USA v. Rosier, et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
NATHAN PEACHEY,
Defendant.
4:19-CR-40097-02-KES
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S
AMENDED MOTION
Defendant, Nathan Peachey, filed an amended motion challenging his
conviction on multiple grounds, and seeking an acquittal or new trial.1 Docket
237. For the following reasons, the court denies Peachey’s motion.
BACKGROUND
In a second superseding indictment, a grand jury charged Peachey with
one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, one count of conspiracy to
launder monetary instruments, nine counts of laundering monetary
instruments, and one count of conspiracy to obstruct, influence, or impede an
official proceeding. Docket 87. A jury trial began on November 15, 2021. At the
close of the government’s case, Peachey, through his attorney, made an oral
1 This motion was captioned as an amended motion for leave to file the
specified motion. Because the court orally granted leave during the trial for
Peachey to file this motion pro se, and because the motion makes arguments
on the merits, the court will treat this as a motion for the specified relief.
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motion for judgment of acquittal under Rule 29(a) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. The United States orally opposed the motion, and the
court denied Peachey’s motion for judgment of acquittal. Although Peachey was
represented by appointed counsel at trial, the court orally granted leave during
the trial for Peachey to file this motion pro se. The jury began deliberating and
returned a verdict of guilty on all counts on November 23, 2021. Docket 227.
Peachey then filed a motion and accompanying exhibits, and later an amended
motion and accompanying exhibits. Docket 235, 237. The amended motion
challenges his conviction on multiple grounds.
DISCUSSION
I. 	This Court Has Jurisdiction
Peachey’s first claim is that plaintiff, the United States, does not have
standing due to a lack of harm or injury and thus, the court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction. Docket 237 ¶ 24. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
12(b)(2) states that “[a] motion that the court lacks jurisdiction may be made at
any time while the case is pending.” This Rule “refers . . . to lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter and not the person.” Sewell v. United States, 406 F.2d
1289, 1292 (8th Cir. 1969); see also 1A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Crim. § 193 (5th
ed.). “[S]ubject-matter jurisdiction in every federal criminal prosecution comes
from 18 U.S.C. § 3231 . . . That’s the beginning and the end of the
‘jurisdictional’ inquiry.” United States v. White Horse, 316 F.3d 769, 772 (8th
Cir. 2003) (quoting Hugi v. United States, 164 F.3d 378, 380 (7th Cir. 1999)).
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, “The district courts of the United States shall have
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original jurisdiction . . . of all offenses against the laws of the United States.”
The second superseding indictment alleged that Peachey violated several
federal laws and that these violations occurred in the District of South Dakota.
Docket 87. Thus, the court has subject-matter jurisdiction over this case.
Other parts of Peachey’s motion reference Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which allows the court to arrest judgment. A motion under
this rule “must be based upon failure of the indictment to charge an offense or
upon a finding that the court was without jurisdiction of the offense.” United
States v. Whitted, 454 F.2d 642, 646 (8th Cir. 1972). The second superseding
indictment charges offenses following the language of the relevant federal
statutes, contains sufficient allegations to fairly notify Peachey of the charges
against him, and otherwise conforms with the requirements of Rule 7(c). Thus,
the court will not arrest judgment under Rule 34.
II. Peachey Was Not Denied His Right to an Impartial Jury
Peachey’s second claim is that he was denied a jury of his peers because
the jury did not include anyone that shares his Amish-Mennonite Christian
faith or anyone from Pennsylvania, where Peachey resides. Docket 237 ¶¶ 25-
26. Peachey appears to ground this argument in a right he claims is
guaranteed to him under the Pennsylvania Bill of Rights. Id. ¶ 25. Because
Peachey was charged and convicted in federal court in South Dakota, however,
the court will construe this as a claim brought under the Sixth Amendment of
the United States Constitution. Under the Sixth Amendment, criminal
defendants have a right to “an impartial jury of the [s]tate and district wherein
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the crime shall have been committed[.]” U.S. Const. amend. VI. “The Supreme
Court has interpreted this to mean that the venire from which a jury is chosen
must be a ‘representative cross section of the community’ where the defendant
is tried.” Singleton v. Lockhart, 871 F.2d 1395, 1398 (8th Cir. 1989) (quoting
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975). Thus, Peachey’s right to an
impartial jury was not violated by the venire being chosen entirely from South
Dakota, where he was tried.
“A venire selection process that ‘systematically exclude[s] distinctive
groups in the community’ will result in a venire that is not fairly
representative.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538). But
Peachey has put forward no evidence showing that people of the Amish-
Mennonite Christian faith were systematically excluded from the venire. And
even if there were no members of this faith group on the empaneled jury, there
is “no requirement that petit juries actually chosen must mirror the community
and reflect the various distinctive groups in the population. Defendants are not
entitled to a jury of any particular composition.” Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538. Thus,
the court concludes that Peachey was not denied his Sixth Amendment right to
an impartial jury.
III. Peachey’s Counterclaim Against the United States
Peachey’s third claim is that he “was improperly denied the common-law
right to file a setoff counterclaim” against the United States for five trillion
dollars that was wrongfully taken from Peachey and his co-defendants. Docket
237 ¶ 27. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not provide a process for
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defendants to file a counterclaim against the United States in a criminal
proceeding. The authorities Peachey cites as support for a common law right to
do so are inapposite, see id. ¶ 28, and the court finds no meritorious support
for such a right. Thus, the court denies this claim.
IV. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 Is Not an Unlawful Bill of Attainder
Peachey’s fourth claim is that he was denied the right to challenge 18
U.S.C. § 1343 as an unlawful bill of attainder. Id. ¶¶ 34-42. He claims this
statutory provision “does not prohibit or declare anything to be unlawful,” but
merely “mandates to take ‘whoever’ that special class of easily identifiable
persons,” is and “sentence[s] them with a fine and imprisonment without a
trial.” Id. ¶ 34. A bill of attainder, which is prohibited by Article I of the United
States Constitution, is “a law that legislatively determines guilt and inflicts
punishment upon an identifiable individual without provisions of the
protections of a judicial trial.” Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 468
(1977). In contrast, statutes that “set forth a generally applicable rule” making
it unlawful for “any person [to] commit[] certain acts. . . and leave[s] to courts
and juries the job of deciding what persons have committed the specified acts”
are not bills of attainder. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 450 (1965).
Here, 18 U.S.C. § 1343 sets out certain acts that are unlawful, and a jury
determined that Peachey had conspired to commit these acts under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1346. Thus, 18 U.S.C. § 1343 is not an unlawful bill of attainder.
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V. Opportunity to Introduce Evidence
Peachey’s fifth claim is that he “was improperly denied the right to
include” certain evidence and arguments at trial. Docket 237 ¶ 43. He does
not, however, specify which evidence or arguments the court prevented him
from including. Thus, the court denies this claim.
VI. Peachey’s Right Against Self-Incrimination Was Not Violated
Peachey’s sixth claim is that his right against self-incrimination was
violated during the trial. Id. ¶ 44. Peachey grounds this claim in the
Pennsylvania Bill of Rights, but the court construes it as a claim under the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Peachey was aware of his
right to remain silent under the Fifth Amendment. See Docket 27. He chose to
waive that right and testify in his own defense at trial. Peachey appears to
argue that any of his testimony that had the limited purpose of “impeach[ing]
the credibility of the accusers” cannot be used to incriminate him. See Docket
237 ¶ 44. But Peachey cites no meritorious support for this claim, and the
court finds none. Thus, the court concludes that Peachey’s right against self-
incrimination was not violated.
VII. Miscellaneous Claims
Peachey’s final claim asserts that he is now a witness to federal crimes
that were committed during the trial by the prosecutors and investigators in
this case. Id. ¶45. In support of this, Peachey submitted a document titled
Affidavit of Live First-Hand Witnesses of Federal Crimes, which makes several
additional claims. Docket 237-1 at 45-56.
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A. Motion for Acquittal Under Rule 29
One of these additional claims is that there was “not one piece of
evidence submitted to [the] jury . . . proving [he] broke a [f]ederal statute or
law.” Id. at 46. The court construes this claim as a motion for acquittal under
Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. On such a motion, the jury
verdict “must be upheld ‘if there is any interpretation of the evidence that could
lead a reasonable-minded jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.’ ” United States v. Espinoza, 885 F.3d 516, 520 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting
United States v. Taylor, 813 F.3d 1139, 1146 (8th Cir. 2016)). The Rule 29
standard is “ ‘very strict’ and a jury’s verdict should not be overturned lightly.”
United States v. Boesen, 491 F.3d 852, 855 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting United
States v. Ellefson, 419 F.3d 859, 862 (8th Cir. 2005)).
The essential elements of a crime for which a defendant is found guilty
may be proven by circumstantial or direct evidence. United States v. Baker, 367
F.3d 790, 797 (8th Cir. 2004). “Th[e] court views the entire record in the light
most favorable to the government, resolves all evidentiary conflicts accordingly,
and accepts all reasonable inferences supporting the jury’s verdict.” Boesen,
491 F.3d at 856 (citing United States v. Water, 413 F.3d 812, 816 (8th Cir.
2005)). “[T]he district court is not to weigh the evidence or assess the credibility
of witnesses[]” but rather is to evaluate the evidence in the light most favorable
to the government to determine if a reasonable jury could have found the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Baker, 367 F.3d at 797.
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The court finds that there was sufficient evidence introduced at trial for a
reasonable jury to convict Peachey on each of the charges against him. The
following is a non-exhaustive summary of such evidence: Several witnesses
testified that they invested money that was supposed to be used either for
humanitarian projects or to produce a return on investment. Voluminous bank
records showed the path of this money from the initial deposit into accounts
controlled by Peachey, and these records covered each of the transactions
included in the money laundering counts. See Docket 239; Docket 240-2 1-46.
Records also showed that Peachey used this money to purchase and renovate a
house in Norway, to purchase a luxury vehicle in Norway, and to buy millions
of dollars in silver coins, many of which were shipped to Norway. See, e.g.,
Docket 240 at 71, 98-120. Several witnesses testified that they would not have
invested their money if they had known it would be used in this way. Many
witnesses also testified that not only did they never receive a return on their
investment, but they also lost the entirety of their initial investment.
Several documents introduced by the government were originally found
on hard drives that appeared to belong to Peachey. See id. These documents
included bank statements showing the flow of money and other records
showing his involvement with the alleged co-conspirators, including updating
them on a “budget crisis,” and they showed that Peachey was monitoring the
investigation into this scheme. See id. at 27-28, 40-46, 143-46, 270-73.
Peachey’s co-defendant, John Rick Winer, also testified that much of his
involvement in the scheme was at the direction of Peachey. The government
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introduced audio recordings of conversations between Peachey and Winer,
including one in which a reasonable jury could find that Peachey and Winer
were discussing this scheme and the types of individuals who should be
avoided because they might cause trouble. Exhibit 37. Another exhibit from the
government showed that Peachey had sent a letter to this court after the
initiation of this investigation, which a reasonable jury could conclude was
intended to obstruct, influence, or impede the investigation. Docket 240-2 at
102-04.
Although Peachey offered other explanations for some of this evidence
during his testimony, credibility determinations are for the jury, and the jury
was free to not believe his testimony. Baker, 367 F.3d at 797. The court heard
the evidence at trial and, evaluating this evidence in the light most favorable to
the government, the court concludes that a reasonable jury could have found
beyond a reasonable doubt that Peachey was guilty of one count of conspiracy
to commit wire fraud, one count of conspiracy to launder monetary
instruments, nine counts of laundering monetary instruments, and one count
of conspiracy to obstruct, influence, or impede an official proceeding.
B. Remaining Claims from the “Affidavit”
Peachey also alleges that a search warrant was obtained without
probable cause. But motions to suppress evidence must be brought prior to
trial. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(C). Additionally, he alleges that the government
withheld exculpatory evidence, but he does not specify which evidence he
believes has been withheld. Docket 237-1 at 52. Peachy also makes several
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allegations that prosecutors and government witnesses lied during the trial,
but he provides no support for these allegations. See id. at 45-46, 48-54. The
remaining allegations in this document—that the prosecutors and investigators
conspired against the Christian religion, perpetuated a form of Christian
genocide, and engaged in an insurrection against the United States—are
without merit. See id. at 47, 55.
CONCLUSION
Defendant’s amended motion is denied for the reasons stated above.
Thus, it is
ORDERED that defendant’s amended motion (Docket 237) is denied.
Dated February 3, 2022.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Karen E. Schreier
KAREN E. SCHREIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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