Gonzalez Arreaga v. Minter et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
DOUGLAZ DOMINGO GONZALEZ
ARREAGA,
Petitioner,
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) 	No. 2:25-cv-03167-TLP-cgc
v. 	)
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TRINITY MINTER, Warden of the West
Tennessee Detention Facility, in her official
capacity, et al.,1
Respondents.
ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Petitioner Douglaz Domingo Gonzalez Arreaga, an alien detained in the West Tennessee
Detention Facility in Mason, Tennessee, petitions for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. §
2241. (ECF No. 1.) On January 05, 2026, the Court ordered Respondents to show cause why
the Writ should not be granted. (ECF No. 6.) They responded.2 (ECF No. 8.) After the Court
issued a second Show Cause Order, Petitioner replied. (ECF Nos. 12–13.) And for the reasons
below, the Court GRANTS the Petition.
1 Although the Court’s Order to Show Cause directed the Clerk to terminate Scott Ladwig as
Respondent (ECF No. 6), that was in error. Respondents now move the Court to reinstate Scott
Ladwig and terminate the other Respondents. (ECF No. 8 at PageID 27 (citing Rosciszewski v.
Adducci, 983 F. Supp. 2d 910, 913–14 (E.D. Mich. 2013).) So with hat in hand, the Court
respectfully DIRECTS the Clerk to modify the docket yet again—this time to reflect “Scott
Ladwig” as the lone Respondent.
2 In their response, Respondents stated that “that the Court can decide this matter without further
briefing and without oral argument.” (ECF No. 8 at PageID 27.) Petitioner agreed. (ECF No.
13 at PageID 53–54.)
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BACKGROUND
Petitioner, a Guatemalan citizen, entered the United States in 2007. (ECF No. 8 at
PageID 27.) He is in his late thirties. (See ECF No. 8-1 at PageID 42 (listing date of birth in
1986).) He has no criminal history other than minor traffic offenses. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 7.)
And the Government detained him around November 2025. (Id. at PageID 6.) The Department
of Homeland Security (“DHS”) then served him with a Notice to Appear. (ECF No. 8-1 at
PageID 42–45.) They allege that Petitioner’s presence in this country violates sections
212(a)(6)(A)(i) and 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) because
he is an alien present in the United States without admission or parole. (Id. at PageID 45.) On
that basis, the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) continues to detain
Petitioner at the West Tennessee Detention Facility in Mason, Tennessee. (ECF No. 8 at PageID
28.)
Yet the DHS and the Executive Office of Immigration Review (“EOIR”) have not held a
bond hearing for Petitioner. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 7; see ECF No. 8 at PageID 26–28.) DHS
and EOIR determined that he is subject to mandatory detention, a change from the decades-long
practice of affording noncitizens in Petitioner’s position with bond hearings before their removal
proceedings. (See ECF No. 1 at PageID 6–8.) The government changed its practice in July
2025, when DHS, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), and ICE issued a new policy.3 See, e.g.,
Monge-Nunez v. Ladwig, No. 25-3043, 2025 WL 3565348, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 12, 2025).
According to the new policy, noncitizens who have resided in the United States for over two
3 American Immigration Lawyers Association, ICE Memo: Interim Guidance Regarding
Detention Authority for Applications for Admission, AILA (July 8, 2025),
https://www.aila.org/library/ice-memo-interim-guidance-regarding-detention-authority-for-
applications-for-admission (“For custody purposes, these aliens are now treated in the same
manner that ‘arriving aliens’ have historically been treated.”) (last visited Feb. 2, 2026).
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years and who are apprehended in the interior of the country are subject to mandatory detention
under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Id. But before July 2025, DHS afforded those same persons
bond hearings under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Id.; Godinez-Lopez v. Ladwig, No. 25-2962, 2025 WL
3047889, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 31, 2025). The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) upheld
this new policy in the case of Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).
And for Petitioner, this means that he now faces continued detention without the
possibility of bond. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 7.) Petitioner alleges that his continued detention
under § 1225(b) violates the INA and its regulations, the Maldonado Bautista decision, the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), and his Fifth Amendment right to procedural due
process. (Id. at PageID 13–16.) He asks the Court to grant his Petition, order that the
Immigration Court provide him with a bond hearing and order that he be released pending that
bond hearing. (ECF No. 13-2 at PageID 59.)
This is not an issue of first impression before the Court. And Respondents detaining
Petitioner under § 1225(b) instead of § 1226(a) is not an isolated event. Indeed, the Court has
recently considered this same legal question many times and consistently held that Ҥ 1226
governs the arrest and detention of a noncitizen without an apparent criminal history who has
been residing in the United States for over a year.” Padilla-Ugsha v. Ladwig, No. 25-3045, 2025
WL 3638007, at *7 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 15, 2025); see Monge-Nunez, 2025 WL 3565348, at *6;
Cordova v. Ladwig, No. 25-3037, 2025 WL 3679764, at *7 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 18, 2025); Rios
Pena v. Ladwig, No. 25-3082, 2025 WL 3679766, at *7 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 18, 2025); Moreno-
Espinoza v. Ladwig, No. 25-3093, 2025 WL 3691452, at *9 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 19, 2025);
Urrutia-Diaz v. Ladwig, No. 25-3098, 2025 WL 3689158, at *7 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 19, 2025)
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(“So even though Petitioner here has resided in the United States for less than a year, § 1226
governs because he is not seeking admission but is already in this country.”).
Because of the increasing frequency of these habeas petitions, other district courts in this
circuit have also been asked to consider which statutory provision governs. They too have
determined that § 1226(a) fits in this scenario. See, e.g., Godinez-Lopez, 2025 WL 3047889;
Lopez-Campos, 797 F. Supp. 3d at 784. Other district courts across the country have concluded
the same. As one court observed:
By a recent count, the central issue in this case – the administration's new position
that all noncitizens who came into the United States illegally, but since have been
living in the United States, must be detained until their removal proceedings are
completed – has been challenged in at least 362 cases in federal district courts.
The challengers have prevailed, either on a preliminary or final basis, in 350 of
those cases decided by over 160 different judges sitting in about fifty different
courts spread across the United States. Thus, the overwhelming, lopsided
majority have held that the law still means what it always has meant.
Barco Mercado v. Francis, -- F. Supp. 3d --, 2025 WL 3295903, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025)
(footnotes omitted) (collecting cases).
LEGAL STANDARD
A petition for habeas corpus enables a person to challenge the legality of their custody.
See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 745 (2008) (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475,
484 (1973)). And its traditional function “is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser,
411 U.S. at 484; see 28 U.S.C. 2241(c)(3) (“The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a
prisoner unless . . . [h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States[.]”). Petitioner here asserts that his custody under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) is
unlawful.
Sections 1225 and 1226 of the INA typically govern the detention of noncitizens during
removal proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225, 1226. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) governs the
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mandatory detention of an “applicant for admission” after an immigration officer has determined
that the applicant is not entitled to admission in the United States.
(b) 	Inspection of applicants for admission
. . .
(2) 	Inspection of other aliens
(A) 	In general
Subject to subparagraphs (B) and (C), in the case of an
alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining
immigration officer determines that an alien seeking
admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be
admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under
section 1229a of this title.
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). The INA defines an “applicant for admission” as an alien “present in
the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. §
1225(a)(1). And “admission” and “admitted” are defined as “the lawful entry of the alien into
the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(13)(A). Again, detention is mandatory under this section. See 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(2)(A).
Section 1226(a) provides for discretionary detention:
(a) 	Arrest, detention, and release
On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and
detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from
the United States. Except as provided in subsection (c) and pending such
decision, the Attorney General—
(1) 	may continue to detain the arrested alien; and
(2) 	may release the alien on—
(A) 	bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and
containing conditions prescribed by, the Attorney General .
. . .
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). But § 1226(c), known as the Laken Riley Act, provides for the mandatory
detention of aliens found inadmissible or deportable under specific provisions and who have
been “charged with,” “arrested for,” “convicted of,” or admit to “having committed” certain
listed crimes. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Aliens arrested and detained under this section “have a right
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to request a custody redetermination (i.e., bond hearing) before an Immigration Judge.” Lopez-
Campos v. Raycraft, 797 F. Supp. 3d 771, 777 (E.D. Mich. 2025) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8),
(d)(1)). That immigration judge “evaluates whether there is a risk of nonappearance or danger to
the community.” Id. (citing Matter of Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 40 (BIA 2006)). With those
provisions in mind, the Court now turns to the Petition.
ANALYSIS
The issue here is whether § 1225(b)(2)(A) or § 1226(a) applies to Petitioner’s detention.
These facts are not distinguishable from those in Monge-Nunez, Padilla-Ugsha, Cordova, Rios
Pena, Morena-Espinoza, or Urrutia-Diaz. And as Respondents correctly note, “the questions of
law in this case, and the challenges to the government’s policy and practice, substantially overlap
with those at issue” in previous cases. (ECF No. 8 at PageID 31.) So in the interest of judicial
economy, the Court addresses the main arguments at issue here—administrative exhaustion,
statutory interpretation, and procedural due process—in a more succinct manner than before.4
I. 	Administrative Exhaustion
Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. (See ECF No. 1 at PageID 6–
8.) To do so, he would need to appeal his denial of a bond hearing to the Board of Immigration
Appeals (“BIA”). Respondents argue that the Court should require Petitioner to go through that
process before considering his Petition. (ECF No. 8 at PageID 29–30.)
When Congress mandates it, courts require petitioners to exhaust their administrative
remedies. See McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992). But when, as here, Congress
has not imposed a statutory exhaustion requirement, the decision whether to require a petitioner
4 The Court declines to rule on Petitioner’s INA regulation, Maldonado Bautista, and APA
claims as ruling on those claims are unnecessary to provide Petitioner with the relief he seeks.
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to exhaust lies within “sound judicial discretion.” 	Id. In exercising that discretion, the Supreme
Court has explained that “federal courts must balance the interest of the individual in retaining
prompt access to a federal judicial forum against countervailing institutional interests favoring
exhaustion.” Id. at 146. Those institutional interests are “protecting administrative agency
authority and promoting judicial efficiency.” Id. at 145.
The Supreme Court also identified situations in which the interest of the individual
weighs heavily against the institutional interests. See id. at 146–49. Relevant here, “an
administrative remedy may be inadequate where the administrative body . . . has otherwise
predetermined the issue before it.” Id. at 148 (citing Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 575, n.
14 (1973); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639, 640 (1968) (in view of Attorney General's
submission that the challenged rules of the prison were “validly and correctly applied to
petitioner,” requiring administrative review through a process culminating with the Attorney
General “would be to demand a futile act”); see also Herr v. U.S. Forest Serv., 803 F.3d 822–23
(6th Cir. 2015) (“If administrative review would come to naught, if any efforts before the agency
would be pointless, the courts do not insist that litigants go through the motions of exhausting the
claim anyway.”) (internal quotations omitted).
The BIA’s decision in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (2025) makes
requesting a bond hearing from an immigration court futile. That is because the BIA’s
decision—which is binding on immigration judges—upholds the very policy Petitioner is
challenging here. See Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. at 228 (holding that aliens
“who surreptitiously cross into the United States remain applicants for admission until and unless
they are lawfully inspected and admitted by an immigration officer” because “[r]emaining in the
United States for a lengthy period of time following entry without inspection, by itself, does not
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constitute an ‘admission”’); see also Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 797 F. Supp. 3d 771, 778 (E.D.
Mich. 2025) (reasoning that “administrative review is not likely to change Respondents’ position
that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies in this context”). What is more, the BIA lacks authority to review
constitutional challenges. See Sterkaj v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 273, 279 (6th Cir. 2006). This
means that Petitioner can only bring his constitutional claim in federal court.
It follows that requiring exhaustion in this case would not further the ends of judicial
efficiency and protecting administrative authority because it would only delay the resolution of
Petitioner’s legal questions. His individual interest in having prompt access to this forum
outweighs any institutional interests at stake. Requiring Petitioner to wait for the BIA to address
an issue it has already decided creates hardship for hardship’s sake. The Court declines to
impose such a result here.5
II. 	Statutory Interpretation
The Parties disagree about whether § 1225(b)(2)(A) or § 1226(a) controls Petitioner’s
detention here. In short, Petitioner argues that § 1225 governs the detention of recent noncitizens
at or near the border and that § 1226 governs the pre-removal detention of noncitizens already
present in the United States. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 8–13.) Respondents counter that § 1225
applies to Petitioner because “he is an alien who entered the United States without inspection or
5 Respondents point the Court to a line of cases out of the Northern District of Ohio that require
immigration habeas petitioners to exhaust their bond-related administrative remedies before
considering their habeas claims. (ECF No. 8 at PageID 29 (citing Monroy Vaillalta v. Greene, --
- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 25-1594, 2025 WL 2472886, at *2– 3 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 5, 2025);
Hernandez Torrealba v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 25-1621, 2025 WL 2444114, at *8–
12 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2025); see also Laguna Espinoza v. Dir. of Detroit Field Off., U.S.
Immigration & Customs Enforcement, No. 25-2107, 2025 WL 2878173, at *2–3 (N.D. Ohio Oct.
9, 2025)). The Court has reviewed those cases and finds the reasoning unpersuasive for the
reasons discussed above.
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parole and thus was and remains an ‘applicant for admission’ who is treated, for constitutional
purposes, as if stopped at the border.” (ECF No. 8 at PageID 30.)
Familiar principles of statutory interpretation control the analysis. Courts construe
statutory text “so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or
superfluous, void or insignificant.” Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009) (quoting
Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004)); see Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner, Reading
Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 174 (2012) (“If possible, every word and every provision
is to be given effect.”). To apply this approach, courts give each word within the statute “‘its
ordinary, contemporary, common meaning,’ while keeping in mind that ‘statutory language has
meaning only in context.’” Kentucky v. Biden, 23 F.4th 585, 603 (6th Cir. 2022) (citation
modified) (citing Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1010, (2017)).
This includes the presumption “that [the] legislature says in a statute what it means and means in
a statute what it says.” Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992). For
the reasons below, these principles resolve the dispute in Petitioner’s favor.
Detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for
admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is
not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). This means
that the alien must be an “applicant for admission” who is “seeking admission” and one who is
“not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.”
Section 1225(a)’s definition of “applicants for admission” does not match Petitioner. The
statute defines an “applicant for admission” as “[a]n alien present in the United States who has
not been admitted or who arrives in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). And the statute
defines “admission” and “admitted” as “with respect to an alien, the lawful entry of the alien into
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the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(13)(A) (emphasis added). So read together, “applicants for admission” means “aliens
who have unlawfully entered into the United States after inspection and authorization by an
immigration officer.” So it does not follow that Petitioner is an “applicant for admission” simply
because he now resides in the interior of the country.
Nor does 1225(a)’s “seeking admission” language apply to Petitioner under these facts.
“Seeking,” of course, implies “some sort of present-tense action.” Barco Mercado, -- F. Supp.
3d. --, 2025 WL 3295903, at *5. With that in mind, to fall under § 1225(b)(2)(A), the alien must
be actively seeking admission, not simply residing in the country after entering it unlawfully.
Because Petitioner’s unlawful entry occurred at an unknown date, the Court is not persuaded that
he was actively seeking admission when ICE detained him.6
The plain meaning of § 1226 better captures Petitioner’s situation. For example, it
applies to the “apprehension and detention of aliens,” providing that, upon “a warrant issued by
the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested or detained pending a decision on whether the
alien is to be removed from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Again, ICE detained
Petitioner in the interior of the country where he was already residing. So the Attorney General
has the discretion under this section to “continue to detain [him]” or she “may release [him] on
bond.” (Id.) She may not, though, deny him the bond hearing to which he is entitled. See 8
C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8), (d)(1).
The titles of the statutory provisions also supports this distinction. See Godinez-Lopez,
2025 WL 3047889, at *4. “[T]he title of a statute in the heading of a section [is a] tool[]
6 To be sure, the INA recognizes two classes of aliens who are not seeking admission, but that
does not preclude the existence of other alien classes that do not fall under § 1225. See, e.g.,
Padilla-Ugsha, 2025 WL 3638007.
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available for the resolution of a doubt” about a statute’s meaning. Dubin v. United States, 599
U.S. 110, 121 (2023). Section 1225’s title is “Inspection by immigration officers; expedited
removal of inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing.” 8 U.S.C. §1225 (emphasis added).
Section 1225’s title then envisions arriving aliens placed in expedited removal. But again,
Petitioner was detained far from the border. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287
(2018). Meanwhile, § 1226’s title is “Apprehension and detention of aliens.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226.
That title fits here. Petitioner was apprehended, not while arriving in the United States, but
sometime later. And he is now detained. Section 1225’s therefore seems inapplicable to aliens
in Petitioner’s shoes, but § 1226’s title seems spot on.
That is not all. Respondent’s interpretation of § 1225(b) makes § 1226(c)’s mandatory
detention provision superfluous. To be sure, subsections 1226(c)(1)(E)(i)–(ii) provide for
mandatory detention of certain aliens. But it applies only to those aliens who both entered the
country without inspection under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A), (C), and (7) and who are also
“charged with, . . . arrested for, . . . convicted of . . .” certain crimes. 8 U.S.C. §
1226(c)(1)(E)(i)–(ii). And so to interpret § 1225(b)(2)(A) as Respondents argue would subject
mandatory detention to every alien who did not lawfully enter the country. This reading would
strip 1226(c) of meaning. What is more, Congress only recently added subsection 1226(c)(1)(E)
when it passed the Laken Riley Act. Pub. L. No. 119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025). The Court declines
to presume that Congress pointlessly amended the statute with a redundant provision when it
most recently considered it. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 607–08 (2019) (“This would
violate the cannon against interpreting any statutory provision in a manner that would render
another provision superfluous.”).
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At bottom, §§ 1225 and 1226 are different statutory provisions that apply to different
contexts. And the Supreme Court has already distinguished the two. In Jennings, the Court
determined that the government may “detain certain aliens seeking admission into the country”
and that the § 1225 process “generally begins at the Nation’s borders and ports of entry, where
the Government must determine whether an alien seeking to enter the country is admissible.”
583 U.S. at 287, 289. Whereas § 1226 “authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens
already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings.” 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018)
(emphasis added). Respondents have articulated no compelling reason to stray from this
commonsense understanding.
So the Court finds § 1226 governs the detention of an alien like Petitioner, who has no
known criminal history and who has been residing in the interior of the United States. Petitioner
is therefore subject to the discretionary bond process under § 1226.
III. 	Due Process
Because the Court has found that § 1226(a) applies to Petitioner’s detention, he is owed
the process given to him under the statute. See, e.g. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam,
591 U.S. 103, 140 (2020) (“[A]n alien in [Petitioner’s] position has only the rights . . . that
Congress has provided by statute.”). Petitioner alleges that Respondents violate his due process
rights by continuing to detain him without a bond hearing. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 16.)
Respondents counter that because Petitioner complains that he is detained under the wrong
statute, even if his detention is unlawful, it is not unconstitutional. (ECF No. 8 at PageID 31–
32.) Or put another way, Respondents assert that § 1225(b)(2)(A) has already afforded Petitioner
the due process that Congress chose to provide him. (Id. (citing Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v.
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Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 138–40 (2020); Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982);
United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950).)
The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects every person from being
“deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. 	And
to evaluate the level of process owed to a noncitizen, the Sixth Circuit generally “applies the
balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).” Godinez-Lopez, 2025 WL
3047889, at *6 (citing United States v. Silvestre-Gregorio, 983 F.3d 848, 852 (6th Cir. 2020)).
Matthews considers (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action” (2) “the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest,” and (3) “the Government’s interest, including
the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.” 424 U.S. at 335.
All three factors weigh in Petitioner’s favor here. He has a strong liberty interest in being
free from physical detention. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004); Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). The risk of erroneous deprivation is high here considering that
Respondents and the BIA’s current position is to afford him no bond hearing whatsoever. And
bond hearings are a significant procedural safeguard to balance the Government’s interest in
immigration enforcement against individual liberties. So the Court finds that the Government’s
interest in detaining Petitioner without that procedural safeguard does not outweigh Petitioner’s
liberty interest or the risk of erroneous deprivation. In fact, as it stands, Petitioner has no
meaningful opportunity for an immigration judge to consider whether he is a danger to society or
a flight risk. And the fact that Petitioner has been residing in the United States for some time
with no known criminal history further tips the scales in his favor.
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This all makes clear that Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing before an immigration
judge. And not only that, but his continued detention without that bond hearing violates his due
process rights. The Court therefore GRANTS the Petition.
IV. 	Attorney’s Fees and Costs
Petitioner seeks attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2412. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 7.) Section 2412(b) allows a court to award “reasonable
fees and expenses of attorneys, in addition to the costs which may be awarded pursuant to
subsection (a), to the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or against the United States.”
28 U.S.C. § 2412(b). The Federal Rules require that claims for attorney’s fees and related
expenses be made by motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(A). So Petitioner must timely file a
motion that complies with Local Rule 54.1(b) to seek attorney’s fees and costs. See L.R. 54.1(b).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, the Court GRANTS the Petition and ORDERS Respondents to
provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8),
(d)(1) within 10 days of the entry of this Order. The Court further ORDERS Respondents to
release Petitioner pending that bond hearing. See Rodriguez v. Woosley, No. 4:25-CV-168-RGJ,
2026 WL 36345, at *11–12 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 6, 2026) (collecting cases and finding immediate
release as a remedy). And the Court further ENJOINS Respondents from pursuing Petitioner’s
detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).
SO ORDERED, this 3rd day of February, 2026.
s/Thomas L. Parker
THOMAS L. PARKER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 2:25-cv-03167-TLP-cgc Document 14 Filed 02/03/26 Page 14 of 14
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