USA v. Williams et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 	EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 	§
§
versus 	§ 	CASE NO. 1:24-CR-109 (2)
§
DARRELL JOSHUA BENDY 	§
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Pending before the court are Defendant Darrell Joshua Bendy’s (“Bendy”) Objections
(#384) to the Government’s Proposed Final Jury Instructions (#358), wherein he states a “general
objection,” as well as “specific instructions.” The Government filed a reply in opposition (#421).
Having considered the proposed instructions, Bendy’s objections, the Government’s reply, the
submissions of the parties, the record, and the applicable law, the court is of the opinion that the
objections should be overruled.
I. 	General Objection
Bendy generally objects to the entirety of the proposed jury instructions to the extent that
they “misstate, omit, or dilute the constitutional and evidentiary protections guaranteed by the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments.” Bendy states that the proposed jury instructions would “unfairly
prejudice the defense, lower the government’s burden of proof, and confuse the jury as to essential
elements of the charged offenses.” The Government opposes Bendy’s general objection, noting
that he fails to articulate the specific language that he opposes. 	Moreover, the Government’s
proposed instructions track the language of the Fifth Circuit’s Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions,
which are designed to prevent the prejudice and confusion claimed by Bendy. Therefore, to the
extent that Bendy fails to state a specific objection to the pattern language approved by the Fifth
Circuit, the court overrules his objection.
Case 1:24-cr-00109-MAC-CLS Document 422 Filed 11/18/25 Page 1 of 9 PageID #:
<pageID>

II. 	Specific Objections
A. 	Presumption of Innocence and Burden of Proof (1.05)
Bendy’s objection: 	Bendy objects to any deviation from the Fifth Circuit Pattern
Jury Instruction § 1.05. 	The 	government’s 	proposed
language omits emphasis that the presumption of innocence
alone is sufficient to acquit unless the prosecution meets its
burden.
Requested Revision: 	The presumption of innocence alone is sufficient to acquit
the defendant unless the government proves beyond a
reasonable doubt every essential element of the offense
charged.
As observed by the Government, the proposed language does not deviate from the Fifth
Circuit’s Pattern Jury Instruction 1.05. Both state:
The indictment or formal charge against a defendant is not evidence of guilt.
Indeed, the defendant is presumed by the law to be innocent. The defendant begins
with a clean slate. The law does not require a defendant to prove his innocence or
produce any evidence at all and no inference whatever may be drawn from the
election of a defendant not to testify.
The government has the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt, and if it fails to do so, you must acquit the defendant. While the
government’s burden of proof is a strict or heavy burden, it is not necessary that
the defendant’s guilt be proved beyond all possible doubt. It is only required that
the government’s proof exclude any “reasonable doubt” concerning the defendant’s
guilt.
A “reasonable doubt” is a doubt based upon reason and common sense after careful
and impartial consideration of all the evidence in the case. 	Proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, therefore, is proof of such a convincing character that you would
be willing to rely and act upon it without hesitation in making the most important
decisions of your own affairs.
Hence it is Bendy who deviates from the Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction 1.05 by
adding language that is not included in Instruction 1.05. 	Accordingly, the court finds that the
2
Case 1:24-cr-00109-MAC-CLS Document 422 Filed 11/18/25 Page 2 of 9 PageID #:
<pageID>

proposed language adequately addresses the presumption of innocence of Bendy. The objection
is overruled.
B. 	“On or About” Instruction (1.19)
Bendy’s objection: 	The “on or about” instruction as proposed improperly
expands the indictment’s time frame and allows conviction
for acts not charged.
Requested Revision: 	Require proof that the offense occurred within the period
alleged in the indictment and reasonably related thereto, not
merely “reasonably near.”
Here, the Indictment charges Bendy in Count One with Conspiracy to Possess with the
Intent to Distribute 50 Grams or More of “Actual” Methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 846, from in or about December 2022 and continuing thereafter up to and including November
6, 2024, and in Count Eight with Possession with Intent to Distribute 50 Grams or More of
“Actual” Methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841, on or about April 20, 2024. The
proposed and pattern jury instructions do not expand the Indictment’s time frame. 	“The
prosecution is not required to prove the exact date alleged in the indictment; it suffices if a date
reasonably near is established.” 	United States v. Mata, 491 F.3d 237, 243 (5th Cir. 2007)
(quoting United States v. Valdez, 453 F.3d 252, 260 (5th Cir. 2006)); see also United States v.
Knowlton, 993 F.3d 354, 359 (5th Cir. 2021); United States v. Girod, 646 F.3d 304, 316-17 (5th
Cir. 2011). The proposed and pattern instructions requires that the Government “prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime on a date reasonably near” the dates
stated in the Indictment. Moreover, “a defendant who has joined a conspiracy continues to violate
the law ‘through every moment of [the conspiracy’s] existence,’. . . and he becomes responsible
for the acts of his co-conspirators in pursuit of their common plot.” Smith v. United States, 568
3
Case 1:24-cr-00109-MAC-CLS Document 422 Filed 11/18/25 Page 3 of 9 PageID #:
<pageID>

U.S. 106, 111 (2013). 	“A conspirator is liable for ‘all acts committed by [co-conspirators] in
furtherance of the conspiracy, including those acts committed without his knowledge before he
joined the conspiracy.’” United States v. Rodriguez-Lopez, 756 F.3d 422, 430 (5th Cir. 2014)
(quoting United States v. Marionneaux, 514 F.2d 1244, 1250 (5th Cir.1975), abrogated on other
grounds by United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438 (1986)). Thus, Bendy’s objection is overruled.
C. 	Venue Instructions (1.20, 1.20A)
Bendy’s objection: 	Defendant objects to 	the “preponderance of evidence”
standard for venue. 	Venue is a constitutional safeguard
under Article III, §2, and the Sixth Amendment, and must
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt when contested.
Requested Revision: 	“Venue must be established beyond a reasonable doubt that
the alleged offense occurred within the Eastern District of
Texas.”
The requested revision is not in line with controlling precedent on this issue which requires
the use of a preponderance of the evidence standard with respect to establishing venue. “[T]he
prosecution’s burden of proof in establishing venue differs from the burden of proving other
elements. 	The prosecution need only show the propriety of venue by a preponderance of the
evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Strain, 396 F.3d 689, 692 n.3 (5th
Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Winship, 724 F.2d 1116, 1124 (5th Cir. 1984)); see also United
States v. McGuire, 151 F.4th 307, 345 (5th Cir. 2025); United States v. Lee, 966 F.3d 310, 320
(5th Cir. 2020); United States v. Garcia Mendoza, 587 F.3d 682, 686 (5th Cir. 2009). Therefore,
Bendy’s objection is overruled.
D. 	Conspiracy Instruction (2.97)
Bendy’s objection: 	The government’s instruction misstates the law by omitting
the possibility of multiple conspiracies and by failing to
require a specific unlawful agreement and an overt act.
4
Case 1:24-cr-00109-MAC-CLS Document 422 Filed 11/18/25 Page 4 of 9 PageID #:
<pageID>

Requested Addition: 	“Evidence of multiple conspiracies requires acquittal unless
the government proves beyond a reasonable doubt that
Defendant 	knowingly 	and 	willfully 	joined 	the 	single
conspiracy charged.”
“Mere 	association, 	presence, 	or 	knowledge 	of 	others’
criminal conduct does not establish conspiracy.”
As the Government notes, Bendy previously filed a motion to dismiss the Indictment,
wherein he alleged that the Government has alleged one conspiracy when there are in fact
multiple, unrelated conspiracies (#362). 	The court rejected this assertion and held that the
Indictment properly alleges a conspiracy involving Bendy and other co-defendants who participated
in a series of acts or transactions (drug trafficking) constituting a violation of the conspiracy
statute. (#s 381,405).
Now, Bendy appears to be requesting an instruction on multiple conspiracies. Count One
of the Indictment charges Bendy with Conspiracy to Possess with the Intent to Distribute 50 Grams
or More of “Actual” Methamphetamine. 	Bendy fails to articulate his basis for requesting an
instruction on multiple conspiracies or to specify what separate conspiracy, apart from the overall
conspiracy, he alleges existed. 	The evidence at trial focused on Bendy’s role as a supplier of
multi-kilogram quantities of “actual” methamphetamine which were further distributed by
co-conspirators.
The court finds that the evidence presented at trial does not warrant an instruction on
multiple conspiracies. See, e.g., United States v. Lozano, 640 F. App’x 326, 327 (5th Cir. 2016)
(holding that multiple conspiracy instruction was not required where there was no evidence of
either the existence of an additional conspiracy separate and distinct from that charged in the
indictment or that the defendant was only involved in separate conspiracies unrelated to the overall
5
Case 1:24-cr-00109-MAC-CLS Document 422 Filed 11/18/25 Page 5 of 9 PageID #:
<pageID>

conspiracy charged in the indictment); United States v. Neal, 27 F.3d 1035, 1053 (5th Cir. 1994)
(holding that an instruction on multiple conspiracies was not warranted based on information
presented at trial); see also United States v. Shah, 95 F.4th 328, 361 (5th Cir. 2024) (holding that
the primary factors the Fifth Circuit requires to be used in determining whether a single conspiracy
or multiple conspiracies are: “(1) the existence of a common goal; (2) the nature of the scheme;
and (3) the overlapping of the participants in the various dealings”), cert. denied sub nom. Rimlawi
v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 518 (2025).
As to Bendy’s requested addition of “[m]ere association, presence, or knowledge of others’
criminal conduct does not establish conspiracy,” the proposed and pattern language more
thoroughly addresses this issue:
Mere presence at the scene of an event, even with knowledge that a crime is being
committed, or the mere fact that certain persons may have associated with each other
and may have assembled together and discussed common aims and interests, does
not necessarily establish proof of the existence of a conspiracy. A person who has
no knowledge of a conspiracy, but who happens to act in a way that advances some
purpose of a conspiracy, does not thereby become a conspirator.
For these reasons, Bendy’s objection is overruled.
E. 	Possession Instruction (1.33)
Bendy’s objection: 	The proposed instruction conflates “possession” and
“control,” permitting conviction based on mere
proximity or association.
Requested Clarification: 	“Mere 	proximity 	to 	a 	controlled substance, or
association with a person who possesses it, without
proof of dominion or control, is insufficient to
establish possession.”
The Government’s proposed and the pattern instruction is more comprehensive than
Bendy’s proposed language. Specifically, the proposed and pattern instruction provides that:
6
Case 1:24-cr-00109-MAC-CLS Document 422 Filed 11/18/25 Page 6 of 9 PageID #:
<pageID>

“Possession,” as that term is used in these instructions, may be one of two
kinds: actual possession or constructive possession.
A person who knowingly has direct physical control over a thing, at a given
time, is in actual possession of it.
Mere touching or physical contact alone is insufficient by itself to establish
possession.
A person who, although not in actual possession, knowingly has both the
power and the intention, at a given time, to exercise dominion or control over a
thing, either directly or through another person or persons, is in constructive
possession of it.
Possession may be sole or joint. 	If one person alone has actual or
constructive possession of a thing, possession is sole. If two or more persons share
actual or constructive possession of a thing, possession is joint.
You may find that the element of possession is present if you find beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant had actual or constructive possession, either
alone or jointly with others.
Accordingly, the court will rely on the pattern language. Bendy’s objection is overruled.
F. 	Aiding and Abetting Instruction (2.04)
Bendy’s Objection: 	The proposed instruction omits the requirement that the
principal offense must be established beyond a reasonable
doubt before any aider and abettor liability attaches.
Requested Revision: 	“A defendant cannot be convicted as an aider or abettor
unless the government first proves beyond a reasonable
doubt 	that 	another 	person 	committed 	the 	underlying
offense.”
The Government’s proposed and the pattern instruction on Aiding and Abetting require the
jury to “find beyond a reasonable doubt that every element of the offense as defined in these
instructions was committed by some person or persons, and that the defendant voluntarily
participated in its commission with the intent to violate the law.” Accordingly, Bendy’s objection
mistakenly states that the proposed instruction omits this requirement. The court will rely on the
7
Case 1:24-cr-00109-MAC-CLS Document 422 Filed 11/18/25 Page 7 of 9 PageID #:
<pageID>

pattern language which is broader and better states the law than Bendy’s requested revision.
Bendy’s objection is overruled.
G. 	Similar Acts and 404(b) Evidence (1.32)
Bendy’s objection: 	Defendant objects to inclusion of “similar acts” instructions
that may improperly permit the jury to infer criminal
propensity. The instruction must make clear that prior acts
cannot be used to prove character or conformity therewith.
Requested Revision: 	“Evidence of other acts may not be considered to show the
defendant’s character or that he acted in conformity with that
character.
During the trial, the court admitted evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) of
Bendy’s prior conviction of the offense of Possession of a Firearm by a Prohibited Person and
gave a limiting instruction. 	The proposed and pattern instruction make clear that this evidence
may not be considered in deciding if Bendy committed the acts charged in the Indictment, but only
for specific, permissible purposes. 	See FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2) (“This evidence may be
admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.”). Accordingly, Bendy’s objection
is overruled.
H. 	Identification Instruction (1.31)
Bendy’s objection: 	Defendant objects to the omission of cautionary language
concerning potential misidentification and witness credibility
in controlled buys and surveillance.
Requested Addition: 	“Where identification is a key issue, you must examine the
witness’s opportunity to observe, prior familiarity, and the
reliability of any law enforcement procedures used.”
8
Case 1:24-cr-00109-MAC-CLS Document 422 Filed 11/18/25 Page 8 of 9 PageID #:
<pageID>

The Government’s proposed and the pattern instruction adequately address Bendy’s
concerns without focusing on only limited aspects of the identification inquiry. Instruction 1.33
provides, in part:
In evaluating the identification testimony of a witness, you should consider all of
the factors already mentioned concerning your assessment of the credibility of any
witness in general, and should also consider whether the witness had an adequate
opportunity to observe the person in question at the time or times about which the
witness testified. You may consider all matters, including the length of time the
witness had to observe the person in question, the prevailing conditions at that time
in terms of visibility or distance and the like, and whether the witness had known
or observed the person at earlier times.
You may also consider the circumstances surrounding the identification itself
including, for example, the manner in which the defendant was presented to the
witness for identification and the length of time that elapsed between the incident
in question and the next opportunity the witness had to observe the defendant.
Therefore, the court will utilize the pattern language approved by the Fifth Circuit.
Bendy’s objection is overruled.
III. 	Conclusion
In accordance with the foregoing, Bendy’s Objections (#384) to the Government’s
Proposed Final Jury Instructions are overruled.
9
________________________________________
MARCIA A. CRONE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
SIGNED at Beaumont, Texas, this 18th day of November, 2025.
Case 1:24-cr-00109-MAC-CLS Document 422 Filed 11/18/25 Page 9 of 9 PageID #:
<pageID>