United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union, and its Local Union No. 228 v. Lion Elastomers, LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
UNITED STEEL, PAPER AND FORESTRY,§
RUBBER, MANUFACTURING, ENERGY, §
ALLIED INDUSTRIAL AND SERVICE §
WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION, §
AND ITS LOCAL UNION NO. 228, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
versus § CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:19-CV-201
§
LION ELASTOMERS, LLC, §
§
Defendant. §
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Pending before the court is Plaintiff United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber,
Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union, and its Local
Union No. 228’s (“the Union”) Motion to Enforce Arbitration Order (#22). Defendant Lion
Elastomers, LLC (“Lion”) filed a Response (#23) in opposition and an Opposed Motion to Vacate
Court’s March 31, 2020, Order Pursuant to Rules 60(b)(5) & (6) (#24). The Union filed a Reply
(#25) to Lion’s Response and a Response (#26) in opposition to Lion’s motion. Having considered
the pending motions, the submissions of the parties, the record, and the applicable law, the court
is of the opinion that the Union’s Motion to Enforce Arbitration Order should be GRANTED,
while Lion’s Motion to Vacate should be DENIED.
I. Background
The present dispute arises out two grievances the Union filed against Lion on behalf of one
of its members, Joseph Colone (“Colone”). Specifically, on July 27, 2017, the Union filed the
first grievance, Grievance 09-2017, pursuant to the three-step procedure contained in the parties’
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Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”). The grievance maintained that Lion had “unjust[ly]
discipline[d]” Colone. Lion denied the grievance at all three stages of the CBA grievance process.
On November 20, 2017, the Union requested arbitration of Grievance 09-2017.
Approximately one year after the filing of its initial grievance, the Union filed a second
grievance on behalf of Colone, Grievance 07-2018, asserting that Lion “unjust[ly] terminat[ed]”
Colone in retaliation for the filing of the first grievance. Lion denied the grievance during steps
one and two of the CBA grievance procedure, but it did not deny the grievance in writing at the
third step. After failing to receive a written response, the Union submitted a request to arbitrate
Grievance 07-2018 on September 5, 2018.
On December 4, 2018, Lion informed the Union that it would not arbitrate Grievance
09-2017 because the Union failed to submit the grievance to the Federal Mediation Conciliation
Service (“FMCS”) in a timely manner. In a separate letter sent the same day, Lion also informed
the Union that it would not arbitrate Grievance 07-2018. According to Lion, the Union failed to
provide Lion with timely notice of its intent to seek arbitration, as required by the CBA.
Therefore, Lion asserted that neither grievance was subject to arbitration.
On April 25, 2019, the Union filed a Complaint (#1) in the Eastern District of Texas,
Beaumont Division, asking this court to compel arbitration of its grievances. The parties agreed
that the Union’s claims against Lion should be resolved on summary judgment. On October 11,
2019, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On March 31, 2020, the undersigned
entered an order denying Lion’s motion for summary judgment and granting the Union’s motion
in part. Specifically, the court held that the Union was entitled to judgment as a matter of law
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regarding the arbitrability of its grievances against Lion.1 Therefore, the court ordered arbitration
and ultimately dismissed the case on April 8, 2020.
Now, approximately five years later, the Union has filed a Motion to Enforce Arbitration
Order (#22). In its motion, the Union discusses related proceedings that were pending before the
National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) at the time the court ordered arbitration. The Union
explains that, around the same time it initiated proceedings in this court, it simultaneously sought
relief before an NLRB Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). In the NLRB proceedings, the Union
asserted that Lion had violated the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) by terminating Colone
for his grievance activity. The ALJ held in favor of the Union, and on May 29, 2020, the NLRB
issued a decision upholding the ALJ’s conclusion. Lion appealed the NLRB’s decision to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in June 2020.
Despite having selected arbitrators pursuant to this court’s March 31, 2020, Order (#20),
the parties agreed to hold the arbitration of the Union’s grievances in abeyance, given that any
remedies the arbitrator might grant would likely be duplicative of any relief that might be ordered
in the appealed NLRB proceeding. While the appeal was pending before the Fifth Circuit, the
NLRB requested a remand, which was granted. Following remand, the NLRB issued another
decision in favor of the Union. Again, Lion appealed the NLRB decision to the Fifth Circuit. On
July 9, 2024, the Fifth Circuit vacated the NLRB’s decision, holding that the NLRB had failed to
apply the correct legal standard and remanding the matter for further proceedings.
1 The court denied the Union’s motion for summary judgment with respect to its request for
attorneys’ fees.
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According to the Union, the NLRB has failed to issue a decision following remand. On
September 25, 2024, a mere two months after the Fifth Circuit’s decision to remand the case, the
Union informed Lion that it no longer wanted to hold the grievances in abeyance. Thus, the
Union stated that it intended to proceed to arbitration. The parties engaged in settlement
discussions, which were ultimately unsuccessful. Following those attempts, the Union contacted
Lion to arrange arbitration, but Lion informed the Union that it would not arbitrate the grievances
because it maintains that laches bars the enforcement of this court’s order compelling arbitration.
Consequently, the Union filed a Motion to Enforce Arbitration Order (#22) on April 29, 2025,
and Lion filed an Opposed Motion to Vacate the Court’s March 31, 2020, Order Pursuant to Rules
60(b)(5) & (6) (#24) on May 14, 2025.
II. Analysis
A federal court has inherent authority to enforce its judgments. Thomas v. Hughes, 27
F.4th 363, 368 (5th Cir. 2022); see Casa Express Corp as Tr. of Casa Express Tr. v. Bolivarian
Republic of Venez., 158 F.4th 1176, 1184 (11th Cir. 2025). Rule 70 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure recognizes that inherent authority and provides a procedural mechanism by which a
court may enforce a judgment that requires a specific act. FED. R. CIV. P. 70. It is pursuant to
this authority that the Union asks this court to enforce its prior Memorandum and Order (#20)
signed on March 31, 2020, ordering the parties to arbitration.
A court may, however, refuse to enforce and, instead, vacate a final judgment under Rule
60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 60(b) provides that:
On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative
from a final judgment, order, or proceedings for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
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(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation,
or misconduct by an opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on an
earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it
prospectively is no longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b). Consequently, in response to the Union’s motion to enforce, Lion filed
a Motion to Vacate Judgment (#24) asking this court to vacate its prior Memorandum and Order
(#20) on the grounds that it is no longer equitable to apply the judgment prospectively and that this
case presents exceptional circumstances warranting relief under Rule 60(b)(6).
A. Timeliness of the Motion to Vacate
A motion brought under Rule 60(b) must be made within a “reasonable time—and for
reasons (1), (2), and (3) no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order or the date
of the proceeding.” FED. R. CIV. P. 60(c). Here, Lion filed its Motion to Vacate Judgment five
years after the entry of the judgment in question. Nevertheless, Lion maintains that the motion
was brought within a reasonable time under the circumstances presented. Specifically, Lion
highlights that the motion was filed approximately two weeks after the Union filed its motion to
enforce.
Despite the significant lapse in time between the initial entry of the final judgment and
Lion’s subsequent motion, the court agrees that the motion was made within a reasonable time.
As Lion notes, the proposed conditions warranting relief did not exist until well after the entry of
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the judgment at issue. Namely, Lion had no reason to seek relief from this court’s order until the
Union sought enforcement of the judgment five years after its initial entry. Accordingly, the
grounds for relief did not exist until the Union sought delayed enforcement of the arbitration
order. Once the grounds for relief materialized, Lion filed its motion to vacate a mere two weeks
later. Therefore, Lion has made its motion within a reasonable time as required by Rule 60(c) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
B. Grounds for Relief Pursuant to Rule 60
The party seeking relief from a judgment, order, or proceeding bears the burden of
showing that Rule 60(b) applies. New High Ltd. v. Global Merch Grp., LLC, No. 22-55983, 2024
WL 3811631, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 14, 2024); Schwindler v. Comm’r, Ga. Dep’t of Corr., No.
23-10457, 2024 WL 3666251, at *3 (11th Cir. Aug. 6, 2024); Compañía de Inversiones
Mercantiles S.A. v. Grupo Cementos de Chihuahua S.A.B. de C.V., 58 F.4th 429, 446 (10th Cir.
2023); Frew v. Janek, 780 F.3d 320, 327 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing League of United Latin Am.
Citizens, Dist. 19 v. City of Boerne, 659 F.3d 421, 438 (5th Cir. 2011)); see Lyles v. Medtronic
Sofamor Danek, USA, Inc., 871 F.3d 305, 316 (5th Cir. 2017). “[T]he decision to grant or deny
relief under Rule 60(b) lies within the sound discretion of the district court and will be reversed
only for abuse of that discretion.” Lyles, 871 F.3d at 315 (quoting Hesling v. CSX Transp. Inc.,
396 F.3d 632, 638 (5th Cir. 2005)); see Buck v. Davis, 580 U.S. 100, 123 (2017) (“Rule 60(b)
vests wide discretion in courts”). Rule 60(b) “is to be construed liberally to do substantial
justice . . . [it] is broadly phrased and many of the itemized grounds are overlapping, freeing
Courts to do justice in hard cases where the circumstances generally measure up to one or more
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of the itemized grounds.” Frew, 780 F.3d at 327 (quoting Johnson Waste Materials v. Marshall,
611 F.2d 593, 600 (5th Cir. 1980)).
1. Rule 60(b)(5)
Rule 60(b)(5) authorizes district courts to terminate final judgments with prospective effects
when their enforcement is no longer equitable. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Hewitt, 68 F.4th 461, 466
(9th Cir. 2023); Pico v. Glob. Marine Drilling Co., 900 F.2d 846, 851 (5th Cir. 1990); Bailey
v. Ryan Stevedoring Co., 894 F.2d 157, 160 (5th Cir. 1990). “In reviewing a request for relief
under Rule 60(b)(5), ‘[w]e are not framing a decree [. . .] [w]e are asking ourselves whether
anything has happened that will justify us now in changing a decree.’” W. Water Mgmt., Inc. v.
Brown, 40 F.3d 105, 108 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106,
119 (1932)). To qualify for relief, the movant must demonstrate that “(1) the judgment has
prospective application and (2) it is no longer equitable that it should so operate.” Kirksey v. City
of Jackson, 714 F.2d 42, 43 (5th Cir. 1983); Union Bethel Afr. Methodist Episcopal Church v.
Indep. Specialty Ins. Co., No. 23-5455, 2025 WL 71912, at *3 (E.D. La. Jan. 10, 2025); In re
Heritage Real Est. Inv., Inc., No. 14-03603-NPO, 2020 WL 9258338, at *7 (S.D. Miss. Bankr.
Oct. 23, 2020); In re Whelan, 582 B.R. 157, 173 (E.D. Tex. Bankr. 2018). “A judgment
operates prospectively if it requires a court to supervise changing conduct or conditions that are
provisional or tentative.” Nat’l City Golf Fin., a Div. of Nat’l City Com. Cap. Co., L.L.C. v.
Scott, 899 F.3d 412, 419 (5th Cir. 2018); Union Bethel Afr. Methodist Episcopal Church, 2025
WL 71912, at *3. Not every order that has an arguably prospective effect, however, will satisfy
the prospectivity requirement of Rule 60(b)(5). Union Bethel Afr. Methodist Episcopal Church,
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2025 WL 71912, at *3 (citing Picco v. Glob Marine Drilling Co., 900 F.2d 846, 851 (5th Cir.
1990)).
In the present case, it is unclear whether the judgment Lion seeks to vacate operates
prospectively, as the judgment does not inherently require the court to supervise changing conduct
or tentative conditions. In Union Bethel African Methodist Episcopal Church, a court in the
Eastern District of Louisiana was faced with a similar question. 2025 WL 71912, at *3.
Specifically, the court was tasked with deciding whether to apply Rule 60(b)(5) to a final judgment
compelling arbitration. Id. The district court noted, however, that the movant failed to address
the prospectivity requirement, electing only to discuss the inequity of enforcing the judgment. Id.
Accordingly, the court held that the movant did not meet its burden of proving the applicability
of Rule 60(b)(5). Similarly, Lion’s motion overlooks the prospectivity requirement and, instead,
focuses solely on the changed circumstances rendering the enforcement of the judgment
inequitable. Therefore, the court is of the opinion that Lion has not met the requisite burden to
show its entitlement to relief under Rule 60(b)(5).
2. Rule 60(b)(6)
Alternatively, Lion seeks relief from this court’s final judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6).
Under Rule 60(b)(6), a district court may relieve a party from an order or proceeding for any
reason which justifies relief, other than those also enumerated in Rule 60(b). BLOM Bank SAL
v. Honickman, 605 U.S. 204, 210 (2025); Buck, 580 U.S. at 123; see Rocha v. Thaler, 619 F.3d
387, 399-400 (5th Cir. 2010). “Rule 60(b)(6) is a grand reservoir of equitable power to do justice
in a particular case when relief is not warranted by the preceding clauses, [and] [the Fifth Circuit]
[has] also narrowly circumscribed its availability, holding that Rule 60(b)(6) relief will be granted
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only if extraordinary circumstances are present.” Balentine v. Thaler, 626 F.3d 842, 846 (5th
Cir. 2010) (quoting Batts v. Tow-Motor Forklife Co., 66 F.3d 743, 747 (5th Cir. 1995)); see
Guevara v. Davis, 679 F. App’x 332, 334 (5th Cir. 2017); Boissier v. Katsur, 676 F. App’x 260,
264 (5th Cir. 2017); Union Bethel Afr. Methodist Episcopal Church, 2025 WL 71912, at *3 (citing
Bailey v. Ryan Stevedoring Co., Inc., 894 F.2d 157, 160 (5th Cir. 1990)). “[T]he rule seeks to
strike a delicate balance between two countervailing impulses: the desire to preserve the finality
of judgments and the ‘incessant command of the court’s conscience that justice be done in light
of all the facts.’” Borne v. River Parishes Hosp., L.L.C., 548 F. App’x 954, 956 (5th Cir. 2013)
(quoting Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, 635 F.2d 396, 401 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting Bankers
Mortg. Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 73, 77 (5th Cir. 1970).
Rule 60(b)(6) is a “catch-all provision, meant to encompass circumstances not covered by
Rule 60(b)’s other enumerated provisions.” In re Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Prods. Liab.
Litig., 742 F.3d 576, 593 n.19 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Hess v. Cockrell, 281 F.3d 212, 216 (5th
Cir. 2002)); see Buck, 580 U.S. at 123; Webb v. Davis, 940 F.3d 892, 899 (5th Cir. 2019). A
motion under Rule 60(b), however, “is not a substitute for a timely appeal, and it is an improper
vehicle for challenging mistakes of law or reasserting arguments on the merits of a claim.” Borne,
548 F. App’x at 956 (citing Pryor, 769 F.2d at 286); see In re Chinese-Manufactured Drywall
Prods. Liab. Litig., 742 F.3d at 593 n.19; Hess, 281 F.3d at 216 (holding that a Rule 60(b)(6)
motion is not appropriate where a mistake of law is alleged to be the primary ground for appeal).
In its motion, Lion essentially maintains that the court should vacate the judgment pursuant to Rule
60(b)(6) because the doctrine of laches equitably bars the enforcement of this court’s order
compelling arbitration.
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a. Procedural Arbitrability
As a preliminary matter, the court must determine whether Lion’s position with respect to
laches raises an issue of substantive or procedural arbitrability. In its Response, the Union
maintains that laches presents an issue of procedural arbitrability, such that the court is without
jurisdiction to evaluate the applicability of the doctrine. In evaluating whether to compel
arbitration, courts must distinguish between matters of substantive and procedural arbitrability.
See 51A C.J.S. Labor Relations § 603 (2025). The term “substantive arbitrability” refers to
whether the dispute involves subject matter that the parties have contractually agreed to submit to
arbitration. Unión Internacional UAW, Local 2415 v. Bacardí Co., 8 F.4th 44, 49 n.1 (1st Cir.
2021). If the dispute is substantive, then the court must evaluate and determine the issue. See
51A C.J.S. Labor Relations § 603 (2025). Procedural arbitrability, however, concerns whether
certain grievance procedures apply to a particular dispute, whether such procedures have been
followed or exused, and whether the unexcused failure to follow them avoids the duty to arbitrate.
Unión Internacional UAW, Local 2415, 8 F.4th at 50 n.3. A court cannot decide questions of
procedural arbitrability, as such questions must be resolved by the arbitrator. See Adam Techs.
Int’l S.A. de C.V. v. Sutherland Global Servs., Inc., 729 F.3d 443, 452 (5th Cir. 2013); 51A
C.J.S. Labor Relations § 603 (2025).
The Union maintains the applicability of laches is a matter of procedural arbitrability
because it challenges the timeliness of its pursuit of the grievances under the CBA. Questions of
timeliness, whether it be the timely filing of the grievance or the timely pursuit of arbitration
pursuant to the CBA, are generally questions of procedural arbitrability. Adam Techs. Int’l S.A.
de C.V., 729 F.3d at 452 (citing Oil, Chem. and Atomic Workers’ Int’l Union, Local 4-447 v.
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Chevron Chem. Co., 815 F.2d 338, 341 (5th Cir. 1987). The Union, however, fails to recognize
a key distinction between the present case and those it cites to support its proposition. In the
present case, the court is no longer evaluating the arbitrability of the Union’s grievances against
Lion, but, rather, it is evaluating the enforceability of its own prior judgment. As a result, the
court is not considering whether the doctrine of laches should bar the Union’s ability to arbitrate
its grievances under the CBA. Instead, the court is evaluating whether the doctrine of laches
should apply to bar the enforcement of this court’s Order signed on March 31, 2020.
Consequently, the question before the court is neither one of substantive nor procedural
arbitrability. As noted above, matters of procedural arbitrability are matters that raise procedural
questions pursuant to the CBA—a contract in which the parties agreed to resolve disputes arising
under the agreement in arbitration. Here, however, the court is not evaluating whether the
Union’s pursuit of its grievances is timely under the agreement. Rather, the court is evaluating
whether, under the principles of equity, it should enforce its own judgment. Therefore, the court
is of the opinion that it may evaluate the applicability of the doctrine of laches in the present case.
b. The Doctrine of Laches
For laches to apply, Lion must demonstrate that the Union delayed in asserting the rights
at issue, that the delay was inexcusable, and that Lion has suffered undue prejudice as a result of
the delay. Uptown Grill, L.L.C. v. Schwartz, 817 F.3d 251, 256 (5th Cir. 2016). Here, the court
cannot say that the Union delayed in asserting its rights, as it appears that the parties reached a
mutual agreement to hold the judgment in abeyance for a period of time. Though the court agrees
that the Union has engaged in some seemingly calculated and perhaps underhanded conduct, it
cannot conclude that the Union inexcusably delayed in asserting its rights when Lion ultimately
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agreed to the delay.2 Additionally, either party could have withdrawn its agreement to hold the
judgment in abeyance at any point. Furthermore, Lion has not been unduly prejudiced as a result
of the delay, as it can raise in arbitration any defenses relating to issue or claim preclusion that
may arise from the NLRB proceedings. Accordingly, the court concludes that Lion is not entitled
to relief from the judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
III. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Union’s Motion to Enforce Arbitration Order (#22)
is GRANTED and Lion’s Opposed Motion to Vacate Court’s March 31, 2020, Order Pursuant to
Rules 60(b)(5) & (6) (#24) is DENIED.
2 Namely, the Union agreed to hold the judgment in abeyance when it appeared that the
proceedings taking place before the NLRB would produce a favorable outcome and withdrew its agreement
shortly after the Fifth Circuit vacated the NLRB’s favorable decision on July 9, 2024.
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________________________________________
MARCIA A. CRONE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
SIGNED at Beaumont, Texas, this 6th day of January, 2026.
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