Mason et al v. Tuggle et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
MICHAEL DARROW MASON, THE LOGOS, )
and THE LOGOS TRUST, )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) No. 25-cv-02774-MSN-tmp
)
THOMAS E. TUGGLE, II, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the court is pro se plaintiff Michael Darrow Mason’s
Complaint.1 (ECF No. 2.) Mason initiated this action on August 1,
2025, by filing a complaint purporting to assert claims on behalf
of himself and other parties against various public and private
individuals, both named and unnamed. (Id.) Because Mason did not
pay the filing fee, on August 21, 2025, the undersigned directed
Mason to either pay the required civil filing fee or submit an
application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (ECF No. 8.) He
did neither. Instead, Mason submitted a self-created “Universal
Notice of Non-Consent” asserting that he need not comply with and
“do[es] not consent” to the court’s order or federal filing-fee
1Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 2013-05, this case has been
referred to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for
management of all pretrial matters for determination or report and
recommendation, as appropriate.
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requirements. (ECF No. 9 at PageID 52.) For the reasons below, the
undersigned recommends that Mason’s complaint be dismissed.
I. PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT
On August 1, 2025, Mason filed his complaint against named
defendants Michael A. Adkinson, Jr., S. Thomas Anderson, Scott
Kenneth Homer Bessent, Pamela Bondi, J. Daniel Breen, Gerald
Chatham, Sr., Annie T. Christoff, Charmiane Claxton, Allen B.
Couch, Vicki Daniels, Ronald DeSantis, Jane and John Does, Michael
Dubeck, Lynn Fitch, John T. Fowlkes, Bill Lee, Sheryl H. Lipman,
Billy Long, Mitchell M. Lundy, Percy Lynchard, Samuel H. Mays, Jon
P. McCalla, Mark S. Norris, Thomas L. Parker, Tu M. Pham,2 Robert
Francis Prevost, Tate Reeves, Marco Rubio, Crystal Sconiers,
2The undersigned is named as a defendant in this case, which would
ordinarily be grounds for recusal. Garrett v. Ohio State Univ., 60
F.4th 359, 368 (6th Cir. 2023) (explaining that judges shall
disqualify themselves if they have “a financial interest in the
subject matter in controversy[,]” are “a party to the proceeding,”
or have “any other interest that could be substantially affected
by the outcome of the proceeding[,]” in accordance with 28 U.S.C.
§ 455(b)). However, since the undersigned is named alongside all
other judges in the Western District of Tennessee, recusal is not
warranted. See, e.g., Langworthy v. Tuck, No. 2:24-cv-13021, 2025
WL 602179, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 25, 2025) (finding that a judge
is not disqualified merely because a litigant sues or threatens to
sue him or her); Elliott v. Golston, No. 19-2767-TLP-tmp, 2023 WL
11985201, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 18, 2023) (clarifying that this
rule is inapplicable where there is no legitimate basis for suing
the judge); United States v. Berry, No. 15-20743, 2018 WL 10418594,
at *1 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 23, 2018) (noting that parties cannot
“manufacture a basis for recusal” when no issues are raised that
would warrant recusal for “bias, prejudice, or financial interest,
and the Court’s impartiality cannot reasonably be questioned”).
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Jonathan Skrmetti, Arturo Sosa, Cosmo M. Spellings, Raj
Subramaniam, Donald John Trump, Thomas E. Tuggle, II, James
Uthmeier, Shellie Wallace, Celeste Wilson, and Jon A. York. (ECF
No. 2 at PageID 5-6.) John and Jane Doe defendants are meant to
represent “all men/women self-confessing to holding an Office of
Trust and The Law . . . and everyone under their control.” (Id. at
PageID 6.) The complaint is presented as a “universal lawful
notice” where Mason refers to himself as “the physical embodiment
of The Law and The Logos, representing divine principles on Earth.”
(ECF No. 2 at PageID 3-4.) Mason states that “this lawsuit is
notice and service to all men/women pretending to act as legal
persons, for all levels of ‘governments,’ and service to the
men/women acting as sheriffs, and is lawful service to all men and
women acting as legal persons, agents, officers, entities, titles,
and citizens.” (Id. at PageID 5.) Plaintiff further avers that he
started de-programming his mind in the mid-1990’s
resulting in a conflict with the fictional constructs,
United States Treasury, and Internal Revenue, in 2007.
With the passing of his wife in 2006, The Man, Michael
Darrow Mason, was subjected to the “pretense” of
indictment by the fictional United States District Court
Western Division of Tennessee. This pretense caused the
loss of career at Fedex, loss of business associates,
loss of family relationships, loss of health (cancer)
through stress, and most importantly the incalculable
value of emotional and spiritual diminishment, and the
eventual incarceration of the body starting in 2008.
(Id. at PageID 12-13.) In addition to calling for “arrest of any
Respondent found in criminal contempt and trespass of The Law and
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The Logos,” Mason also requests a monetary remedy of “Thirty Six
Billion Nine Hundred Million (36,900,000,000) ounces of .999 pure
silver specie[] or its equivalent in other precious metals, land,
and other sources of energy (currency).” (Id. at PageID 19-20.)
II. PROPOSED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Pro se pleadings are generally held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers and are thus
liberally construed. Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th
Cir. 2011) (citing Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir.
2004)); Kremer v. Unilever, PLC, No. 24-cv-01410, 2025 WL 2674556,
at *6 (M.D. Tenn Sept. 18, 2025). Even so, pro so litigants must
adhere to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Wells v. Brown,
891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989), and the court cannot create a
claim that has not been spelled out in a pleading. See Brown v.
Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 613 (6th Cir. 2011); Payne v. Sec’y
of Treas., 73 F. App’x 836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003); Wooden v. Lee,
No. 24-cv-01052, 2025 WL 2678796, at *5 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 18,
2025).
Mason’s refusal to pay the filing fee or file an application
to proceed IFP combined with his submission of a self-created
“Universal Notice of Non-Consent” telling the court that “[we] do
not have [his] consent to order . . . anything on [his] behalf or
in [his] name . . .” constitute grounds for dismissal. (ECF No. 9
at PageID 51.) Federal courts cannot entertain a civil action
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unless the filing fee is paid or IFP status is granted. See 28
U.S.C. §§ 1914–1915.
Although the complaint should be dismissed on this basis
alone, the complaint should also be dismissed because plaintiff’s
claims are frivolous. Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir.
1999). A court may dismiss a complaint sua sponte for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction when the allegations are “totally
implausible, attenuated, unsubstantial, frivolous, devoid of
merit, or no longer open to discussion.” Id. at 479–80 (citing
Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536–37 (1974)); see also Smith v.
Walbridge Constr., No. 1:23-cv-02108, 2023 WL 5827272, at *2 (W.D.
Tenn. Aug. 21, 2023) (quoting Bumpas v. Corr. Corp. of America,
No. 3:10-1055, 2011 WL 3841674, at *8 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 30, 2011)
(citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32—33 (1992))).
Mason’s complaint warrants a sua sponte dismissal. Plaintiff
asserts invented procedures and purports to place himself outside
the authority of federal law and the court. He operates on the
belief that “[t]he Logos is the original and only true living Trust
concerning Earth and this world” and that he is “the Initiate
Guardian Trustee, and Protector of [t]he Logos under [t]he Laws
and Order of [t]he Creator” seeking reparations from defendants
for their violations of “[t]he Principles of Being and Morality”
for their “participat[ion] in the legal system.” (ECF No. 2 at
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PageID 16, 33.) Mason’s complaint does not contain coherent factual
allegations, a cognizable legal theory, or any connection to
federal law sufficient to invoke this court’s jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1331 or § 1332. The complaint is comprised entirely of
fantastical allegations that lack any plausible basis in law or
fact. The Sixth Circuit has repeatedly affirmed dismissal of
similar actions under Apple v. Glenn when a complaint is so
insubstantial that it fails to invoke federal jurisdiction.
Accordingly, dismissal under Apple v. Glenn is appropriate.
III. RECOMMENDATION
Based on the above, the undersigned recommends that
plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed.
Respectfully submitted,
s/ Tu M. Pham
TU M. PHAM
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
December 5, 2025
Date
NOTICE
WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS AFTER BEING SERVED WITH A COPY OF THIS
REPORT AND RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION, ANY PARTY MAY SERVE AND FILE
SPECIFIC WRITTEN OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS. ANY PARTY MAY RESPOND TO ANOTHER PARTY’S
OBJECTIONS WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS AFTER BEING SERVED WITH A
COPY. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(2); L.R.
72.1(g)(2). FAILURE TO FILE OBJECTIONS WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS
MAY CONSTITUTE A WAIVER AND/OR FORFEITURE OF OBJECTIONS,
EXCEPTIONS, AND FURTHER APPEAL.
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