Burgess v. Bradford Hills HOA et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
MONSIEUR SHAWNELLIS BURGESS,
Plaintiff,
v.
BRADFORD HILLS HOA, et al.,
Defendants.
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NO. 3:25-cv-00930
JUDGE CAMPBELL
MAGISTRATE JUDGE EVANS
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
To allow efficient consideration of the many pending motions in this case, the referral to
the Magistrate Judge (Doc. No. 61) is REVOKED. The undersigned will consider the pending
motions, including Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 31), and other non-dispositive
motions.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Monsieur Shawnellias Burgess (“Plaintiff” or “Burgess”) initiated this lawsuit on
August 15, 2025. (See Complaint, Doc. No. 1 at 1). Plaintiff alleges that the Bradford Hills
Homeowners Association (the “HOA”), its property management company, a former employee of
the property management company, and members of the board of directors have taken retaliatory
and discriminatory actions, including “illegal fines and harassment,” against him because of his
success in a state court case against the HOA in 2020. (Id.). The state case is Burgess v. Bradford
Hills HOA, et al., Case No. 20C1835, in the 5th Circuit Court for Davidson County, Tennessee.
(See Doc. No. 1-1 at PageID# 43-52). That case concerned Plaintiff’s challenge to the HOA’s
enforcement of restrictive covenants against him. (Id.). The state court judgment determined that
Plaintiff had not violated the HOA’s restrictive covenants prohibiting “noxious or offensive
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activity which may become and annoyance or nuisance to the neighborhood,” because the
covenants were too vague and ambiguous to be enforceable. (Id. at PageID# 49-50 (emphasis in
original)). The court also found that the restrictive covenants did not include an enforcement
remedy of fines. (Id. at PageID #49).
In the Complaint, Plaintiff claims that following the state court ruling, the HOA amended
the covenants, conditions, and restrictions and then sent him notices of violations and assessed
fines against him for the same signs at issue in the state litigation. (Compl., Doc. No. 1).
He brings a federal claim for discrimination under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), and state
law claims for selective enforcement, breach of fiduciary duty, ultra vires acts, breach of settlement
agreement, and negligence.
II. 	PRELIMINARY MATTERS
Before turning to the motion to dismiss, the Court will briefly address the numerous other
motions pending in this case. The vast majority of these motions are mooted by the dismissal of
the case.1 The Court will, however, briefly address Defendants’ motion for extension of time to
respond to the Complaint (Doc. No. 22), and Plaintiff’s motions to disqualify counsel (Doc. Nos.
29, 30, 35), motion for leave to file under seal (Doc. No. 16), and motion for sanctions (Doc. No.
44).
A. Motion for Extension of Time
In the motion for extension of time, Defendants sought an extension of time to respond to
the complaint to October 17, 2025, and an additional 30 days to respond to Plaintiff’s pending
1 	These include the following motions filed by Plaintiff: motions for injunction (Doc. Nos. 12, 46);
motions to supplement motions for injunction (Doc. No. 15, 70); motion for jury demand (Doc. No. 14);
motion to clarify notice of appearance (Doc. No. 21); motion for judicial notice (Doc. No. 50); motion for
order on unopposed motion to take judicial notice (Doc. No. 50); motion for clarification (Doc. No. 68);
and motion to ascertain status (Doc. No. 75). Defendant’s motion to strike (Doc. No. 77) is also moot. Any
motions not specifically mentioned are moot.
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motions, at which point there were six, to allow time to review the numerous motions and to permit
the filing of consolidated responses. The Court finds good cause for the extension of time.
Accordingly, the motion for extension of time (Doc. No. 22) is GRANTED, and is retroactive.
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss, which was filed on October 17, 2025, was timely
filed. Plaintiff’s emergency motion for a ruling on the motion, correction, motion to supplement
response in opposition, and motion to strike, all of which pertain to the motion for extension of
time (Doc. Nos. 24, 25, 26, 27) are DENIED as MOOT.
B. Motions to Disqualify Counsel
Plaintiff’s motions to disqualify counsel for the defendant, motion to supplement the
motion to disqualify, and second supplement (Doc. Nos. 29, 30, 51) are grounded on Plaintiff’s
contention that the Defendants should be represented by separate counsel due to potential conflicts
of interest among the defendants. As an initial matter, Plaintiff does not have standing to assert
opposing counsel’s alleged conflict of interest when he does not claim to be a current or former
client. See Willis v. First Bank Nat. Ass’n, 916 F.2d 714 (6th Cir. 1990) (“[P]laintiff’s standing to
assert opposing counsel’s alleged conflict of interest is questionable at best.”). Although joint
representation may present constitutional issues in criminal cases, the same is not true for
representation in civil matters. Moreover, any potential conflicts may be waived by the defendants.
Accordingly, the motions to disqualify counsel (Doc. Nos. 29, 30, 51) are DENIED. Plaintiff’s
motion for the Court to rule on the motion to disqualify (Doc. No. 35) is DENIED AS MOOT.
C. Motion for Leave to File Document Under Seal
Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file document under seal (Doc. No. 16) seeks to seal the
confidential settlement agreement between the HOA and Plaintiff from a prior state case. (Doc.
No. 16). The Court finds sealing the document is appropriate. Accordingly, the motion is
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GRANTED. The document filed at docket entry 17 shall remain under seal. Plaintiff’s signed
letter of correction (Doc. No. 18), which is a duplicate of the motion to seal, is MOOT.
D. Motion for Sanctions
Plaintiff filed a motion for sanctions seeking to strike Defendants’ motion to dismiss as a
sanction for alleged misrepresentations in the memorandum. (Doc. No. 44). Plaintiff argues that
by asserting that the state court order was not “final,” Defendants are “trying to avoid the
preclusive effect of the state court’s judgment.” (Id. at 1). Plaintiff contends that this is an “abuse
of judicial process” and that the Court should strike Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss and impose
monetary or other sanctions as it deems appropriate. (Id. at 6).
The portion of Defendants’ memorandum to which Plaintiff objects states:
Plaintiff cites to Tennessee Circuit Court case 20C1835, which held,
regarding a 2020 Complaint filed by Plaintiff about another HOA violation
notice, “Plaintiff has not violated the Bradford Hill’s HOA’s CCRs.” (Docket
Entry No. 1-1, Exhibit 2 to Complaint). Plaintiff characterizes this as a “final
order,” though it is more specifically the “Court’s Final Order on Plaintiff’s
Request for a Declaratory Judgment as Interpreted by the Court of Appeals’
Opinion.” Id. The State Court docket for this matter continues until January
17, 2025, and includes 156 docket entries after this Order. Plaintiff appears
to raise, in the instant Complaint, claims defendants have violated the State
Court’s 2023 Order. Following entry of this Order, the parties to the State
Court Action entered a Settlement Agreement. (Complaint, p. 5).
(Doc. No. 31-1 at 2). The Court has reviewed the record of the state court proceeding and
finds that Defendants have not misrepresented the record. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for
sanctions (Doc. No. 44) is DENIED.
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III. 	MOTION TO DISMISS2
A. Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits dismissal of a complaint for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For purposes of a motion to dismiss, a court must
take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations, accepted
as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Id. at 678. A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads facts that allow the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the
Court construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepts its allegations as
true, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Directv, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d
471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007). Thus, dismissal is appropriate only if “it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”
Guzman v. U.S. Dep’t of Children’s Servs., 679 F.3d 425, 429 (6th Cir. 2012).
In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court may consider the complaint and any
exhibits attached thereto, public records, items appearing in the record of the case, and exhibits
attached to a defendant’s motion to dismiss provided they are referred to in the Complaint and are
central to the claims. Bassett v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir.
2 	At the conclusion of his motion for the Court to rule on the motion to disqualify Defendants’
attorneys, Plaintiff requests the court delay consideration of the motion to dismiss until after the motion to
disqualify is resolved and states that he intends to file an amended complaint after the disqualification issue
is decided. (Doc. No. 35). Because Plaintiff has not filed a motion for leave to amend, filed an amended
complaint, or provided any information concerning the substance of an amended complaint, particularly
information to suggest the amendment would survive a motion to dismiss, the Court declines to delay
adjudication of the motion to dismiss.
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2008). Here, the Court has also reviewed filings from the state court case which are attached to
the Complaint and a public record.
B. Fair Housing Act
Plaintiff’s sole federal cause of action is a claim for discrimination under the Fair Housing
Act 	(“FHA”), 	specifically 	42 	U.S.C. 	§§ 	3604(a) 	and 	3617. 	Section 	3604(a) 	prohibits
discrimination against “any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national
origin” in the rental or sale of housing. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). Section 3617 protects plaintiffs who
“aided or encouraged” the housing rights enumerated in the statute and “allows a plaintiff to step
into the shoes of the victims of certain types of housing discrimination when the plaintiff faces
retribution for providing encouragement to the victims.” Linkletter v. Western & Southern Fin.
Grp., Inc., 851 F.3d 632, 637 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3617). “To qualify for
a § 3617 claim, a defendant's ‘interference’ must still be in retaliation for a plaintiff having ‘aided
or encouraged’ another’s enjoyment of the housing rights protected by §§ 3603–06.” Id. at 638.
To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to give rise to a plausible
inference of discrimination; conclusory allegations of discriminatory intent are insufficient. See
HDC, LLC v. City of Ann Arbor, 675 F.3d 608, 612-13 (6th Cir. 2012) (“A complaint that includes
only conclusory allegations of discriminatory intent without supporting factual allegations does
not sufficiently show entitlement to relief.”).
Defendants argue the FHA claim should be dismissed because Plaintiff has not stated facts
from which a plausible inference of discrimination can be drawn. The Court agrees.
The Complaint makes the following allegations regarding racial discrimination:
 	The Defendants have harassed, discriminated and retaliated against
the Plaintiff because he won his state case (20C-1835) by breaching
the settlement agreement, ignoring a court’s declaration that he is not
in 	violation 	of 	the 	HOA’s 	CCR 	[Covenants, 	Conditions, 	and
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Restrictions] and trying to force him to violate Metro Ordinance
8.04.110 [ ]. The Defendants have fined the Plaintiff despite a state
court determining that the HOA doesn’t have the authority to levy
fines pursuant to its CCRs.” (Compl., Doc. No. 1 at 2).
 	The Defendants’ motivation was based on Plaintiff’s race and his
status as a victor in the previous legal case (20C-1835). In addition
the Defendants have demonstrated Selective Enforcement of the
HOA’s rules which list that Homeowners are required to abide by pet
laws to which Plaintiff is but the HOA has illegally fined him for
following their written rule. Also, the HOA for the 2nd time is not
following the CCR’s mandatory enforcement process … (Id.)
 	“Plaintiff contends that when the HOA issues fines to him as a
homeowner after a court has declared there is no violation, and he as
the homeowner belongs to a minority group, it is undeniably [sic]
that the HOA’s actions are clearly racism, harassment, and/or
retaliation. (Id. at 5).
 	Plaintiff contends that if a court has declared a minority homeowner
is not in violation of the CCRs, and the HOA continues to fine that
individual, the conduct is actionable under the FHA as it is motivated
by discriminatory intent. (Id. at 9).
 	Plaintiff contends that his race is the primary factor in the HOA’s
persistence to violate him for signs in his yard. (Id.).
 	Plaintiff contends because of his race the HOA and Board persist [in
fining Plaintiff for signs in his yard]. (Id. at 10).
Plaintiff’s allegations of racial discrimination are merely conclusory and appear to be based
solely on the fact that he is “a minority homeowner.” These conclusory allegations are insufficient
to plausibly state a claim for relief under the FHA. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss this claim
is GRANTED.
Having dismissed the only federal claim, the Court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the remaining claims. See Hester v. Chester Cty., Tenn., 162 F.4th 780, 790 (6th
Cir. 2025) (“A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing all
claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)).
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 31) is GRANTED. The
claim for violation of the FHA is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and the state law claims are
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Defendants’ motion for extension of time to respond to the Complaint (Doc. No. 22) is
GRANTED. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file under seal (Doc. No. 16) is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s
motions to disqualify counsel (Doc. Nos. 29, 30, 35) and motion for sanctions (Doc. No. 44) are
DENIED. All other pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT and the Clerk is directed to close
the file.
It is so ORDERED.
______________________________________
WILLIAM L. CAMPBELL, JR.
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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