USA v. Ulrich

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
TANYA ROCHELLE ULRICH,
Defendant.
4:22-CR-40020-KES
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATION AS
MODIFIED AND DENYING
ULRICH’S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS
The Government charged defendant, Tanya Rochelle Ulrich, with one
count of Concealing Person from Arrest in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1071. Docket
1. Citing the Fourth Amendment, Ulrich moves to suppress all evidence that
law enforcement officers recovered during their search of her home on August
24, 2021, including that James Jo Fries was present in the back bedroom of
the residence. Docket 32 at 1. Ulrich also moves to suppress all statements
that she and Fries made to officers after the search as fruit of an illegal search.
See id.
The court referred Ulrich’s motion to Magistrate Judge Veronica L. Duffy
under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). After holding an evidentiary hearing, Magistrate
Judge Duffy recommended Ulrich’s motion to suppress be denied. Docket 47.
Ulrich filed objections to the Report and Recommendation. Docket 49. After a
de novo review of the Report and Recommendation and a review of the record,
the court adopts the Report and Recommendation as modified below and
denies Ulrich’s motion to suppress.
Case 4:22-cr-40020-KES Document 55 Filed 11/22/22 Page 1 of 18 PageID #: <pageID>

2
LEGAL STANDARD
This court’s review of a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation is
governed by 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. The court reviews de novo any objections to the magistrate judge’s
recommendations with respect to dispositive matters that are timely made and
specific. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b). Because motions to
suppress evidence are considered dispositive matters, a magistrate judge’s
recommendation regarding such a motion is subject to de novo review.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673
(1980). In conducting a de novo review, this court may then “accept, reject, or
modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the
magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also United States v. Craft, 30 F.3d
1044, 1045 (8th Cir. 1994).
FACTS
After a de novo review of the transcripts of the suppression hearing and
the exhibits received into evidence, the court makes the following pertinent
factual findings necessary to resolve this dispute:
In May 2021, Jamie Jo Fries had a warrant out for her arrest. See Docket
48 at 7. Deputy United States Marshal Jack Valentine attempted to locate
Fries. See id. In his attempt, Valentine spoke with Debra McDaniel, Fries’s
mother, at McDaniel’s house, 26 East Rampart Place. See id. at 6-7. During
this interaction, McDaniel told Valentine that Fries was “running around with
her boyfriend at the time, Nick Lamb, and that she was going to be living in the
Case 4:22-cr-40020-KES Document 55 Filed 11/22/22 Page 2 of 18 PageID #: <pageID>

3
Whittier neighborhood.” Id. at 8. McDaniel did not provide a specific address
but did say that Fries drove either a silver BMW or Mercedes and that Lamb
drove an older black Chevy Suburban with Nebraska license plates. See id.
After speaking with McDaniel, Valentine went to the Whittier neighborhood and
found a silver Mercedes parked next to a black Suburban with Nebraska
license plates. See id. Valentine then took a picture of the silver Mercedes and
sent it to McDaniel, who confirmed Valentine found the right vehicle. See id.
Valentine then set up a Dakota Territory Fugitive Task Force to see if
they could see Fries or Lamb. See id. at 8-9. Valentine learned that Fries had
previously received a ticket for an animal control violation, in connection with
her black lab. See id. at 9. Valentine and the Task Force spotted a woman who
roughly matched Fries’s description walking a black lab next to her vehicle and
Lamb’s vehicle. See id. Valentine then arrested Fries. See id. Magistrate Judge
Duffy released Fries from custody on certain conditions. See J.F. Docket 23.1
On August 13, 2021, Magistrate Judge Duffy ordered that a warrant be
issued for Fries’s arrest for violating one of her conditions of release. J.F.
Docket 49. Valentine became aware of the warrant and soon after attempted to
locate Fries. Docket 48 at 4-5. Valentine conducted an initial investigation and
found 26 East Rampart Place (McDaniel’s residence) to be of interest. See id. at
5. On August 18, 2021, Valentine went to that address, but did not find Fries.
See id. at 5-6. Valentine did, however, speak with McDaniel. See id. at 6.
1 Fries’s criminal case is United States v. Brockhouse et al., 4:21-cr-40071-KES
(D.S.D. 2022). The court will follow the Report and Recommendation’s
approach using the court’s assigned docket number preceded by “J.F.”
Case 4:22-cr-40020-KES Document 55 Filed 11/22/22 Page 3 of 18 PageID #: <pageID>

4
McDaniel told Valentine that Fries did not live at 26 East Rampart Place. Id.
Instead, McDonald told Valentine that Fries was “staying with someone named
Tanya” in an apartment near 14th and Dakota. See id. She also gave Valentine
directions on which specific apartment Fries was in, stating that “if you go in
the front door of the apartment complex, it’s downstairs and the first door to
your right[.]” Id. McDonald also indicated that Fries still drove the same silver
Mercedes. Id. at 73. At no time did Valentine or any other law enforcement
officer contact Fries’s probation officer about Fries’s location, despite that being
a typical step to take. Id. at 28, 59.
On August 18, 2021, Valentine drove towards the intersection that
McDaniel had flagged for him and found a silver Mercedes with the same
license plates as the Mercedes that he had located earlier that year. See id. at
10, 72-73. The Mercedes was parked in a parking lot at 634 South Dakota. See
id. at 10-11. Valentine then “took the advice of Ms. McDaniel,” and went
through the first door, down the stairs, and knocked on the first door on the
right. See id. at 11. Defendant Tanya Ulrich answered the door. Id. Valentine
informed Ulrich that he had an arrest warrant for Jamie Fries, that he was
looking for Fries, and that he had reason to believe she was in the apartment.
See id. at 12.
Ulrich told Valentine that he could not come in. Id. at 13. Ulrich yelled at
Valentine, and in response to Valentine’s warning that she could be charged
with a federal felony of harboring a fugitive if Fries was in the apartment,
Ulrich said she understood and that she wouldn’t do anything to jeopardize her
Case 4:22-cr-40020-KES Document 55 Filed 11/22/22 Page 4 of 18 PageID #: <pageID>

5
child. See id. Because the door was open, Ulrich saw a black lab in the
apartment, which was similar to the one that he saw Fries with earlier that
year. See id. Valentine said that he and his team “backed up” because they
“weren’t certain that [Fries] was there[.]” Id.
The next week, Valentine texted McDaniel indicating that Fries was not
at Ulrich’s apartment. See id. at 14. McDaniel said that she “do[esn’t] know
where else [Fries] would be.” Id. McDaniel asked Valentine if he saw any
puppies in the apartment. Id. McDaniel explained that Fries’s black lab had
recently had puppies, and that “if the puppies were there, [Fries] was there.” Id.
In addition to talking with McDaniel, Valentine also reviewed some text
messages from the Yankton County jail, between Fries and Lamb. See id. Fries
and Lamb exchanged these messages in June and July of 2021. See id. at 15.
On June 21, 2021, Fries sent the following message to Lamb:
Babe, you just now got my phone turned back on. It died, and
the hardwired car charger stopped working. Then Tanya had
her lower [sic] cut off when I was there charging it.
Id. at 16. On July 17, 2021, Lamb texted Fries, “Why you spending so much time
over at Tanya’s? You never liked her before, and now all a sudden.” Id.
With the new information about Fries’s puppies and the text messages
between Fries and Lamb, Valentine returned to Ulrich’s apartment on August
24, 2021. See id. at 17. Valentine went to Ulrich’s apartment in the mid-
morning because they had seen that Fries had a job as a delivery driver for a
food delivery service such as Grubhub. See id. at 18, 55-56. United States
Marshal Service Supervisor Gary Bunt also went with Valentine to Ulrich’s
Case 4:22-cr-40020-KES Document 55 Filed 11/22/22 Page 5 of 18 PageID #: <pageID>

6
apartment on August 24. See id. at 52-53. At no point did Valentine or Bunt
obtain a search warrant to search Ulrich’s house. See id. at 44. Bunt stayed on
the perimeter of the scene to ensure no one could escape from the window. See
id. at 53.
Upon arriving at Ulrich’s apartment on August 24, Valentine saw the
same Mercedes that he saw earlier in May and on August 16. See id. at 19.
Valentine knocked on the door, and Ulrich answered. See id. Ulrich again did
not consent to Valentine coming into the apartment. See id. Valentine spotted a
black lab and puppies. See id. at 20. Valentine then called Bunt over. Id. at 20,
65.
Bunt and Ulrich spoke briefly, and Bunt soon after told Ulrich that he
was going to enter the apartment. See id. at 20, 56. Ulrich, who was holding a
child in her left arm, attempted to close the door. Id. at 21, 56. Bunt put his
foot in the door to stop it from fully closing. Id. at 21. Ulrich raised her voice
and was “very animated, very belligerent, [and] very standoffish.” Id. at 56. She
repeatedly yelled, “get out of my apartment, get out of my apartment.” Id. She
attempted to swing her arm at Valentine and strike her knee against Bunt’s
leg. See id. at 22-23, 57.
Eventually, Valentine went inside the house and shouted, “Jamie, this is
the U.S. Marshals, get out here.” Id. at 23. Fries walked out of a bedroom door.
Id. In the bedroom Fries left, Valentine saw “multiple open duffel bags that
contained clothes, multiple cell phones, a bed that was made with bedding,
and other household items.” Docket 45 at 13. Based on Valentine’s
Case 4:22-cr-40020-KES Document 55 Filed 11/22/22 Page 6 of 18 PageID #: <pageID>

7
observations, it appeared that Fries “was residing in the back bedroom.” Id.
After arresting Fries, Valentine spoke with Fries later that day on August
24, 2021, as well as another time on December 7, 2021, and on March 28,
2022. See Docket 48 at 44-47. Valentine arrested Ulrich in early March of
2022. Id. at 48. Valentine also interviewed Ulrich about the August 24, 2021,
encounter. See id. at 48-49.
DISCUSSION
Ulrich makes two primary objections to the Report and Recommendation.
Docket 49 at 1. First, Ulrich objects to the Report’s conclusion that officers
lawfully entered Ulrich’s apartment. See id. Second, Ulrich objects to the
admissibility of evidence that Fries was in Ulrich’s apartment, along with
subsequent statements made by Ulrich and Fries during interviews with
Valentine and other law enforcement officers. See id.
I. 	Entering Ulrich’s Apartment
“A valid arrest warrant carries with it the implicit but limited authority to
enter the residence of the person named in the warrant in order to execute the
warrant.” United States v. Risse, 83 F.3d 212, 215 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Payton
v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603 (1980)). But without exigent circumstances or
consent, an arrest warrant does not authorize an officer to enter a third-
person’s home to search for the subject of the arrest warrant. See Steagald v.
United States, 451 U.S. 204, 213-16 (1981). Instead, officers generally need a
search warrant to search a third party’s home, because without this general
requirement, police who have only an arrest warrant of an individual “could
Case 4:22-cr-40020-KES Document 55 Filed 11/22/22 Page 7 of 18 PageID #: <pageID>

8
search all the homes of that individual’s friends and acquaintances.” Id. at 215.
Sometimes, however, officers are unsure where the subject of an arrest
warrant resides. Thus, officers may enter a third party’s home so long as they
“have a reasonable belief that the suspect resides at the place to be entered
and have reason to believe that the suspect is present at the time the warrant
is executed.” United States v. Powell, 379 F.3d 520, 523 (8th Cir. 2004)
(emphasis omitted). “Whether the officers had reasonable belief is based upon
the ‘totality of the circumstances’ known to the officers prior to entry.” United
States v. Glover, 746 F.3d 369, 373 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing United States v.
Junkman, 160 F.3d 1191, 1193 (8th Cir. 1998)).2
2 The court notes that at least some evidence in the record suggests that Fries
actually resided in Ulrich’s apartment. For example, Fries’s car was parked in
front of Ulrich’s apartment on both August 18 and 24. See Docket 48 at 10-11,
18-19. Furthermore, Valentine reported that the back bedroom that Fries
walked out of on August 24, 2021, had “multiple open duffel bags that
contained clothes, multiple cell phones, a bed that was made with bedding,
and other household items.” See Docket 45 at 13. According to Valentine, “[i]t
appeared . . . that Fries was residing in the back bedroom.” If Fries did indeed
reside in Ulrich’s apartment, then officers could lawfully enter Ulrich’s
apartment to arrest Fries so long as they had reason to believe she was present
in the apartment, regardless of whether officers reasonably believed she lived
there. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 603 (“[A]n arrest warrant founded on probable
cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which
the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within.”); United
States v. Davis, 288 F.3d 359, 362 (8th Cir. 2002) (“Since Davis was living at
the trailer property, the warrant for his arrest permitted officers to execute the
warrant at that location.”); Washington v. Simpson, 806 F.2d 192, 196 (8th Cir.
1986) (when subject of arrest warrant is co-resident with third party, officers
may enter residence of the third party without search warrant). But the
government did not argue Fries actually resided in Ulrich’s apartment, and
thus the court declines to make this finding.
Case 4:22-cr-40020-KES Document 55 Filed 11/22/22 Page 8 of 18 PageID #: <pageID>

9
A. Did Officers reasonably believe Fries resided in Ulrich’s
apartment?
The court must first decide whether Valentine and Blunt reasonably
believed Fries resided in Ulrich’s apartment. Valentine spoke with Fries’s
mother, McDaniel, multiple times about where Fries may be. Docket 48 at 6-8,
14. In fact, just a few months before August 24, 2021, McDaniel provided
accurate information about where officers would find Fries at a separate
location. See id. at 8. McDaniel accurately named the neighborhood where
officers could find Fries. Id. McDaniel also told Valentine that Fries drove either
a silver Mercedes or BMW and that her boyfriend, Nick Lamb, drove a black
suburban Chevy. See id. This information was accurate, as Valentine found a
silver Mercedes and black Chevy suburban parked in the same neighborhood.
See id.
Because McDaniel reliably provided information to Valentine about
Fries’s location in the past, it was reasonable for Valentine to rely on
McDaniel’s assertions about Fries’s location in August of 2021. See Glover, 746
F.3d at 373. In Glover, police officers received a call from a confidential
informant who knew the defendant’s name, location, date of birth, and the fact
that he had outstanding arrest warrants. See id. at 370, 73. The informant
knew the entrance gate code. See id. at 373. Officers approached the address
the informant relayed to them and observed that a vehicle in the driveway
matched the description of one of the vehicles associated with the defendant in
the defendant’s fugitive profile. See id. at 373-74. Officers called the informant
Case 4:22-cr-40020-KES Document 55 Filed 11/22/22 Page 9 of 18 PageID #: <pageID>

10
back, who then relayed additional information about what the defendant was
doing in real time. See id. at 374. The Eighth Circuit found that the totality of
these circumstances supported the officers’ reasonable belief that the
defendant resided and was present at the home at the time officers searched
the home. See id.
Valentine’s reliance on McDaniel is similar to the officers’ reliance on the
confidential informant in Glover. Just as the confidential informant told officers
about the entrance gate code, so too did McDaniel tell Valentine specific
directions about how to find the exact apartment in which Fries was located.
See id. at 373; Docket 48 at 6 (noting that McDaniel told Valentine that if he
“go[es] in the front door of the apartment complex, it’s downstairs and the first
door to your right[.]”). The specific instructions from McDaniel suggest “she had
a close relationship with [Fries] or the property.” Glover, 746 F.3d at 373.
McDaniel also told officers that Fries was staying with someone named Tanya,
and Valentine soon confirmed that Tonya did in fact live at the apartment
where McDaniel directed them. See Docket 48 at 11-12. Additionally, in
between August 18 and 24, McDaniel asked Valentine if there were any
puppies in the house. Id. at 14. McDaniel explained that Fries’s black lab had
recently had puppies, and that “if the puppies were there, [Fries] was there.” Id.
And on August 24, Valentine spotted puppies in Ulrich’s apartment, which
further bolsters McDaniel’s credibility and in turn Valentine’s reasonable belief
that Fries resided and was present in Ulrich’s apartment. See id. at 20. In
summary, officers reasonably relied on McDaniel for information. In fact,
Case 4:22-cr-40020-KES Document 55 Filed 11/22/22 Page 10 of 18 PageID #: <pageID>

11
Valentine arguably had more reason to trust the information from McDaniel
than the officers in Glover. Unlike in Glover, which involved an anonymous
person, McDaniel was Fries’s mother. See id. at 373; Docket 48 at 6.
But Valentine did not just rely on his conversations with McDaniel. On
both August 18 and 24, Valentine observed Fries’s silver Mercedes—the same
one Valentine associated with Fries a few months earlier in May—parked
outside of Ulrich’s apartment complex. See Docket 48 at 10-11, 18-19.
Valentine also read text messages from June and July of that year that
suggested that Fries spent a significant amount of time with Ulrich. See id. at
16-17. Of course, as Ulrich stresses, these text messages alone would not
supply a reasonable belief that Fries resided in Ulrich’s apartment. See Docket
49 at 6. But they nonetheless comport with and reinforce the other information
officers knew suggesting that Fries lived in Ulrich’s apartment. And finally,
Valentine testified that both times he interacted with Ulrich, Ulrich appeared
agitated. For example, on August 18, Valentine testified she “yelled” at officers
to leave. See Docket 48 at 13. On August 24, she raised her voice at the officers
almost immediately. Id. at 21. Bunt similarly testified that on August 24, Ulrich
was “very animated, very belligerent, [and] very standoffish.” Id. at 56.
Valentine further explained that based on his experience, Ulrich’s reactions
caused suspicion because “generally speaking, people that have nothing to hide
don’t shout at the cops.” Id. at 21. All of these factors, along with the
information from McDaniel, are sufficient such that an officer could reasonably
believe Fries resided in Ulrich’s apartment.
Case 4:22-cr-40020-KES Document 55 Filed 11/22/22 Page 11 of 18 PageID #: <pageID>

12
Ulrich resists this conclusion by making two primary arguments. First,
Ulrich argues that “[l]aw enforcement unreasonably declined to speak to Ms.
Fries’s probation officer to determine where she lived.” Docket 49 at 2. In
support, she notes that Fries had been in regular contact with her probation
officer—indeed, as recent as just a few weeks before August 24—and that Bunt
testified that officers “typical[ly] [] contact the probation office to find out
information about where [a fugitive] would be living[.]” See Docket 48 at 59.
Furthermore, Valentine testified that “there was nothing in the [pre-trial]
violation report where Probation indicated that there was a problem with where
[Fries] was living[.]” Id. at 38; see also Docket 45 at 1-2. Thus, Ulrich argues
that it was unreasonable for officers “to proceed with the assumptions of Ms.
Daniel, Ms. Fries’s mother, about where Ms. Fries was living, before attempting
to verify her address with probation[.]” Docket 49 at 3.
Ulrich’s argument implicitly assumes that Ms. Fries had just one home,
but the Eighth Circuit has explicitly rejected this assumption. See Risse, 83
F.3d at 217. In Risse, officers searched for the defendant’s girlfriend in order to
execute an arrest warrant for the girlfriend and entered the defendant’s home
to do so without a warrant. See id. at 214. In the process, officers observed
marijuana, which ultimately lead the government to obtain a search warrant
and subsequently seize more marijuana, marijuana paraphernalia, several
guns, two scales, and cash. See id. Facing drug tracking and firearm charges,
the defendant moved to suppress the evidence found in his house. See id. He
argued that because the officers knew, or should have known, that the
Case 4:22-cr-40020-KES Document 55 Filed 11/22/22 Page 12 of 18 PageID #: <pageID>

13
girlfriend lived at a different address other than the defendant’s address, the
officers did not reasonably believe she lived at his house and thus violated his
Fourth Amendment rights when they entered without a warrant. See id. at 217.
The Risse court rejected this argument, stating there is “no authority to
support Risse’s implicit assumption that a person can have only one residence
for Fourth Amendment purposes.” Id. Rather, a dwelling “can certainly be
considered [a person’s] ‘home’ for Fourth Amendment purposes, even if the
premises are owned by a third party and others are living there, and even if
[the person] concurrently maintains a residence elsewhere as well.” Id. (quoting
Steagald, 451 U.S. at 230-31 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)). Here, even if officers
could have spoken to probation officers, and even if probation officers had a
different address on file for Fries, officers could still reasonably believe that
Fries resided with Ulrich. And given the amount of information officers had as
discussed above, Valentine and Bunt did in fact reasonably believe Fries was
residing with Ulrich. Thus, Ulrich’s argument about the officers’ failure to
discuss Fries’s location with probation fails.
Ulrich’s second argument also fails. Ulrich asserts that the fact that
Valentine “backed up” because he was not “certain that [Ms. Fries] was there”
and subsequently texted McDaniel that “[Fries] [was] not at the apartment”
suggests that after the August 18 visit, Valentine did not possess enough
information to form a reasonable belief that Fries lived in Ulrich’s apartment.
See Docket 49 at 4 (first alteration in original); Docket 48 at 13; Docket 45 at
12. Ulrich argues that because officers did not enter Ulrich’s apartment on
Case 4:22-cr-40020-KES Document 55 Filed 11/22/22 Page 13 of 18 PageID #: <pageID>

14
August 18, 2021, officers acted unreasonably in entering on August 24 given
the “few facts that law enforcement learned between the August 18 and August
24 visits to Ms. Ulrich’s apartment . . . .” Docket 49 at 4-5.
But Ulrich’s argument places undue weight on Valentine’s decision not to
enter Ulrich’s apartment on August 18. Even if Valentine was not certain that
Fries was at Ulrich’s apartment on August 18, the Fourth Amendment does not
require certainty: it merely requires that officers reasonably believed Fries
resided in Ulrich’s apartment. Powell, 379 F.3d at 523. Furthermore, an
officer’s subjective beliefs about whether they have a reasonable belief is also
irrelevant: instead, the court looks to whether an objective officer could
reasonably believe Fries resided in Ulrich’s apartment. See Brigham City v.
Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006) (finding officers’ real motivations for entering
a home to be irrelevant because “[a]n action is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth
Amendment, regardless of the individual officer's state of mind, ‘as long as the
circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the] action.’ ” (second alteration in
original) (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978))); Devenpeck
v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation
even when the criminal offense for which there is probable cause to arrest is
not “closely related” to the offense stated by the arresting officer at the time of
the arrest because “[the Supreme Court’s] cases make clear that an arresting
officer’s state of mind (except for the facts that he knows) is irrelevant to the
existence of probable cause.”); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813
(1996) (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth
Case 4:22-cr-40020-KES Document 55 Filed 11/22/22 Page 14 of 18 PageID #: <pageID>

15
Amendment analysis.”); United States v. Fuehrer, 844 F.3d 767, 772 (8th Cir.
2016) (“As a result, [the officer’s] observation of the traffic violation based on
his use of the radar gave him probable cause to stop the vehicle, and his
subjective intent to detain the vehicle for a dog-sniff search is irrelevant.”)
Here, as of August 18, an officer could have reasonably believed Fries
was residing in Ulrich’s apartment. On August 18, Valentine had the
information that McDaniel told him, including how to find the specific
apartment where Fries stayed. McDonald had previously given reliable
information to Valentine about Fries’s location just a few months earlier. See
Docket 48 at 6-9. McDonald told Valentine that Fries was “staying with
someone named Tanya” in an apartment near 14th and Dakota. See id. at 6.
McDonald told Valentine about Fries’s silver Mercedes, which Valentine saw
parked outside the apartment complex. See id. at 10, 72-73. And furthermore,
Valentine “took the advice of Ms. McDaniel,” and went through the first door,
down the stairs, and knocked on the first door on the right. See id. at 11.
Ulrich answered the door, and Valentine noticed a black lab that appeared to
be the same dog that Valentine had seen Fries with earlier in May. Id at 11-13.
In sum, Valentine’s observations corroborated much of what McDaniel told
Valentine. Together, these factors provided Valentine with sufficient
information such that he could reasonably believe, as of August 18, that Fries
lived in Ulrich’s apartment, given McDaniel’s demonstrated track record. Thus,
the court rejects Ulrich’s argument that Valentine’s failure to enter Ulrich’s
apartment on August 18 suggests Valentine could not reasonably believe Fries
Case 4:22-cr-40020-KES Document 55 Filed 11/22/22 Page 15 of 18 PageID #: <pageID>

16
lived in Ulrich’s apartment on August 24.
B. Did Officers reasonably believe Fries was in Ulrich’s apartment on
August 24, 2021 at the time of the search?
Having found that officers reasonably believed Fries resided in Ulrich’s
apartment, the court next considers whether they reasonably believed they
would find Fries in Ulrich’s apartment on August 24, 2021. Both Valentine and
Bunt testified that they believed Fries worked as a food delivery driver for a
delivery service such as Grubhub. See id. at 18, 55-56. Valentine explained
that he went to Ulrich’s apartment in the mid-morning to avoid a lunch or
dinner rush. See id. at 17-18. Bunt echoed this explanation. See id. at 55-56.
The court finds this explanation reasonable. See, e.g., Risse, 83 F.3d at 217
(citing favorably United States v. Lauter, 57 F.3d 212, 215 (2d. Cir. 1995),
which found belief that suspect was currently present at dwelling was
reasonable because officer knew that suspect was unemployed and typically
slept late). Additionally, Valentine saw the silver Mercedes—the same car
Valentine confirmed with McDaniel that Fries drove—parked in the parking lot
outside of Ulrich’s apartment as Valentine walked towards the apartment,
further supporting a reasonable belief that Fries was present at the time
Valentine entered Ulrich’s apartment. See Docket 48 at 8, 18-19. Given the
totality of the circumstances, the court finds Valentine and Bunt reasonably
believed Fries was present at the time they approached and entered Ulrich’s
apartment.
Case 4:22-cr-40020-KES Document 55 Filed 11/22/22 Page 16 of 18 PageID #: <pageID>

17
Because officers reasonably believed that Fries both resided and was
present in Ulrich’s apartment, they lawfully entered Ulrich’s apartment to
execute the arrest warrant for Fries. The court overrules Ulrich’s first objection.
II. 	Suppression
Ulrich also objects to the Report’s findings that the attenuation doctrine
applies to Ulrich’s and Fries’s statements to law enforcement during interviews.
Docket 49 at 8. Because the court concludes that officers did not violate
Ulrich’s Fourth Amendment rights, the court overrules Ulrich’s second
objection as moot.
CONCLUSION
Officers lawfully entered Ulrich’s apartment on August 24, 2021. Perhaps
it would have been better for them to have sought a search warrant of Ulrich’s
apartment after August 18. But this court is not a policy maker, nor does it
have the authority to determine best practices for law enforcement. The court
cannot require that officers take the best course of action; only a legal one. And
here, officers complied with the Fourth Amendment’s commands: they
reasonably believed Fries resided in Ulrich’s home, and they reasonably
believed Fries was present in the home at the time of their search. This
conclusion ends the inquiry.
The court adopts Magistrate Judge Duffy’s recommendation as modified
and denies Ulrich’s motion to suppress. Thus, it is
ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation (Docket 47) denying
Ulrich’s motion to suppress is adopted as modified by this opinion. The motion
Case 4:22-cr-40020-KES Document 55 Filed 11/22/22 Page 17 of 18 PageID #: <pageID>

18
to suppress (Docket 32) is denied.
Dated November 22, 2022.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Karen E. Schreier
KAREN E. SCHREIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 4:22-cr-40020-KES Document 55 Filed 11/22/22 Page 18 of 18 PageID #: <pageID>