”
and that “[a]ny allegation relating to a failure to provide such material is false and denied.” See
also #464-5. 	The Government further asserts that “[b]efore the testimony of the government’s
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witnesses at trial, Defendant was handed copies of all relevant reports and statements made by
those individuals.” Because Bendy fails to identify any Brady, Giglio, or Jencks material that he
believes was withheld, his motion is denied.
III. 	Motion for New Trial
Bendy’s Motion for New Trial lists the following grounds that he believes justifies a new
trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33: Discovery Violations; Jencks Act Violations;
Government Misconduct; Wire Tap Authentication Failure; Minimization Failure; and Witness
Impeachment Restrictions.
Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permits the court to vacate a judgment
and grant a new trial on a defendant’s motion if it determines that “the interest of justice so
requires.” F ED. R. CRIM . P. 33(a). The rule specifies, however, that “[a]ny motion for a new
trial grounded on newly discovered evidence must be filed within 3 years after the verdict or
finding of guilty.” FED. R. CRIM . P. 33(b)(1). The rule further states that “any motion for a new
trial grounded on any reason other than newly discovered evidence must be filed within 14 days
after the verdict or finding of guilty.” 	F ED. R. C RIM . P. 33(b)(2). 	This deadline is generally
viewed as an inflexible claim-processing rule that prevents the court from accepting a late-filed
motion if the Government objects. See Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 19 (2005); United
States v. Scott, 70 F.4th 846, 859 (5th Cir. 2023).
No issues raised in Bendy’s motion relate to newly discovered evidence, and the
Government’s response (#463) asserts that the court must deny Bendy’s motion for failure to
comply with the 14-day deadline in Rule 33. The jury returned its verdict and finding of guilt on
November 19, 2025. 	Pursuant to Rule 33, Bendy should have filed his motion grounded on
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reasons other than newly discovered evidence within fourteen days after the verdict or finding of
guilty—on or before December 3, 2025. United States v. Cobas, 415 F. App’x 555, 556 (5th Cir.
2011) (“Any motion for a new trial grounded on any reason other than newly discovered evidence
must be filed within 14 days after the verdict or finding of guilty.”); see also F ED. R. CRIM . P.
33(b)(2).
In his reply, Bendy opposes the Government’s contention that his motion is untimely and
states that “multiple timely filing attempts were obstructed by clerical failure and filing
irregularities.” Bendy contends that his family members and friends attempted to file motions on
his behalf, but he does not provide documentation of the purported motions, an indication of the
arguments allegedly raised therein, or evidence that these motions complied with the court’s orders
regarding his pro se filings in this case. See, e.g., #347 (requiring that Bendy’s filings with the
court be signed by him prior to filing), #349 (cautioning Bendy that his filings with the court must
be filed by mail or in person (not by facsimile) and must be signed by him prior to filing), #360
(stating that clerk’s office will not accept any filings by facsimile or email from Bendy and
cautioning Bendy that his continued refusal to sign his filings could result in them being returned
to him as improper), #409 (refusing to accept for filing three motions Bendy presented to the court
because they appeared to have been prepared by an individual (other than Bendy in his pro se
capacity) who was not admitted to practice law in this court, and appeared to be generated with
the assistance of artificial intelligence without proper review and verification, among other
reasons). Accordingly, the court concludes that Bendy’s motion is untimely.
Furthermore, even if Bendy had timely filed his motion for new trial, his accusations lack
the particularity and specificity required to allow the Government to respond and the court to rule
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on his motion. 	First, under the heading “Discovery violations,” Bendy states that “the
Government failed to comply with Rule 16 and this court’s discovery order.” 	There is no
additional information provided. This conclusory statement is insufficient to support a motion for
new trial.
Next, under the subheading “Jencks Act Violations,” Bendy contends “Required witness
statements under 18 U.S.C. § 3500 were not produced.” The Government provided Bendy with
copies of all relevant reports and statements made by its witnesses before they testified. 	The
Jencks Act provides that statements made by the Government’s witnesses do not have to be
disclosed “until said witness has testified on direct examination in the trial of the case.” 	18
U.S.C. § 3500(a). 	Accordingly, the Government has complied with the requirements of the
Jencks Act.
Bendy also contends that the “Government withheld evidence, misled the defense, and
introduced undisclosed material at trial.” 	This vague and conclusory statement provides no
context or specific issues for the court to address.
Under the subheading “Wire Tap Authentication Failures” Bendy asserts that the
“Government failed to Authenticate recordings under FRE 901 and Failed to show proper sealing,
chain of custody, and voice identification.” The Government, however, presented testimony from
Penny Folloder, a Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) Telecommunications Specialist,
Courtney Daniels, a representative of Verizon, Abel Jennings, a representative of AT&T, Ricardo
Leal, a representative of T-Mobile, and Greg Cherundolo, with JSI Telecom, to authenticate the
intercepted phone calls, and they were admitted by the court. See #416 (supplementing the court’s
oral order admitting intercepted phone calls). Bendy’s conclusory statement fails to articulate how
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the Government’s authentication of the intercepted phone calls falls short of the requirements of
Federal Rule of Evidence 901.
Bendy also states that the “Government violated 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) by failing to
minimize non-pertinent calls.” Again, Bendy fails to indicate which phone calls he contends were
not properly minimized, providing the court exactly zero context to evaluate his assertion.
Finally, Bendy avers that he was “improperly limited from [] impeaching government
witness, violating the 6th Amendment.” Again, no explanation is provided to allow the court to
understand his claim. Without any additional information, Bendy’s conclusory statement fails to
support his motion for new trial.
In his reply, Bendy also adds claims for “Brady violations,” “Franks violation,” and “Title
III violations.” 	With respect to an asserted Brady violation, Bendy states that “Grand Jury
testimony at page 28 lines 7-20 and page 29 line 1-3 was not disclosed prior to trial. 	This
prevented Defendant from challenging probable cause and preparing a defense, violating Brady
v. Maryland.” 	The identified excerpt from the Grand Jury testimony discusses: 	(i) Cash App
payments made by co-defendant Joseph Lynn Williams to Andrews and (ii) the agent’s testimony
that Bendy and Andrews did not have any significant employment history.
The Government violates Brady where it suppresses evidence that is (1) favorable to the
accused, either because it was exculpatory or impeaching, and (2) material. 	United States v.
Cessa, 861 F.3d 121, 128 (5th Cir. 2017). Here, Bendy fails to articulate how this testimony was
either favorable or material in order to be considered Brady material. 	As stated above, the
Government avers that it did not identify any Brady material related to Bendy in this matter.
Moreover, the Government provided the grand jury transcripts to Bendy prior to Agent Marchese
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testifying pursuant to the Jencks Act. Information which falls under Brady or Giglio that is also
subject to the Jencks Act need not be produced until after the government witness testifies unless
the failure to produce the information in advance would prevent the defendant from effectively
using it at trial. See United States v. Swenson, 894 F.3d 677, 683 (5th Cir. 2018); United States
v. O’Keefe, 128 F.3d 885, 898 (5th Cir. 1997) (“When evidence is disclosed at trial in time for
it to be put to effective use, a new trial will not be granted “simply because it [the Brady evidence]
was not disclosed as early as it might have and, indeed, should have been.” (quoting United States
v. McKinney, 758 F.2d 1036, 1050 (5th Cir. 1985))); United States v. Brown, 699 F.2d 704, 709
(5th Cir. 1983) (“[W]hen alleged Brady material is contained in Jencks Act material, disclosure
is generally timely if the government complies with the Jencks Act.” (quoting United States v.
Anderson, 574 F.2d 1347, 1352 (5th Cir. 1978))); United States v. Harris, 349 F.R.D. 614, 618
(E.D. La. 2025) (collecting cases).
As to Bendy’s contentions of Franks violations and Title III violations, his contentions
continue to lack specificity, and thus, the court will not hypothesize as to the alleged faults Bendy
intends to raise. Therefore, Bendy’s motion for new trial provides no basis for relief.
IV. 	Conclusion
Accordingly, Bendy has failed to show that either dismissal of the Indictment or that a new
trial is warranted. Bendy’s pro se Motion to Dismiss the Indictment (#446) and Motion for New
Trial Pursuant to Rule 33 (#447) are DENIED.
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________________________________________
MARCIA A. CRONE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
SIGNED at Beaumont, Texas, this 17th day of April, 2026.
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