Bordages v. United States Department of Justice et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
______________________________________________________________________________
JAMES HARRY HEBERT BORDAGES, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No: 2:25-cv-02717-BCL-atc
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE et al.,
Defendants.
______________________________________________________________________________
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT UNDER § 1915
______________________________________________________________________________
On July 14, 2025, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint against Defendants. Doc.
1. Magistrate Judge Annie T. Christoff1 issued a Report and Recommendation advising dismissal
of this case. Doc. 11. Plaintiff timely objected to the Report. Doc. 12. For the following reasons,
the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s Objections (Doc. 12) and ADOPTS the Report and
Recommendation (Doc. 11). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED.
LEGAL STANDARD
A United States District Court Judge may designate a United States Magistrate Judge to
submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law for disposition by the District Judge of
certain matters. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The District Judge “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole
or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge,” and “shall make a de
novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which objection is made.” Id. Written objections to a magistrate judge’s
1 Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 2013-05, this case was referred to the United States Magistrate Judge
for management and for all pretrial matters for determination and/or report and recommendation as appropriate.
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findings or conclusions must be specific. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). “[A] general objection to a
magistrate [judge]’s report, which fails to specify the issues of contention, does not satisfy the
requirement that an objection be filed.” Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995).
Under Local Rule 4.1(b)(2), the Clerk of the Court will only issue summonses in cases with
non-prisoner pro se plaintiffs who are proceeding in forma pauperis at the Court’s direction after
the Court conducts a screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Under that provision, the Court
shall dismiss the case at any time if it determines that the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii)
fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a
defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Section 1915 permits “judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an
indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s
factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Hill
v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 327
(1989)). “[A] finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level
of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts
available to contradict them.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32–33 (1992); see also Neitzke,
490 U.S. at 328 (explaining that Section 1915 is designed to screen “clearly baseless” claims,
which describe “fantastic or delusional scenarios”). Importantly, “[u]nlike a dismissal for failure
to state a claim, where a judge must accept all factual allegations as true,” when screening a
complaint under Section 1915, “a judge does not have to accept ‘fantastic or delusional’ factual
allegations as true.” Hill, 630 F.3d at 471 (first citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009),
then citing Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327–28).
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BACKGROUND
As stated in the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he “has been subjected to unlawful
surveillance, exploitation, false imprisonment, medical experimentation without consent,
suppression of legal redress, and coordinated obstruction by federal and state officials.” Doc. 1 at
1. Plaintiff alleges that the United States Department of Justice, the United States Secret Service,
their respective agents, plus the State of Tennessee and State of Texas all “actively collaborated in
a prolonged and deliberate conspiracy with federal and other state actors to deprive Plaintiff of his
rights.” Id. at 2. In an attached memorandum, Plaintiff suggests that Defendants have perpetrated
“ongoing, unauthorized, and continuous surveillance . . . for fifteen years using government
technology to treat personal devices as state-controlled spy tools.” Doc. 1-2 at 4.
Plaintiff lists claims for relief under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388
(1971), Section 1983, Section 1985, and Section 1986, Title 18 United States Code Section 1962(c)
and (d), as well as the Federal Tort Claims Act. Doc. 1 at 2–3. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and
injunctive relief, attorneys’ fees and court costs, in addition to one hundred billion United States
dollars in compensatory damages and one hundred billion United States dollars in punitive
damages. Id. at 3.
ANALYSIS
The Report “recommended that this case be dismissed sua sponte, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Doc. 11 at 1. Plaintiff’s objections center
on the Report’s discussion of Plaintiff’s voluminous other civil actions filed in this District. Doc.
12 at 1–6. Plaintiff objects that the Report’s analysis is “procedurally unsound,” because it
“depends on a factual composite that does not exist in the operative pleading.” Id. at 6.
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These objections are OVERRULED. The Report correctly noted how Plaintiff claims
“Defendants in this case conspired . . . to remotely surveille and control him and that he is entitled
to compensation from Defendants resulting from their persistent remote surveillance.” Doc. 11 at
4. The Court agrees with the Report that Plaintiff’s Complaint is not sufficient to avoid dismissal
under Section 1915(e)(2)(B). From Plaintiff’s history of unmeritorious filings2 and the nature of
the claims alleged here on their own terms, Plaintiff’s Complaint is frivolous on its face. Even at
this procedural juncture and under the relaxed standard for pro se pleadings, Plaintiff’s claims are
“wholly incredible”: Plaintiff demands two hundred billion United States dollars in damages
stemming from an alleged conspiracy between federal agencies and two state governments to
illegally surveil him. See Denton, 504 U.S. at 32–33; Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328. Plaintiff’s
Complaint is DISMISSED.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s Objections (Doc. 12) are all OVERRULED. The Court ADOPTS the Report
and Recommendation (Doc. 11). Defendant’s Complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED. The Clerk
SHALL close this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 13th day of October, 2026.
s/ Brian C. Lea
BRIAN C. LEA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
2 When deciding whether to dismiss a complaint, courts may take judicial notice of “facts in a public record
that ‘are not subject to reasonable dispute’—such as the court’s ultimate resolution of a prior case.” Blackwell v.
Nocerini, 123 F.4th 479, 487–88 (6th Cir. 2024).
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