Eglet v. Howell

1
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
IN RE: 	)
)
JOHN RAYMOND CHADWICK 	) 	Case No. 1:25-bk-02710
HOWELL, 	) 	Chapter 7
) 	Judge Nancy B. King
Debtor. 	)
)
KATHLEEN EGLET, 	) 	Adversary No. 1:25-ap-90116
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	)
)
JOHN RAYMOND CHADWICK 	)
HOWELL, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court upon John Raymond Chadwick Howell’s (“Defendant”)
“Motion to Dismiss.” The Defendant cites Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)’s failure to
state a claim for which relief can be granted standard challenging the sufficiency of the Complaint.
Kathleen Eglet (“Plaintiff”) filed a response in opposition. Before addressing the merits, the Court
points out that the filing of a post-answer motion to dismiss has resulted, at least in some courts,
THIS ORDER HAS BEEN ENTERED ON THE DOCKET.
PLEASE SEE DOCKET FOR ENTRY DATE.
SO ORDERED.
SIGNED 16th day of March, 2026
Nancy B. King
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge
Case 1:25-ap-90116 Doc 15 Filed 03/16/26 Entered 03/16/26 15:21:59 Desc Main
Document Page 1 of 11

2
in the denial of consideration of such motions on the ground that the filing of an answer
categorically precludes a defendant from later challenging the sufficiency of a complaint. See
Oxford House, Inc. v. Twp. of N. Bergen, 158 F.4th 486, 490 (3d Cir. 2025) (citing other decisions
which have collected cases).
Rule 12(b)1 requires certain defenses “must be made before pleading if a responsive
pleading is allowed.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). As noted by the Third Circuit, however:
[T]he consequences for failing to raise such defenses depends on which provision
of Rule 12(b) is later invoked. Filing an answer waives any unasserted defense
under Rule 12(b)(2)-(5), see id. 12(h)(1). The Rule 12(b)(6) defense of failure to
state a claim is different in that it may be raised “in any pleading allowed or ordered
under Rule 7(a),” “by a motion under Rule 12(c),” or “at trial,” id. 12(h)(2).
Oxford House, Inc., 158 F.4 th at 490.
For this reason, the Court will construe the Defendant’s post-answer motion to dismiss as
a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c). Doing so is straightforward and
does not prejudice the rights of any party because the standard is the same under either rule. Allen
v. Lo, 751 F. Supp. 3d 863, 871 (M.D. Tenn. 2024) (citing Jackson v. Prof’l Radiology Inc., 864
F.3d 463, 466 (6th Cir. 2017) (finding a motion for judgment on the pleadings is governed by
Rule 12(c) and is analyzed the same as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under
Rule 12(b)(6)).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When considering a Rule 12(c) motion, the court “‘must construe the complaint in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, accept all of the complaint's factual allegations as true, and
determine whether the plaintiff undoubtedly can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that
would entitle him to relief.’” Engler v. Arnold, 862 F.3d 571, 574–75 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting
1 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 is made applicable by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7012.
Case 1:25-ap-90116 Doc 15 Filed 03/16/26 Entered 03/16/26 15:21:59 Desc Main
Document Page 2 of 11

3
Kottmyer v. Maas, 436 F.3d 684, 689 (6th Cir. 2006)). “To survive a Rule 12(c) motion, the
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Id. at 575 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “Mere labels and conclusions are not enough; the allegations must
contain ‘factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
“When reviewing a motion for judgment on the pleadings, [the Court] generally may only
review the pleadings, any attachments to those pleadings, and documents that are referred to in the
complaint and [are] central to the plaintiff’s claim or are matters of public record.” Saalim v.
Walmart, Inc., 97 F.4th 995, 1002 (6th Cir. 2024) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
In this case, the Court considers the Adversary Complaint, the Answer, the General Sessions Civil
Summons, the Notice of Appeal, and the Order of the Circuit Court of Williamson County,
Tennessee (“Circuit Court Order”) as the pleadings and necessary documents that are referred to
in the Complaint or are public record and central to the Plaintiff’s claim.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Plaintiff is listed as a creditor on the Defendant’s Chapter 7 voluntary petition.
[Complaint, Dkt. No. 1, at 1; ¶ 2]. The claim arose from a Williamson County, Tennessee, General
Sessions Court (“General Sessions Court”) action for “breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and
damage to property.” [Id.]. The General Sessions Court entered a judgment of dismissal [Answer
to Complaint, Dkt. No.7, Exh. 2], and the Plaintiff appealed to the Circuit Court for Williamson
County, Tennessee (“Circuit Court”). On June 25, 2025, the Circuit Court entered an order granting
the Plaintiff a default judgment against the Defendant for $20,040.50 when the Defendant failed
to appear. [Id. (citing Exh. C, Circuit Court Order)].
Case 1:25-ap-90116 Doc 15 Filed 03/16/26 Entered 03/16/26 15:21:59 Desc Main
Document Page 3 of 11

4
During the appeal to the Circuit Court, the Plaintiff testified about her damages resulting
from overpayment to the Defendant “for services, goods, and repairs misrepresented as necessary
on her property and fraud in the conducting of services.” [Complaint, Dkt. No. 1, at 2, ¶ 2]. The
Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant, “acting as a contractor, misrepresented the cost of repairs
related to plumbing and crawl space encapsulation.” [Id. at 2; ¶ 3]. Based on these factual
allegations, the Plaintiff alleges that the debt is nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(2)(A) as a debt obtained by false pretense, false representation, or actual fraud. [Id. at 2,
¶¶ 4-5].
The Defendant timely filed an Answer, and a pretrial conference was held. Per the Pretrial
Order, dispositive motions were to be filed on or before January 30, 2026. [Pretrial Order, Dkt.
No. 9]. The Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss [Motion to Dismiss, Brief/Memorandum in
Support of Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. Nos. 11-12] on January 30, 2026, and the Plaintiff timely
responded to the Motion. [Response, Dkt. No. 13].
DISCUSSION
The Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss asserts that the Complaint fails to state specific facts
establishing 	that 	the 	Defendant 	incurred 	this 	debt 	as 	a 	result 	of 	false 	pretenses, 	false
representations, or actual fraud. Specifically, the Defendant points out that the Plaintiff relies fully
on the Circuit Court Order which fails to raise any issue of fraud, false pretenses, or
misrepresentation. Even considering the additional pleadings attached to both the Plaintiff’s
Complaint and the Defendant’s Answer, the Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to survive, as a matter of
law, because the “Plaintiff undoubtedly can prove no set of facts in support of [a] claim that would
entitle h[er] to relief.” Engler, 862 F.3d 571, 574–75.
Case 1:25-ap-90116 Doc 15 Filed 03/16/26 Entered 03/16/26 15:21:59 Desc Main
Document Page 4 of 11

5
As set forth above, the Plaintiff’s General Sessions Civil Summons alleged “breach of
contract, unjust enrichment and damage to property.” [Complaint, Dkt. No 1, Exh. B; Answer to
Complaint, Dkt. No. 7, Exh. 1]. The General Sessions Court entered a judgment of DISMISSAL
of the Plaintiff’s claims contained in the General Sessions Civil Summons after a hearing, [Answer
to Complaint, Dkt. No.7, Exh. 2] and the Plaintiff appealed to the Circuit Court. [Id., Exh. 3]. The
Plaintiff alleges in her Complaint that she testified at the Circuit Court hearing about her damages,
and the Defendant failed to appear. [Complaint, Dkt. No. 1, at 2, ¶ 3]. As a result of that hearing,
the Circuit Court entered a judgment in favor of the Plaintiff noting that the Defendant did not
appear at the hearing and that, although the Defendant indicated he was preparing to file for
bankruptcy relief, he had not yet done so at the time of the Circuit Court hearing. The Order
provides:
Accordingly, the Court finds it appropriate to grant Ms. Eglet’s request for
default judgment against Mr. Howell, finding that he has not responded to or
otherwise defended against this appeal. Having granted default judgment, the Court
received testimony and documentary evidence to support her claim for damages
which the Court accepts.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
1. 	The Court grants a default judgment against Mr. Howell;
2. 	Ms. Eglet is awarded a judgment for which execution may issue against
Mr. Howell in the amount of $20,040.50;
3. 	All court costs shall be taxed against Mr. Howell;
4. 	This order shall constitute a final appealable order.
[Complaint, Dkt. No. 1, Exh. C; Answer, Dkt. No. 7, Exh. 4].
There is no mention of fraud, false pretense, or false representation in the General Sessions
Civil Summons, the General Sessions Court’s Judgment of Dismissal, the Notice of Appeal, nor
the Circuit Court’s Order granting the Plaintiff a default judgment. The Plaintiff contends that
because she provided testimony at the de novo trial (appeal of the General Sessions Court
Case 1:25-ap-90116 Doc 15 Filed 03/16/26 Entered 03/16/26 15:21:59 Desc Main
Document Page 5 of 11

6
dismissal) to support a claim of false representation or false pretense, she has likewise stated a
claim for nondischargeability in this adversary proceeding. The Defendant does not dispute that
the Plaintiff testified, nor does he dispute what testimony was or was not provided at the hearing.
He nonetheless contends that the underlying judgment is not based upon false pretenses, false
misrepresentation, and/or fraud.
Pursuant to T.C.A. § 16–15–729, proceedings originating in general sessions courts, when
appealed to the circuit court, may be amended to add new parties, causes of action, counterclaims,
cross-claims, third-party claims, or defenses. Brown v. Roland, 357 S.W.3d 614, 619 (Tenn. 2012)
(citation omitted). Here, the original complaint raised claims of “breach of contract, unjust
enrichment and damage to property” as provided in the General Sessions Civil Summons. The
Plaintiff did not file an amended complaint in the Circuit Court, nor were any new causes of action
included in the Plaintiff’s Notice of Appeal. In fact, the Plaintiff checked “Original Claim” on the
Notice of Appeal. A party appealing from general sessions to circuit court is bound by the
perimeters of the civil warrant filed in the general sessions court unless an amendment is filed with
the circuit court. See, e.g., Flynn v. Citizens Nat’l Bank, No. E2014–02231–COA–R3–CV, 2015
WL 6453008, at *8 (citation omitted) (Plaintiff was bound by the amount sought in the general
sessions civil warrant where no amendment to increase the amount of damages was filed in the
circuit court.).2 Accordingly, the Plaintiff did not properly present any claims based on fraud, false
representation, or false pretense in the Circuit Court.
Additionally, whatever testimony the Plaintiff 	may have presented to the Circuit Court
regarding false representation or false pretense was not specifically incorporated into the Order
granting her a default judgment. The Circuit Court Order is simply a default judgment for failure
2 An appeal must put the parties and the Court on notice of what issues are being decided. If the Plaintiff wanted to
allege fraud as part of her appeal, she was required to give the Defendant notice of new causes of action.
Case 1:25-ap-90116 Doc 15 Filed 03/16/26 Entered 03/16/26 15:21:59 Desc Main
Document Page 6 of 11

7
to appear and an award of damages. The Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure mandate that a trial
court, after hearing a case without a jury, “shall find the facts specially and shall state separately
its conclusions of law and direct the entry of the appropriate judgment.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01.
“These findings of fact and conclusions of law must be ‘incorporated into the trial court’s written
order, as the court speaks through its orders and not through the transcript of the proceedings.’”
Bean v. Bean, No. M2022-00394-COA-R3-CV, 2022 WL 17830533, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Dec. 21, 2022) (quoting Friedsam v. Krisle, No. M2021-00530-COA-R3-CV, 2022 WL 3654658,
at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 2022)). See also In re Navada N., 498 S.W.3d 579, 594 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 2016) (citing Williams v. City of Burns, 465 S.W.3d 96, 119 (Tenn. 2015) (“Tennessee law
is clear that the trial court speaks through its written orders, not the transcript.”)).3
The Circuit Court, speaking through its written order, as drafted by counsel for the Plaintiff,
granted a default judgment based on the Defendant’s failure to appear and on the Plaintiff’s
“testimony and documentary evidence to support her claim for damages.” This Court cannot
assume, based on the record before it, that the documentary evidence and testimony established
causes of action that were not alleged in the General Sessions Civil Summons or amended in
Circuit Court and addressed in the Circuit Court Order.
While not raised in the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, the Court also notes that there are
no specific allegations of intent included in the Complaint. As succinctly summarized by the
Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania: “The three (3) different types of
3 Requiring a trial court to set out its findings and conclusions is generally understood to serve three important
purposes: “(1) aiding appellate review by affording reviewing courts ‘a clear understanding of the ground or basis of
the decision of the trial court’; (2) making it clear ‘precisely what is being decided by the case’ for res judicata
purposes; and (3) ensuring that trial courts carefully ascertain and apply the facts, potentially decreasing the need for
an appeal.” Bean, 2022 WL 17830533, at *4 (citing 9 C Charles A. Wright and Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice
and Procedure § 2571 (3d ed. 2022) (collecting cases)).
Case 1:25-ap-90116 Doc 15 Filed 03/16/26 Entered 03/16/26 15:21:59 Desc Main
Document Page 7 of 11

8
conduct that give rise to nondischargeability under § 523(a)(2) all require that a plaintiff prove
false or deceptive conduct, fraudulent intent, and justifiable reliance.” Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty.,
and Mun. Emps., Local 2187 v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 623 B.R. 123, 133 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
2020) (citing Holden v. Altieri (In re Altieri), No. 11-12819, Adv. No. 11-1196, 2012 WL 3595298,
at *2 (Bankr. D.N.J. Aug. 20, 2012)). Thus, “[t]o be actionable under § 523(a)(2)(A), the debtor
must act with scienter, regardless of whether the creditor alleges that the debtor’s conduct
constituted false pretense, a false representation or actual fraud.” Jaroslawicz v. Steinberg (In re
Steinberg), No. 16 Civ. 4074 (LGS), 2017 WL 1184314, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2017). Again,
there is no mention of scienter in the Adversary Complaint, General Sessions Civil Summons,
Notice of Appeal, or Circuit Court Order.4 The underlying decision of the Circuit Court supports
only a money judgment for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and damage to property, which
is dischargeable in bankruptcy without any allegations of scienter.
Finally, even if the Plaintiff sought and was granted an opportunity to amend her complaint,
her allegations would be barred by res judicata or claim preclusion.5 This Court must look to
Tennessee law to determine whether res judicata applies. Smith v. Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss,
4 The Adversary Complaint recounts the procedural history in the state court proceedings in paragraph 2. Paragraph 3
states only: “Mr. Howell, acting as a contractor, misrepresented the costs of services, goods, and repairs necessary
upon Ms. Eglet’s residential property located at [address] related to a minor plumbing repair and crawl space
encapsulation. After opportunity for hearing and receipt of Ms. Eglet’s testimony on the matter, the Circuit Court of
Williamson County accepted her testimony as to Mr. Howell’s conduct and awarded her $20,040.50 in damages to
recoup money paid to him as a result of his false representation and false pretense.” [Complaint, Dk. No. 1, at 2].
While this is the Plaintiff’s interpretation of the testimony presented in the Circuit Court, it is not consistent with the
pleadings or the Circuit Court Order that awarded a default judgment only for “breach of contract, unjust enrichment
and damage to property.”
5Although res judicata and/or collateral estoppel generally cannot be raised in a motion to dismiss and should instead
be pleaded as an affirmative defense, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c) is appropriate if the res judicata/collateral
estoppel bar is “apparent from the complaint and judicially noticed facts and the plaintiff fails to challenge the
defendant’s failure to plead it as an affirmative defense.” Pie Dev., L.L.C. v. Pie Carrier Holdings, Inc., 128 F.4th 657,
661 (5th Cir. 2025). See also Regions Bank v. Prager, 625 S.W.3d 842, 848 (Tenn. 2021) (citation omitted) (affirmative
defense of res judicata may be raised in motion to dismiss when applicable on face of complaint).
Case 1:25-ap-90116 Doc 15 Filed 03/16/26 Entered 03/16/26 15:21:59 Desc Main
Document Page 8 of 11

9
L.P.A., 658 F. App’x. 268, 275 (6th Cir. 2016) (“Federal courts look to the rendering state’s law
to determine the preclusive effect that attaches to the rendering state’s judgments.”). Under
Tennessee law, the elements of res judicata include “‘(1) that the underlying judgment was
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) that the same parties or their privies were
involved in both suits; (3) that the same claim or cause of action was asserted in both suits; and
(4) that the underlying judgment was final and on the merits.’” Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. City
of Memphis, 620 S.W.3d 318, 324 (2021) (quoting Jackson v. Smith, 387 S.W.3d 486, 491(Tenn.
2012)).
The first element is met because the Circuit Court Order constitutes a final decision by a
court of competent jurisdiction, and the second element is met as the two suits involve the same
parties. The third element is also met as the two suits share an identity of causes of action. For
purposes of res judicata, causes of action are the same “where they arise out of the same transaction
or a series of connected transactions.” Creech v. Addington, 281 S.W.3d 363, 381 (Tenn. 2009)
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24(1) (Am. Law Inst. 1982)). See also Hampton v.
Hawker Powersource, Inc., No. 1:23-cv-190, 2024 WL 6111882, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. March 1, 2024)
(Third element was met “because the instant action arises from the same facts and circumstances
at issue in the state court case.”). Whether or not the Plaintiff actually raised claims of false
pretense, false representation, or actual fraud in the Circuit Court, res judicata applies “with respect
to all issues which were, or could have been, litigated in the former suit.” Jackson v. Smith, 387
S.W.3d 486, 491 (Tenn. 2012) (emphasis added); Elk Horn Coal Co., LLC v. Conveyor Mfg. &
Supply, Inc. (In re Pen Holdings, Inc.), 316 B.R. 495, 498 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2004) (quoting
Browning v. Levy, 283 F.3d 761, 772) (6th Cir. 2002)) (“‘res judicata principles bar relitigation of
any issues raised or that could have been raised.’”). Finally, the fourth element is met. The Circuit
Case 1:25-ap-90116 Doc 15 Filed 03/16/26 Entered 03/16/26 15:21:59 Desc Main
Document Page 9 of 11

10
Court Order was entered on June 25, 2025, and rather than appeal the decision, the debtor chose
to file for bankruptcy protection on June 30, 2025.
“Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)[(2)],6 a court should freely give leave to amend a
complaint ‘when justice so requires.’ However, leave to amend may be denied where the
amendment would be futile.” Yuhasz v. Brush Wellman, Inc., 341 F.3d 559, 569 (6th Cir. 2003)
(citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). An amendment is futile if the amended
complaint would not survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6). Kalasho v. Republic of Iraq, No. 06–11030, 2010 WL 4062212, at *1 (E.D. Mich.
Oct. 14, 2010) (“[D]espite the general rule of liberality with which leave to file amended
complaints is to be granted, the Sixth Circuit has held that when a proposed amended complaint
would not survive a motion to dismiss, the court may properly deny the amendment as futile.”)
(citing Neighborhood Dev. Corp. v. Advisory Council on Historic Pres., 632 F.2d 21, 23 (6th Cir.
1980) and Thiokol Corp. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 987 F.2d 376 (6th Cir. 1993)). See also United States
ex rel. David Antoon v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 978 F. Supp.2d 880, 886 (S.D. Ohio 2013)
(proposed amendment futile if it could not withstand Rule 12(b)(6) motion). Here granting leave
to amend to the Plaintiff to allege specific allegations of fraud would be futile and cannot transform
Plaintiff’s state court judgment for “breach of contract, unjust enrichment and damage to property”
into a nondischargeable debt for fraud.
CONCLUSION
For all the reasons cited herein, the Court finds that the Defendant’s Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) should be GRANTED.
An appropriate Order will issue.
6 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 is made applicable by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7015.
Case 1:25-ap-90116 Doc 15 Filed 03/16/26 Entered 03/16/26 15:21:59 Desc Main
Document Page 10 of 11

11
THIS MEMORANDUM OPINION WAS SIGNED AND ENTERED ELECTRONICALLY AS
INDICATED AT THE TOP OF THE FIRST PAGE
Case 1:25-ap-90116 Doc 15 Filed 03/16/26 Entered 03/16/26 15:21:59 Desc Main
Document Page 11 of 11