USA v. Cabiro

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA §
§
versus § CASE NO. 1:20-CR-22(1)
§
PAUL ANDREW CABIRO §
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Pending before the court is Defendant Paul Andrew Cabiro’s (“Cabiro”) pro se Request
for Early Termination of Supervised Release (#58) wherein Cabiro seeks early termination of
his three-year term of supervised release. Cabiro’s United States Probation and Pretrial Services
(“Probation”) Officer in the Eastern District of Texas prepared a report for the court’s
consideration. The report indicates that Cabiro’s supervising Probation Officer in the Southern
District of Texas expressed no objections to the early termination request and that the Government
is also unopposed. His Probation Officer in the Eastern District of Texas, however, is opposed
to the early termination of Cabiro’s supervised release and recommends that his supervision be
continued as ordered. Having considered the motion, the viewpoints of Probation in the Southern
and Eastern Districts of Texas, the Government’s position, the record, and the applicable law, the
court is of the opinion that Cabiro’s motion should be denied.
I. Background
On March 4, 2020, a federal grand jury in the Eastern District of Texas, Beaumont
Division, returned a two-count Indictment against Cabiro charging him in Count One with
Possession with the Intent to Distribute a Controlled Substance—lysergic acid diethylamide
(“LSD”); 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (“MDMA”); cocaine HCl; heroin; and fentanyl,
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and in Count Two with Possession of a Firearm in
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Furtherance of a Drug Trafficking Offense (#6). On December 2, 2020, Cabiro pleaded guilty
to the offense charged in Count One of the Indictment, pursuant to a binding plea agreement (#43).
On March 24, 2021, the court sentenced Cabiro pursuant to the plea agreement to a term of 70
months’ imprisonment as to Count One, to be followed by a three-year term of supervised release
(#56). On February 9, 2024, Cabiro began serving his term of supervised release in the Southern
District of Texas, which is projected to expire on February 8, 2027.
In his motion, Cabiro, age 44, asks the court to terminate his supervision at this time,
having served almost two years of his three-year term of supervised release. In his motion, Cabiro
maintains that since the beginning of his supervision, he has complied fully with all terms and
conditions of supervised release, including reporting, payments, and program requirements. He
asserts that he has maintained steady employment since he arrived at the halfway house, working
at Williams Brothers Construction, Aerotek, and Integra Mission Critical. He has submitted
written character references from three of his supervisors. Cabiro further claims that he has
strengthened his family relationships and built a stable support system. He has also provided a
letter of support from his brother which addresses his growth and responsibility. Cabiro states that
he has remained law-abiding and drug-free, focusing on his career and future. He adds that he
has obtained his TWIC (“Transportation Worker Identification Credential”) card after many
attempts, which demonstrates his persistence and ability to meet federal security standards.
II. Analysis
Title 18, United States Code, Section 3583(e) authorizes a district court to terminate
supervised release at any time after the expiration of one year if, after considering certain of the
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factors set forth in Section 3553(a),1 “it is satisfied that such action is warranted by the conduct
of the defendant released and the interest of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1); accord United
States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 59-60 (2000); United States v. Peters, 856 F. App’x 230, 233
(11th Cir. 2021); Herndon v. Upton, 985 F.3d 443, 446 n.5 (5th Cir. 2021); United States v.
Melvin, 978 F.3d 49, 52 (3d Cir. 2020); United States v. Cochran, 815 F. App’x 361, 363 (11th
Cir. 2020); United States v. Davies, 746 F. App’x 86, 88-89 (3d Cir. 2018). In addition, the
United States Sentencing Guidelines list supplemental factors that the court may wish to consider
when determining whether to terminate the remaining term of supervised release.2 “Early
termination of supervised release is not an entitlement.” United States v. George, 534 F. Supp.
3d 926, 927 (N.D. Ill. 2021). Instead, the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that early
termination is warranted. Id.; United States v. Luna, No. 1:95-cr-05036-AWI, 2018 WL
10156108, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2018), aff’d, 747 F. App’x 561 (9th Cir. 2018). Early
1 These factors include: the nature and circumstances of the offense and the defendant’s history
and characteristics; the need to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; the need to protect the
public from further crimes of the defendant; the need to provide the defendant with needed educational or
vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; the kinds
of sentences and sentencing ranges established for defendants with similar characteristics under applicable
Sentencing Commission guidelines and policy statements; any pertinent policy statement of the Sentencing
Commission in effect on the date of sentencing; the need to avoid unwarranted disparities among
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and the need to provide
restitution to any victims of the offense. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(e).
2 Specifically, the Guidelines list: (i) any history of court-reported violations over the term of
supervision; (ii) the ability of the defendant to lawfully self-manage (e.g., the ability to problem-solve and
avoid situations that may result in a violation of a condition of supervised release or new criminal charges);
(iii) the defendant’s substantial compliance with all conditions of supervision; (iv) the defendant’s
engagement in appropriate prosocial activities and the existence or lack of prosocial support to remain
lawful beyond the period of supervision; (v) a demonstrated reduction in risk level or maintenance of the
lowest category of risk over the period of supervision; and (vi) whether termination will jeopardize public
safety, as evidenced by the nature of the defendant’s offense, the defendant’s criminal history, the
defendant’s record while incarcerated, the defendant’s efforts to reintegrate into the community and avoid
recidivism, any statements or information provided by the victims of the offense, and other factors the
court finds relevant. U.S.S.G. § 5D1.4, Application Note B.
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termination “is not warranted as a matter of course.” United States v. Morris, No. 3:99-cr-264-17
(VAB), 2022 WL 3703201, at *3 (D. Conn. Aug. 26, 2022). “To the contrary, it is only
‘occasionally’ justified.” United States v. Shellef, No. 03-CR-0723 (JFB), 2018 WL 3199249,
at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2018) (quoting United States v. Lussier, 104 F.3d 32, 36 (2d Cir. 1997)).
In fact, in United States v. Bowe, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated
that “Congress has manifested an intent to require full service of supervised release for
rehabilitative purposes.” 309 F.3d 234, 240 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing Johnson, 529 U.S. at 53).
Although the Government and the Probation Officer in the Southern District of Texas do
not oppose early termination, this fact, standing alone, is insufficient to justify granting Cabiro’s
request for early termination of his three-year term of supervised release. See, e.g., United States
v. Boyd, 606 F. App’x 953, 960 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Just as a federal prosecutor or probation
officer cannot dictate a district court’s sentence, they likewise do not call the shots concerning a
court’s decision whether to terminate early a term of supervised release. A criminal sentence is
the court’s sentence, not the prosecutor’s and not the probation officer’s.”); United States v. Lynn,
No. S90-00053(P), 2022 WL 2446328, at *3 (S.D. Miss. May 31, 2022) (finding that although
the Government and Probation did not oppose early termination, that fact, standing alone, was
insufficient to justify granting the defendant’s request for early termination of supervised release);
United States v. Hartman, No. 3:00-cr-228-B(01), 2013 WL 524257, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 18,
2013) (denying defendant’s request for early termination of supervised release despite the
Government’s recommendation that it be granted), adopted by 2013 WL 540490 (N.D. Tex. Feb.
13, 2013); United States v. Grimaldi, 482 F. Supp. 2d 248, 249 (D. Conn. 2007) (denying early
termination even though the defendant’s probation officer supported it).
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District courts enjoy considerable discretion in determining when the interest of justice
warrants early termination. United States v. Tacker, 672 F. App’x 470, 471 (5th Cir. 2017);
United States v. Jeanes, 150 F.3d 483, 484-85 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Lynn, No. S90-
00053(P), 2022 WL 2446328, at *3 (S.D. Miss. May 31, 2022); see Melvin, 978 F.3d at 52.
Compliance with the terms of supervised release and with the law alone is not enough to merit
early termination; such conduct is expected and required. United States v. Taylor, 729 F. App’x
474, 475 (7th Cir. 2018) (“[M]ere compliance with the terms of supervised release is expected,
and without more, insufficient to justify early termination.”); United States v. Seymore, No. CR
07-358, 2023 WL 3976200, at *1 (E.D. La. June 13, 2023) (“[C]ourts have generally held that
something more than compliance with the terms of [supervised release] is required to justify an
early termination . . . .” (quoting United States v. Smith, No. 10-cr-53-DPJ-FKB, 2014 WL
68796, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 8, 2014))); Lynn, 2022 WL 2446328, at *4 (although the defendant
adhered to the conditions of his release, a balancing of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors did not
support early termination, noting that the defendant “engaged in constant serious criminal behavior
when he was given chances before”); United States v. Sandles, No. 11-CR-204-PP, 2021 WL
3080995, at *3 (E.D. Wis. July 21, 2021) (“[C]ourts have held ‘that the conduct of the defendant
necessary to justify early termination should include more than simply following the rules of
supervision; otherwise, every defendant who avoided revocation would be eligible for early
termination.’” (quoting United States v. O’Hara, No. 00-cr-170, 2011 WL 4356322, *3 (E.D.
Wis. Sept. 16, 2011))); United States v. Boudreaux, No. 2:19-CR-00377-01, 2020 WL 7635708,
at *1 (W.D. La. Dec. 22, 2020); United States v. Pittman, No. 3:15-CR-221-O(1), 2020 WL
6564724, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 9, 2020) (finding that the conduct of the defendant did not
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warrant early termination of supervised release, as the defendant sought relief based on his
circumstances and the alleged conduct of others) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1)); see United States
v. Berger, No. CR 09-308, 2021 WL 2354517, at *5 (W.D. Pa. June 9, 2021) (“Compliance with
the conditions of supervision, including refraining from engaging in criminal conduct and paying
restitution, however, is required behavior while serving a term of supervised release.”). As courts
have observed, “if every defendant who complied with the terms of supervised release were
entitled to early termination, ‘the exception would swallow the rule.’” United States v. Kassim,
No. 15 Cr. 554-3 (KPF), 2020 WL 2614760, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2020) (citing United States
v. Medina, 17 F. Supp. 2d 245, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)).
While the court need not find extraordinary, compelling, or changed circumstances to
justify an early termination of supervised release, this does not mean that such circumstances are
irrelevant to ruling on a motion under § 3583(e)(1). United States v. Ferriero, No. 13-0592 (ES),
2020 WL 6701469, at *2 (D.N.J. Nov. 13, 2020) (citing Melvin, 978 F.3d at 53); accord United
States v. Parisi, 821 F.3d 343, 347 (2d Cir. 2016). This is because, if a sentence was “sufficient,
but not greater than necessary” when first pronounced, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), it would
be expected that something has changed that would justify an early end to a term of supervised
release. Melvin, 978 F.3d at 53; United States v. Jackson, No. 11-55, 2022 WL 2789870, at *2
(W.D. Pa. July 15, 2022); United States v. Santoro, No. 21-76 (MAS), 2022 WL 37471, at *2
(D.N.J. Jan. 4, 2022); Ferriero, 2020 WL 6701469, at *2. In other words, extraordinary
circumstances may be sufficient to justify early termination of a term of supervised release, but
they are not necessary for such a termination. Melvin, 978 F.3d at 53; United States v.
McClamma, 676 F. App’x 944, 947 (11th Cir. 2017) (“New or unforeseen circumstances can
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justify a modification, but such circumstances are not necessary.”); Parisi, 821 F.3d at 347
(recognizing that “changed circumstances may in some instances justify a modification” of a term
of supervision). Nonetheless, “‘generally, early termination of supervised release under
§ 3583(e)(1)’ will be proper ‘only when the sentencing judge is satisfied that new or unforeseen
circumstances’ warrant it.” Melvin, 978 F.3d at 53 (quoting Davies, 746 F. App’x at 89); United
States v. Baptiste, No. 98-207, 2025 WL 871520, at *1 (E.D. La. Mar. 20, 2025) (noting that
early termination is generally warranted “only in cases where the defendant shows changed
circumstances, such as exceptionally good behavior” (quoting United States v. Jones, No. V-11-
21, 2013 WL 2417927, at *1 (S.D. Tex. June 4, 2013))); Smith, 2014 WL 68796, at *1.
According to Cabiro’s Presentence Report (“PSR”), prepared on February 23, 2021, his
offense of conviction entails his possession with intent to distribute a variety of controlled
substances—LSD, MDMA, cocaine, heroin, and fentanyl. On February 21, 2020, a Jefferson
County Sheriff’s deputy conducted a traffic stop on a vehicle being driven by Cabiro for speeding
and failing to maintain a single lane. While speaking with Cabiro and his female passenger, the
deputy noted that they both appeared nervous. When the deputy asked if there were any guns in
the vehicle, Cabiro hesitated and then responded, “No.” Cabiro denied the deputy consent to
search the vehicle. A canine officer was called to the scene and, after conducting an “open air
sniff,” alerted to the presence of drugs in the vehicle. A subsequent search of the vehicle revealed
two fully loaded Smith & Wesson .38 special revolvers in the center console, a black and gray
backpack with a small container containing marijuana wax and several vapes containing THC oil,
a gray and white backpack with an Altoids metal container holding methamphetamine, a large
plastic bag with a variety of drugs, including ketamine pills, crushed clonazepam pills, 480 doses
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of LSD, 97.6 grams of marijuana, 41 Adderall pills, 101.6 grams of psilocybin mushrooms, 121.6
grams of heroin, 48 grams of cocaine, 48.2 grams of MDMA, and a black leather bag holding
$10,580 in U.S. currency. Cabiro signed a Factual Basis and Stipulation in which he admitted to
the facts set forth above. He was held responsible for 97.6 grams of marijuana, 101.6 grams of
psilocybin mushrooms, 121.6 grams of heroin, 48 grams of cocaine, 1.235 grams of ketamine,
32.962 net grams of methamphetamine (actual), 5.123 net grams of LSD, 11.18 net grams of
tetrahydrocannibinol (“THC”), and 2.342 net grams of clonazepam.
Cabiro’s criminal history includes prior convictions for possession of marijuana, theft, and
driving while intoxicated (2x). Two prior terms of probation were amended before he was
ultimately discharged from probation. He was also arrested for the wrongful use of controlled
substances while serving in the U.S. Army and was administratively discharged for drug abuse
in 2004. He was previously married and has two children with his ex-wife, who are now about
13 and 11 years old. The PSR indicates that Child Protective Services was contacted previously
because Cabiro was suspected of being involved in drugs and the welfare of his two children was
in question.
Cabiro reported a long history of poly-substance abuse beginning at age 12, when he first
smoked marijuana, which he then used daily until arrested in 2020 for his offense of conviction.
He also consumed alcohol daily from age 16, when he also began using ecstasy and LSD. He
stated that he used ecstasy “a lot” and LSD “sporadically” until his arrest. Cabiro began using
methamphetamine at age 20, which he used daily until 2 years before his arrest, explaining that
he used it to self-medicate when he could not afford prescription medication. He also used heroin
a few times from age 31 to the date of his arrest. Cabiro acknowledged to Probation that he felt
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he had a drug problem and that drug treatment would be beneficial. He explained that he
consumed a gallon of vodka each week, which would take him about four days. Cabiro advised
Probation that he even poured vodka into his feeding tube when he was hospitalized in 2018 after
he sustained a head injury in an automobile accident in which he collided with a concrete wall
while going approximately 120 mph and not wearing a seat belt. He also has a history of mental
health problems since 2018. Cabiro’s Judgment contains two Special Conditions of Supervision
that specifically address his substance abuse problem:
You must not possess or consume any alcoholic beverages.
You must participate in a program of testing and treatment for substance abuse and
follow the rules and regulations of that program until discharged. The probation
officer, in consultation with the treatment provider, will supervise your
participation in the program. You must pay any cost associated with treatment and
testing.
In this situation, the court finds that Cabiro’s post-release conduct does not warrant early
termination of his supervised release. Although he appears to have complied with his conditions
of release to date by maintaining gainful employment, incurring no new arrests, pending charges,
or violation reports, and complying with his conditions of supervision, he identifies no new or
exceptional circumstances or needs that would merit early release from supervision. In view of
the wide variety and significant quantity of illegal narcotics that were recovered from his vehicle
at the time of his arrest, along with the two loaded firearms, as well as his long history of poly-
substance abuse, the court is of the opinion that Cabiro should continue to obtain services
throughout his three-year term of supervised release to assist him to remain drug-free. Cabiro
fails to explain how the conditions of his supervised release limit his employment opportunities,
interfere with his family responsibilities, impede any medical or substance abuse treatment, or
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otherwise impact his daily life in a significant manner. According to Probation, he is currently
being supervised on a low-risk caseload, which requires only minimal contact. Cabiro does not
clarify how being on supervised release keeps him from furthering his career, achieving additional
goals, assisting his family, or engaging in recreational, religious, or volunteer activities. Under
the circumstances, the court finds the current conditions of Cabiro’s supervised release are not
onerous and remain appropriate in view of his offense of conviction and his long history of
substance abuse and mental health problems.
While his achievements to date should be commended, continuing Cabiro on supervision
will provide him the best opportunity for success in reentry in view of his prior commission of a
serious crime involving the possession and distribution of multiple controlled substances, his
administrative discharge from the Army for drug abuse, and his history of multiple substance
abuse problems. Requiring Cabiro to complete his entire three-year term of supervised release
safeguards against the reoccurrence of criminal activity, while imposing only a minimal burden
on Cabiro. Generally, early termination of supervised release is not granted unless there are
significant medical concerns that are not being addressed, substantial limitations on employment,
or extraordinary post-release accomplishments that would warrant such a release. Cabiro does not
identify any such circumstances in his motion and is instead seeking early termination of his
supervision simply for complying with the conditions of release imposed by the court for the past
two years. Thus, although Cabiro appears to be on the right path, the court believes that the
completion of his full term of supervised release appropriately reflects the seriousness of his
offense of conviction, deters future criminal conduct, and provides needed structure for his
continued rehabilitation. See Lynn, 2022 WL 2446328, at *4.
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As Probation points out:
Though Mr. Cabiro should be commended for his compliance on supervision thus
far, mere compliance with his conditions does not innately warrant early
termination as such behavior is expected. According to the offense conduct
detailed in the presentence report, Mr. Cabiro refused to allow officers to search
his vehicle after a traffic stop and it required a canine unit to be dispatched to the
scene to conduct an “open air sniff” of the vehicle which alerted to the presence of
drugs. After a subsequent search of the vehicle and lab verification, Mr. Cabiro
was found to be in possession with intent to distribute a considerable amount of
various illicit drugs, namely 97.6 grams of marijuana, 101.6 grams of Psilocybin
Mushrooms, 121.6 grams of heroin, 48 grams of cocaine, 1.235 grams of ketamine
(converts to 2.47 units), 32.962 net grams of methamphetamine (actual), 5.123 net
grams of D-Lysergic Acid Diethylamide (LSD), 11.8 net grams of
Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), and 2.324 net grams of clonazepam-Schedule IV
(converts to 4.684 units). In addition, two fully loaded firearms were discovered
in the vehicle and Mr. Cabiro was initially also indicted in Count 2 for Possession
of a Firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense. It was later dismissed
upon conviction for the instant offense. In addition, his criminal records also
consists of previous terms of community supervision that required modification of
the conditions due to concerns with alcohol and/or drug use while being
supervised. Based on the information provided, it is believed that continuing Mr.
Cabiro’s supervision term would be in the best interest of the community. As
previously mentioned, Mr. Cabiro is being supervised on the low-risk caseload of
the Southern District of Texas, which should require minimal intervention by the
probation office, while still providing accountability for his actions and access to
beneficial services if deemed necessary. Remaining on supervision is not believed
to be a hindrance on his ability to further his employment or life goals. As such,
the U.S. Probation Office in the Eastern District of Texas respectfully recommends
the Court deny the motion and allow Mr. Cabiro to continue supervision as
ordered.
The court concurs with the assessment of the situation by the Probation Office for the Eastern
District of Texas and finds that the early termination of Cabiro’s three-year term of supervised
release would not be in the interest of justice.
III. Conclusion
In accordance with the foregoing, Cabiro’s Request for Early Termination of Supervised
Release (#58) is DENIED.
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12
________________________________________
MARCIA A. CRONE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
SIGNED at Beaumont, Texas, this 27th day of January, 2026.
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