Price v. Memphis Police Department et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
______________________________________________________________________________
BRANDON PRICE, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 2:24-02136-MSN-atc
)
CITY OF MEMPHIS, MEMPHIS POLICE )
DEPARTMENT, OFFICER C. PITTMAN, 	)
OFFICER C. YANCEY, OFFICER 	)
MCFADDEN, OFFICER MITCHELL, and )
OFFICER MCNEAL, 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
______________________________________________________________________________
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND
ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS
______________________________________________________________________________
Before the Court by order of reference1 are several pending motions filed by pro se
Plaintiff Brandon Price: Motion for Sanctions, filed July 3, 2025 (ECF No. 49); Motion to
Amend/Correct Amended Complaint, filed July 8, 2025 (ECF No. 50); Motion for Entry of
Default, filed August 19, 2025 (ECF No. 62); Motion for Default Judgment, filed August 19,
2025 (ECF No. 63); Motion to Strike Late Response, filed August 19, 2025 (ECF No. 64); Pro
Se Motion for Sanctions on the Defendant, filed September 3, 2025 (ECF No. 65); Motion for
1 Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 2013-05, this case has been referred to the United States
Magistrate Judge for management and for all pretrial matters for determination and/or report and
recommendation as appropriate.
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Clarification or Request for Default Entry, filed September 29, 2025 (ECF No. 73);2 and Motion
to Compel Discovery, filed October 8, 2025 (ECF No. 76).
The Court held a status conference on October 10, 2025, to discuss the pending motions.
As of the time of the status conference, Defendant City of Memphis (“the City”) had failed to
timely respond to Price’s Motions for Sanctions, Motion to Amend, Motion for Entry of Default,
Application for Default Judgment, and Motion to Strike. Accordingly, the Court ordered the
City to respond to those motions by October 16, 2025. (ECF No. 79.)
The City’s deadlines to respond to Price’s Motion for Clarification and Motion to
Compel had not yet expired as of the time of the status conference. In light of the City’s
disregard for the Court’s deadlines, however, the City was admonished and instructed to comply
with all future deadlines or request an extension from the Court prior to the expiration of a
deadline when appropriate. (Id.)
The City complied with the Court’s October 16th deadline and filed a combined
Response to Plaintiff’s Request for Entry of Default, Application for Default Judgment, Motion
to Strike Late Response, Motion for Sanctions, and Motion for Clarification of Request for
Default Entry. (ECF No. 80.) Notably, however, the City failed to timely respond to Price’s
Motion to Compel. The City filed its response to the Motion to Compel on October 23, 2025,
one day after the deadline had expired, despite the Court’s admonishment. (ECF No. 81.)
2 Despite its title, Price’s Motion for Clarification or Request for Default Entry seeks to clarify
that her request for default judgment is made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
55(b)(1), rather than Rule 55(b) generally. (ECF No. 73, at 2.) Accordingly, the Court will
consider her Motion for Clarification in conjunction with her Motion for Default Judgment.
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For the reasons explained below, the Court recommends that Price’s Motion to Amend
(ECF No. 50), Motion for Entry of Default (ECF No. 62), Motion for Default Judgment (ECF
No. 63), and Motion for Clarification or Request for Default Entry (ECF No. 73) be denied.
The Court further DENIES Price’s Motions for Sanctions (ECF Nos. 49, 65) and Motion
to Strike (ECF No. 64). As to Price’s Motion to Compel, Price is ORDERED to inform the
Court, on or before February 3, 2026, whether the Motion is now moot in light of the City’s
Notice of Service of its discovery responses, filed October 30, 2025 (ECF No. 83).
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. 	Proposed Findings of Fact
Price brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged constitutional violations
and torts arising from an incident at the opening of the YMCA located at 4727 Elvis Presley
Boulevard on March 1, 2023. (ECF No. 35, at 1–3.) At the event, Price stood outside the
building “jeering” at Governor Bill Lee, who was delivering a speech inside. (Id. at 3.) Price
alleges that she was approached by three Memphis Police Department officers, and an altercation
subsequently occurred. (Id. at 3–4.) The officers then detained Price for “resisting arrest.” (Id.
at 5.) After she was placed in handcuffs, the officers allegedly continued to use force against her
even though she was “crying out in pain.” (Id. at 6.) The officers then removed Price from the
event, and Price received a Misdemeanor Citation in Lieu of Arrest. (Id. at 7–8.) Price seeks
$100,000,000 in damages for the City’s “violations of the Monell doctrine,” $6,500,000 in
compensatory damages, $10,500,000 in punitive damages, and injunctive relief. (Id. at 26–27.)
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II. 	Proposed Conclusions of Law
A. 	Recommendation to Deny Motion to Amend
In her Motion, Price seeks to add Officer Hamilton as a defendant because she learned of
his involvement upon rereading the citation she received following the events giving rise to this
action. (ECF No. 50, at 1.) In its one-page Response, the City contends that, “[b]ecause the City
of Memphis will represent the defendants acting in their official capacity, there is no need to add
Officer Hamilton to the suit as it does not change the parties involved in or responding to this
litigation.” (ECF No. 60, at 1.)
“[M]otions for leave to amend are reviewed under the deferential standard of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 15, and the Court ‘should freely give leave when justice so requires.’”
Porter v. AAR Aircraft Servs., Inc., 316 F.R.D. 691, 692 (W.D. Tenn. 2016) (quoting Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(a)(2)). An exception to this forgiving standard is when a proposed amendment is
futile. Id. (citing Pedreira v. Ky. Baptist Homes for Child., Inc., 579 F.3d 722, 729 (6th Cir.
2009)); see also Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, (1962). “A proposed amendment is futile if
the amendment could not withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” Berry v. Regions Fin.
Corp., 507 F. Supp. 3d 972, 977 (W.D. Tenn. 2020), appeal dismissed, No. 21-5038, 2021 WL
1511687 (6th Cir. Jan. 29, 2021) (quoting Riverview Health Inst. LLC v. Med. Mut. of Ohio, 601
F.3d 505, 512 (6th Cir. 2010)).
Price’s proposed amendment is indeed futile. “Suit against an individual defendant in
that defendant’s official capacity is identical to suit against the governmental entity.” Henderson
v. City of Memphis, No. 2:19-cv-2776-SHM-tmp, 2021 WL 1109362, at *4 (W.D. Tenn. Mar.
23, 2021) (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985)). Accordingly, “[w]here the
governmental entity is already a defendant, suit against a government officer in that officer’s
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official capacity” is redundant and thus futile. Id. During the July 10, 2025 scheduling
conference, Price confirmed that she brings her claims against the individual officers in their
official, not individual, capacities. (ECF No. 53, at 1 n.1.) Because the City is already a named
Defendant, adding an official-capacity claim against Officer Hamilton is unnecessary, and it is
recommended that Price’s Motion to Amend be denied as futile.
B. 	Recommendation to Deny Motions for Entry of Default and Default Judgment
Price seeks entry of default and default judgment against the City for its failure to comply
with two of the Court’s Orders to Show Cause. (ECF No. 61, at 1.) Specifically, Price correctly
establishes that the City was ordered to respond to her Motion for Leave to Amend (ECF No. 28)
or to show cause as to why it should not be granted by April 4, 2025, after missing the original
response deadline (ECF No. 32). The City neither responded to nor otherwise acknowledged the
Court’s Order. Price further notes that the Court ordered the City to respond to her Motion for
Sanctions (ECF No. 49) and Motion to Amend (ECF No. 50) on or before August 12, 2025, after
missing the deadline to respond to those motions (ECF No. 58), but the City did not respond to
these motions until August 15, 2025. (ECF Nos. 60–61.) In its response, the City asserts that
default judgment “would be a drastic response that would deny Defendant the opportunity” to
defend itself against Price’s claims. (ECF No. 80, at 2.)
“District courts have tools ‘to penalize’ those who violate their rules.” Prime Rate
Premium Fin. Corp., Inc. v. Larson, 930 F.3d 759, 767 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Nat’l Hockey
League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976) (per curiam)). Rule 16(f) grants
courts the authority to issue “‘just orders,’ including the sanctions listed in Rule 37(b), for failure
to follow a scheduling or other pretrial order.” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f)(1)(C)). These
sanctions may include, in appropriate circumstances, rendering a default judgment. Id. (citing
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(vi)). Default judgment, however, “is a drastic step which should be
resorted to only in the most extreme cases.” United Coin Meter Co. v. Seaboard Coastline R.R.,
705 F.2d 839, 845 (6th Cir. 1983). When considering whether to render a default judgment as a
sanction, courts are to consider: (1) whether the party acted in bad faith; (2) whether the
opposing party was prejudiced, (3) whether the court gave adequate warning, and (4) whether
less drastic sanctions could ensure compliance. Prime Rate, 930 F.3d at 769 (citation omitted).
Though the City has repeatedly failed to comply with filing deadlines and Court orders,
the Court declines to impose the extreme sanction of default at this time. The City’s conduct
does not rise to the level of bad faith warranting default, nor does it demonstrate prejudice to
Price so severe that no lesser remedy could cure it. Additionally, though the Court has expressly
warned the City that continued noncompliance with its orders could result in sanctions, the Court
has not expressly warned that noncompliance could result in default. Given the severity of the
requested sanction and the strong preference for resolving cases on their merits, the Court finds
that, as discussed below, less drastic sanctions are available to ensure compliance with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Court’s orders. Accordingly, it is recommended that
Price’s requests for entry of default and default judgment be denied at this time.
III. 	Recommendation
For the reasons set forth above, it is recommended that Price’s Motion to Amend, Motion
for Entry of Default, and Motion for Default Judgment be denied.
ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS
I. 	First Motion for Sanctions
Price argues that the City violated Rule 11(b) by “denying verified facts and
contradicting its own admissions and evidence” in its Answer to the Amended Complaint (ECF
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No. 39) and thus “engag[ed] in conduct that demonstrates a lack of good faith in their Answer.”
(ECF No. 49, at 1.)3 In response, the City contends that Price’s arguments “assume facts not yet
in evidence,” as Price’s Motion was filed before entry of a scheduling order or initiation of
discovery. (ECF No. 61, at 1–2.)
“Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, sanctions may be imposed if ‘a reasonable
inquiry discloses [that a] pleading, motion or paper is (1) not well grounded in fact, (2) not
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of
existing law, or (3) interposed for an improper purpose such as harassment or delay.’” Merritt v.
Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 613 F.3d 609, 626 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Herron v. Jupiter Transp. Co., 858 F.2d 332, 335 (6th Cir. 1988)). Rule 11 sanctions exist to
deter abuse of the legal process. Id. (citing Herron, 858 F.2d at 335). “The Rule ‘stresses the
need for some pre-filing inquiry into both the facts and the law to satisfy the affirmative duty
imposed.’” Gibson v. Solideal USA, Inc., 489 F. App’x 24, 29 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Merritt,
613 F.3d at 626). In deciding Rule 11 motions, the Sixth Circuit applies an objective
reasonableness standard, which asks “what was reasonable to believe at the time the pleading,
motion or other paper was submitted.” Id.
Price characterizes certain “facts” within her Amended Complaint as “verified” based on
“evidence” she attached to her Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 49, at 2–3.) Specifically, Price
identifies the following “verified facts” that the City denied in its Answer:
• 	Former Mayor Jim Strickland had been Mayor of Memphis and his term ended
after the investigation into the City’s and Memphis Police Department’s pattern or
practice by the Department of Justice began.
3 In this Motion, Price also argues that the City violated the Court’s March 21, 2025 Order to
Show Cause (ECF No. 32) by failing to timely respond. That argument is discussed below in
Section V.
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• 	Police Chief C.J. Davis has an established record of covering up crimes by police
officers under her command and their spouses.
• 	The Defendant’s agents attempted to block the press from viewing what was
being done to the Plaintiff and one of its agents threatened the local media with
being detained.
(Id. at 2.) The second and third of these allegations contain both factual and legal conclusions
that the City disagrees with and intends to disprove. (See ECF No. 61, at 2.) The City is entitled
to take that position at this time.
As to the first allegation, the City notes that the allegation regarding the former mayor’s
tenure is included in a paragraph that also contains allegations the City disputes, such as the
mayor’s awareness of “constitutional violations and racial discrimination made by the Memphis
Police.” (ECF No. 35, at 9; ECF No. 61, at 2.) Though Rule 8 provides that a defendant “that
intends in good faith to deny only part of an allegation must admit the part that is true and deny
the rest,” Rule 10 also requires a plaintiff to “state its claims or defenses in numbered
paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(b)(4); Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). It thus appears that neither pleading is fully compliant with the
Rules but also that neither was filed in bad faith. As such, the sanction of striking the City’s
Answer (or any portions of it) is unwarranted, and Price’s Motion is denied on this basis.
II. 	Second Motion for Sanctions
Price argues that sanctions should also be imposed against the City “due to their failure to
comply with discovery rules and court orders” pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37.
(ECF No. 65, at 1.) 	The City maintains, however, that sanctions are unwarranted because it
agreed to submit the discovery responses upon entry of an agreed upon protective order. (ECF
No. 80, at 3.)
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 sets forth two frameworks for the imposition of
sanctions due to discovery-related conduct. Clark Const. Grp., Inc. v. City of Memphis, 229
F.R.D. 131, 137 (W.D. Tenn. 2005). First, pursuant to Rule 37(a)–(b), “a party may move for an
order to compel discovery.” Id. “If that motion is granted and a party refuses or fails to comply
with the Court’s Order, the Court may issue a wide range of sanctions under Rule 27(b),
including dismissal of the lawsuit.” Id. The scenario provided in Rule 37(d) occurs less
frequently, and it allows the court to impose sanctions even in the absence of a prior court order.
Id.
Because the Court had not entered an order compelling discovery at the time Price filed
her Motion, Rule 37(d) provides the proper framework for evaluating Price’s request for
sanctions. Although the City had not yet served its discovery responses when the Motion was
filed, the record reflects that the City remained in communication with Price and provided
explanations for the delay. Specifically, the City represented via email that the delay resulted
from staffing changes and the need to secure a protective order governing the production of
discovery materials. (ECF No. 65-2.) Under these circumstances, the Court does not find that
the City’s delay was willful or in bad faith, nor did it adversely impact the progression of this
case, as the responses were served on October 30, 2025. (ECF No. 83.) Sanctions are
unwarranted at this time, and Price’s Motion is denied.
III. 	Motion to Strike
In her Motion, Price again correctly asserts that the City failed to comply with the Court’s
July 29, 2025 Order to Show Cause, which directed the City to respond to Price’s Motion for
Sanctions (ECF No. 49) and Motion to Amend/Correct Amended Complaint (ECF No. 50) by
August 12, 2025. (ECF No. 58.) The City did not respond to the Court’s Order until August 15,
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2025, three days after the deadline. (ECF Nos. 60–61.) Because the City failed to timely
respond to the Court’s Order, Price asks the Court to strike the late responses. (ECF No. 64, at
1.) Notably, the City again failed to timely respond to the Motion to Strike until it was ordered
to do so by October 16, 2025, at the October 10, 2025 status conference. (ECF No. 79.) In its
Response, the City merely states that it responded to the Motion for Sanctions and Motion to
Amend “within 72 hours” of the August 12, 2025 deadline set by the Court, but it did not directly
address Price’s request to strike the responses. (ECF No. 80, at 2.)
Rule 12(f) provides that the Court “may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or
any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” “When . . . a request to strike
falls outside the scope of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), which provides for striking
matters from ‘a pleading,’ the Court relies on its inherent power to control the docket when
deciding whether to strike the document.” Stillwagon v. City of Del., 274 F. Supp. 3d 714, 740
(S.D. Ohio 2017), aff’d in part, appeal dismissed in part sub nom. Stillwagon v. City of Del.,
Ohio, 747 F. App’x 361 (6th Cir. 2018) (citations omitted). “Motions to strike are viewed with
disfavor and are not frequently granted.” Operating Eng’rs Loc. 324 Health Care Plan v. G & W
Const. Co., 783 F.3d 1045, 1050 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v.
United States, 201 F.2d 819, 822 (6th Cir. 1953)).
Though the Court acknowledges and shares in Price’s frustration with the City’s
disregard for multiple deadlines in this matter, it declines to strike the responses from the record.
The responses do not contain “redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous” material.
Further, “[t]he federal courts do their business in public—which means the public is
presumptively entitled to review every document that a party files with the court for purposes of
influencing a judicial decision.” Grae v. Corrections Corp. of Am., 134 F.4th 927, 930 (6th Cir.
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2025). Though City’s conduct has indeed been problematic, striking the late-filed responses
would not advance the purpose of imposing sanctions and would instead merely remove those
filings from public view. Accordingly, Price’s Motion to Strike is DENIED.
IV. 	Motion to Compel
As previously discussed, Price’s Motion asserts that the City failed to timely respond to
her discovery requests. The record reflects, however, that on October 30, 2025, the City filed a
Notice of Service indicating that it served its discovery responses on Price on that date. (ECF
No. 83.) Since that filing, Price has not advised the Court whether the City’s responses are
deficient or whether any disputes regarding those responses remain. Accordingly, Price is
ordered to file a notice by February 3, 2026, stating whether the Motion is now moot in light of
the City’s service of its discovery responses.
V. 	The City’s Failure to Meet Deadlines
The record reflects an ongoing pattern of untimeliness by the City. The City initially
failed to respond to Price’s Motion to Amend/Correct Amended Complaint (ECF No. 28) by the
response deadline, prompting the Court to enter an Order to Show Cause directing the City to
respond by April 4, 2025 (ECF No. 32). The City neither responded to nor otherwise
acknowledged that Order. Subsequently, the City again failed to timely respond to Price’s
Motion for Sanctions (ECF No. 49) and Motion to Amend/Correct Amended Complaint (ECF
No. 50), despite the Court ordering a response by August 12, 2025 (ECF No. 58). The City did
not file its responses until August 15, 2025. (ECF Nos. 60–61.) The City’s responses to Price’s
Motion for Entry of Default (ECF No. 62), Motion for Default Judgment (ECF No. 63), and
Motion to Strike Late Response (ECF No. 64) were also late, but the City complied with the
Court’s extension and filed its combined response to those motions on October 16, 2025 (ECF
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No. 80). Nonetheless, the City once again failed to meet a deadline by filing its response to
Price’s Motion to Compel one day late, on October 23, 2025 (ECF No. 81), when the response
was due October 22, and failed to request leave for the late filing or even acknowledge its
tardiness.
The City has on multiple occasions failed to timely respond to motions, failed to comply
with express Court Orders setting response deadlines, and failed to seek extensions or otherwise
communicate with the Court in advance of missed deadlines. This conduct has persisted even
after the Court admonished the City that failure to adhere to deadlines could warrant sanctions.
(ECF No. 79.) The City’s position that Price “has filed 19 motions in this matter” and that the
City’s “counsel is responding to this matter while also handling other matters” is not well-taken.
(ECF No. 80.) Several of Price’s motions arise directly from the City’s failure to comply with
filing deadlines and Court Orders. (See ECF No. 62 (seeking default judgment for the City’s
failure to comply with two of the Court’s Orders to Show Cause); ECF No. 64 (asking the Court
to strike the City’s late responses); ECF No. 65 (moving for sanctions against the City due to its
failure to comply with discovery rules and court orders).) Moreover, the fact that counsel for the
City may be managing other matters does not excuse noncompliance or relieve counsel of the
obligation to adhere to applicable deadlines and show appropriate respect for the Court and its
orders. Should the City require additional time to complete any task required by a deadline, it
should file a motion seeking to enlarge that time. It should not simply ignore the deadline.
The City’s repeated noncompliance, even after admonishment, justifies an award of
sanctions. Because Price is proceeding pro se, she is not entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees.
See Kay v. Ehrler, 900 F.2d 967, 972 (6th Cir. 1990). The Court will, however, require the City
to reimburse Price for any expenses she has incurred due to the City’s dilatory conduct. Price
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shall file a notice on or before February 6, 2026, detailing any such expenses, and the City may
file a response by February 20, 2026. The City is further warned that any future failure to
comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Local Rules, or this Court’s deadlines—or
any failure to timely request a reasonable extension—may result in the imposition of additional
sanctions pursuant to Rule 37. Such sanctions may include, but are not limited to, orders
deeming certain facts established, prohibiting the City from supporting or opposing designated
claims or defenses, striking pleadings in whole or in part, or entering default judgment against
the City. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(i)–(vii).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, it is recommended that Price’s Motion to Amend, Motion
for Entry of Default, and Motion for Default Judgment be denied. Price’s First Motion for
Sanctions (ECF Nos. 49, 65) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Price is
ORDERED to file a notice regarding her expenses on or before February 6, 2026, and the City
may file a response by February 20, 2026. Price’s Second Motion for Sanctions (ECF No. 65)
and Motion to Strike (ECF No. 64) are DENIED. As to the Motion to Compel (ECF No. 76),
Price is ORDERED to file a notice by February 3, 2026, stating whether the Motion is now moot
in light of the City’s service of its discovery responses.
SO ORDERED this 27th day of January, 2026.
s/Annie T. Christoff
ANNIE T. CHRISTOFF
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
NOTICE
Within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this report and recommendation
disposition, a party may serve and file written objections to the proposed findings and
recommendations. A party may respond to another party’s objections within fourteen (14) days
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after being served with a copy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file objections within
fourteen (14) days may constitute waiver/forfeiture of objections, exceptions, and further appeal.
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