USA v. Rederick

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
LARRY DEAN REDERICK,
Defendant.
4:20-CR-40066-KES
ORDER DENYING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL
Defendant, Larry Dean Rederick, moves for judgment of acquittal under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, or alternatively for a new trial under
Rule 33. Docket 108. The United States opposes the motion. Docket 116. For
the following reasons, the court denies Rederick’s motion.
BACKGROUND
In a superseding indictment, a grand jury charged Rederick with one
count of conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance and one count of
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. Docket 58. A
jury trial began on January 4, 2022. At the close of evidence, before the jury
began deliberating, Rederick made an oral motion for judgment of acquittal
under Rule 29(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Docket 103-2 at
37-38. The court denied Rederick’s motion for judgment of acquittal. Id. at 38.
The jury began deliberating and returned a verdict of guilty on both counts.
Docket 91.
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DISCUSSION
I. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal
A. Legal Standard
Rule 29 allows convicted defendants to file a motion for judgment of
acquittal after a jury returns its verdict. Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c)(1). The jury
verdict “must be upheld ‘if there is any interpretation of the evidence that could
lead a reasonable-minded jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.’ ” United States v. Espinoza, 885 F.3d 516, 520 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting
United States v. Taylor, 813 F.3d 1139, 1146 (8th Cir. 2016)). The Rule 29
standard is “ ‘very strict’ and a jury’s verdict should not be overturned lightly.”
United States v. Boesen, 491 F.3d 852, 855 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting United
States v. Ellefson, 419 F.3d 859, 862 (8th Cir. 2005)).
The essential elements of a crime for which a defendant is found guilty
may be proven by circumstantial or direct evidence. United States v. Baker, 367
F.3d 790, 797 (8th Cir. 2004). “Th[e] court views the entire record in the light
most favorable to the government, resolves all evidentiary conflicts accordingly,
and accepts all reasonable inferences supporting the jury’s verdict.” Boesen,
491 F.3d at 856 (citing United States v. Water, 413 F.3d 812, 816 (8th Cir.
2005)). “[T]he district court is not to weigh the evidence or assess the credibility
of witnesses[]” but rather is to evaluate the evidence in the light most favorable
to the government to determine if a reasonable jury could have found the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Baker, 367 F.3d at 797.
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B. Whether Sufficient Evidence Exists to Sustain the Guilty
Verdict
The jury found Rederick guilty on Count 1 of the superseding indictment
that charged him with possession of a controlled substance with intent to
distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine (actual). Docket 91. This
charge required the United States to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
Rederick was in possession of methamphetamine (actual), that he knew he was
in possession of it, and that he intended to distribute some or all of it to
another person. Docket 89 at 3-4. The United States also had to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that Rederick intended to distribute 50 grams or more of
methamphetamine (actual). See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490
(2000).
Rederick argues that “the evidence clearly was insufficient to establish
that [he] possessed methamphetamine on January 9, 2020[.]” Docket 108 at 1.
Rederick acknowledges that the evidence at trial showed that
“methamphetamine [was] seized from [the] trunk of the Monte Carlo that was
on the trailer being towed by the defendant’s pickup truck.” Docket 109 at 5.
But he argues that the presence of methamphetamine in the car on the trailer
does not amount to possession, because “[n]o witness testified that they saw
[Rederick] putting any methamphetamine in the trunk of the Monte Carlo.” Id.
Rederick’s argument overlooks contrary direct and circumstantial
evidence presented at trial. Evidence at trial established that there were three
bags of what was later determined to be 388 grams of 100% pure
methamphetamine in the trunk of the car—a Monte Carlo—on the trailer that
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Rederick was pulling when he was apprehended. Docket 103-1 at 105-07;
Docket 95 at 82. Rederick was the sole occupant of the truck pulling the trailer
when he was stopped. Docket 103-1 at 97. Zach Stark testified that, shortly
before the stop, Rederick picked up a package of methamphetamine near
Norfolk, Nebraska, and that Rederick and several others “tried the dope out.”
See Docket 103 at 97. Joseph Bauman testified that he was with Rederick in
the garage when they loaded a Monte Carlo onto Rederick’s trailer. Docket 103-
1 at 20-22. Inside the garage, Bauman saw Rederick with a “big bag of
methamphetamine,” and he saw Rederick inside the trunk of the Monte Carlo
on the driver’s side—the same location where the methamphetamine was later
found by law enforcement. Id. at 23-24; see id. at 104-05. Viewed in the light
most favorable to the government, the evidence supports the reasonable
interpretation of evidence that Rederick was in possession of
methamphetamine on January 9, 2020. Thus, the motion for judgment of
acquittal is denied as to Count 1.
The jury also found Rederick guilty on Count 2 of the superseding
indictment that charged him with conspiracy to distribute a controlled
substance—500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a
detectable amount of methamphetamine. Docket 91 at 2-3. This charge
required the United States to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was
an agreement to distribute a controlled substance, that Rederick intentionally
joined this agreement, and that at the time he did so, Rederick knew the
purpose of the agreement. Docket 89 at 6-9; United States v. Campbell, 986
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F.3d 782, 804 (8th Cir. 2021). The United States also had to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the conspiracy involved 500 grams or more of a mixture
or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine. See
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
Rederick argues under Count 2 that “the evidence clearly was insufficient
to establish that . . . [he] was [a] member of a conspiracy to distribute
methamphetamine[.]” Docket 108 at 1. Instead, Rederick argues that the
evidence at trial establishes only that he “was a user of methamphetamine
from time to time” and that he “merely[] ‘participated in a series of sales[.]’ ”
Docket 109 at 8 (quoting United States v. West, 15 F.3d 119, 121 (8th Cir.
1994)). Rederick continues, “[t]hat [I] bought for [my]self and may have shared
or sometimes sold some to others is not evidence of any agreement to distribute
methamphetamine with others.” Id.
“[I]t is settled in our circuit . . . that ‘evidence of multiple sales of resale
quantities of drugs is sufficient in an of itself to make a submissible case of a
conspiracy to distribute.’ ” United States v. Slagg, 651 F.3d 832, 842 (8th Cir.
2011) (quoting United States v. Garcia-Hernandez, 530 F.3d 657, 661 (8th Cir.
2008)). When there is evidence of drug distribution in large amounts over an
extended period of time, including “fronting,” there is sufficient evidence of a
conspiracy to distribute. Id. at 841 (citing United States v. Pizano, 421 F.3d
707, 720 (8th Cir. 2005)); see also id. at n.3 (“ ‘Fronting’ denotes a transaction
in which the buyer receives drugs on credit and repays the seller from the
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resale proceeds.” (quoting United States v. Buckley, 525 F.3d 629, 631-32 (8th
Cir. 2008))).
At trial, Stark testified that he set up a deal for Rederick to buy a pound
of methamphetamine from Brandon Wolff in either 2018 or 2019. Docket 103
at 65-66. Later, Stark was present when the “deal” took place at Rederick’s
farm. Id. at 70. As part of the deal, a supplier fronted Rederick a pound of
methamphetamine. Id. at 73; see also id. at 74-76, 78 (describing the nature of
the front). Later, Stark connected Rederick with Javier Benitz, Wolff’s source,
for another front sale to Rederick. Id. at 85. In exchange for Stark’s help setting
up the deal with Benitz, Stark got an ounce of methamphetamine from
Rederick. Id. at 97-98. Bauman testified that, since meeting Rederick in 2018
or 2019, Rederick has paid him in methamphetamine, and Bauman has sold
methamphetamine for Rederick at Rederick’s request. E.g., Docket 103-1 at 11-
13, 15-16. And as previously discussed, Bauman was present in Norfolk for the
sale of methamphetamine that occurred just before Rederick’s arrest on
January 9, 2020. The testimony of these witnesses permits an interpretation of
the evidence that could lead a reasonable-minded jury to find that Rederick
was a member of a conspiracy that obtained and distributed
methamphetamine to and from multiple people. Thus, the motion for judgment
of acquittal is denied as to Count 2.
II. Motion for New Trial
Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 33(a), a court can vacate
a judgment and grant a new trial “if the interest of justice so requires.” “As a
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general rule, the decision whether to grant or deny a motion for a new trial lies
within the discretion of the district court.” United States v. McMahan, 744 F.2d
647, 652 (8th Cir. 1984) (citing McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood,
464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984)). The court’s authority to grant a new trial should be
used cautiously and sparingly. United States v. Cole, 537 F.3d 923, 926 (8th
Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
“Rule 33 is [an] unusual remedy that is reserved for ‘exceptional cases in
which the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict.’ ” United States v.
Anwar, 880 F.3d 958, 970 (8th Cir. 2018) (alteration in original) (quoting
United States v. Campos, 306 F.3d 577, 579 (8th Cir. 2002)). “Unless the
district court ultimately determines that a miscarriage of justice will occur, the
jury’s verdict must be allowed to stand.” Campos, 306 F.3d at 579.
Rederick moves for a new trial and challenges “the weight of the evidence
supporting his conviction on both Counts 1 and 2.” Docket 109 at 8. Rederick
argues that “[t]he government’s cooperating witnesses Zachary Stark and
Joseph Bauman completely lacked credibility and any conviction based upon
their testimony simply cannot stand.” Docket 108 at 2.
Here, the parties had every opportunity to probe the truthfulness of each
witness, including Stark and Bauman, and the jury was able to assess each
witness’s credibility. In hearing from witnesses with differing accounts, the jury
was able to credit the testimony of witnesses they found credible and discount
testimony that they found inconsistent or otherwise not credible. Rederick cites
to specific inconsistencies in Stark’s and Bauman’s testimony, and he suggests
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that both had improper motives for testifying. See Docket 109 at 11-14. But
the inconsistencies he identifies are all within the trial transcript, meaning that
the jury heard the same information and came to its own conclusion as to
credibility. And both witnesses were questioned by Rederick’s attorney
regarding their respective motivations for testifying. Without more, Rederick
has failed to identify any unfairness in the trial or miscarriage of justice in its
result. Thus, the court will not exercise its discretion to order a new trial, and
the motion is denied.
CONCLUSION
A reasonable-minded jury could find the defendant guilty on both counts
beyond a reasonable doubt, and no miscarriage of justice occurred. Thus, it is
ORDERED that Rederick’s motion for judgment of acquittal (Docket 108),
or alternatively for a new trial, is denied.
Dated March 30, 2022.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Karen E. Schreier
KAREN E. SCHREIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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