USA v. Barnes et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 3:24-CR-79-KAC-JEM
)
CORNELIUS BARNES, JR., and 	)
MICHAEL MAHONE, 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
All pretrial motions are referred to the undersigned for disposition or recommendation as
appropriate. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). This case is before the undersigned on Defendant Cornelius
Barnes’s Motion and Memorandum to Suppress Evidence Seized at 5101 Asheville Highway,
Unit 101, Knoxville, Tennessee [Doc. 56] and Defendant Michael Mahone’s Motion to Adopt
Motion to Suppress Evidence Seized at 5101 Asheville Highway Unit 101 [Doc. 59]. Defendants
ask the Court to suppress evidence seized during the execution of a search warrant at the apartment,
arguing the affidavit in support of the search warrant lacks probable cause for its issuance
[Doc. 56 p. 1].
The Indictment charges Defendants Barnes and Mahone with conspiring with each other
and unnamed others to distribute fifty grams or more of methamphetamine (Count One) and four
hundred grams or more of a mixture containing fentanyl (Count Two) between June 7 and July 12,
2024 [Doc. 13 pp. 1–2]. Both Defendants also allegedly possessed fifty grams or more of
methamphetamine (Count Three) and four hundred grams or more of a mixture containing fentanyl
(Count Four) with intent to distribute on July 12, 2024 [Id. at 2]. The Indictment also alleges
Defendants possessed firearms in furtherance of drug trafficking (Count Five) and contends that
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Defendant Barnes, a convicted felon, possessed a firearm (Count Six), both allegedly occurring on
July 12, 2024 [Id. at 2–3]. These charges arise in part from the execution of a search warrant at an
apartment1 at the Holston Place Apartments in Knoxville, Tennessee, on July 12, 2024.
Defendants move to suppress all evidence seized from the apartment, arguing the search
violated their rights under the Fourth Amendment [Doc. 56 p. 1]. Defendants contend that the
supporting affidavit fails to provide probable cause to issue the search warrant because it does not
show a nexus between the apartment and drug trafficking, and contains stale information [Id. at 1,
5–8]. They deny that the executing officers relied on the search warrant in good faith because the
supporting affidavit contains not even a modicum of evidence supporting a nexus [Doc. 65
pp. 3–6].
After reviewing the evidence, the arguments of the parties, and the relevant law, the
undersigned finds Defendants have standing to challenge the search of the apartment, Detective
Strickenberger’s affidavit provides a nexus between the apartment and drug trafficking, and the
information in the affidavit was not stale. Even if probable cause were lacking, the undersigned
finds the officers executed the search warrant in good faith. The undersigned therefore
recommends that the District Judge GRANT Defendant Mahone’s motion to adopt the suppression
motion and DENY the motion to suppress.
I. 	BACKGROUND AND EVIDENCE
Knoxville Police Department (“KPD”) Detective Todd Strickenberger submitted an
affidavit in support of an application for a search warrant for unit 1 at the Holston Place
Apartments, at 5101 Asheville Highway, in Knoxville, Tennessee (“the apartment”) [Doc. 58-1].
1 	Defendants state the apartment number is 101 in their filings [Docs. 56 & 59]. The affidavit
in support of the search warrant states the apartment number is 1 [Doc. 58-1 p. 1]. The undersigned
refers to the apartment that is the subject of the search warrant as unit 1.
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In his affidavit, Detective Strickenberger states that Cornelius Barnes occupies or controls the
apartment [id. at 1] and that probable cause exists to believe that the apartment contains evidence,
fruits, and instrumentalities of drug trafficking and possession of controlled substances and drug
paraphernalia [id. at 3].
Detective Strickenberger states that on April 24, 2024, he and officers in the KPD
Organized Crime Unit (“OCU”) used a confidential informant to conduct a controlled purchase of
a quantity of “heroin/opiate” from an individual identified as Khalid Sullivan [Id. ¶ 3].2 Officers
surveilling the controlled buy saw Sullivan driving a white Dodge Durango with a Texas license
tag [Id.]. Through “law enforcement databases,” officers determined that the Dodge Durango,
which was a rental vehicle, was parked in the parking lot of the Holston Place Apartments on
May 5, 2024 [Id.]. While conducting surveillance at the Holston Place Apartments on June 6, 2024,
Detective Strickenberger saw Sullivan driving a silver Chevrolet Impala with tinted windows and
a temporary license tag [Id.]. Officers confirmed that the Impala was registered to Sullivan [Id.].
Detective Strickenberger believed that Sullivan borrowed the Durango from a friend or neighbor
on April 24, 2024, because he owned the Impala [Id.]. Detective Strickenberger related that on
May 8, 2024, he observed that the Durango was no longer in the parking lot of the Holston Place
Apartments and, instead, he saw another rental vehicle, which was a silver Toyota 4Runner with
an 	Ohio 	license 	tag 	[Id.]. 	Approximately 	one-month 	later, 	on 	June 	6, 	2024, 	Detective
Strickenberger saw that the 4Runner was replaced with another rental vehicle, a white Dodge
Hornet with a Pennsylvania license tag [Id.]. Detective Strickenberger states that based upon his
training and experience, he knows that drug traffickers commonly use rental vehicles, which they
2 	The “probable cause” portion of Detective Strickenberger’s affidavit contains numbered
paragraphs, while the paragraphs in the rest of the affidavit are not numbered [See Doc. 58-1]. The
undersigned will cite to paragraphs when possible.
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replace often to “thwart law enforcement detection” [Id.]. He says that law enforcement then began
surveilling the apartment complex to determine who besides Sullivan used the rental vehicles [Id.].
Detective Strickenberger states that on June 7, 2024, he and officers from the KPD OCU
and other agencies surveilled the Holston Place Apartments to determine whether the apartment
was “a base of operations” for drug trafficking [Id. ¶ 4]. Officers observed two black males,
Suspect 1 and Suspect 2, leave the apartment [Id.]. Suspect 1 entered the white Dodge Hornet
rental vehicle [Id.]. Suspect 2 opened the driver’s door on a black Jeep Cherokee with a Tennessee
license tag [Id.]. Suspect 1 left the parking lot in the Dodge Hornet, and Suspect 2 returned to the
apartment [Id.]. Detective Strickenberger states that a short time later, surveilling officers observed
the Dodge Hornet in the Kroger parking lot at 4414 Asheville Highway and, based upon their
training and experience, saw an “obvious hand-to-hand drug transaction” between the Dodge
Hornet and the driver of a Nissan Rogue [Id.]. The Dodge Hornet immediately returned to the
Holston Place Apartments, and Suspect 1 returned to the apartment [Id.]. According to Detective
Strickenberger, Suspect 1 left the apartment again, entered the Dodge Hornet, and left the
apartment complex [Id.]. Surveilling officers observed the Dodge Hornet make many unnecessary
turns and take circuitous routes, which was consistent with an individual attempting to evade
surveillance [Id.].
Detective Strickenberger maintains that after Suspect 1 left the apartment the second time
on June 7, 2025, Suspect 2 left the apartment on foot and conducted two brief hand-to-hand drug
transactions with other pedestrians [Id.]. After each transaction, Suspect 2 returned to the
apartment, which indicated to Detective Strickenberger that Suspect 2 was “resupplying” [Id.].
Suspect 2 left the apartment on foot a third time and subsequently entered a white Honda Civic
[Id.]. Surveilling officers followed the Civic one-half mile to a Circle K gas station on Asheville
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Highway [Id.]. Suspect 1, driving the Dodge Hornet, met Suspect 2 at the Circle K, and Suspect 2
returned to the apartment with Suspect 1 without entering the Circle K convenience store [Id.].
Detective Strickenberger opines, based upon his training and experience, that Suspect 2 met with
the occupants of the Civic to conduct a drug transaction due to Suspect 2’s short time in the Civic
and because Suspect 2 walked farther to meet the Civic than the distance to the Circle K [Id.].
Detective Strickenberger says he noticed there were two new rental vehicles, a black
Chrysler Pacifica van with a Texas license tag and a black Chevrolet Impala with an Indiana license
tag, in the typical parking spaces used by Suspect 1 and Suspect 2 on July 1, 2024 [Id. ¶ 5]. Using
a law enforcement database, Detective Strickenberger was able to determine the white Dodge
Hornet was still in Detroit, Michigan, and determined that the two new rental vehicles had replaced
it [Id.]. Surveilling officers observed Suspect 1 enter and exit the black Chevrolet Impala, and
Suspect 2 enter and exit the black Chrysler Pacifica.
Detective Strickenberger states that on July 2, 2024, detectives with OCU and other
agencies conducted surveillance on Holston Place Apartments, as well as on the black Chevrolet
Impala and the black Chrysler Pacifica [Id. ¶ 6]. During the operation, officers observed
Suspect 2 leave the apartments in the black Chrysler Pacifica, pick up an unknown female, and
drive her directly across the street to the Kroger located at 4414 Asheville Highway [Id.]. The
unknown female exited the black Chrysler Pacifica and walked directly to the women’s restroom
[Id.]. The unknown female was not observed to make any purchases while inside [Id.]. After a
brief interaction with the unknown female, Suspect 2 returned directly back to Holston Place
Apartments [Id.]. Detective Strickenberger contends, based on his training and experience, that
this type of behavior exhibited by the unknown female and Suspect 2 is indicative of drug
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trafficking, and further shows that Suspect 2 was consistently leaving and returning to the
apartments to resupply, proving that illegal substances are stored there [Id.].
During the same surveillance operation on July 2, 2024, officers observed Suspect 1 leave
the apartments in the black Chevrolet Impala and conduct a hand-to-hand transaction with a male
in a black SUV in the parking lot of the Kroger located at 4414 Asheville Highway [Id. ¶ 7].
Immediately after the interaction, Suspect 1 returned to the apartments [Id.]. After Suspect 1 had
left, an officer approached the individual in the black SUV in the parking lot of the Kroger and
observed in plain view what the officer knew to be from training and experience to be a small
amount of heroin [Id.]. The officer subsequently learned that the individual had an outstanding
warrant and took him into custody [Id.]. Further inspection revealed that the recovered substance
did appear to be a heroin/opiate narcotic [Id.]. After the individual was taken into custody and
questioned about their interaction with Suspect 1, the individual admitted they had purchased one
gram of suspected heroin/opiate from the black man driving the black Chevrolet Impala, and that
the only person with whom they had interacted in the Kroger parking lot that day was Suspect 1
[Id.]. The individual further stated they had purchased approximately one gram of suspected
heroin/opiate at least one to two times per day from numerous individuals that use one telephone
number for the last six months, with most if not all the drug purchases conducted in the area of
Asheville Highway, which is in close proximity to the apartments [Id.]. The individual further
represented that the dealers usually drove rental vehicles [Id.].
On July 5, 2024, Detective Strickenberger learned that the Knox County Sheriff’s Office
Narcotic Unit conducted a traffic stop on the white Dodge Hornet on January 10, 2024, and that
the operator of that vehicle was identified as Cornelius Barnes [Id. ¶ 8]. After reviewing
surveillance videos compiled from June 7, July 1, and July 2, 2024, Detective Strickenberger
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determined that Suspect 2 was likely Cornelius Barnes [Id.]. During the traffic stop, Defendant
Barnes was found in possession of a large sum of currency and could not explain how he acquired
it [Id.]. Defendant Barnes told the officers that he was on his way back to Detroit, Michigan [Id.].
On the evening of July 5, 2024, Detective Strickenberger learned that the black Chevrolet
Impala and the black Chrysler Pacifica were both in Detroit, Michigan [Id. ¶ 9]. He believed that
because the vehicles were now in Detroit, it was likely that Defendant Barnes and Suspect 1 were
also in Detroit, and that the apartment was vacant [Id.]. Before pursuing any further action on the
apartment, law enforcement decided to wait until either of the vehicles returned to Knoxville [Id.].
On the night of July 6, 2024, Detective Strickenberger conducted hours of surveillance on Holston
Place Apartments but observed no activity [Id.].
The 	morning 	of 	July 	11, 	2024, 	Detective 	Strickenberger 	discovered 	through 	law
enforcement databases that the black Chrysler Pacifica had returned to the Knoxville area on
July 10, 2024 and was parked in the parking lot of Holston Place Apartments [Id. ¶ 10]. That day,
Detective Strickenberger and other law enforcement officers conducted a surveillance operation,
during which they observed Defendant Barnes and Suspect 1 exit the black Chrysler Pacifica and
enter the apartment [Id. ¶ 11]. Moments later, the surveillance units observed Suspect 1 leave the
apartment and drive away in the black Chrysler Pacifica, and return to the apartment within a few
minutes in the same vehicle [Id.]. A short time later, Suspect 1 again left the apartments in the
black Chrysler Pacifica [Id.]. Officers were able to maintain constant surveillance on the vehicle
as it traveled around Knoxville taking numerous unnecessary turns and circuitous routes, which is
consistent with an effort to elude law enforcement detection and employ counter surveillance [Id.].
Detective Strickenberger stated that Suspect 1 also engaged in a “heat run,” which is taking routes
to confuse or throw off law enforcement surveillance, on July 7, 2024 [Id.]. Suspect 1 took at least
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three heat runs on July 11, 2024 [Id.]. One heat run involved Suspect 1 exiting the interstate,
driving through a business parking lot without stopping or patronizing the business, and then again
entering the interstate and continuing in the original direction [Id.]. Suspect 1 also arrived at a
Waffle House on 6230 Papermill Road and entered the business for a short time, not long enough
to order and eat a meal [Id.]. Detective Strickenberger noted that Suspect 1 passed a Waffle House
less than one mile away from the apartment on his way to the Waffle House on Papermill [Id.].
Based upon this investigation, Detective Strickenberger knows that members of this drug
trafficking organization commonly conduct drug transactions from their vehicles while in the
parking lots of restaurants and other businesses [Id.]. After Suspect 1 left the Waffle House,
surveilling officers observed a brown pickup truck with three other occupants back in next to
Suspect 1 as he sat in the black Chrysler Pacifica in the Waffle House parking lot [Id.]. Suspect 1
then opened his door and engaged in “a short, very brief interaction” with the driver of the brown
pickup truck, concluding within seconds [Id.]. From his position, the surveilling officer did not
observe a hand-to-hand transaction but, based upon his training and experience and consistent with
the prior drug transactions by this drug trafficking organization, the surveilling officer thought it
more likely than not that the two engaged in a drug transaction [Id.]. The brown pickup truck
immediately left the parking lot, pulled into an adjacent hotel parking lot for approximately one
minute, and then left again [Id.]. Detective Strickenberger knows from training and experience that
drug customers commonly use the drugs they just purchased immediately or will stow or hide
recently purchased contraband from law enforcement [Id.]. Surveilling officers also observed
Suspect 1 immediately leave the restaurant parking lot and drive directly back to the apartment
[Id.].
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During the aforementioned surveillance operation, law enforcement stopped the brown
pickup truck and questioned the three occupants about the location from which they came
[Id. ¶ 12]. While the occupants had similar stories, all omitted being in the parking lot of the Waffle
House or interacting with Suspect 1 [Id.]. The driver consented to a search of the vehicle, but
officers found no contraband [Id.]. The affiant states, however, that the female occupant was not
searched beyond a Terry pat down for weapons and could have hidden narcotics on her person
[Id.]. Two of the three occupants had prior drug convictions or activity involving drug sales and
personal use [Id. ¶ 13].
Based upon the affidavit of Detective Strickenberger, Knox County Criminal Court Judge
Hector Sanchez issued a search warrant for unit 1 of the Holston Place Apartments at 5101 Ashville
Highway [Doc. 58-1 pp. 9, 13]. On July 12, 2024, law enforcement executed the search warrant at
unit 1 and seized “[a]pproximately 750 grams of crystal-like substance that field tested positive
for methamphetamine, approximately 474 grams of a tan compressed powder that field tested
positive for fentanyl, two loaded handguns (one of which was previously reported stolen), $5,047
[in] U.S. currency, six cellular telephones, and various items used to manufacture and distribute
narcotics, including plastic baggies, a kilogram press, electronic sales, and cutting agents
commonly used to dilute narcotics” [Doc. 1 ¶¶ 4–5, Affidavit Supporting Criminal Complaint].
On March 20, 2025, Defendant Barnes filed a suppression motion, arguing that the affidavit
in support of the search warrant did not establish probable cause because it fails to show a nexus
between the criminal conduct alleged and the place to be searched and because the information
provided in the affidavit was stale [Doc. 56 p. 1]. Defendant submitted a copy of Detective
Strickenberger’s affidavit, the search warrant, and the return as a supplement to his motion
[Doc. 58-1]. Codefendant Michael Mahone moved to adopt the suppression motion, arguing that
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the motion to suppress “addresses issues germane to the charges against him and the interests of
judicial economy and the need to avoid duplicative pleadings would be best served by permitting
adoption of the motion” [Doc. 59 p. 1].
The Government responded in opposition to the suppression motion [Doc. 62], also
attaching a copy of the affidavit for the search warrant [Doc. 62-1]. It argues that the affidavit
establishes a sufficient nexus between the apartment and evidence of drug trafficking, the
information in the warrant is not stale, and even if probable cause is lacking, the officers executed
the search warrant in good faith [Doc. 62 pp. 6, 10, 13].
In reply, Defendants argue that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule is not
applicable, because the affidavit failed to establish a minimally sufficient nexus between the illegal
activity and the place to be searched [Doc. 65 p. 6].
The parties appeared before the undersigned on July 11, 2025, for a motion hearing.
Assistant United States Attorney Caroline Poore appeared on behalf of the Government.
Attorney Robert Kurtz represented Defendant Barnes, and Attorney Ashlee Mathis represented
Defendant Mahone. Both Defendants were also present.
Following the hearing, the undersigned took the matter under advisement.
II. 	ANALYSIS
The Fourth Amendment protects citizens against unreasonable searches or seizures.
U.S. Const. amend IV. A search warrant for a residence must be based upon probable cause and
must state the items to be seized with particularity. Id.; Collins v. Virginia, 584 U.S. 586, 593
(2018) (“At the [Fourth] Amendment’s very core stands the right of a man to retreat into his own
home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.” (citations omitted & cleaned
up)). Probable cause “requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an
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actual showing of such activity.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 244 n.13 (1983). “[P]robable
cause is a flexible, common[-]sense standard,” causing a person “of reasonable caution” to believe
that the items are evidence of a crime. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983). In other words,
probable cause is “reasonable grounds for belief[] supported by less than prima facie proof but
more than mere suspicion.” United States v. Bennett, 905 F.2d 931, 934 (6th Cir. 1990) (citation
omitted). Whether probable cause to issue a search warrant exists is evaluated by looking at the
totality of the circumstances related in the affidavit. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.
An issuing judge’s determination that probable cause exists is entitled to “great deference.”
United States v. Allen, 211 F.3d 970, 973 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 236). This
deferential standard promotes the preference for the use of search warrants as opposed to
warrantless searches. Id. “The task of the issuing [judge] is simply to make a practical, common-
sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, . . . there
is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”
Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. The “duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the [judge] had a
substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.” Id. at 238–39. In reviewing the
sufficiency of probable cause for a search warrant, the Court considers only the information that
was before the issuing judge—that is, the information contained within the four corners of the
supporting affidavit. United States v. Brooks, 594 F.3d 488, 492 (6th Cir. 2010).
Defendant Barnes argues the search of the apartment violates his rights under the Fourth
Amendment because the affidavit does not provide probable cause for the search warrant [Doc. 56
p. 1]. Specifically, he contends probable cause is lacking because (1) the affidavit does not provide
a nexus between the apartment and drug trafficking and (2) the information in the affidavit is stale
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[Id.]. Defendant Mahone joins in these arguments asserting he was an overnight guest at the
apartment and, thus, Defendant Barnes’s arguments apply equally to him [Doc. 59 p. 1].
After reviewing the evidence, the arguments of the parties, and the relevant law, the
undersigned finds Defendants have standing to challenge the search of the apartment, Detective
Strickenberger’s affidavit provides a nexus between the apartment and drug trafficking, and the
information in the affidavit was not stale. Even if probable cause were lacking, the undersigned
finds the officers executed the search warrant in good faith.
A. 	Standing
A claimant alleging a Fourth Amendment violation must have a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the place searched or the thing seized. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978).
“[S]tanding is ‘an element’ of a Fourth Amendment suppression claim[,]” and the person raising
the Fourth Amendment challenge shoulders the “burden” of demonstrating his or her standing.
United States v. Russell, 26 F.4th 371, 375 (6th Cir. 2022). The term “standing” has become
“shorthand” for the requirement that a defendant must show that a search or seizure infringed upon
his or her own rights. Id. at 374.
A defendant must show that the search of the challenged place infringed upon his personal
rights or legitimate expectation of privacy. Id. at 375; United States v. Talley, 275 F.3d 560, 563
(6th Cir. 2001) (holding a defendant challenging a search has the burden of demonstrating his or
her legitimate expectation of privacy in the location). In assessing the reasonableness of a
defendant’s expectation of privacy, the Court examines
the person’s proprietary or possessory interest in the place to be
searched or item to be seized[;] whether the defendant has the right
to exclude others from the place in question; whether he had taken
normal 	precautions 	to 	maintain 	his 	privacy; 	whether 	he 	has
exhibited a subjective expectation that the area would remain free
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from governmental intrusion; and whether he was legitimately on
the premises.
United States v. Waller, 426 F.3d 838, 844 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. King,
227 F.3d 732, 744 (6th Cir. 2000)) (alteration in original). An overnight social guest “has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the place where he sleeps at night.” United States v. Allen,
720 F. App’x 254, 257 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing Minnesota v. Oleson, 495 U.S. 91, 96-97 (1990)).
In determining whether an overnight guest has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the host’s
home, the Court examines a relationship with the homeowner or lessee and other indicia of
“acceptance into the household,” such as having a key. United States v. Heath, 259 F.3d 522, 532–
33 (6th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation omitted).
While the parties focus little attention on the issue, the record before the undersigned
reflects that Defendants have standing to challenge the search. In the affidavit, the affiant identifies
Defendant Barnes as occupying or controlling the apartment [Doc. 58-1 p. 1]. Defendant Mahone
is not identified in the affidavit, and he asserts that he was an overnight guest at the apartment
[Doc. 59 p. 1]. The affiant states that Suspect 1, who is not identified, and Suspect 2, whom officers
later identified as Barnes, were seen coming and going from the apartment on at least four dates
between June 7 and July 11, 2024 [Id. ¶¶ 4, 6, 8, 11]. The affiant relates that each of the suspects
entered the apartment separately from the other [Id.]. This information shows that the suspects had
access to the apartment and could each freely come and go. Additionally, the affiant states the
suspects were believed to be in Detroit, Michigan, on July 5 and 6, 2024, because law enforcement
databases showed the rental vehicles the suspects were observed using were in Detroit and
surveilling officers observed no activity at the apartment on the night of July 6 [Id. ¶ 9]. According
to the affiant, law enforcement databases showed that one of the rental vehicles, a Chrysler
Pacifica, returned from Detroit to Knoxville on July 10, and an officer saw the Pacifica parked in
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the parking lot of the apartment on the morning of July 11 [Id. ¶ 10]. The affiant states that on
July 11, surveilling officers saw both suspects exit the Pacifica and enter the apartment, and later
saw Suspect 1 leave the apartment, enter the Pacifica, and drive via a circuitous route to the Waffle
House [Id. ¶ 11]. This information on the suspects’ return from Detroit to the apartment is
circumstantial evidence that the suspects spent the night at the apartment. Defendant Barnes filed
the affidavit for the search warrant and the search warrant return as an exhibit to his motion
[Doc. 58-1]. The attached Property Inventory Report lists the apartment as the address for both
Barnes and Mahone [Id. at 16]. The Property Inventory Report states that law enforcement seized
“[t]wo Michigan ID[s] belonging to Mahone and Barnes” from the apartment [Id. at 19]. This
information reveals that Defendants stored personal items in the apartment. Considering this
information collectively, the undersigned finds Defendants had a reasonable expectation of privacy
at the apartment.3
B. 	Nexus
The Fourth Amendment requires that a search warrant be based on an affidavit containing
“particularized facts” that demonstrate “a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be located
on the premises of the proposed search.” United States v. McPhearson, 469 F.3d 518, 524
(6th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Frazier, 423 F.3d 526, 531 (6th Cir. 2005)). “To justify
a search, the circumstances must indicate why evidence of illegal activity will be found ‘in a
particular place.’” United States v. Carpenter, 360 F.3d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc). In other
words, probable cause requires a “nexus between the place to be searched and the evidence
sought.” Id. (quoting United States v. Van Shutters, 163 F.3d 331, 336–37 (6th Cir. 1998)). “The
3 	The Government also indicates that Defendants have standing [See Doc. 62 p. 12 (the
Government argues that the officers observations of the Defendants traveling two and from the
apartment “indicat[es] that Barnes and Mahone resided at that location”)].
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connection between the residence and the evidence of criminal activity must be specific and
concrete, not ‘vague’ or ‘generalized.’” United States v. Brown, 828 F.3d 375, 382 (6th Cir. 2016)
(quoting Carpenter, 360 F.3d at 595). Assessing whether an affidavit establishes a nexus turns
upon the facts of a particular case and requires examination of the totality of the circumstances.
Id. The Court must determine “whether the [issuing judge] had a substantial basis for finding that
the affidavit established probable cause to believe that the evidence would be found at the place
cited.” United States v. Merriweather, 728 F. App’x 498, 504 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting United
States v. Davidson, 936 F.2d 856, 859 (6th Cir. 1991)).
Defendants contend the affidavit “does not provide sufficient information from which a
neutral and detached judge could find a nexus to the residence” [Doc. 56 p. 5]. Defendants argue
that none of the alleged drug transactions, which the surveilling officers purportedly observed on
June 7 and July 2 and 11, occurred at or near the apartment [Id. at 5–6]. Defendants assert that
officers recovered contraband from only a single alleged transaction on July 2, 2024, when
Suspect 1 engaged in a drug transaction in a parking lot, officers arrested the other participant, and
that individual said he purchased heroin from Suspect 1 [Id. at 6]. They assert that the affidavit
contains no information on the reliability or credibility of this individual [Id.]. Defendants argue
that on the third date, July 11, 2024, law enforcement did not observe the alleged transaction and
did not recover contraband, despite stopping and searching the other vehicle [Id.]. As a result,
Defendants submit that “[a]t most, the affidavit established a single drug transaction in a parking
lot that was some distance from the residence on July 2, 2024” [Id.].
In response, the Government contends that the officers observed the suspects leave the
apartment, meet up with various unknown individuals for a brief period, and immediately return
to the apartment [Doc. 62 p. 8]. It acknowledges that no controlled buys were conducted in this
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case [Id.]. Focusing on the events of July 2, 2024, the Government submits that while the individual
who purportedly bought heroin from Suspect 1 was not a confidential informant, the individual
gave “direct evidence” that he purchased one gram of suspected heroin from Suspect 1 and “that
for the last six months he had been purchasing approximately one gram of suspected heroin/opiate
from numerous individuals using the same phone number” [Id. at 9]. The Government argues that
officers corroborated the information from the arrested individual because they observed the hand-
to-hand transaction between Suspect 1 and the individual [Id. at 9–10].
In reply, Defendants contend that “the cooperating individual [from the July 2 transaction]
is actually part of the criminal milieu because he was arrested with illegal narcotics in his
possession” and that this requires the Court to weigh the individual’s reliability, veracity, and basis
of knowledge [Doc. 65 p. 4]. At the suppression hearing, defense counsel argued that the individual
arrested after the July 2 transaction was a “chronic drug user” who admitted purchasing gram
quantities of narcotics daily from multiple individuals over a six-month period. Defendants further
asserted that the failure to find contraband in the search of the alleged participants and their vehicle
on July 11, 2024, contradicts the affiant’s assertions that the officers were observing drug
transactions on earlier dates. Defendants contend that the single transaction on July 2 that occurred
away from the residence is insufficient to provide a nexus between the residence and drug
trafficking.
Circumstantial evidence of an individual leaving a location and soon engaging in a drug
sale “suggest[s] that the illicit materials came from the location.” United States v. Sanders,
106 F.4th 455, 462 (6th Cir. 2024) (citations omitted). Similarly, a defendant’s “return[] to the
location sought to be searched, [following a controlled buy,] create[s] a reasonable inference that
the defendant took the proceeds with him.” Id. (citations omitted). “[A] warrant’s validity does not
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turn on whether it is supported by an ‘actual showing’ of criminal activity at the targeted location.”
Id. (quoting United States v. Christian, 925 F.3d 305, 311 (6th Cir. 2019)). “[I]nstead[, the Court]
ask[s] whether officers provided direct or circumstantial support to create ‘more than mere
suspicion’ that contraband will be found at the location in question.” Id. (quoting United States v.
King, 227 F.3d 732, 739 (6th Cir. 2000)).
Here, surveilling officers observed several suspected drug transactions on three dates. On
June 7, Suspect 1 left the apartment, entered a rental vehicle and drove to a Kroger parking lot,
where he engaged in a suspected drug transaction and then returned directly to the apartment
[Doc. 58-1 ¶ 4]. Also on that day, officers observed Suspect 2, later identified as Barnes, leave the
apartment on foot, conduct two separate, brief hand-to-hand transactions with two people also on
foot, and return to the apartment after each transaction [Id.]. Officers later saw Suspect 2 depart
the apartment and begin walking, enter the passenger compartment of a Honda Civic, and exit the
Civic one-half mile later at a gas station, where Suspect 1 picked up Suspect 2, who did not enter
the gas station, and returned directly to the apartment [Id.]. Based upon their training and
experience, the surveilling officers believed four drug transactions occurred on June 7, 2024, with
the seller leaving from and returning to the apartment after each transaction [Id.].
While conducting surveillance on July 2, 2024, officers saw Suspect 2 (Barnes) leave the
apartment, drive a rental car to an address on Meadow View Road where he picked up a female,
and drive the female to the Kroger across the street [Id. ¶ 6]. After this “very brief” interaction
with the female, Suspect 2 drove directly back to the apartment [Id.]. Officers also followed the
female, who went directly to the women’s restroom inside the Kroger and did not make any
purchases while at the grocery store [Id.]. Based upon his training and experience, the affiant
believed Suspect 2 had engaged in drug trafficking with the female [Id.]. Also on this date,
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surveilling officers observed Suspect 1 leave the apartment, drive a second rental vehicle to the
Kroger parking lot, engage in a hand-to-hand transaction with a man in a black SUV, and return
to the apartment [Id. ¶ 7]. “A short time later,” an officer observed suspected heroin in plain view
in the black SUV, which was still parked in the Kroger parking lot, and arrested the driver, who
subsequently admitted that he purchased heroin from Suspect 1 [Id.].
Officers again surveilled the apartment on July 11, 2024, the day after they believed the
suspects had returned from Detroit, Michigan [Id. ¶¶ 9–10]. Officers observed Suspect 1 leave the
apartment and drive away in a rental vehicle and followed him as he drove three “heat runs”
(circuitous routes taken to avoid surveillance by law enforcement) while in route to a Waffle House
on Papermill Road [Id. ¶ 11]. Officers observed Suspect 1 engage in a brief conversation with the
driver of a brown truck in the Waffle House parking lot and then drive directly back to the
apartment [Id.]. Officers observed the brown truck leave the Waffle House parking lot, stop for
one minute in the parking lot of an adjacent hotel, and then drive away [Id.]. Law enforcement
stopped and searched the brown truck and its occupants but did not find contraband, although they
identified two of the three occupants as drug dealers and users [Id.]. Based upon his training and
experience, the affiant stated that drug customers will commonly use drugs they purchase
immediately or hide them to prevent confiscation by law enforcement [Id.].
The affiant relates seven suspected drug transactions over a thirty-eight-day period and in
all of these, the suspects left for the transaction from the apartment and returned directly to the
apartment afterward. This pattern of activity provides a nexus between the apartment and drug
trafficking. Sanders, 106 F.4th at 462.
Defendants deny the suspected transactions provide a nexus because law enforcement only
found suspected narcotics following one transaction on July 2 [Doc. 56 p. 5]. They acknowledge
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that “recent and reliable” evidence of ongoing drug activity at a residence can establish a nexus to
the residence [Id. (citing United States v. McCoy, 905 F.3d 409, 418 (6th Cir. 2018))]. Defendants
assert, however, that “[w]hen the evidence in the affidavit establishes a single drug transaction or
drug activity that is not recent, then nexus has not been established” [Doc. 56 p. 5 (citing United
States v. Reed, 993 F.3d 441, 448 (6th Cir. 2021))]. They also argue that the evidence from the
July 2 transaction is not reliable [Doc. 56 p. 6; Doc. 65 p. 4 (arguing the July 2 “cooperating
individual is actually part of the criminal milieu because he was arrested with illegal narcotics in
his possession”)].
“Evidence that one leaves a ‘residence, engage[s] in a drug transaction, and then return[s]
into the residence’ ‘plainly demonstrate[s] a sufficient nexus’ with the location.” Sanders,
106 F.4th at 463 (citations omitted). And a single instance of a defendant leaving a residence,
completing a drug transaction, and returning to that residence is sufficient for a finding of probable
cause. United States v. Florence, 150 F.4th 773, 777–78 & n.1 (6th Cir. 2025) (noting that in
Sanders, “the officers’ observation of [the defendant] leaving his residence, completing a single
drug transaction, and returning to a residence was enough for the Sanders court to find probable
cause to search that residence” (citing Sanders, 106 F.4th at 463)). Thus, the single confirmed
transaction on July 2 is sufficient to establish a nexus to the residence. But this single transaction
is only a portion of the evidence supporting nexus. Surveilling officers observed six other trips to
and from the apartment that they believed to be drug transactions based upon their training and
experience. Additionally, on two of the three dates, Suspect 1 engaged in circuitous driving in
order to avoid detection by law enforcement, which further supports that the transactions were
drug transactions.
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Defendants characterize the driver of the SUV’s admission that he purchased the heroin
from Suspect 1 (whom he identified as the black make driving the white Chevrolet Impala
[Doc. 58-1 ¶ 7]) as unreliable. “[W]hen information comes from a confidential informant within
the criminal milieu, courts proceed with skepticism, and probable cause may hinge upon evidence
of the informant’s reliability, veracity, and basis of knowledge. United States v. Dauksys,
No. 6:25-CR-21, 2025 WL 3482852, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 20, 2025) (citing United States v.
Ketzeback, 	358 	F.3d 	987, 	991 	(8th 	Cir. 	2004)), 	report 	& 	recommendation 	adopted 	by
2025 WL 3281592 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 25, 2025). Generally, an informant’s self-incriminating
statements are deemed intrinsically credible. See United States v. Gamble, No. 22-5194,
2022 WL 17456308, at *4 (6th Cir. Dec. 6, 2022) (“[T]he driver, in voluntarily speaking with the
officers about the drug transaction, made statements against his own penal interest which further
indicated his reliability.” (citations omitted)); United States v. Barone, 584 F.2d 118, 122
(6th Cir. 1978) (“That some of the statements necessarily were against the penal interest of the
informant weighs heavily in support of his reliability and is, we have held, a significant and
sometimes conclusive, reason for crediting the statements of the informant.” (citation omitted)).
Information from a person from the criminal milieu, however, may be shorn up by independent
law enforcement corroboration. United States v. Frazier, 423 F.3d 526, 532 (6th Cir. 2005)
(finding that “in the absence of any indicia of the [confidential] informants’ reliability, courts insist
that the affidavit contain substantial independent police corroboration” (citations omitted)). Cf.
United States v. Higgins, 557 F.3d 381, 391 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding probable cause lacking where
informant gave statements after police discovered a large amount of drugs in his car, police failed
to corroborate any of his statements, and the affidavit contained no information connecting
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defendant’s residence to the drugs), overruled on other grounds by DePierre v. United States,
564 U.S. 70 (2011).
Here, 	the 	affiant 	provides 	substantial 	information 	to 	corroborate 	the 	informant’s
statements. The affidavit states surveilling officers witnessed Suspect 1 leave the target residence,
drive to the Kroger parking, meet the individual in the black SUV, and then drive back to the target
location. Only “[a] short time” after Suspect 1 left the Kroger parking lot, a uniformed officer
approached the SUV and observed narcotics in plain view. When questioned following his arrest,
the individual stated that he bought one gram of heroin from a black male driving a Chevrolet
Impala and had often bought narcotics from multiple people using the same cell-phone number.
Further, Defendants’ argument “assumes the detectives ‘conducted a search based on [the]
informant’s tip alone. But in reality, ‘the warrant was based on [the detectives’] own observations
more than it was the informant[’s].’” United States v. Sims, No. 23-4034, 2025 WL 692346, at *5
(6th Cir. Mar. 4, 2025) (quoting United States v. Jones, 817 F.3d 489, 492 (6th Cir. 2016)) (first
alteration in original). The bulk of the affidavit is not reliant on the information provided by the
individual but rather is based on officers’ own observations of Defendants’ comings and goings
from the apartment, as well as their suspicious behavior, and the officers’ conclusions based on
their training and experience. Further, it can be inferred that the identity of the driver of the SUV
was known to law enforcement because he had an outstanding warrant and was taken into custody
[Doc. 58-1 ¶ 7], and if his identification of Suspect 1 proved to be false, he could be prosecuted.
United States v. May, 399 F.3d 817, 824–25 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that a report from an
informant whose identity is known to law enforcement, thus, subjecting the informant to
prosecution for making a false report, is “entitled to far greater weight than . . . an anonymous
source”).
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“[T]here is no model fact pattern for establishing a fair probability that contraband will be
found” at a given place. Sanders, 106 F.4th at 462. “Instead, the officers just [have] to show a
connection between the place to be searched and the illicit activity.” Higgins, 141 F.4th at 816
(citation omitted). Here, the affiant’s information that two black males left the apartment, engaged
in seven suspected drug transactions, and directly returned to the apartment provides a substantial
basis for the issuing judge to believe that the apartment will contain evidence of drug trafficking.
The undersigned therefore finds that Detective Strickenberger’s affidavit establishes a nexus
between the apartment and drug trafficking.
C. 	Staleness
Defendants assert that the information in the affidavit is stale, because “[t]he limited
information in the affidavit linking drug trafficking to the residence is almost exclusively based on
information gained through surveillance thirty-four (34) days prior to the execution of the search
warrant” [Doc. 56 p. 7]. Defendants submit that “[t]he affidavit fails to establish when the criminal
activity began” and the “only evidence of what could arguably be an actual drug transaction is
from the July 2, 2024 incident in the parking lot” [Id. at 8].
Assessing whether an affidavit’s information is stale requires a case-by-case analysis.
United States v. Spikes, 158 F.3d 913, 923 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing Sgro v. United States,
287 U.S. 206, 210–11 (1932)). Under this analysis, “the length of time between the events listed
in the affidavit and the application for the warrant [is] salient” but not dispositive. Id. When
considering whether information presented in support of a request for the issuance of a search
warrant is stale, the Court considers: “(1) the character of the crime[, whether it is] a chance
encounter . . . or a regenerating conspiracy[], (2) the criminal[, whether he is] nomadic or
entrenched[], (3) the thing to be seized[, whether it is] perishable and easily transferable or of
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enduring utility to its holder[], and (4) the place to be searched [whether it is a] mere criminal
forum of convenience or secure operational base[].” United States v. Frechette, 583 F.3d 374, 378
(6th Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Abboud, 438 F.3d 554, 572–73 (6th Cir. 2006)).
Analysis of these four factors reveals the information in Detective Strickenberger’s
affidavit was not stale. As a preliminary matter, the last suspected drug transaction described in
the affidavit occurred on July 11, 2024, one day before the search warrant was issued on
July 12, 2024. Defendants assert that information in the affidavit “linking drug trafficking to the
residence is almost exclusively based on information gained through surveillance thirty-four (34)
days prior to the execution of the search warrant” on July 12, 2024 [Doc. 56 p. 7]. Not so. As
discussed above, the affidavit outlines a series of seven suspected drug transactions between
June 7 and July 11, 2024.
“Evidence of ongoing criminal activity will generally defeat a claim of staleness.” United
States v. Greene, 250 F.3d 471, 481 (6th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted) (finding that a twenty-three-
month-old controlled drug buy from ongoing enterprise was not stale); see also United States v.
Young, 847 F.3d 328, 348 (6th Cir. 2017) (three-week-old drug buy not stale); United States v.
Sinclair, 631 F. App’x 344, 348 (6th Cir. 2015) (fifteen-day-old information about drug trafficking
not stale); United States v. Thomas, 605 F.3d 300, 309–10 (6th Cir. 2010) (eight-month-old
information about drug manufacturing not stale); United States v. Hammond, 351 F.3d 765,
771–72 (6th Cir. 2003) (five-month-old information about drug manufacturing not stale); Spikes,
158 F.3d at 924 (finding that four-year-old evidence coupled with recent surveillance was not stale
when there was ongoing drug trafficking).
Defendants argue that evidence of a single drug transaction (the July 2 transaction) does
not establish ongoing drug activity [Doc. 56 p. 8 (citing Reed, 993 F.3d at 449)]. At the suppression
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hearing, Defendants highlighted that the affidavit does not allege that they had a history of drug or
convictions, nor prior involvement with law enforcement. But the Court judges the sufficiency of
an affidavit based upon what it contains, rather than what it lacks. Sanders, 106 F.4th at 463. Here,
the affidavit describes that in early May 2024, law enforcement learned that rental cars linked to
Khalid Sullivan, an individual who sold heroin in a controlled buy on April 24, 2024, were
repeatedly located in the parking lot of the Holston Place Apartments. Surveilling officers then
observed repeated drug sales by Suspects 1 and 2 on June 7, July 2, and July 11, and four involved
rental cars. 	The activity described in the affidavit is not a “chance encounter” but, instead, the
affidavit describes an ongoing drug conspiracy.
The seven suspected drug transactions in the affidavit all involve the suspects leaving the
apartment, traveling to and conducting the transaction, and then returning directly to the apartment.
This information shows the suspects are operating out of the apartment, which is their operational
base. Defendants argue that the suspects were nomadic because they traveled to Detroit while
under surveillance [Doc. 56 p. 8]. Comparing the case to the facts and circumstances in United
States v. Scales, No. 3:22-CR-20, 2024 WL 841191 (E.D. Tenn. 2024),4 Defendants alleged at the
hearing that it was clear from the affidavit that this was a nomadic endeavor, as Defendants were
believed to be in Detroit, Michigan for approximately five days, and there was a number of times
that there was no activity at the apartment. Defendants further note that “[b]y their very nature,
drugs are easily transferable and quickly sold and consumed” [Id.]. Defendants contend that the
apartment was not a secure operational base, as there were no transactions linked to the apartment,
nor any tips regarding evidence to be found at the apartment.
4 	The undersigned notes that since the hearing, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
affirmed 	this 	decision. 	See 	United 	States 	v. 	Scales, 	No. 	24-5905, 	2025 	WL 	2042202
(6th Cir. July 21, 2025).
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Considering as it must the totality of the circumstances, the undersigned concludes that the
affidavit alleges a regenerating conspiracy, as surveilling officers on several occasions saw
Defendants leave the apartment, conduct what appeared to be a hand-to-hand drug transaction, and
then return to the apartment immediately thereafter. That, combined with the officers’ extensive
experience in narcotics, and with the events of July 2, 2024, where an officer observed drugs in
plain view and the purchaser identified Suspect 1 as the person who sold heroin to him, supports
a finding that the suspects were operating out of the apartment, where they stored drugs and
proceeds. Defendants repeated behavior of coming from and returning to the same location after
the various transactions indicates a more entrenched situation. Finally, while drugs by their nature
are easily perishable and transferable, the undersigned finds that the evidence, including a
suspected transaction the day before the search warrant issued, shows the information provided in
the affidavit was not stale.
D. 	Good Faith
“[J]udicial suppression is inappropriate when an officer conducts a search in ‘objectively
reasonable reliance’ on a warrant later deemed to be invalid.” United States v. Neal, 106 F.4th 568,
572 (6th Cir. 2024) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984)); see also United
States v. Herring, 555 U.S. 135, 141–42 (2009) (rejecting automatic exclusion of evidence and,
instead, asking whether exclusion will provide “appreciable deterrence”). This is because
“[p]enalizing the officer for the [judge’s] error, rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to
the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations.” United States v. White, 874 F.3d 490,
505–06 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 921); see also Neal, 106 F.4th at 572 (observing
that when the affidavit lacks probable cause, “the authorizing judge—not the officer—is the
blameworthy party”).
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The “good-faith inquiry is confined to the objectively ascertainable question whether a
reasonably well[-]trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the
magistrate’s authorization.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23. “Some modicum of evidence, however
slight[,] between the criminal activity at issue and the place to be searched” will support an
officer’s 	good-faith 	belief 	in 	the 	existence of 	probable 	cause. 	United 	States 	v. 	McCoy,
905 F.3d 409, 416 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting White, 874 F.3d at 496). Thus, only when the affidavit
is “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely
unreasonable” will the search fall outside the good-faith exception and the evidence be suppressed.
Neal, 106 F.4th at 572 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 923).
Here, the warrant for the search of unit 1 of the Holston Place Apartments was based upon
probable cause that evidence of drug trafficking would be found at the location. But even if
probable cause was lacking, the evidence seized in the search of the apartment should not be
suppressed because the executing officers relied on the search warrant in good faith.
Defendants allege Leon’s bare-bones affidavit exception applies. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923.
Defendants assert that the affidavit shows only a single confirmed drug transaction [Doc. 65 p. 4].
They contend that this transaction is based upon unverified information by an informant of
unsubstantiated reliability [Id. at 5]. Defendants liken this case to United States v. Helton,
314 F.3d 812, 825 (6th Cir. 2003), where the Court found that no reasonable officer would have
believed the affidavit provided probable cause when it failed to show that the informant was
trustworthy and reliable [Doc. 65 p. 5]. Finally, they maintain that the affidavit lacks any “relevant
independent investigation” by law enforcement [Id.].
Detective Strickenberger’s eight-page affidavit provided the executing officers with
evidence of a connection between the apartment and drug trafficking. Officers conducted
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surveillance at the apartment complex on at least seven days between June 6, 2024, and July 11,
2024. The surveilling officers witnessed on seven occasions Defendants leaving the apartment,
traveling to a location away from the apartment, conducting what appeared to be a hand-to-hand
drug transaction based on the officer’s training and experience, and then returning to the apartment.
Further, following the suspected drug transaction on July 2, 2024, an officer saw drugs in plain-
view in the vehicle and arrested the driver who said he purchased the drugs from the individual
whom the officers were surveilling. While the affidavit contains no information on the individual’s
credibility, the information from the arrested individual is corroborated by the officers’ real-time
observations of the drug sale itself and the seller’s leaving and returning to this apartment
following the transaction. Accordingly, this is not a case where the affidavit is “completely devoid
of any nexus between” the illegal activity and the place to be searched or the item to be seized,
Carpenter, 360 F.3d at 595–96, nor does it “nakedly assume or vaguely conclude, without
attempting to demonstrate why, probable cause has been satisfied,” Sanders, 106 F.4th at 469
(citations omitted). Finally, the facts here are inapposite to the circumstances in Helton, where the
statements “were not corroborated in any meaningful manner.” Helton, 314 F.3d at 824.
These connections between drug activity and the apartment provide at least a “minimally
sufficient nexus” to support the executing officers’ good faith reliance on the search warrants.
Accord Neal, 106 F.4th at 573 (affirming application of the good-faith exception when the affidavit
demonstrated defendant lived at the residence, was recently dealing a large quantity of drugs per
a reliable confidential informant and engaged in a single controlled buy). Thus, if Detective
Strickenberger’s affidavit is found to be deficient in establishing a probable cause, then the
evidence seized in the execution of the search warrant still should not be suppressed.
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III. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed herein, the undersigned finds as follows:
(1) 	Defendants have standing to challenge the search of the
apartment;
(2) 	the affidavit provides probable cause for a search warrant,
including a nexus between the apartment and criminal
activity and fresh information of drug trafficking; and
(3) 	officers searched the apartment in good faith reliance on the
search warrant.
The undersigned therefore RECOMMENDS5 that the District Judge GRANT Defendant
Mahone’s Motion to Adopt Motion to Suppress Evidence Seized at 5101 Asheville Highway Unit
101 [Doc. 59] and DENY the Motion to Suppress [Doc. 56].
Respectfully submitted,
________________________
Jill E. McCook
United States Magistrate Judge
5 	Any objections to this report and recommendation must be served and filed within fourteen
(14) days after service of a copy of this recommended disposition on the objecting party. Fed. R.
Crim. P. 59(b)(2) (as amended). Failure to file objections within the time specified waives the right
to review by the District Court. Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(2); see United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d
582, 587 (6th. Cir. 2008); see also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985) (providing that failure
to file objections in compliance with the required time period waives the right to appeal the District
Court’s order). The District Court need not provide de novo review where objections to this report
and recommendation are frivolous, conclusive, or general. Mira v. Marshall, 806 F.2d 636, 637
(6th Cir. 1986). Only specific objections are reserved for appellate review. Smith v. Detroit Fed.
of Tchrs, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987).
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