LaCoe v. City of Sisseton et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
NORTHERN DIVISION
0 I' 2022
eiGRr^
SAMANTHA LACOE,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CITY OF SISSETON, JAMES
CROYMANS,INDIVIDUALLY AND
CHIEF OF POLICE; BRITTANY APPEL,
CITY POLICE COMMISSION,
INDIVIDUALLY AND ALDERWOMAN;
LEE SOLBERG,CITY POLICE
COMMISSION,INDIVIDUALLY AND
ALDERMAN;DELRAY GERMAN,CITY
POLICE COMMISSION,INDIVIDUALLY
AND ALDERMAN;DYLAN
KIRCHMEIER,INDIVIDUALLY AND IN
HIS ROLE AS ROBERTS COUNTY
STATE'S ATTORNEY; TERRY JASPERS,
INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS CAPACITY
AS MAYOR;TREVOR MISHLER,
INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY; AND JEREME STAUSS,
INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY;
Defendants.
1:22-CV-01010-CBK
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff Samantha LaCoe brings this eivil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
along with several purported state law claims seeking monetary and injunctive relief
against defendants James Croymans, Brittany Appel, Lee Solberg, Delray German, Dylan
Kirchmeier, Terry Jaspers, Trevor Mishler, Jereme Stauss, and the City of Sisseton for
the violation of her constitutional rights arising from her term of employment with the
Sisseton Police Department. This matter is before the Court on defendant's motion to
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dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. The motion
should be granted.
1. Background
Samantha LaCoe entered into an agreement with the Sisseton Police Department
on January 18, 2021,to work as a law enforcement offieer. Approximately a year later,
LaCoe resigned on Chief James Croymans' request after being placed on a Bradv/Giglio
impeachment disclosure list.^ LaCoe alleges that State's Attorney Dylan Kirchmeier
plaeed her on the list, absent any rule or regulation, and that she signed a letter consenting
to the Bradv/Giglio listing under duress. Kirehmeier put LaCoe onto the list after four
total incidents. In August and December of 2021, Kirchmeier did not agree with LaCoe's
stated reason for two different traffic stops. In January 2022, Kirchmeier found that
LaCoe made a misstatement in one of her reports and a clerieal error naming the wrong
defendant. LaCoe contends that none of her conduct warranted placement on the
Bradv/Giglio list, and that she was not given a meaningful opportunity to rebut or defend
herself before being placed on the list. She retraeted her resignation and eonsent to the
Bradv/Giglio listing in an undated affidavit attached to her complaint.
LaCoe further alleges that she was subject to a variety of discriminatory conduct,
including failure to train and harassment, because she is a woman. She contends that
during her first week on the job, she was given a duty vest that was too large for her body
and was given a service weapon too large for her hands. LaCoe claims that between
January and April, her Field Training Officer, Sergeant Jereme Stauss, was constantly
complaining about his personal life rather than providing training for LaCoe to be
successful at her job. Stauss allegedly failed to provide training on how to write reports
as well as guidance about the Department's policies and procedures. In late April, LaCoe
'Pursuant to the constitutional duty to provide criminal defendants with exculpatory
evidence under Bradv v. Maryland. 383 U.S. 80(1963), and impeachment evidence
under Giglio v. United States. 405 U.S. 150(1972), a Bradv/Giglio list, or Impeachment
Disclosure List, eontains the names of officers known to a jurisdiction who have been
dishonest in the past.
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contends that she was "labeled a 'snitch'" for reporting Officer Jon Sheehan to Croymans
after she learned while helping as a cheer coach at the local high school that Sheehan was
inappropriately contacting the girls through social media. She alleges that during a July
2021 law enforcement appreciation event, none ofthe other officers would speak to her.
After the event, LaCoe claims that Croymans brought her into his office and said that
LaCoe was "weak and [alienates herself] from people," that "no one wants to speak with
[her] or work with [her] and people see through [her]," and that she should think "long
and hard if this career is for [her]." In October 2021, Croymans told LaCoe that he did
not believe she would pass the Emergency Vehicle Operations Course and firearms
training, and she allegedly never received any additional training from Strauss after
Croymans told her to seek assistance. LaCoe contends that Croymans received her
complaints ofsex discrimination, including Corporal Trevor Mishler's remark that if
LaCoe "sucked d like she sucked the fun out ofthe room she would be further
ahead," which Croymans dismissed as a misunderstanding.
On January 17, 2022, Croymans called LaCoe into his office to notify her that
Kirchmeier determined that statements in one of her reports did not match her body
camera footage. Croymans informed LaCoe that she was being placed on the
Bradv/Giglio list and put on a year of probation, but that the disclosure would stay within
Roberts County. Two days later on January 19, Croymans told LaCoe that the Police
Commission had lost confidence in her during an emergency meeting and that she had to
resign. LaCoe alleges that all the defendants acted together to arbitrarily place her on the
Bradv/Giglio list and to deny her adequate training so that she would resign from her job.
Because ofthe defendants' actions, LaCoe claims that she has suffered harm to her career
as a law enforcement officer, lost job opportunities, and suffered severe depression,
anxiety, and economic harm.
II. Standard of Review
When reviewing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), the Court assumes that all facts in the complaint are true and construes any
reasonable inferences from those facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
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Jacobson Warehouse Co. v. Schnuck Mkts., Inc., 13 F.4th 659, 668 (8th Cir. 2021);
Ashcroftv. Iqbal 556 U.S. 662, 678(2009).
The complaint must contain "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face" to survive the motion to dismiss. C.N. v. Willmar Pub. Sch., Indep. Sch.
Dist. No. 347. 591 F.3d 624,630(8th Cir. 2010)(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twomblv.
550 U.S. 544, 570(2007)). The factual allegations "must be enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level." In re Pre-Filled Propane Tank Antitrust Litig., 860
F.3d 1059, 1063 (8th Cir. 2017)(quoting Twomblv, 550 U.S. at 555). In addition, the
factual contents ofthe complaint must "allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Pietoso. Inc. v. Rep. Servs., Inc.,
4 F.4th 620,622(8th Cir. 2021)(quoting Gliek v. W.Power Sports. Inc., 944 F.3d 714,
717(8th Cir. 2019)).
Nevertheless, courts "are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as
a factual allegation." Iqbal 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twomblv, 550 U.S. at 555). When
assessing the merits of a complaint challenged under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), a court should "begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more
than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption oftruth." McDonough v. Anoka
Cntv., 799 F.3d 931, 945-46 (8th Cir. 2015)(citing Iqbal. 556 U.S. at 679).
"A court generally may not consider materials outside the pleadings when
deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim." Greenman v. lessen, 787 F.3d
882, 887(8th Cir. 2015)(citing Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079
(8th Cir. 1999). However, courts may "consider 'some materials that are part ofthe
public record or do not contradict the complaint, as well as materials that are necessarily
embraced by the pleadings.'" Id (quoting Porous Media Corp., 186 F.3d at 1079).
Discussion
LaCoe asserts various claims against the defendants. She first claims that the
Department violated both her proeedural and substantive due proeess rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution as well as under the South
Dakota State Constitution. LaCoe claims further that she was eonstructively discharged
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based on the Department's pattern of harassment and failure to train. She alleges that all
the defendants together aeted to eonspire to violate her Fourteenth Amendment rights to
due process by placing her on the Bradv/Giglio list, as well as providing her with
inadequate training so that she would resign from her job. She additionally claims that by
placing her on the Bradv/Giglio list, the defendants intentionally and negligently inflicted
emotional distress upon her. All of LaCoe's federal claims should be dismissed for
failure to state a claim or because the particular named defendant is immune from suit,
and all of her state law claims should be dismissed because the Court chooses not to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction when no federal claims remain.
A. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claims
LaCoe argues, in essence, that the defendants violated her procedural and
substantive due process rights by placing her on the Bradv/Giglio list without giving her
an opportunity to defend herself and forcing,her to resign from her job with the
Department. For the protections of procedural due process to attach, a plaintiff must first
"have a constitutionally protected interest in life, liberty, or property." Mickelson v.
Cntv. of Ramsev. 823 F.Bd 918, 930(8th Cir. 2016). Here, LaCoe claims that she had a
property interest in her employment and a liberty interest in her reputation and good
name.
1. Property Interest
To establish a property interest in a job, a plaintiff must show that she "had a
reasonable and legitimate expectation of continued employment." Mogard v. City of
Milbank. 932 F.3d 1184, 1190 (8th Cir. 2019)(quoting Howard v. Columbia Pub. Sch.
Dist., 363 F.3d 797, 803 (8th Cir. 2004)). "State law and the terms of employment
determine whether the plaintiffs interest in his or her job rises to the level of a
constitutionally protected property right." Id.(citing Howard, 363 F.3d at 803). "A
plaintiffs subjective and unilateral expectation that she had a legitimate claim of
entitlement to continued employment in the same position is insufficient to create a
property interest." Id.(cleaned up).
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LaCoe fails to establish a property interest sufficient to support a procedural due
process claim. She relies on her contract with the Department to demonstrate that she has
a property interest in her employment as a law enforcement officer, but the contract that
she produced does not bind the city to employ her for any period oftime. Instead, the
contract provides that LaCoe must remain in the Department for a minimum of three
years or reimburse the city for certain expenses incurred to hire her. Indeed, the contract
specifically states,"Nothing contained herein shall be construed as a promise or
agreement by either the Sisseton Police Department or the CITY to retain Samantha
LaCoe as a police officer for the Sisseton Police Department for thirty-six (36) months or
any portion thereof." Because the contract does not bind the city to employ LaCoe for a
certain period oftime, it cannot serve as the basis of a property interest that entitles
LaCoe to procedural due process.
LaCoe's apparent beliefthat she had a three-year contract is insufficient to form a
property interest in the face of South Dakota's standard employment law. She states that
she "was lead [sic] to believe that her employment term was for three years per contract
and [she] was not an 'at-will' employee." But a unilateral belief that she had a contract
entitling her to three years of employment with the Department is insufficient to form the
basis of a property interest.^ LaCoe seems to concede that South Dakota is an at-will
employment state. See Holland v. FEM Elec. Ass'n. Inc.. 637 N.W.2d 717, 720 (S.D.
2001)("South Dakota is an employment-at-will state."); SDCL 60^^. She argues,
however, that because her contract specified a term of years, her employment was not at-
will. Although the contract does contain a term of years, that term is in reference to the
amount oftime that LaCoe had to work for the Department to avoid repayment of
training costs—not to a period oftime that the Department had to employ LaCoe.
Further, while an employer can surrender the statutory right to terminate employees at
will, LaCoe has not alleged facts sufficient to show that the Department has done so here.
^ Even if the Court considered the text-message exchange between LaCoe and Croymans
that she submitted with her response to the defendants' motion to dismiss, it does not
establish that the Department was contractually bound to employ LaCoe for three years.
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See Harvey v. Regional Health Network. Inc.. 906 N.W.2d 382, 397(S.D. 2018). At-will
status can be given up if an employer "explicitly states that discharge will occur for cause
only" or an employment agreement "contains a detailed list of exclusive grounds for
employee discipline or discharge and, a mandatory and specific procedure which the
employer agrees to follow prior to any employee's termination." Id. at 397-98 (quoting
Butterfield v. Citibank of S.D.. 437 N.W.2d 857, 859(S.D. 1989)). Here, rather than
limiting the Department to for-cause termination only, LaCoe's contract explicitly
preserved at-will status. And, as the defendants correctly argue, Sisseton's municipal
code of which the Court takes judicial notice, contains a non-exhaustive list of grounds
for employee discipline or discharge, not a list of exclusive grounds. See SISSETON, S.D.,
Mun. Code § 2.24.650 (2021), https://library.municode.com/sd/sisseton. LaCoe has
failed to allege facts sufficient to show that her employment fell outside ofthe
employement at-will status of South Dakota.
Although Sisseton's municipal code preserves due process for its employees, that
provision of the Code cannot serve as the basis for a federal procedural due process
violation claim. The Code states that certain specified due process procedures will be
followed for municipal employees. SiSSETON, S.D., MUN.CODE § 2.24.040 (2021). But
while the procedural due process property interest inquiry does focus on state law, see
e.g., Howard, 363 F.3d at 803,"[t]he simple fact that state law prescribes certain
procedures does not mean that the procedures thereby acquire a federal constitutional
dimension." Bucklev v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993)(quoting Vruno v.
Schwar2walder, 600 F.2d 124, 130-31 (8th Cir. 1979)); see also Olim v. Wakinekona,
461 U.S. 238, 250(1983)("Process is not an end in itself. Its constitutional purpose is to
protect a substantive interest to which the individual has a legitimate claim of
entitlement."). Here, the Sisseton Municipal Code mandates certain procedures, but does
not create an independent underlying substantive right to public employment. Therefore,
LaCoe fails to state a claim that she was denied procedural due process based on a
protected property interest and this claim should be dismissed.
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2. Liberty Interest
LaCoe's liberty interest claim hinges on the alleged failure to provide her with a
name-clearing hearing after she was placed on the Bradv/Giglio list. As an at-will
employee, LaCoe has no liberty interest in her continued employment. See Mogard. 932
F.Bd at 1190("At-will, public employees generally have no liberty interest in continued
employment."). But "liberty interests are implicated where the employer levels
accusations at the employee that are so damaging as to make it difficult or impossible for
the employee to escape the stigma ofthose charges." Winskowski v. Citv of Stephen,
442 F.Bd 1107, 1110(8th Cir. 2006)(quoting Winegar v. Des Moines Indep. Cmtv. Sch.
Dist.. 20 F.Bd 895, 900 (8th Cir. 1994)). Accusations of dishonesty are sufficiently
stigmatizing to implicate liberty interests. See Winegar. 20 F.Bd at 899("The requisite
stigma has generally been found when an employer has accused an employee of
dishonesty, immorality, criminality, racism, and the like."(quoting Shands v. Kennett,
99B F.2d 1BB7, 1B47 (8th Cir. 199B)). The defendants do not appear to challenge the
adequacy of LaCoe's liberty interest in her reputation but argue that she failed to state a
claim for a procedural due process violation.
The Eighth Circuit appears to have two different, but very similar, tests that a
plaintiff must meet to successfully claim the deprivation of a liberty interest. Under the
first test, a plaintiff must show that "(1)[s]he was stigmatized by the statements;(2)those
statements were made public by the administrators; and (B)[s]he denied the stigmatizing
statements." Mogard. 9B2 F.Bd at 1191 (quoting Rush v. Perrvman. 579 F.Bd 908, 91B
(8th Cir. 2009)); see also Correia v. Jones, 94B F.Bd 845, 848 (8th Cir. 2019); Hammer v.
Citv of Osage Beach, B18 F.Bd 8B2, 8B9-40 (8th Cir. 200B); Speer v. Citv of Wvnne,276
F.Bd 980, 984 (8th Cir. 2002); Coleman v. Reed, 147 F.Bd 751, 755 (8th Cir. 1998).
Under the second test, a plaintiff"must demonstrate: '(1) an official made a defamatory
statement that resulted in a stigma;(2)the defamatory statement occurred during the
course ofterminating the employee;(B)the defamatory statement was made public; and
(4) an alteration or extinguishment of a right or legal status.'" Crews v. Monarch Fire
Prot. Dist, 771 F.Bd 1085, 1091-92(8th Cir. 2014) Cquoting Crooks v. Lvnch, 557 F.Bd
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846, 849(8th Cir. 2009)); see also Brown v. Simmons,478 F.3d 922(8th Cir. 2007).
Under either test, a plaintiff must avail herself of available procedures before
complaining of a procedural due process violation. Ravmond v. Bd. of Regents of
the Univ. of Minn.. 847 F.3d 585, 599-90 (8th Cir. 2017). "[A]n employee who fails to
request post-termination process cannot later sue for having been deprived of it." Id. at
599(quoting Winskowski. 442 F.3d at 1111).
LaCoe fails to state a claim for the deprivation of a liberty interest in her
reputation because she did not allege in her complaint that she requested a name-clearing
hearing after her resignation. Although LaCoe alleges in her complaint that she was
denied a meaningful opportunity to defend herself from being placed on the list, she did
not allege that she ever asked for a hearing to clear her name. LaCoe states in her
response to the defendant's motion to dismiss that she requested that the Bradv/Giglio
listing be purged from her record on June 1, 2022, but that claim is outside ofthe
pleadings and improper for the court to consider at this phase. Even if the Court did
consider it, the request is still insufficient to support a claim for the deprivation of a
liberty interest. Not only was LaCoe's purported hearing request to the Department made
almost six months after she resigned, but the request was also made within a demand
letter asking the Department to purge her personnel file in order to avoid further
embarrassment or future litigation. While "a discharged employee need not use the term
name-clearing hearing," the request must put an employer on notice of what hearing may
be required. Flovd-Gimon v. Univ. of Ark, for Med. Scis. ex rel. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of
Ark., 716 F.3d 1141, 1148 (8th Cir. 2013)(quoting Rosenstein v. City of Dallas, 876
F.2d 392, 396 (5th Cir. 1989)). In Flovd-Gimon, the Court held that the plaintiffs
general request for a due process hearing was insufficient as a matter oflaw because it
could have applied to the plaintiffs property interest claim in her employment in addition
to her liberty interest claim in her reputation. Id. Because the type of process required
depends on the type of claim asserted, the general request was insufficient to notify the
employer that it had to provide a name-clearing hearing related to a liberty interest. Id-
Here, LaCoe did not allege that she requested a hearing at all, nor did she allege that she
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notified the Department she was asserting a liberty interest in her reputation. The letter
requesting that her personnel file be purged is insufficient to give notice that she was
requesting a hearing with respect to her liberty interest claim—a claim she now seeks to
raise in addition to her property interest claim—^because it lacked the requisite level of
specificity. Since LaCoe failed to allege in her complaint that she requested a name-
clearing hearing, she has failed to state a claim for the violation of her due process rights.
3. Predeprivation Process
LaCoe's threadbare complaint can potentially be construed to argue that she was
denied pre-deprivation process for both of her procedural due process claims. "The [pre-
termination] due process requirements pronounced in Loudermill apply equally to liberty
and property interests." Coleman, 147 F.3d at 755 (citing Schleck v. Ramsev Cntv., 939
F.2d 638, 642-43 (8th Cir. 1991)). Here, even if her complaint can be construed to allege
that she was denied a pre-deprivation hearing based on a property interest in her
employment, her claim fails because her contract with the Department is insufficient in
the face of South Dakota law.
Although LaCoe had a liberty interest in her reputation sufficient to warrant a
Loudermill hearing, she fails to state a claim against any ofthe named defendants
because they are either immune from suit or were not personally involved in the
Bradv/Giglio listing. To start, LaCoe's complaint fails to state a claim for the deprivation
ofj905?-termination procedures because she failed to request a hearing; alleging apre-
termination procedural due process violation does not require exhaustion. See Does 1-2
V. Regents of the Univ. of Minn.. 999 F.3d 571, 582(8th Cir. 2021)("[I]t is not necessary
for a litigant to have exhausted available postdeprivation remedies when the litigant
contends that he was entitled to predeprivation process."). Although a pre-termination
hearing is required to discharge a public employee,"it 'need not be elaborate.'"
Ravmond, 847 F.3d at 590(quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill 470 U.S. 532,
545 (1985)). "The essential requirements of due process ... are notice and an
opportunity to respond." Id.(quoting Loudermill. 470 U.S. at 546). "To satisfy minimal
due-process requirements at the pre-termination stage, a public employer must give the
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public employee oral or written notice ofthe eharges against him, an explanation ofthe
employer's evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story." Id.(quoting
Smutka v. City of Hutchinson, 451 F.3d 522, 526-27 (8th Cir. 2006)). LaCoe admits in
her complaint that she was aware ofthe various charges against her that Kirchmeier
planned to use as the foundation to put her on the Bradv/Giglio disclosure list, but she
elaims that she did not receive an opportunity to explain or defend herself against the
allegations.^
The Bradv/Giglio listing that essentially accuses LaCoe of dishonesty is sufficient
to entitle her to predeprivation proeess based on her liberty interest in her reputation, but
as a State's Attorney sued in his individual capacity for damages, Kirchmeier has
absolute immunity. It is well established that prosecutors are immune for actions that are
"intimately associated with the judicial phase ofthe criminal process." Van de Kamp v.
Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 342^3(2009)(quoting Imbler v. Pachtman,424 U.S. 409,430
(1976)). But absolute immunity may not apply to a prosecutor engaged in investigative
or administrative tasks. Id.(citing Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.33). When determining
whether absolute immunity applies to a prosecutor's actions, the Court examines "the
nature ofthe function performed, not the identity ofthe actor who performed it." Kalina
V. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 127(1997)(quoting Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229
(1988)).
At first glance this case appears to involve a prosecutor engaged in an
administrative activity, but the weight of precedent shows that creating a Bradv/Giglio
impeachment disclosure list is a prosecutorial function. A prosecutor is not absolutely
immune when, for example, they give legal adviee to a police offieer in the course of an
investigation. See Anderson v. Larsen, 327 F.3d 762, 769(8th Cir. 2003)(citing Burns v.
^ The emails that LaCoe submitted with her response to the defendants' motion to
dismiss, whieh are inappropriate for the Court to consider at this time, show that
Kirchmeier did in fact give LaCoe the opportunity to respond to the allegations against
her in at least two instances where he ultimately determined LaCoe was dishonest or
made inconsistent statements.
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Reed. 500 U.S. 478,494(1991)). On the other hand, a proseeutor is entitled to absolute
immunity even when they knowingly present false testimony or suppress exculpatory
evidence. See Woodworth v. Hulshof, 891 F.3d 1083, 1089(8th Cir. 2018)(citing
Reasonover v. St. Louis Cntv.. 447 F.3d 569, 580(8th Cir. 2006)). Here, Kirchmeier was
reviewing the Sisseton Police Department files while deciding whether to pursue a
criminal prosecution of a suspect that LaCoe had stopped. During that review, he
determined that LaCoe made misrepresentations in her reports that would prevent a
successful prosecution. He was obligated by Bradv and Giglio to disclose that evidence
to the defense in that case and any future ease where LaCoe would appear as a witness.
Ifthe suppression of material exculpatory evidence is "intimately tied to the judicial
process," and warrants absolute immunity, it stands to reason that the disclosure of
similar evidence should receive the same treatment. Even if Kirchmeier had improper
motives when adding LaCoe to the list as she alleges, Kirchmeier would still retain his
immunity. See Sample v. Citv of Woodburv, 836 F.3d 913, 916 (8th Cir. 2016)
("Because the immunity depends upon the functional nature ofthe prosecutor's activities,
allegations of improper motive in the performance of prosecutorial functions will not
defeat its protection."). For that reason, LaCoe's due process violation claim for damages
against Kirchmeier in his individual capacity should be dismissed.
Similarly, LaCoe fails to state a claim for damages against Kirchmeier in his
official capacity. A claim against a government employee in his or her official capacity
is considered a claim against the public employer, whether it be the state or the county.
See Will v. Mich. Den't of State Police. 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)("[A] suit against a state
official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit
against the official's office. As such, it is no different from a suit against the State
itself."); Kellv v. Citv of Omaha. 813 F.3d 1070, 1075 (8th Cir. 2016)("A plaintiff who
sues public employees in their official, rather than individual, capacities sues only the
public employer and therefore must establish the municipality's liability for the alleged
conduct.") Unless a state has waived its immunity or Congress has abrogated it under
Section 5 ofthe Fourteenth Amendment,the Eleventh Amendment bars actions for
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damages against state offieials sued in their offieial capaeities. See Will v. Mich. Dep't
of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66, 71 (1989). LaCoe appears to argue that Kirehmeier was
acting on behalf of a county or municipality when placing LaCoe on the list and is
therefore not entitled to state sovereign immunity. It is true that "the Eleventh
Amendment does not apply to counties and similar municipal corporations." Pennhurst
State Seh. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 124 n.34 (1984); see also Northern Ins.
Co. of New York v. Chatham County, 547 U.S. 189, 193 (2006)("[T]his Court has
repeatedly refused to extend sovereign immunity to counties."). But a county cannot be
held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 "solely because it employs a tortfeasor—or, in other
words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior
theory." Monell v. Dep't of Soe. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). "A county may be
liable for a constitutional violation under § 1983 only if the violation resulted from a
policy or custom of the municipality." Calgaro v. St. Louis Cntv., 919 F.3d 1054, 1058
(8th Cir. 2019)(quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). LaCoe has failed to allege any
unconstitutional policy or custom that enabled Kirehmeier's acts. Therefore, even if
Kirehmeier does not have Eleventh Amendment immunity in his official capacity, LaCoe
has failed to state a claim for relief.
LaCoe fails to state a claim for damages against Chief Croymans in his individual
capacity because she does not allege facts in her complaint sufficient to show that he was
personally involved in placing her on the Bradv/Giglio list. Establishing "liability under
§ 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights.
To establish personal liability of the supervisory defendants, the plaintiff must allege
specific facts of personal involvement in, or direct responsibility for, a deprivation of his
constitutional rights." Clemmons v. Armontrout, 477 F.3d 962, 967 (8th Cir. 2007)
(quoting Mavorga v. Missouri, 442 F.3d 1128, 1132(8th Cir. 2006)(cleaned up)). The
only allegation in LaCoe's complaint that connects Croymans to the Bradv/Giglio listing
states,"Croymans was the main actor in determining that Plaintiff violated Bradv/Giglio
and made the records for Plaintiffs personnel file and unilaterally added them to
Plaintiffs personnel file to insure [sic] that Plaintiff'would never be a police officer
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again.'" As it relates to the Bradv/Giglio listing, this is a legal conclusion and
insufficient to state a claim for relief. The factual allegations in the complaint relate to
Croymans' actions taken as Chief ofPolice to allegedly force LaCoe to resign. But as
already stated, LaCoe does not have a due process property interest in her employment
with the Department—she only has a liberty interest in her reputation. The complaint
accuses Croymans of asking LaCoe to resign two days after Kirchmeier placed her on the
list and subsequently sharing her personnel file with other departments. While sharing
details of her tenure with the Department to prevent her from attaining other employment
may be an unsavory practice, it does not implicate constitutional protections. Because
LaCoe does not allege facts to show that Croymans was responsible for placing her on
the Bradv/Giglio list, which implicates her liberty interest in her reputation, this claim
should be dismissed.
In addition to her claim for damages, LaCoe also seeks injunctive relief requiring
the defendants to remove her from the Bradv/Giglio list and contact past background
inspectors to notify them ofthe change. Of course, the Eleventh Amendment does not
bar suits for prospective injunctive relief against state actors that violate federal law. See
Ex parte Young. 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908). LaCoe provides no legal support for the
applicability ofthe Ex narte Young doctrine, and the defendants seemingly ignore that
LaCoe requested injunctive relief at all. But the request for injunctive relief, in essence,
asks this Court to require a State's Attorney to violate the constitution rather than prevent
any ongoing transgression. As already noted, the Bradv/Giglio list exists to satisfy the
State Attorney's obligation to provide eriminal defendants with exculpatory evidence.
There is no basis for injunctive relief requiring the opposite. Accordingly, LaCoe has
failed to state a claim for injunctive relief against either Kirchmeier or Croymans.
Alderwoman Brittany Appel, Alderman Lee Solberg, Alderman Delray German,
Mayor Terry Jaspers, Deputy Trevor Mishler, and Sergeant Jereme Stauss cannot be held
personally liable for any ofKirchmeier or Croymans's acts. Like her claim against
Croymans, LaCoe does not provide any specific facts alleging that any ofthese
defendants were personally involved in or directly responsible for violating LaCoe's
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constitutionally protected interest in her reputation. As such, these personal eapaeity
claims must be dismissed.
LaCoe's offieial capacity claims against Croymans, Appel, Solberg, German,
Jaspers, Mishler, and Stauss are treated as claims against the City of Sisseton that are
redundant and should be dismissed. See Kelly. 813 F.3d at 1075. These claims are
redundant because LaCoe also brought a claim directly against the City of Sisseton. See
Veatch v. Bartels Lutheran Home,627 F.3d 1254, 1257 (8th Cir. 2010)(dismissing a
redundant official capacity claim). Thus, LaCoe's claims against Croymans, Appel,
Solberg, German, Jaspers, Mishler, and Stauss in their official capacities should be
dismissed.
LaCoe's claim against the City of Sisseton should also be dismissed because she
fails to allege facts sufficient to support munieipal liability. As stated above, a city
cannot be held liable under § 1983 on the sole basis of respondeat superior. See Monell,
436 U.S. at 691 (1978). LaCoe has failed to allege that any of the individual defendants
were enforcing an unconstitutional policy or custom ofthe city that resulted in the
violation of her federal constitutional rights. Thus, the elaim against the City of Sisseton
must be dismissed.
4. Substantive Due Process
LaCoe also fails to state a claim for a violation of her substantive due process
rights. To establish a substantive due process violation, a plaintiff must allege "(1)that
the official violated one or more fundamental constitutional rights, and (2)that the
eonduct of the exeeutive official was shocking to the contemporary eonseience." Flowers
V. City of Minneapolis. 478 F.3d 869, 873 (8th Cir. 2007)(citations and internal
quotation omitted). "For purposes of substantive due process analysis, fundamental
rights are those 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition, and implicit in the
eoncept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist ifthey were
sacrificed.'" Id- (quoting Terrell v. Larsen, 396 F.3d 975, 978 n.l (8th Cir. 2005)(en
banc)). Here, LaCoe identifies no fundamental right violation or eontemporary
conscience-shocking conduct. Therefore, this claim should be dismissed.
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B. Constructive Discharge
LaCoe alleges that she was constructively discharged based on a series of actions
taken by the defendants. In response, the defendants argue that constructive discharge is
not a standalone federal cause of action and that the claim should be dismissed. The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require "a short and plain statement ofthe claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ.P. 8(a)(2). LaCoe did not
state any federal cause of action in her complaint entitling her to relief. While
constructive discharge is sufficient to show an adverse employment action under Title
VII, for example, LaCoe did not plead a Title VII discrimination claim. See, e.g., Jones
V. City of St. Louis, 825 F.3d 476,480(8th Cir. 2016)("An adverse employment action
is defined as a tangible change in working conditions that produces a material
employment disadvantage, including but not limited to .. . circumstances amounting to a
constructive discharge."(quoting Jackman v. Fifth Jud. Dist. Dep't of Corr. Servs., 728
F.3d 800, 804 (8th Cir. 2013)). As the defendants correctly assert, there is no
freestanding or independent federal cause of action for constructive discharge. Assuming
that all LaCoe's factual allegations are true, she has failed to state a claim for relief.
Even if LaCoe's constructive discharge allegation could be construed as a state
law claim, it is still subject to dismissal. In South Dakota, at-will employment may be
terminated with or without cause by notice of either party, but there are certain at-will
terminations that are considered contrary to public policy. Constructive discharge may
form the basis for a wrongful termination claim under South Dakota Law. S^ Anderson
V. First Century Fed. Credit Union., 738 N.W.2d 40, 46-48 (S.D. 2007). But because
LaCoe's federal claims are subject to dismissal and there are no remaining claims over
which the Court has original jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over any potential state law wrongful discharge claim. See Wilson v. Miller,
821 F.3d 963, 970(8th Cir. 2016)("A federal district court has discretionary power to
decline the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction where the court has 'dismissed all
claims over which it has original jurisdiction.'"(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)).
Therefore, LaCoe's constructive discharge claim should be dismissed.
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C. Remaining State Law Claims
LaCoe also alleges a violation of her due process rights under Section VI, Article
Two ofthe South Dakota State Constitution and raises claims for civil conspiracy,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.
Similar to LaCoe's possible state claim for wrongful discharge, the Court also declines to
exercise jurisdiction over these claims. There are no remaining federal law claims where
the Court has original jurisdiction that would warrant an exercise of supplemental
jurisdiction over these state law claims. Accordingly, those claims should be dismissed
without prejudice.
IV. Conclusion
Now,therefore, it is ordered:
1. Defendant's motion for judicial notice. Doc. 10, is granted.
2. Defendant's motion to dismiss. Doe. 7, is granted.
3. Plaintiffs federal law claims are dismissed.
4. Plaintiffs statelaw claims are dismissed without prejudice.
DATED this^2^2ay ofDecember, 2022.
BY THE COURT:
CHARLES B. KORNMANN
United States District Judge
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